

EAST ASIAN HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS

General Editor: WANG GUNGWU

THE KINGDOM OF JOHOR
1641-1728

THE KINGDOM OF JOHOR 1641-1728

LEONARD Y. ANDAYA

KUALA LUMPUR
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK MELBOURNE
1975

806828

Oxford University Press

OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW NEW YORK

TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON CAPE TOWN

DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACCA

KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA HONG KONG TOKYO

NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA ADDIS ABABA

IBADAN ZARIA ACCRA BEIRUT

© *Oxford University Press 1975*

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press

M
959 5119
AND

*Typeset and printed by
Charles Grenier Sdn. Bhd, Kuala Lumpur
Published by Oxford University Press,
Bangunan Loke Yew, Kuala Lumpur*

327566

24 NOV 1984

Perpustakaan Negara
Malaysia

PREFACE

A number of people have contributed their time, effort, and knowledge in helping me formulate and complete this work, for which I am deeply grateful. To Professors Knight Biggerstaff, Ben Anderson, and especially O. W. Wolters, of Cornell University, I owe a special debt of gratitude for guiding me through the various stages of my Ph.D. dissertation which forms the basis of this book. I would also like to thank the following groups without whose generous financial assistance my research would not have been possible: the Fulbright-Hayes Fellowship Committee, the National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship Committee, the London-Cornell Committee, and the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University.

Without the help of the members of the staff of various institutions, I would never have been able to compile the material which was essential for this work. My sincere thanks to Mr. Richard Howard, Curator of the Wason Collection, and Mr. Giok Po Oey, Southeast Asian bibliographer, at Cornell University; the staff of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden; Miss Miriam van den Berg and the staff of the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague; members of the Eastern Manuscript section of the University of Leiden Library; Miss Sumartini of the Arsip Negara in Jakarta; the staff in the manuscript section of the Perpustakaan Lembaga Kebudayaan in Jakarta; and to the members of the Lembaga Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara in Ujung Pandang (Macassar).

I would also like to mention those individuals who were responsible for some of the most fruitful discussions I have had during the entire

period of my research. To Dr. J. Noorduyn, Professor Dr. A. A. Cense, and the late Dr. H. Th. Chabot, for their willingness to share their insights and understanding of the Buginese and Macassarese people and literature; to Professor Mr. Zainal Abidin bin Farid, Andi Alam, H. Mudarrijah, the late Abdul Razak Daeng Patunru, Ibu Burhannudin (Datu Pammana), Andi Pangeran, Abdulgani, Abdurrahim, and La Side for their knowledge of the history, the literature, and the culture of their people, the Buginese and Macassarese; to Dato Abdullah bin Mohamed and Mr. Shaharom Husain for their enlightening views on the history of the Kingdom of Johor; to Professor Dr. P. E. De Josselin de Jong and Drs. Mohd. Dahlan Mansur for their helpful comments on certain puzzling questions concerning Minangkabau institutions and seventeenth century history of the Minangkabaus; to Professor S. Arasaratnam, Dr. Khoo Kay Kim, Mr. R. Bonney, Dr. J. Kathirithamby-Wells, and Dr. Chin Yoon Fong for their thought-provoking conversations and helpful suggestions on sources, historical writing, and specific points of information concerning the history of Malaya; to Dr. Dianne Lewis who shared so much of her interest and knowledge of this period of Malay history with me; to Mr. Anthony Day, Professor Peter Worsley, Dr. D. K. Bassett, and Mev. Professor Dr. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs for reading the manuscript and offering comments which have proved to be useful in the final preparation of this book; and to still many others unmentioned here with whom I have had the pleasure of discussing my work, my very special thanks.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Mr. and Mrs. H. J. Koerts, who first introduced me to the fascinating and long-neglected study of the history of south-west Celebes, and to Dr. Barbara Watson Andaya, whose valuable suggestions and stimulating discussions on source materials, the history of the Malay world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the character of the work which I attempted to write, helped make my task both an interesting as well as an enjoyable one.

University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur,
February 1974

LEONARD Y. ANDAYA

CONTENTS

Preface	v
Maps and Appendixes	viii
Abbreviations	ix
A Note on Spelling	x
INTRODUCTION	1
I. THE BACKGROUND: JOHOR AND THE VOC	20
II. JOHOR'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BASES OF POWER	37
III. JOHOR WITHIN THE DUTCH TREATY SYSTEM	55
IV. THE JOHOR-JAMBI WARS	84
V. THE LAKSAMANA AND THE ADVERSARIES OF JOHOR	103
VI. THE GLORY OF JOHOR AND THE LAKSAMANA	127
VII. THE RESTORATION AND DEMISE OF TRADITION- AL ROLES	166
VIII. TRIALS OF A NEW DYNASTY	196
IX. RAJA KECIL AND THE CONQUEST OF JOHOR	250
X. THE CREATION OF A NEW KINGDOM OF JOHOR THE SEQUEL	279 321
Appendixes	325
Glossary	334
Bibliography	338
Index	365

MAPS

1. GENERAL MAP OF THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO	xi
2. AREAS OF VOC ACTIVITIES	xii
3. RIAU-LINGGA ARCHIPELAGOS	xiii
4. THE MALAY PENINSULA	xiv
5. THE JOHOR RIVER	xv
6. CENTRAL AND EAST COAST SUMATRA	xvi
7. SOUTH-WEST SULAWESI	xvii

APPENDIXES

A. TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR AND THE VOC, 6 APRIL 1685	324
B. TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR AND THE VOC (MALAY VERSION), 6 APRIL 1685	325
C. TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR AND THE VOC, 9 APRIL 1689	327
D. TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR AND THE VOC, 19 AUGUST 1713	328
E. A NEW SUCCESSION PRINCIPLE IN PAGAR RUYONG IN THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	329
F. MEN AND SHIPS IN THE KINGDOM OF JOHOR AND ITS DEPENDENCIES IN 1714	332

ABBREVIATIONS

ARB	<i>Adatrechtbundels</i>
BKI	<i>Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië</i>
<i>Bingkisan</i>	<i>Bingkisan, Yayasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, Ujung Pandang, Indonesia</i>
BUB	<i>Bataviaasche Uitgaande Briefboecken, Koloniaal Archief</i>
<i>Dagh-Register</i>	<i>Dagh-Register Gehouden in -t Casteel Batavia van 't Passerende Daer ter Plaetse als over Geheel Nederlandts Indië, 1624-1682 Batavia 1887 etc.</i>
<i>Generale Missiven</i>	<i>Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel I-IV, 's-Gravenhage, 1960, etc. W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed.</i>
IG	<i>De Indische Gids</i>
JIA	<i>Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia</i>
JMBRAS	<i>Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
JSBRAS	<i>Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
JSEAH	<i>Journal of Southeast Asian History</i>
KA	<i>Koloniaal Archief</i>
KS	<i>Koloniale Studiën</i>
KT	<i>Koloniaal Tijdschrift</i>
OB	<i>Overgekomen Brieven (Incoming Letters from Batavia)</i>

TBG	<i>Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</i>
TBB	<i>Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur</i>
TNI	<i>Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie</i>
VKI	<i>Verhandelingen van de Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</i>
VBG	<i>Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap Van Kunsten en Wetenschappen</i>
VOC	<i>Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie</i> (<i>United Dutch East India Company</i>)

A NOTE ON SPELLING

In this book the spelling of Malay-Indonesian place names (with the exception of Malacca and Macassar), personal names, and words quoted directly from Malay-Indonesian texts follow the official system of spelling adopted by both the Indonesian and the Malaysian governments in late 1972. For example:

The Indonesian *tj* and the Malay *ch* now become *c*

Indonesian *tjap*=Malay *chap*=present official spelling *cap*

Indonesian *Atjeh*=Malay *Acheh*=present official spelling *Aceh*

The Indonesian *sj* and the Malay *sh* now become *sy*

Indonesian *sjahbandar*=Malay *shahbandar*=present official spelling *syahbandar*

Indonesian *sjarat*=Malay *sharat*=present official spelling *syarat*

The Indonesian *dj* and the Malay *j* now become *j*

Indonesian *radja*=Malay *raja*=present official spelling *raja*

The Indonesian *nj* and the Malay *ny* now become *ny*

Indonesian *senjap*=Malay *senyap*=present official spelling *senyap*

The Indonesian *e* *pepet i* and the Malay *e* *pepet e* now become *e* *pepet i*

Indonesian *lebih*=Malay *lebeh*=present official spelling *lebih*

The Indonesian *u...i*, and the Malay *u...e*, now become *u...i*

Indonesian *putih*=Malay *puteh*=present official spelling *putih*

The Indonesian *u...u*, and the Malay *u...o*, now become *u...u*

Indonesian *tubuh*=Malay *tuboh*=present official spelling *tubuh*

Indonesian *burung*=Malay *burong*=present official spelling *burung*




1. GENERAL MAP OF THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO




3. RIAU-LINGGA ARCHIPELAGOS




4. THE MALAY PENINSULA



5. THE JOHOR RIVER



6. CENTRAL AND EAST COAST SUMATRA



7. SOUTH-WEST SULAWESI

INTRODUCTION

THERE have been two major studies of the Kingdom of Johor written by Europeans and a number by Malay historians. One of the two works by Europeans is entitled *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (The Dutch in Johor and Siak) by E. Netscher, published in 1870.¹ As the title indicates the study is concerned primarily with the activities of the Dutch in these two countries and secondarily with native events which had significant repercussions on the affairs of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) between 1603 and 1864. Netscher used not only the VOC records which were then extant in Malacca and some material on VOC activities housed in the State Archives in The Hague, but also the Malay chronicles available at the time of his writing. Two of the Malay texts which he used to supplement each other and to provide a check on the Dutch sources were the *Siak Chronicles* and the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*.

At the time of his writing Netscher reflected the views of a Dutch administration eager to provide proof of its legal claims to areas on the east coast of Sumatra ceded by treaties concluded with the Sultan of Johor in the eighteenth century. His academic interest in the Kingdoms of Johor and Siak, therefore, was governed by a concern with the legal position of the Dutch *vis-à-vis* the Malay states. Netscher's underlying goal forced his history to move from treaty to treaty, thus ignoring at times the more important activities which were the result not of a legal document, but of an unwritten code of conduct acknowledged by both the Dutch and the Malays.

Netscher commented on the Dutch attitudes toward the Kingdom of Johor and the later Kingdom of Siak and the types of problems which the Dutch faced dealing with these two kingdoms. Although

he deplored the shortsightedness of some of the Dutch administrators in these parts, he was nevertheless a product of his predecessors' view of the Buginese who played an important role in the history of these kingdoms. It was difficult for him to see the Buginese in any other terms but as interlopers, pirates, etc., thus colouring his interpretation of events even when facts contradicted his judgements. Since Netscher himself was a Dutch colonial administrator in the nineteenth century, he understood the difficulties encountered by his predecessors in the area and confronted the history of these kingdoms in terms of the Dutch position. He did not attempt to describe the native institutions or the kinds of activities which were important to the Kingdom of Johor. Realizing the standpoint from which he viewed Johor and Siak history, it is commendable that he did treat of some purely Malay activities with understanding. As a history of the Kingdom of Johor, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* leaves much to be desired; but, as a Dutch view of Dutch attitudes and activities *vis-à-vis* a native kingdom, it is an excellent work.

A half century later Sir Richard Winstedt wrote a *History of Johore*, which was first published in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* in 1932,² a year after he was appointed General Advisor of Johor.³ As a member of the Malayan Civil Service, he wrote numerous articles and books on various aspects of Malay history and culture. His knowledge of Malay literature was great, and he used all the available Malay texts dealing with the history of Johor. In addition he consulted the printed volumes of the *Dagh Register van 't Casteel Batavia* (Daily Register of Castle Batavia),⁴ which cover the years between 1624 and 1682, as well as Netscher's work. Since the Malay histories deal very summarily with the period in the late seventeenth century, and since the published *Dagh Register* only goes up to the year 1682, Winstedt was able to add very little new to what had already been said by Netscher. Almost his entire treatment of the period between 1682 and 1699 was borrowed from Netscher, since he himself lacked access to unpublished Dutch archival material.

Winstedt drew upon a wide knowledge of the literature and the history of the Malay people in order to shed light on certain events which would have been overlooked by another with lesser qualifications. Of added interest were his references to genealogies which brought a new emphasis to the Malay side of the history of Johor.

Yet, although he brought together valuable Malay material which in itself was new and enlightening, he failed to illuminate satisfactorily the attitudes of the Malays to the developments in their lands, the basis upon which they undertook certain activities, and the significance which they attached to such events as the murder of Sultan Mahmud Syah in 1699, the establishing of a Bendahara king, the Minangkabau conquest of Johor in 1718, and the absorption of the Buginese *en masse* into their social and political structure. The Johor Kingdom was undergoing a period of transformation in its political and social structure in these early years of the eighteenth century, and a discussion of the Malay views would have been of interest. Instead, Winstedt used the Malay material mainly as a source of historical facts to substantiate or to supplement information provided from European accounts. When these Malay histories recounted certain fabulous tales, Winstedt tended to dismiss them without attempting to explain what may have been the reason for the inclusion of such tales. This was unfortunate since the importance of these Malay documents lies not so much with their accuracy of historical detail as with their illumination of Malay attitudes conveyed through a conventional Malay historical-literary tradition.

In so far as the court Malay histories are concerned, there is little in any extant Malay document known to the present author concerning events between 1535 and 1699. After the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511, the Malays led by their fugitive rulers roamed the wide reaches of their maritime kingdom seeking safety from the Portuguese and later from the newly-founded Kingdom of Aceh. Their capitals were often attacked and burned, and the migratory existence of the Malay court may have made it difficult to preserve many of the written documents. The early seventeenth century brought little relief from the depredations of the now pre-eminent Acehnese power in the Straits of Malacca. Only after 1641, with the conquest of Portuguese Malacca by the Dutch and the beginning of a firm friendship between Johor and the Dutch was Johor able to lead a more settled court life on the Johor River. Despite the prosperity and renewed strength of the kingdom, Johor once again fell victim to an invasion in 1673 in which the entire city was burnt to the ground. Presumably any records which may have been kept at the court would have been destroyed at that time. It is noteworthy that the *Hikayat Negeri Johor* and the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* begin with the destruction of Johor by Jambi in 1673.

Except for one relatively detailed account of an incident in 1688 mentioned in one of the works, little is known from the Malay sources about events in seventeenth century Johor.

Information on Johor in the first half of the eighteenth century from the Malay material is fortunately much more substantial. There are three principal Malay sources which provide an interesting and varied perspective of events in Johor from the viewpoint of the Minangkabaus, the Buginese, and the Johor Malays. The first of these Malay texts is the *Siak Chronicles*, whose date of completion and author are not known.⁵ The first part of the work is a version of the *Sejarah Melayu* with a sustained narrative which ends with the Portuguese attack on Johor in 1535. From 1535 until 1699 the *Chronicles* becomes simply a catalogue of kings with a brief comment about each. Only in 1699, when the fortunes of the Kingdom of Johor become entangled with those of Raja Kecil, the founder of the Siak Dynasty, does the style once again become lively and reminiscent of the brilliantly written episodes of the Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu*.⁶

The *Siak Chronicles* begins the history of Johor in 1699 with a narrative of the events leading to the murder of a wicked and depraved ruler by the Orang Kaya (nobles) with the complicity of the Bendahara of Johor. One of the Orang Kaya, the Sri Bija Wangsa, questions the decision of the assembled Orang Kaya to kill the ruler by declaring that there is no precedence for such an action.⁷ Indeed, the *Sejarah Melayu*, the oldest known chronicle of the Malays of Malacca, describes the 'punishment' of several wicked rulers, but this is usually accomplished through supernatural means. The murder of the ruler of Johor as described in the *Siak Chronicles*, then, is a particularly heinous one because never before has there been an example of such open, brazen murder at the hands of the ruler's subjects. The enormity of the crime is accentuated by the highly moving episode the evening before the deed, when the aforementioned Sri Bija Wangsa refuses to commit *derhaka* and foretells the death of the Bendahara (who is later to succeed the murdered ruler) for his role in the plot. The stage is thus set for the appearance of Raja Kecil, the founder of the Siak dynasty, as the posthumously born son of the murdered ruler of Johor. By providing Raja Kecil with a royal pedigree through the last king of the Malacca dynasty, the Siak chronicler prepares the way for legitimizing the 'rightful' conquest of the kingdom some eighteen years later.

Throughout this sustained and exciting narrative, from the murder of the wicked ruler of Johor in 1699 until the conquest of the kingdom by Raja Kecil in 1718, the case for Raja Kecil is slowly and carefully argued. The importance of the rulers of Minangkabau in Pagar Ruyong in the upbringing of Raja Kecil perhaps betrays the chronicler's knowledge of the true background of Raja Kecil and/or his desire to provide the founder with yet another glorious ancestry by which the two ancient lines in the Malay world which could trace their origins to the mythical Bukit Siguntang would meet in the person of Raja Kecil.

For the years 1699 until the death of Raja Kecil in 1746, the *Siak Chronicles* should be recognized as a document carefully presenting the claims of a founder of a dynasty. From Raja Kecil's posthumous birth and his peregrinations throughout the Malay world in the service of one and then another ruler, to his extraordinary powers displayed in the conquest of Johor, the *Siak Chronicles* never wavers from its intended purpose. Cleverly interwoven within a conventional founder's myth are the strands of historical truth which provided the chronicler with the material from which to illustrate the legitimacy of Raja Kecil. Once the claims of legitimacy are established, Raja Kecil's conquest of Johor and his struggle against the Buginese become a crusade against an illegitimate dynasty supported by interlopers. This is the theme which surges through the *Siak Chronicles* during the period under consideration.

As a source for the study of events in Johor in the eighteenth century, the *Siak Chronicles* is an intriguing document. There are references to the roles played by the rulers of Pagar Ruyong, especially by the Putri Jamilan, in the affairs of the Malay kingdoms on the Malay Peninsula and on east coast Sumatra. Events such as the organization of the Minangkabaus for the invasion of Johor in 1718, the confusion among the ranks as to the true identity of Raja Kecil, and the protracted war between the Buginese and Minangkabaus in Kedah between 1723 and 1725, are mentioned fleetingly in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* but discussed in depth in the *Siak Chronicles*. The detail provided in this latter work concerning the actions and motives of Raja Kecil and his two sons provides a fine balance to the Buginese slant of the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*.

The second major Malay work in the study of Johor for this period is the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (The Precious Gift). It was written sometime in the 1860s by Raja Ali Haji, a descendant of Daeng Cellak, the

second Buginese Raja Muda of Johor (1728-1745).⁸ Raja Ali Haji's position as court genealogist would have given him access to a number of official documents and Malay histories, including a '*sejarah pihak Terengganu*', which thus far no one has been able to trace.⁹ Quite unlike other court Malay historians before him, Raja Ali Haji mentions his sources in the *Tuhfat* and disclaims responsibility for any reported incredulous event contained in them. Despite these innovations he was very much a product of the traditions of the Malay court writer. He presents two or more different versions of a single event seemingly to allow the reader the opportunity of judging the veracity and significance of the episode. Yet the material extracted from another source is often selected carefully to emphasize a point of view acceptable to those for whom he wrote, that is the Raja Muda family of Riau.

Raja Ali Haji quotes extensively from three sources for the period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the *Karangan Engku Busu*, the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, and the *Siak Chronicles*.¹⁰ Although this may appear to be a fair range of attitudes from the strongly pro-Buginese point of view of the *Karangan Engku Busu*, to a more moderate pro-Buginese stance of the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, and finally to the fervent anti-Buginese attitude of the *Siak Chronicles*, this 'balance' of viewpoints is illusory. In the more controversial parts of the *Tuhfat*, where the motives and the role of the Buginese in the Kingdom of Johor are brought into question, Raja Ali Haji carefully selects his sources in defence of his ancestors. Although he quotes extensively from the *Siak Chronicles*, he dismisses the entire work as being of little value:

The '*sejarah dan siarah Siak*' [the *Siak Chronicles*] contains no dates — neither years, months, nor days — from the beginning to the end. Not a single one did I find. The document has been too often copied, and much of it is unpleasant to read because it has been passed on from person to person. Furthermore, the person who wrote it did no research for his story. That is my opinion.¹¹

In attacking the *Siak Chronicles* in this fashion, Raja Ali Haji draws attention to the more favourable and 'trustworthy' account which he presents — complete with dates and source material. The *Siak Chronicles* was too important a work to ignore in any account of the history of the Malay world in the eighteenth century, but its versions which contradicted those of Raja Ali Haji could be discredited. Thus while Raja Ali Haji attacks the author of the *Siak Chronicles* for

'faults' which, however, can be justified in light of the traditional court Malay historical writings, he himself indulges in that same tradition by carefully assembling his material to support a specific position or attitude held by himself and his 'clients'.

A principal concern of Raja Ali Haji in the *Tuhfat* is with the legitimacy of his Buginese ancestors in the affairs of the Malay world. Although by the middle of the nineteenth century many of the Buginese descendants of the original settlers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had become an integral part of Malay society, they still remembered their ancestors with pride and were still conscious of their different backgrounds. In reconstructing the story of his Buginese ancestors, Raja Ali Haji relied on court notebooks, various histories housed in the court archives, and personal accounts of those who had some memory of the not too distant past. The portrait given of the Buginese in the early decades of the eighteenth century is perhaps unavoidably tinged with heroism and self-sacrifice. Although the first detailed account of Buginese activities in the Malay world only occurs around 1718 in the *Tuhfat*, Raja Ali Haji does not neglect to prepare the stage for the intervention well in advance. As carefully and as shrewdly as the author of the *Siak Chronicles*, Raja Ali Haji clears the ground and points the way toward the desired conclusion.

At the very outset the stronger spiritual power of the Buginese over the Minangkabaus is proclaimed in a conventional fashion: the Buginese cock proves victorious over the Minangkabau one.¹² Raja Ali then proceeds to discredit Raja Kecil as a mere Minangkabau adventurer and usurper and thus establish the legitimacy of the Bendahara dynasty. While repeating the *Siak Chronicles's* version of the Sultan Mahmud-Raja Kecil story, Raja Ali Haji undermines its arguments of legitimacy by the simple device of employing the words, *kononnya*, 'so it is said'. Raja Ali Haji intersperses this phrase at crucial places to emphasize the bizarre circumstances under which Raja Kecil was supposedly conceived and thus injects a note of incredulity to any claims that Raja Kecil was truly the son of Sultan Mahmud and legitimate successor to the throne of Johor.¹³ By this shift in emphasis the new Bendahara no longer is regarded as a usurper but, according to *adat*, as a legitimate successor to the last ruler who had no heirs.¹⁴ By recounting in all its lurid detail the mad acts of a wicked king, Raja Ali Haji also capitalized on an *adat* well-known in the court circles in Riau in the nineteenth

century which approved the deposing of a king who was mad or who forsook his religion.¹⁵ Yet Raja Ali Haji was much too inculcated with the Malay abhorrence and fear of regicide to have condoned the killing in any way. For this abominable crime of *derhaka*, he repeats the *Siak Chronicles's* story of grass growing in this Orang Kaya's wounds for four years before he dies. In the end he who commits *derhaka* is punished, but the role of the Bendahara family in the murder of the ruler is minimized and even vindicated in view of the *adat*.

Raja Kecil's invasion of Johor and the subsequent seizure of the crown of the Bendahara family is thus seen as an act of an outsider and a usurper. The legitimate Bendahara family, being incapable of overthrowing the usurper alone, invites the assistance of the Buginese. Raja Ali Haji denies any motives of profit and advantage on the part of his Buginese ancestors in intervening on behalf of the Bendahara family. When the forces of Raja Kecil are finally defeated, the grateful Johor king then rewards the faithfulness of the Buginese with offices and lands. Only the pleading of the Johor ruler and the Buginese recognition of their responsibility in preserving the newly-crowned king in office prevent them from leaving Johor and returning to their homeland. A great bond of friendship and a firm alliance are then established between the Buginese and the Malays in this early period.

For the period from 1699 until 1728 the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* should be regarded as a document justifying and legitimizing the Buginese intervention in the Malay world and more particularly, in the Kingdom of Johor. In examining the *Tuhfat* for this period, therefore, an attempt has been made to analyse events with an understanding of the viewpoint which Raja Ali Haji brings to such events as the murder of the Johor ruler in 1699, the origins of Raja Kecil, the invasion of Johor in 1718, the Buginese intervention on the side of the Johorese in 1722, the establishment of the Raja Muda-ship in 1722, and the permanent settlement of the Buginese in the Malay world after this period.

Other chronicles which contain almost the same details and similar viewpoints to the *Tuhfat* during this period of Johorese history are the *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis*,¹⁶ the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*,¹⁷ the *Karangan Engku Busu* or better known as the *Aturan Setia Bugis dengan Melayu*,¹⁸ the *Hikayat Opu Daeng Menambon*,¹⁹ and the *Sejarah Bugis*.²⁰

The Malay point of view is presented in the third major Malay work on Johor for this period: a composite text which Ernst Ulrich Kratz has termed the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*.²¹ Although the *Peringatan* is neither as colourful as the *Siak Chronicles* nor as persuasive as the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, its simple, straightforward account of events and occasional insertions of documents provide it with a convincing authority which more than compensates for any lack of style. Kratz considers the *Peringatan* to be an historical annal relating the political biography of Sultan Sulaiman of Johor (reign dates 1722–1760). In support of this contention, Kratz makes the following observations. As with the various versions of the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, the *Peringatan* begins with Johor's defeat at the hands of Jambi in 1672 [actually in 1673] and presents only a brief summary of events until the birth of Sultan Sulaiman in 1699. This is followed by an incomplete description of the relations with Raja Kecil and the role of the Buginese in the crowning of Sultan Sulaiman in 1699. From 1721 [1722 is the actual date of Sultan Sulaiman's accession] until 1750, which is the final date in the text, the activities of the Johor Malays, the Buginese, and the Dutch are only mentioned in connection with Sultan Sulaiman.²² Kratz goes on to say that although the *Tuhfat* overlooks the period between 1739 and 1745, and the Buginese-centred Riau histories only begin to concentrate on Buginese activities from 1743 onward, the *Peringatan* continues to present material as an historical annal until the end of the text in 1750.²³ Finally, Kratz suggests that the author of the *Peringatan* copied events from another text up until the year 1743. Many similarities are noted between the *Peringatan* and the other Buginese-oriented Riau histories until 1743. However, from 1743 until 1750 the author of the *Peringatan* seems to have provided extra information other than that given by the text he was copying. The *syair* at the end of the *Peringatan* dedicated to Tun Hassan on the occasion of his appointment as Bendahara on 23 August 1748, plus the personal remarks made about the Bendahara family, led Kratz to conclude that the author must have had close ties with Tun Hassan.²⁴

Kratz thus argues that the *Peringatan* should be viewed as a political biography of Sultan Sulaiman, which only concerns itself with the activities of the Johor Malays, the Buginese, or the Dutch, when they impinge favourably on the life of Sultan Sulaiman.²⁵ Although the validity of this observation could be questioned, it does seem without a doubt that this text more than any other known to

the present author is primarily concerned with the activities of the Johor Malays between 1673 and 1750. Whether or not the text itself is a political biography of Sultan Sulaiman is not as significant as the fact that the copyist knew Tun Hassan and the Bendahara family well. It would be highly likely that a copyist who favoured the Malay Bendahara family would also favour the Malay Sultan Sulaiman over the increasingly powerful Buginese groups on Riau. What is recorded, therefore, is less a condemnation of the Buginese presence on Riau (which would have been much too inflammatory during the period when this work was copied/written) as an emphasis on the activities of the various Malay rulers and ministers. Whereas the Buginese-oriented Johore-Riau histories rarely give the personal names of the Malay chief ministers, the *Peringatan* never fails to mention the name of a chief minister or of a slightly lower official. Even those who led punitive expeditions to east coast Sumatra or against a fugitive Malay chief minister, are identified by their own individual names rather than by their impersonal titles.

An important event in the late seventeenth century which involved a conflict between the Bendahara and the Laksamana of Johor is only briefly mentioned in the other *hikayat* but is treated with fascinating detail in the *Peringatan*. While the writers of the Buginese-oriented histories may have only been mildly interested in events prior to Buginese intervention in the affairs of the Kingdom of Johor, for the writer who worked for the pleasure of a Malay official, especially if this official were from the important and old line of the Bendaharas of Johor, any and every episode in which the Malay rulers, ministers, or nobility were involved merited his attention. In this way the *Siak Chronicles*, the *Peringatan*, the *Tuhfat* and the other more Buginese-slanted histories of Riau-Johor, were alike: They all had a task to satisfy their respective clients, and this they did admirably.

By comparing these texts one finds interesting *lacunae* in one which are explained quite satisfactorily in another. An interesting example of this is in the treatment of the Buginese Raja Tua family of Johor. The Buginese-oriented texts originating from the Raja Muda family of Johor greatly underplayed the role of the rival Buginese Raja Tua family in the Malay world. The *Peringatan*, on the other hand, is not particularly concerned about the rivalries and antagonisms among the Buginese and therefore presents the facts in the way in which they appeared to the Malays. Although the Buginese histories deny

the importance of the Raja Tua and take pains to emphasize that the first Raja Tua had not been given a sultan's title as had the first Raja Muda, the *Peringatan* unintentionally disproves this statement by describing an episode in which both the Raja Muda and the Raja Tua are addressed by their title of sultan in a letter from a neighbouring ruler. Also apparent in the letter was the great respect accorded not only to the ruler and the Raja Muda of Johor, but also to the Raja Tua. While separately these Malay sources may present an unduly one-sided version of events, together they complement one another to provide a somewhat more balanced, though still incomplete, picture of affairs of the kingdoms in the Malay world.

The *Siak Chronicles*, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, and the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* can thus be considered to be documents presenting the story of the roles of the Minangkabaus, Buginese, and the Johor Malays, respectively, in the affairs of the Kingdom of Johor during the late seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries. While one may regard the Malay point of view to be ill-represented when compared with the sheer narrative power of the *Siak Chronicles* or the overwhelming display of factual information in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* and other Buginese-oriented Johor-Riau histories, the *Peringatan* is still a remarkable document. Much of what is recorded, including the dates, have been found by the present author to be very accurate when compared with contemporary Dutch sources.

The *Peringatan* is admirably supplemented by the best known of the Malay histories, the *Sejarah Melayu*. Although the *Sejarah Melayu* is believed to have originated in the Malacca court sometime in the fifteenth century, many of the priorities and system of values of the court Malays described in this work continued to be emulated in the various kingdoms in the Malay world. This work has indeed proven to be of great value in understanding the motives and actions of seventeenth and early eighteenth century Johor rulers and ministers. What often appeared to the Dutch in that period to be rather enigmatic moves by the leaders of Johor were often comprehensible and predictable when studied in conjunction with the beliefs and attitudes of the court Malays as expounded in the *Sejarah Melayu*. The *Sejarah Melayu* provides a yardstick in measuring the importance which the Malays attached to such concepts as *daulat* (sovereignty, etc.) and *derhaka* (treason to the ruler and state), and to the maintaining of proper relationships between two sovereign powers and among the various officials in a Malay kingdom. Within

the framework of these values, one can better comprehend a sudden toppling of a seemingly invincible chief minister in 1688 by the 'mere' possession by a rival minister of the person of the young ruler; or a sudden refusal of Johor to negotiate a treaty with the Dutch, despite great shows of amity on both sides, because of an 'inconsequential' remark by the Dutch concerning a vague jurisdiction claimed by the ruler of Johor in some remote interior of east coast Sumatra.

These, then, are the major Malay and published European sources dealing with the period of Johor history between 1641 and 1728. In general they provide their own version of events and raise certain questions which can only be partially answered by a comparison of texts. Even those Malay works sympathetic to the Buginese or the Minangkabaus make only the briefest comment about the origins of these peoples in Celebes and in Sumatra. There is no attempt to discuss the factors in their homelands and in their new environment which motivated their activities in the seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth century, nor what formed the bases of their power. For the seventeenth century the almost total lack of Malay material and the preoccupation of the principal works in Western languages with the activities of the VOC have left a glaring gap in our knowledge of how Johor, the heir to the famous Malay Kingdom of Malacca, once again assumed an influential role in the affairs of the Malay world during this period. Although Malay and European sources are more substantial for the eighteenth century, only a passing comment is made on the aftermath of the murder of Sultan Mahmud Syah in 1699 and the accession of the non-royal Bendahara to the throne of Johor. The deep divisions caused by this act undermined the forces which held the kingship and, therefore, the kingdom, together. The Minangkabau invasion of 1718 completed this process of dissolution and prepared the way for a new power structure with the Buginese replacing the traditional groups which had been the basis of strength of the Malacca-Johor kingdom. Because of the personal involvement of the writers of the various sources in defence or justification of their particular client, the history of Johor between 1641 and 1728 has been accorded a kaleidoscopic treatment. It is thus difficult to see the whole sweep of Johor history and the slow metamorphosis in the traditional elements of the power structure.

In view of the nature of the Malay sources, it is necessary to rely on the abundant seventeenth and eighteenth century VOC

records for any careful reconstruction of the history of Johor during this period. The bulk of the VOC material from Malacca is concerned with the day to day administration of this Dutch post and with discussion of the state of VOC trade in the area. There were always conflicts of interests with the neighbouring native states which sometimes led to wars and disruption of this vital trade. In order to prevent a deterioration of relations and to safeguard the VOC against any unexpected changes of attitudes and policies with these native states, the Dutch were forced to send missions bearing letters and gifts to the native rulers and to negotiate commercial and political treaties with them. The Dutch also used these missions to learn about the state of affairs in a particular kingdom at first hand.

In regard to Johor, the reports submitted by successive missions usually include considerable detail about the condition of trade, the power of the various individuals at the court, the particular problems worrying the rulers and the Orang Kaya, and the attitudes and the responses of the ruler and certain major ministers to the points listed in the draft treaties brought by the Dutch envoys. Very often these envoys also provide a description of the city and a résumé of certain events and rumours which had occurred in the kingdom since the last mission.

A second source of useful information about Johor from the VOC records is the missives written by the Dutch Governor and Council in Malacca to the Governor-General and Council of the Indies in Batavia. These missives usually summarize the various reports arriving in Malacca with regard to situations in the neighbouring Malay lands and the state of trade in the area, as well as comment on affairs in the city of Malacca. In some cases, when the report of a mission was not sent on to Batavia, one has to rely on this summary in lieu of the more detailed information provided in the report itself.

Johor was considered by the Dutch to be a principal Malay power in the Straits of Malacca during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The governor's missives from Malacca, therefore, often included news of the latest political and economic developments in that kingdom. From the tone of lamentation or jubilation which a particular missive assumes in discussing the trade at Malacca, one can usually gauge the success or failure of Johor's economic policy. Dutch comments on issues which the rulers and ministers of Johor considered both trivial and significant are also of great interest.

Finally, there is information furnished by the Johorese themselves which was recorded by the Dutch at Malacca and forwarded to Batavia. This information is of a varied nature. Some reports are merely responses to specific questions asked by the Dutch Syahbandar at Malacca, and others are comments on trade at Johor. There are also interviews with Malays and accounts from Malay envoys about the political situation in Johor itself. For example, several interesting interviews held with the refugee Johorese Syahbandar and Bendahara in 1718 and translated into Dutch form the basis of the description given in this study of the events preceding and during the conquest of Johor by Raja Kecil in 1718. Letters not only from the rulers and chief officials of Johor but also from the Minangkabau and Buginese leaders provide another source of information. These letters contain sufficient material to enable one to make certain statements about the attitudes and motivations which guided their policies in internal and external affairs. One has only to inspect the correspondence between the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil and the Dutch to realize the danger of advancing the view that, because the bulk of the material for the history of an Asian country is in Western languages, its contents can provide little insight on the activities and motivations of the Asians themselves. The present writer has attempted to quote, either *verbatim* or in paraphrase, a few of the letters kept in Dutch translation in the archives from the various native leaders in order to provide the reader with a sense of the material. Several of the quoted passages are paraphrased in order to avoid the elliptical construction of seventeenth and early eighteenth century Dutch style without changing the meaning of the sentences. Unfortunately, none of the original Malay letters to the Dutch have been preserved. It is thus difficult to check names and titles distorted by inaccurate transcriptions, or terms such as that translated into Dutch as 'Indië' (a reference presumably to the present-day area of Indonesia), which would have been useful in understanding the Malay conception of the whole Indonesian Archipelago.

The wealth of VOC material provides another viewpoint and a useful complement to the Malay sources for the study of Johor. Since the principal concern of the Dutch was assuring a smooth flow of trade through the Straits of Malacca and the collection of certain desired commodities in the area, they reported events in the Malay kingdoms merely as a way of assessing their repercussions on

these vital VOC interests. Unlike the Malay sources, these records are not concerned about the status of any particular group within Johor or in any other Malay kingdom. They are instead quite matter-of-fact documents pieced together from one or more sources with no particular goal in mind but to give the VOC leaders in Batavia an accurate picture of the state of affairs in that area of Asia. The Dutch in Malacca may have favoured one ruler over another, but directives from Batavia prevented any interference in the internal affairs of the Malay states in this early period. The disinterested nature of the VOC reports on internal developments in the Malay kingdoms makes them a valuable source in reconciling a number of conflicting stories from the Malay texts. On the other hand, the Malay materials provide the colour, the vitality, and the depth of Malay attitudes and beliefs, which are merely sketched in the Dutch records. By using both the Dutch and Malay sources in this complementary fashion, it has been possible to attempt to describe the functioning of the traditional power structure of Johor in response to the new opportunities in the Straits of Malacca after 1641 and to examine the role of the Johor Malays, the Orang Laut, the Minangkabaus, and the Buginese in the transition from the traditional to a new power structure in the Kingdom of Johor after 1699.

During the period of prosperity in Johor between 1641 and 1699, one can see the operation of the state which closely approximated the ideal prescriptions recorded in the *Sejarah Melayu*. Despite the conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511, the subsequent upheaval and peregrinations of the refugee monarchs, and the early seventeenth century humiliations suffered at the hands of the Acehnese, the Malacca kingship and power structure survived *mutatis mutandis* into the late seventeenth century. Through VOC contemporary reports one can view how these idealized conceptions were closely maintained, even though several centuries had elapsed since the writing of the *Sejarah Melayu*. Up to the late seventeenth century the Johorese were still using the models of their ancestors, the Malacca kings and Orang Kaya, as ideal forms of behaviour in the Johor Kingdom. Realizing this important fact, one is better able to judge the decisions taken and actions committed by the Johorese in their affairs in this period.

Important also is a study of the years 1699 to 1718 during which the traditional concept of kingship and the last link with the Malacca dynastic line were undermined in a single act of regicide. A non-

royal minister ascended the throne, and the linchpin which assured the perpetuation of the kingdom was removed. While there still existed a ruler whose position was guaranteed by tradition and by some mysterious force surrounding the Malacca dynasty, he could legitimize the actions of his subjects and retain their loyalty. When the kingship in Johor lost its direct tie with the past, it was shorn of the special sovereignty (*daulat*) which had assured the existence of the kingdom. For the next two decades, it was rent with factions, civil wars, and punitive expeditions against subject territories. How deep was the cleavage created by the regicide in 1699 only became apparent in the conquest of Johor by Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus in 1718.

It was during these years that the Minangkabau and Buginese subjects occupying lands in Johor's outlying territories of the west coast Malay Peninsula and east coast Sumatra began assuming a more belligerent attitude toward the centre and asserting a more independent policy in defiance of the leaders of Johor. Previous works on the history of Johor have failed to explain the phenomenon adequately. The Minangkabaus had been in the area of the Malay world for several centuries, and the Buginese had already been settled peacefully in Johor's territories by the middle of the seventeenth century. Both these groups lived peacefully within the kingdom and were free to pursue their own way of life under their own leaders. But in the first few decades of the eighteenth century they threatened their overlord and caused the splits in the Kingdom of Johor to break asunder. Both the cultural and political milieu of these groups in their homelands have been taken into account in this study to gain some understanding of their aspirations and activities in their new environment. Definite links seem to have been established by both groups with rulers in their homeland in this period, thus making possible certain daring exploits which changed the course of Johor history. An attempt has been made to make their roles in the dissolution of the old, and the reconstituting of the new, Kingdom of Johor more comprehensible.

Finally, some attention will be devoted to the period of almost continual warfare or threat of warfare between 1719 and 1728, when the old Johor kingdom and its traditional power structure was dissolved and a new one established. Since the conquest of Johor was a delicate matter to the Buginese and Minangkabaus, each group tried to vindicate the roles played by its ancestors in these crucial years.

Even the Dutch found it difficult to ignore the bitter struggle with Buginese forces throughout the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago; thus their judgements of this period are highly coloured. The *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, the *Siak Chronicles*, and the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* give a catalogue of battles for this period, and the archival sources are little better. Nevertheless, it was during this period that the Buginese became an indispensable military arm of the ruler of Johor and slowly began to usurp the position and power once exerted by the Malay Orang Kaya and the Orang Laut. It was also in these years that the Minangkabaus lost their bid for control of the Kingdom of Johor but became a powerful force within the Malay world with a base in the new Kingdom of Siak. No longer could one invoke the traditions of the past and arouse the same measure of loyalty and respect which had characterized the old kingdom. The basis of kingship had changed and the old elements which had helped to preserve the status and aura of kingship under the Malacca dynasty had now been replaced. With the erosion of the old concept of kingship and the desertion of two of its former props — the Malay Orang Kaya and, more important, the Orang Laut — the old Malacca-Johor Kingdom had to seek a new arrangement which would guarantee its survival. The requirement was met in this period when Johor evolved a new conception of kingship under the Bendahara dynasty based on its new champions, the Buginese.

1. E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (Batavia, 1870).

2. R. O. Winstedt, 'A History of Johore (1365-1895)', *JMBRAS*, X, iii (Dec. 1932), pp. 1-159.

3. J. Bastin and R. Roolvink, *Malayan and Indonesian Studies* (Oxford, 1964), p. 7.

4. *Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia van 't passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands-Indië, 1624-82* (Batavia, 1887, etc.).

5. This chronicle, which goes up well into the nineteenth century, is called the *Sejarah Melayu* and is listed in the University of Leiden Library as Cod. Or. 7304 and Cod. Or. 6342. The latter is a typed carbon copy of the manuscript found in the Perpustakaan Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia in Jakarta and is listed as Von de Wall 191. It may have been the original used by Winstedt for the typed copy Cod. Or. 6342. Dr. R. O. Roolvink, who is currently working on a critical edition of this text, describes this work as 'a Malay history which is an edited and in several places abbreviated text of the *Sejarah Melayu*, followed by an eighteenth century history of the Straits of Malacca told from the Siak point of view.' See R. O. Roolvink, 'The Variant Versions of the Malay Annals', *BKI*, CXXIII (1967), pp. 301-24.

6. See Roolvink, *ibid.* for a discussion of the *Sejarah Melayu* as a document. He mentions that there are twenty-nine manuscripts of the *Sejarah Melayu* in various libraries throughout the world. In 1952 C. C. Brown translated the Raffles Ms 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* which was supposed to have been edited about \pm 1535 by Tun Sri Lanang. C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu or the Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952). For the purposes of analysis of the traditional power structure of the Malacca kingdom, I have used C. C. Brown's translation and the Shellabear recension in Romanized Malay, which was first published in Singapore in 1898 and which contains a sequel up to 1673 written by the son of the editor of the earlier text.

7. For example, the killing of Sultan Abu Syahid by the Raja Rekan is portrayed in the Raffles Ms 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* as a desperate act of a dying man, and not as a coldly calculated decision. Brown, *op. cit.* p. 63.

8. According to V. Matheson, there are only three copies of the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* still extant: (1) a short version preserved in the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden, which was a copy made for the Dutch Resident of Riau, A. L. van Hasselt, at Penyengat in 1896; (2) a longer version known as the Maxwell 2 MS in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society in London, which is a copy made for Sir William Maxwell, British Resident in Selangor, in March, 1890; and (3) a printed Jawi text of Sir Richard Winstedt, based on a 1923 text which belonged to Tengku Fatimah, daughter of Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor. This Jawi version was then transcribed into Rumi by Inche Munir bin Ali and published in Singapore in 1965. See V. Matheson, 'The *Tuhfat al-Nafis*: Structure and Sources', *BKI*, CXXVII (1971), pp. 375-92. Another manuscript entitled the *Sejarah Raja-Raja Melayu dan Bugis*, preserved in the Library of the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka in Kuala Lumpur, is believed to be the original *Tuhfat al-Nafis* written by Raja Ali Haji himself. This conclusion was reached by a Malay scholar after comparing this text page by page with the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*. See Mohd. Khalid Saidin, 'Naskhah2 lama mengenai sejarah negeri Johor', *Dewan Bahasa*, XV, viii (Aug. 1971), pp. 339-41.

9. Matheson, *op. cit.* p. 383.

10. *Ibid.* p. 379.

11. Raja Ali Haji, *op. cit.* p. 104.

12. Raja Ali Haji, *op. cit.* p. 39. See also the symbolic role of the cock in J. J. Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar* ('s-Gravenhage, 1968), pp. 82-3.

13. Raja Ali Haji, *op. cit.* pp. 34-5.

14. *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis* (Johor, 1956), p. 12.

15. 'On Adat of Malay Rulers', Cod. Or. 1999, University of Leiden Library, p. 10.

16. According to V. Matheson this work was written between 7 September 1865 and 15 January 1866. There are a number of similarities between this work and the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, especially with regard to the pre-Riau stories of the Buginese. Matheson believes that this may have been a result of direct borrowing of sections from the *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis* by the author of the *Tuhfat*. Matheson, *op. cit.* p. 381. Hans Overbeck did an English summary of the *Silsilah* printed in *JMBRAS*, IV, iii (Dec. 1926), pp. 339-81, from a printed version of the work dated 1900. In 1956 a Jawi version was printed in Johor, Malaysia.

17. There are a number of different manuscripts of this work. In the University of Leiden Library in The Netherlands, there are three listed: Cod. Or. 1741 (2); Cod. Or. 3322; and KL 24A. The Perpustakaan Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia in Jakarta owns two other manuscripts of the same work listed in the Von de Wall Collection as numbers 192 and 193. Several years ago Professor Dr.

A. Teeuw of the University of Leiden discovered another manuscript in the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C., and gave a brief description of it in *BKI* CXXIII (1967), p. 519. Professor Ismail Hussein of the University of Malaya has made a study of Cod. Or. 1741 (2), Cod. Or. 3322, Von de Wall 192 and 193, and the Winstedt Jawi version of this work in *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932). Professor Ismail Hussein observed that the first part of the *Hikayat Negeri Johor* has the character of a court note book (*buku catatan Istana*), but that later the narrative becomes more fluid indicating that the events of the second half of the eighteenth century were better known to the author. He feels that the last part was written hurriedly. Ismail Hussein, *Hikayat Negeri Johor, satu penyelenggaraan teks*, unpublished M.A. thesis (Kuala Lumpur, 1962), pp. 25-6. The *Hikayat* covers the period between the destruction of Johor Lama by Jambi in 1673 to the conquest of Perak by Selangor in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

18. The *Aturan Satiya Bugis dengan Melayu* (Cod. Or. 1724 (2)) is a manuscript in the University of Leiden Library which deals with the history of Johor between 1718 and 1784. This story is found in other manuscripts with such titles as *Hikayat Negeri Riau, Sejarah Raja-Raja Riau, Silsilah Raja Bugis*. Another manuscript listed as *Hikayat Riau*, Von Ronkel 106, in the University of Leiden Library has a similar text. It was written in November, 1837, in Riau. Matheson lists the following manuscripts as representative of the same text as the *Aturan Satiya Bugis dengan Melayu*: KL 37 (*Sadjarah Radja-Radja Riau*); Cod. Or. 1741 (1); Royal Asiatic Society London 119 (*Sejarah Raja-Raja Riau*); Von de Wall 195 (*Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw I*); Von de Wall 62 VI (*Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw II*). Matheson, *op. cit.* pp. 381, 391.

19. The *Hikayat Opu Daeng Menambon* is listed as Cod. 1754 in the University of Leiden Library. It is a story of one of the five Buginese princes, Opu Daeng Menambon, the first Buginese ruler of Mampawah. Of particular interest are the sections concerning the Buginese role in the reconquest of Riau from Raja Kecil and in the civil wars in Kedah.

20. The manuscript *Sejarah Bugis* was housed in the Museum Perak in Malaysia until 1962 when it was brought to the Museum Negara in Kuala Lumpur. A microfilm copy of the manuscript is also preserved at the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka in Kuala Lumpur. According to Mohd. Khalid Saidin, a very close relationship exists among the *Sejarah Bugis*, the *Hikayat Opu Daeng Menambon*, and the *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis*. All of these works seem to have originated from a manuscript written by Opu Daeng Menambon which is referred to in these works as the 'eastern manuscript' (*naskhah timur*). The latter was written first in Buginese and then translated into Malay by Daeng Menambon's son, Gusti Jamril. From this work Raja Ali Haji compiled and wrote his *Sejarah Bugis*, which then became the source for the compilation and the composing of the *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis*. The events in the *Sejarah Bugis* end in A.H. 1185 (A.D. 1771/2). See Mohd. Khalid Saidin, *op. cit.* pp. 342-7.

21. Ernst Ulrich Kratz, *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*, Wiesbaden, 1973. The basic text used is Klinkert 24b from the Leiden University Library in The Netherlands, with variant readings taken from a similar text von de Wall 196 from the Perpustakaan Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia in Jakarta.

22. *Ibid.* pp. 24-5.

23. *Ibid.* p. 28.

24. *Ibid.* pp. 35-6, 74-5.

25. *Ibid.* pp. 24-5.

I

THE BACKGROUND: JOHOR AND THE VOC

AT the time of the arrival of the first Portuguese in 1509, Malacca was a city whose fame was already widespread as an international emporium. Goods from all parts of the world were bought and sold here with great profit and advantage accruing to its rulers and traders.¹ The sultan ruled an empire which assured Malacca of a steady flow of tin, pepper, and gold which were much sought after by traders from East and West.² It was not long before the new economic participants of the Asian trade, the Portuguese, began to appreciate the role played by Malacca in this world of trade and to consider seriously the possibilities of such a successful entrepot in terms of Portuguese visions of a trade monopoly in Asian spices. Alfonso d'Albuquerque, Governor of Portuguese India between 1509 and 1515, saw Malacca as one of the important controlling points in the trade with the West. With Malacca in Portuguese hands, he believed that the valuable goods which went via the Red Sea to Alexandria and then taken by Venetian traders to the markets in Europe would be diverted to Lisbon, thus making the Portuguese capital the centre of all trading activity for rare Asian products.³ To fulfil this vision d'Albuquerque personally led an expedition against Malacca which succeeded in conquering the well-fortified and well-provisioned city on 10 August 1511, after little more than a month's siege.⁴

The relatively easy conquest of the city should not be attributed totally to the superior firepower of the Portuguese.⁵ Quarrels between Sultan Mahmud of Malacca and his son Sultan Ahmad,

who had only recently been raised to be ruler of the kingdom, contributed to the weak resistance of the Malays. Sultan Mahmud refused to commit his troops to battle, and his decision very likely influenced the Laksamana to withhold his fleet from participating in any of the fighting.⁶ Both sultans retreated to the interior and finally settled in Bentan.⁷ A very short time later Sultan Mahmud had his son murdered, and he once again assumed the crown.⁸

The military superiority of the Portuguese was quickly recognized by the dependencies of the humbled Kingdom of Malacca. In 1512 a refugee ruler of Pasai went first to the Portuguese for assistance in regaining his throne from a usurper from Aru. Only when his request was denied did he then turn to the former ruler of Malacca.⁹ Sultan Mahmud kindly received him and gave him a daughter in marriage. The fleets of Sultan Mahmud then brought the ruler back to Pasai and re-installed him on the throne.¹⁰ Sultan Abdullah of Kampar in 1514 found his options increased by the presence of the Portuguese and offered his services to them, while rejecting the overlordship of the Malay ruler of Malacca.¹¹ Although the timely arrival of the Portuguese saved Sultan Abdullah from a punitive expedition sent out by Sultan Mahmud, he was later sentenced to be beheaded by his saviours through rumours skilfully spread by Sultan Mahmud that Sultan Abdullah was really working in collusion with him.¹² These ventures re-affirmed Sultan Mahmud's ability to continue to afford protection to his allies and mete out punishment to rebellious subjects.

The Portuguese thus failed to seize the opportunity to impress the Malay kingdoms when two rulers had come seeking redress and the protection of a new, powerful overlord in the area. Indeed, their lack of response to these appeals revealed to the Malays the different nature of this Portuguese power. Although the Portuguese participated in wars, they were willing to do so only to protect the trade which they were seeking to monopolize. The traditional Malay ties between overlord and vassal were not applicable to the Portuguese, the new power in the Straits of Malacca. To the Portuguese the acquiring of vassals and the outward forms of splendour and power were only incidental to the acquiring of monopoly trade goods. In this regard the threat posed by the Portuguese to the rulers of the Malacca-Johor Kingdom was confined mainly to the economic plane in the scramble for local trade products. Portuguese expeditions were sent to destroy the Johorese¹³ bastions in Muar, Johor,

and Bentan, in order to crush Johor as an economic competitor and to eliminate any future attacks on Portuguese shipping and on trading vessels going to Malacca.¹⁴ The Portuguese, however, were not interested in acquiring vassals or in challenging any Malay ruler for political hegemony.

Although the establishment of Portuguese influence in the Malay world did not directly challenge the political overlordship of the rulers of Malacca-Johor, the presence of the Portuguese in Malacca made possible the rise of Aceh. Aceh became the beneficiary of the Muslim trade which avoided the Portuguese at Malacca and went to Aceh instead as a port of call. In time the Acehnese rulers responded to the situation and took measures to acquire possession of those lands which produced the much desired products of pepper and gold, thus attracting Muslim traders from the West and Chinese traders from the East.¹⁵ Aceh soon came to challenge not only the economic position of the Portuguese and Johor, but also the latter's political hegemony in the Malay world.

The consolidation of the Kingdom of Aceh was rapid, but in 1540 the Kingdom of Johor was still powerful enough to repulse an Acehnese invasion at the mouth of the Panai River.¹⁶ This was, however, the only occasion in the sixteenth century when the Johorese actively sought out the Acehnese and defeated them. By the middle of the century Aceh was already considered by the Portuguese to be the main headquarters of the trade of the Muslims of Western Asia and India with the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago.¹⁷ With this growing trade and contact with the West came the wealth, the expertise, and the manpower with which Aceh came to challenge the economic and the political hegemony of the Kingdom of Johor in the Malay world.¹⁸ Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah al-Kahar (c. 1537-1571) styled himself King of Aceh, Barus, Pedir, Pasai, Daya, and Batak, Prince of the two seas and of the mines of Minangkabau.¹⁹ In 1564 (or 1565) he led the first of a number of Acehnese invasions which were to plague Johor in the latter half of the sixteenth and the first third of the seventeenth centuries.²⁰

Aceh reached the height of its power under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) who extended Acehnese hegemony in Sumatra along the west coast as far south as Padang,²¹ along the east coast down to Siak, and to Kedah, Perak, Pahang, and for a time Johor, on the Malay Peninsula.²² While the Portuguese had been more an economic competitor, all of whose invasions of Johor but one occurred

during the first twenty-five years of their presence in Malacca in an attempt to eliminate an economic rival, the rise of Aceh went beyond the economic sphere and effectively challenged the right of Johor to claim leadership in the area. No longer capable of protecting its outlying vassals or even affording a sanctuary within Johor because of the frequency and ferocity of Acehnese attacks, Johor's claim to hegemony was questionable in the Malay waters during this time. Nevertheless, it exhibited a resilience in face of Portuguese and Acehnese attacks which created the image of a kingdom unwilling to relinquish its long revered status as leader of the Malays.

The Portuguese launched invasions against this kingdom in 1518, 1520, 1521, 1523, 1524, 1526, 1535, 1536, and 1587;²³ and the Acehnese in 1564 (or 1565), 1570, 1582, 1613, 1618, and 1623.²⁴ The frequency of these invasions attests to Johor's ability to reconstitute itself within a relatively short time and once again become a menace to both the Portuguese and the Acehnese. A closer look at the details of the aftermath of some of these invasions reveals an unexpected picture of a kingdom continuing to exercise its sovereignty, while adjusting to the frequent dislocations caused by the attacks.

Barely a year after being forced to abandon Malacca to the Portuguese invaders in August, 1511, Sultan Mahmud assembled a force which besieged the Portuguese within their newly-built fortifications.²⁵ Although unsuccessful in this venture, he dared to move his residence within close proximity of Malacca at Pagoh on the Muar River in 1518. Another attempt to wrest the city of Malacca from the Portuguese soon thereafter again ended in failure.²⁶ Despite the difficulties encountered in the frequent changes of residence during the period between 1511 and 1518, the refugee ruler of Malacca refused to acknowledge the Portuguese presence in Malacca as anything but temporary and continued to exercise his role as overlord as was seen in the cases of the refugee ruler of Pasai and the rebellious Sultan of Kampar.

In 1535 a Portuguese task force completely razed a Johorese fortified city far up the Johor River, but most of the inhabitants escaped further upriver carrying everything possible out of the city. When the invaders left, the Johorese easily reassembled and continued to harass Portuguese and native shipping which frequented Malacca. Since the situation had not altered at all, the Portuguese again sent a force to the Johor River in 1536 and destroyed the city.²⁷

Despite these two invasions by the Portuguese, the reputation of Johor among the Malay nations was but slightly tarnished.

In 1540 the widowed wife of the ruler of Aru fled a refugee to Johor and appealed for assistance against the Acehnese who had invaded her country. Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah of Johor (1529-1564?) reacted in this situation in the same confident fashion as had his predecessors, the rulers of the Kingdom of Malacca. He married the Queen of Aru to cement the friendship between the two countries, and then led a fleet which defeated the Acehnese at the Panai River, thus freeing the Kingdom of Aru.²⁸

In 1564 or 1565 Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah al-Kahar of Aceh completely devastated the capital of Johor, carried off the royal family, and then placed one of the sons of the Sultan of Johor back on the throne under Acehnese supervision. When this puppet ruler was overthrown by his uncle in Johor, Sultan Alauddin sent a fleet to chastise the Johorese in 1570. The Acehnese found the city so fully recovered and strongly defended that they discreetly returned to Aceh.²⁹

An almost similar situation occurred in 6 June 1613 when Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh (1607-1636) destroyed Batu Sawar on the Johor River and forcefully brought to Aceh Sultan Alauddin of Johor, his wife and children, his brother Raja Seberang (Raja Abdullah), and three or four other princes and Orang Kaya.³⁰ Sultan Iskandar Muda married his daughter to Raja Seberang and then sent him back to rule with a permanent escort of 2,000 Acehnese under Raja Lela Wangsa.³¹ Despite the presence of this large contingent of Acehnese soldiers within his kingdom, Raja Seberang, now entitled Sultan Hammat Syah, soon communicated secretly with the Dutch and offered them a site for a fort anywhere within his kingdom, presumably in return for their assistance against the Acehnese.³² Since the Dutch were non-committal, Sultan Hammat Syah signed a treaty with the Portuguese and managed somehow to force the Acehnese to leave his kingdom. As an indication of the determinedly self-confident move of Sultan Hammat Syah, he refused to remain in the Johor River, which would afford an avenue of escape from any formidable invasion by the Acehnese, but opted instead for a confrontation by moving to the island of Bentan. The ever-present threat of an Acehnese invasion was always in the background, yet Sultan Hammat Syah was prepared to defend his kingdom from the position of strength among his faithful Orang

Laut in the Riau-Lingga archipelago rather than remain a parody of a sovereign ruler ready to flee upriver at a moment's notice to escape an enemy invasion.³³

When the Dutch visited Sultan Hammat in Bentan in September, 1615, they discovered that a month before, the Orang Kaya of Pahang had asked and received a ruler from Johor. The son of Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah (1597-1613) had been installed in Bentan by Sultan Hammat Syah and sent to become Sultan of Pahang.³⁴ With Pahang now definitely within Johor's camp, Sultan Hammat organized and led a defensive alliance against Aceh consisting of Palembang, Jambi, Indragiri, Kampar, and Siak.³⁵ He then moved to a place called 'Benuw' (Penuba?) on the island of Lingga, which was protected by its natural surroundings and closer to his more powerful allies, Jambi and Palembang.

Junks from Siam, Patani, Java, Macassar, etc., traded at Lingga in rice and other necessities which were then brought to the Portuguese in Malacca on small boats. In this way Sultan Hammat prospered from the income of the Malacca trade³⁶ and raised Johor from its fallen state in 1613 to a position of some importance by 1618.³⁷ When the relentless Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh again destroyed the Johor capital at Lingga in 1623, Sultan Hammat Syah fled to Tambelan — another of his numerous islands which were one of the principal sources of his strength — where he died a few months later.³⁸

The overwhelming Portuguese victory over the Acehnese in 1629, in which the latter lost some 19,000 men and all of their ships, provided Johor with the first real opportunity to regain its former position in the Malay world.³⁹ With the newly-found freedom from Acehnese attack, Johor attempted to reassert its influence and re-establish its trading relations with the outside world. Envoys were sent to Jambi and Palembang asking for the repatriation of Johorese who had taken refuge there from the Acehnese attack in 1623.⁴⁰ Jambi was also asked to return Tungkal, since it had earlier belonged to Johor but had been forcefully incorporated into the Kingdom of Jambi.⁴¹ Ties between Patani and Johor were re-established and exploited.⁴² A Dutch official reported in 1637 that a Johorese fleet at the Karimun Islands had not only seized Portuguese ships but had also defeated a squadron of Acehnese ships which was going to Pahang. So confident was Johor of its

power that it asked the Dutch to remain neutral in its conflict with Aceh and not to interfere with its affairs in Pahang.⁴³

A decisive factor in Johor's resurgence as a power in the area was its long and friendly relations with the Dutch, dating back to 1602. In that year Admiral Jacob Heemskerck arrived in Batu Sawar and offered the Johorese another source of support in their struggle against the Portuguese, the Acehnese, and at that time, the Patanese. Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah of Johor (1597-1613) was not unaware of the advantages of maintaining the friendship of these strangers in the Straits of Malacca and sent with Admiral Heemskerck a personal envoy with a letter to the Stadhouder Prince Maurits of Holland⁴⁴. In these early years of the seventeenth century, both the Johorese and the Dutch sought each other's friendship as a counterweight against the Portuguese and the Acehnese. But as the strength of the Dutch rapidly increased in the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago, the Johor Sultans became more firmly convinced of the advantages of cultivating their friendship.

When Sultan Iskandar Thani (1637-1641) of Aceh vacillated once too often in committing his troops alongside the Dutch for an attack on Malacca, the Johorese were only too willing to assist the VOC against the Portuguese, as they had done in the past. The Portuguese conquest of their former thriving emporium of Malacca in 1511 had remained a source of shame for the rulers of Johor,⁴⁵ and the desire to wreak vengeance made this decision an easy one. Sometime in 1639 the Laksamana of Johor, who had informed the Dutch that he had been given full authority by his Sultan to rule in his stead,⁴⁶ signed a written contract with Philips Lucasz, a VOC official in Patani, committing the Johorese to the siege of Malacca. In return for this assistance the Dutch agreed to help the ruler of Johor build forts in Batu Sawar and elsewhere with cannons and war munitions,⁴⁷ and to protect Johor from 'all unlawful procedures and annoyances of the Portuguese as well as the Acehnese'.⁴⁸

In the blockade of Malacca which began on 2 August 1640 and ended with the conquest on 14 January 1641,⁴⁹ the Johorese were invaluable in the transport of material, the constructing of batteries and trenches, and in preventing the enemy from escaping to the nearby gardens and jungles.⁵⁰ The Dutch appreciated the services of the Johorese much more than it would appear on paper since they did not participate at all in the actual fighting. In late November 1640 the Dutch forces had dropped to 1,707, of whom 470 were sick;

thus they were greatly relieved to receive a reinforcement of 600 Johorese to augment the Johorese force of 1,000 to 1,200 men who had arrived earlier in Malacca on 29 July under the command of the Sri Bija di Raja, the eldest son of the Laksamana.⁵¹ Governor-General Antonio van Diemen wrote in a letter to the Heeren XVII in Holland dated 23 December 1643: 'We must continue to remember that the Johorese contributed substantially toward the conquest of Malacca. Without their help we would never have become master of that strong place.'⁵²

The Dutch were grateful for the loyalty of the Johorese and were ready to reward them liberally. The Johorese had proven by word and deed to be a faithful ally with the new dominant European power in the area, which augured well for the future.⁵³ Then on 15 February 1641, Sultan Iskandar Thani of Aceh died⁵⁴ and was succeeded by weak female rulers during the remainder of the seventeenth century. The year 1641 was thus a clear demarcation in the affairs of the Kingdom of Johor. Two of its principal enemies for more than a century had been rendered ineffectual, and Johor could once again seek to recapture the glory and prestige of former days with the intervention of a European power newly-arrived in the Straits of Malacca.

The Dutch presence in Asia began during the last few years of the sixteenth century and formed but one part of an extensive trading system to ensure the continuing prosperity of the provinces of The Netherlands. As in Johor, trade was the life blood of the nation. The geographical position of The Netherlands had shaped the course of destiny of the Dutch by making the opportunities of trade apparent:

Stretching across the estuaries of the great rivers Scheldt, Maas, and the Rhine, the Low Countries were provided with excellent harbours looking westward to England and the Atlantic and backed by the great hinterlands of Germany. More immediately significant was their position midway between the great corn and timber area of the Baltic and the markets of southern Europe.⁵⁵

By the middle of the sixteenth century the Dutch had already utilized the excellent advantages provided by their geography to become a trading nation of note. In a petition to Emperor Charles V of Spain in 1543, the States of Holland explained that, owing to their small size and poor land, they were forced to maintain themselves by handicrafts and trade,

in such wise that they fetch raw materials from foreign lands and re-export the finished products, including diverse sorts of cloth and draperies, to many places such as the kingdoms of Spain, Portugal, Germany, Scotland, and especially to Denmark, the Baltic, Norway, whence they return with goods and merchandise from those parts, notably wheat and other grains. Consequently, the main business of the country must needs be in shipping and related trades, from which a great many people earn their living.⁵⁶

This was, in brief, the testament of life of the Dutch nation which governed the attitudes and activities of its leaders in the subsequent centuries.

When the States of Holland formally renounced allegiance to Philip II of Spain in 1581, a long sporadic war of independence against Spain began, which is known as the Eighty Years' War. Instead of destroying the thriving Dutch trade, the war provided the merchants with the opportunity of consolidating their positions in the municipal and provincial governments and enabled them to encourage the development of trade and industry in the towns.⁵⁷ Economic activity received an unexpected boost in 1585 when Antwerp, then the greatest commercial entrepot in Europe, fell to the Spaniards. Rich and influential Calvinist merchants were allowed two years grace to remove their capital and business elsewhere, and many flocked to Amsterdam and other Dutch cities. With their knowledge of book-keeping, banking, and insurance techniques, these refugees were invaluable in making Amsterdam the worthy successor of Antwerp. Of equal importance were the contacts which these refugee merchants had in the various trading areas of Europe and the Mediterranean which facilitated the rise of Amsterdam as the pre-eminent entrepot in Europe.⁵⁸

With the influx of the wealthy entrepreneurs and skilled workers arose new industries and greater prosperity at home. An even more valuable contribution of these newcomers, however, was their established trading connexions which were an important factor in the Dutch expanded trade to the Levant and south Atlantic.⁵⁹ Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the increasingly prosperous Dutch states began to extend their activities to Asia and America, areas which hitherto had been almost the exclusive preserve of Spain and Portugal.

Although the first voyage to Asia in 1598 had yielded but a small profit, the Dutch were heartened by the prospects of trade in the

much-desired spices of the East. By 1600 there were five separate companies in Amsterdam, two each in Rotterdam and in Zeeland, and one each in Delft, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen — all competing for the Asian spice trade.⁶⁰ The rivalry among the Dutch companies soon increased the prices which the Dutch had to pay for the spices in Asia and lowered the prices for which they could sell them in Europe. The companies were finally persuaded to abandon their internecine competition and form a joint company which came into being as the United East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or the VOC) on 20 March 1602. According to Article 35 of the charter granted to the VOC, the Company could, in the name of the States-General of The Netherlands, make treaties with princes and potentates, build forts, appoint governors and judicial officers, and levy troops.⁶¹ Although the rights granted to the VOC to obtain territory and strongholds and to exercise sovereign rights in pursuit of trade appeared extreme, The Netherlands realized that this was a temporary expedient to avoid risks in distant regions while there was still a state of war in Europe.

The VOC was thus a child of a young merchant nation and became the extension of its parent's ambition and struggles in the East. The Asian trade, however, played only a minor, subsidiary role to the trade between northern and western Europe. This latter trade, which extended from Gibraltar in the south and Bergen in the north, through the Gulf of Finland in the northeast and Britain in the west, was called by contemporaries, 'the mother trades', the 'vital nerves', and 'the soul of all trade'.⁶² Since the principal theatre of operations remained in Europe, the Directors of the VOC, the *Heeren XVII*, were relatively free to pursue whatever policies they deemed necessary to secure the all important high-level of dividends for the Company's stockholders. These Directors were first and foremost merchants, and they carefully instructed their servants in Batavia to avoid all unnecessary expenditures to maximize profits. Yet they were not averse to the use of force when this was considered necessary to secure the monopoly of spices or to dislodge Portuguese or English competition from the area. Oftentimes the *Heeren XVII* were reprimanded for their flagrant disregard of a treaty concluded in Europe in their activities in Asia. Nevertheless, the *Heeren XVII* were on the whole as eager as any other merchant leader in The Netherlands to preserve the peace in any area where Dutch trade was being conducted. Since the *Heeren XVII* were often themselves

the merchant leaders of The Netherlands or had close familial ties with them, their interests closely coincided with those of the government.

On the other side of the world, the Governor-General and the members of the Council of The Indies in Batavia did not share many of the views of the policy-makers in The Netherlands and were often reluctant to implement the purely commercial concerns of the Directors in the home country. Most of the Governors-General had risen from the ranks and often regarded Batavia as the seat of their sovereign power. They did not view VOC operations in Asia in the same light as the Heeren XVII, who were motivated by the pursuit of profit and greater dividends for the stockholders at home.⁶³ Jan Pietersz. Coen (1618-1623, 1627-1629) considered it necessary to expel the English from the Malayo-Indonesian Archipelago, but the Heeren XVII rebuked his overzealous aims, reminding him that the VOC was not designed to create a realm in The Indies under Dutch sovereignty, but to acquire wealth.⁶⁴ Coen countered with the assertion that '...we cannot carry on trade without war nor war without trade'.⁶⁵ The Heeren XVII, however, did acquiesce in Coen's brutal policy of genocide in the Banda Islands to maintain the monopoly of spices. The Heeren XVII sent instructions to the government in Batavia on 26 April 1650 discouraging the use of force, except in the case of enforcing the spice monopoly in the Moluccas.⁶⁶ Elsewhere in Asia, especially 'the neutral places belonging to free nations, where we find the laws and do not have to bring them', the Heeren XVII discouraged any use of force to acquire trade.⁶⁷

After Coen there followed a period when the Heeren XVII's fear of any expenditure not immediately profitable discouraged the extension of territorial rule because of the cost of military expeditions and garrisons.⁶⁸ Governor-General Antonio van Diemen (1636-1645) maintained Coen's contention that affairs in The Indies be entrusted to the Governor-General and Council in Batavia, without Heeren XVII interference. In a letter to the Heeren XVII, van Diemen urged the Directors to a more forceful VOC policy in Asia: 'We are taught by daily experience that the Company's trade in Asia cannot subsist without territorial conquests.'⁶⁹ He lived the maxim, 'Whoever will mow, must first sow'⁷⁰ by seizing the cinnamon ports of Negombo and Gale from the Portuguese in Ceylon in 1640, capturing Malacca in 1641, driving the Spaniards out of

the northern part of Taiwan in 1642, and consolidating VOC rule in the Moluccas by 1643. Only his attempts to conquer Goa, the seat of the Portuguese government in Asia, failed. He continued Coen's policy of maintaining VOC power in Asia by means of forts, garrisons, and especially warships.⁷¹ These activities would have been adjudged extravagant and unnecessary by the Heeren XVII who demonstrated later that the peaceful trading posts such as those at Surat under the Great Mogul, the Hugli under the Nabob of Bengal, Deshima under the Shogun of Japan, and Persia under the Syah yielded higher profits than those posts in which the VOC had assumed sovereignty and had to maintain garrisons to support.⁷²

These activities of Coen and van Diemen were to an extent tolerated by the Heeren XVII and by the leaders of the home government because of their successes against the enemy. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, however, feeling at home strongly opposed any military commitments regardless of outcome. The First Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-1654 sobered many of the Dutch statesmen to the fact that a nation such as theirs, whose prosperity depended upon their all important fisheries and carrying trade, could be extremely vulnerable in times of war. Fishing and commerce stopped and the harbours were filled with idle ships. People were reduced to begging, grain was scarce, and money was not to be found in the public treasuries. Many wharves, shops, and warehouses were shut down, and 3,000 houses stood vacant in Amsterdam, once a bustling city.⁷³ The Netherlands had proven especially vulnerable to the enemy's fleets which could prey at will on the numerous Dutch trading ships and fishing boats which were too numerous to be adequately protected, even by the large and impressive Dutch navy. These leaders, therefore, became increasingly conscious of any activity of the VOC which could possibly endanger the peace in Europe.

Since the Heeren XVII usually shared the same interests and philosophy as the merchant leaders of The Netherlands in this period, it was not difficult for them to conform to the wishes of the government. The situation was quite different in the relations between the Heeren XVII and Batavia. The Heeren XVII would establish certain guidelines for the officials in Batavia and deliver periodical exhortations on the value of maintaining the peace and avoiding any costly involvement in Asian wars, but the Governor-General in Batavia acted more like an independent Oriental potentate

than a VOC official. His style and personality were more important in shaping the course of VOC activities in Asia than any commands from the homeland. This was especially true after 1650 when many of the Heeren XVII had never been to Asia and had to rely on the intelligence and recommendations of the officials in Batavia.⁷⁴ Furthermore, since it took about 1½ to 2 years to receive directives from the homeland concerning any course of action initiated in Batavia, strong Governors-General could present a *fait accompli* to the Directors. One of the major officials in Batavia in 1706 stated quite bluntly: 'The Directors in the fatherland decide matters, as it seems best to them there; but we do here, what seems best and most advisable to us.'⁷⁵

Unlike the relationship between The Netherlands and Batavia, that between Batavia and the Dutch outposts (*buitencomptoir*) in Asia was often close. There was some freedom exercised by the outposts arising from the difficulty of communications with Batavia. On the whole, however, the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies in Batavia maintained tight control over each outpost, especially those in the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago, in order to regulate their activities for the benefit of the entire Dutch trading system in Asia. They were cognizant of the importance of implementing one of the basic commercial policies of the VOC, which was to control the principal import and export products in order to regulate prices beneficial to Dutch trade everywhere.⁷⁶ Under these circumstances, certain matters considered of vital importance to an outpost were sometimes adjudged by Batavia irrelevant and dispensable for the general good. Furthermore, the *buitencomptoir* were the hapless victims of indecision on the part of Batavia with regard to trade policies. The vacillation between a policy of monopoly and free trade in Malacca during the first decade of Dutch control in this port hampered its economic prosperity. Only in the 1650s was there a general belief among the leaders in Batavia that Malacca's pre-eminent role in the VOC trading network would not be as a major entrepot, but as a guardhouse to assure the peace on the vital Straits of Malacca. The main priority of the VOC leaders was to establish Batavia as the principal entrepot in the inter-Asian trade while maintaining outposts such as Malacca to contribute to the growth of Batavia.

These considerations conditioned the Johor-Malacca and the Johor-Batavia relationships throughout most of the seventeenth

and early eighteenth centuries. Whenever Malacca reminded Batavia of its failing trade due to Johor's prosperity, Batavia advised restraint and patience in accordance with the now established VOC policy. Johor's leaders perpetuated the belief in their unimportance by reiterating that the Dutch should have no reason to fear Johor since it was just a tiny garden, and definitely not a Bantam or a Macassar!⁷⁷ Even if Batavia realized the deception, there were many more pressing objectives elsewhere in this extensive trading domain of the VOC. The desire to secure their more important interests elsewhere provided the leaders of the Kingdom of Johor with an enviable bargaining position with the VOC officials in trade and defense agreements. In these years Johor learned to manipulate Batavia's fear of unnecessary involvement in what could result in a futile, costly, and harassing war with a mobile, maritime nation in order to harness the more truculent VOC officials in Malacca and to pursue its commercial and political interests.

1. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 35-6.

2. C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu or the Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952), pp. 29-30; B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, vol. 1 (The Hague/Bandung, 1955), p. 42.

3. P. A. Tiele, 'De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel', First Section, 1509-1529, *BKI*, XXV (1877), p. 335.

4. *Ibid.* pp. 339-40.

5. Meilink-Roelofs, *op. cit.* p. 18.

6. *Ibid.* pp. 338-9.

7. For a detailed and scholarly discussion of the peregrinations of the two rulers after the conquest of Malacca in 1511, see I. A. MacGregor, 'Johor Lama in the Sixteenth Century', *JMBRAS*, XXVIII, ii (May 1955), pp. 48-125.

8. Brown, *op. cit.* p. 170. According to the Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu*, 'Sultan Ahmad still had no love for his officers and chiefs: his favourites were the (young) men of the court' There seems to have been a division in the court between Sultan Mahmud and those around him and Sultan Ahmad and the new court favourites, which finally resulted in a confrontation and the murder of Sultan Ahmad by his father.

9. Tiele, *op. cit.* p. 366.

10. *Ibid.* p. 366.

11. *Ibid.* p. 347; Brown, *op. cit.* pp. 171-2.

12. *Ibid.* pp. 347-8; The Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* mentions that forty ministers of state under the Sri Amarabangsa were delegated to deal with Kampar, which indicates the importance which Sultan Mahmud attached to this mission. Brown, *op. cit.* pp. 172-3.

13. Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah, the successor of Sultan Mahmud, became the first ruler of Johor. He reigned between 1529 and 1564 or 1565.

14. MacGregor, op. cit. pp. 63-75.
15. Schrieke, op. cit. pp. 42-3.
16. Tiele, op. cit. Second Section, 1529-1540, *BKI*, XXVII (1879), p. 66.
17. *Ibid.*, Fourth Section, 1556-1578, *BKI* XXVIII (1880), p. 408.
18. Anthony Reid, 'Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia', *JSEAH*, X, iii (Dec. 1969), pp. 396-9, 401, 405; C. R. Boxer, 'A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Aceh, 1540-1600', *JSEAH*, X, iii (Dec. 1969), p. 418.
19. Arun Kamar Dasgupta, 'Aceh in Indonesian Trade and Politics: 1600-1641', unpublished Ph. D. thesis (Ithaca, 1962), p. 47.
20. MacGregor, op. cit. pp. 84-5.
21. Dasgupta, op. cit. p. 90.
22. Tiele, op. cit. Ninth Section, 1618-1623, *BKI*, XXXVI (1887), pp. 246-7.
23. *Ibid.*, First Section 1509-1529, *BKI*, XXV (1877), pp. 350, 365-6, 371, 387, 395; Second Section 1529-1540, *BKI*, XXVII (1879), pp. 35-6; Fifth Section 1578-1599, *BKI*, XXIX (1881), p. 175.
24. Schrieke, op. cit. p. 54; Tiele, Eighth Section 1611-1618, *BKI*, XXXV (1886), p. 308.
25. MacGregor, op. cit. pp. 71-2.
26. Tiele, op. cit. First Section 1509-1529, *BKI*, XXV (1877), p. 350.
27. *Ibid.* Second Section 1529-1540, *BKI*, XXVII (1879), pp. 35-6.
28. *Ibid.* pp. 65-6.
29. *Ibid.* Fifth Section 1578-1599, *BKI*, XXIX (1881), pp. 169-70.
30. R. O. Winstedt, 'History of Johor (1365-1895 A.D.)', *JMBRAS*, X, iii (Dec. 1932), p. 32.
31. *Ibid.* p. 32; Tiele, op. cit. Eighth Section 1611-1618, *BKI*, XXXV (1886), p. 303.
32. *Ibid.* p. 306.
33. The Johor River was understood to be an escape route *par excellence* by Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah (1597-1613) and probably by his brother Raja Seberang (Raja Abdullah, later to be Sultan Hammat Syah, 1613-1623). When Admiral Verhoeven tried to convince Sultan Alauddin in 1609 of the defensive value of having a Dutch fort within his kingdom, the Sultan replied that he was not afraid of the Portuguese even if they came with a large fleet since he and his subjects could always flee upriver. Isaak Commelin, *Begin ende Voortgang van de Vereenigde Nederlandsche Geotroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, vol. 2 (Amsterdam, 1646), p. 43.
34. Tiele, op. cit. Eighth Section 1611-1618, *BKI*, XXXV (1886), p. 308.
35. *Ibid.* p. 309.
36. *Ibid.* Ninth Section 1618-1623, *BKI*, XXXV (1886), p. 304.
37. Admiral Cornelis Matalief de Jong who visited Johor in 1606 had only praiseworthy things to say about Raja Seberang, who later became Sultan Hammat Syah. He was described as 'a man of about thirty-five years of age, nearly white, ... long-suffering, even-tempered and far-sighted, an enemy of the Portuguese, diligent in his work, to which he would devote much time if he possessed power: in sum, a man worthy of being the King of Johor and Malacca.' Commelin, op. cit. p. 11. At the siege of Malacca alongside the Dutch in 1606, the Johor Orang Kaya refused to place their men under anyone except the Raja Seberang. *ibid.* p. 19.
38. In view of the success of Sultan Hammat Syah in reconstituting the kingdom and resuming the life style and governance of the Johorese despite suffering two invasions by the Acehnese, it is difficult to believe that Sultan Hammat Syah

died at Tambelan of 'despair' or of a 'broken-heart'. *ibid.* p. 304; Winstedt, *op. cit.* p. 35.

39. C. R. Boxer, 'The Acehnese Attack on Malacca in 1629, as described in Contemporary Portuguese Sources', in Bastin and Roolvink (eds.), *Malayan and Indonesian Studies* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 109-21.

40. At Sultan Hammat Syah's death at Tambelan a few months after the Acehnese destruction of the capital of the Kingdom of Johor in Lingga in 1623, his widow took her two year old son and went with a following of 500 ships back to her father's kingdom in Jambi. See *Dagh-Register* 1624-1629; 17 September 1624, p. 81.

41. N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw', *JG*, XXV¹¹ (1903), p. 1258.

42. The relations between both countries had been close since the marriage in 1612 of the brother of Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah, the Raja of Siak, to the daughter of the sister of the Queen of Patani, and both nations had offered belated help to the Portuguese in the victory over Aceh in 1629. See Commelin, *op. cit.* p. 11. By early 1629 Patani had a new ruler who pursued an anti-Siamese policy. See A. Teeuw and D. K. Wyatt, *Hikayat Patani*, vol. 2 (The Hague, 1970), p. 249. This would have provided an excellent opportunity for Johor to gain a strong ally in the Malay world.

43. Macleod, *op. cit.* p. 1921.

44. Unfortunately, Megat Mansur died on the voyage. His name, however, was often invoked in later seventeenth and eighteenth century missives from the Kingdom of Johor to the Dutch in order to demonstrate their long-standing friendship. E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (Batavia, 1870), pp. 7-8.

45. In 1568 a Johor ruler was honoured in Malacca by the Portuguese because of his attempts to assist them against an Acehnese attack on that city. The Johorese, however, considered this to be a slight to their ruler's dignity since he was visiting the city of his ancestors which was still under Portuguese rule. See Tiele, *op. cit.* Fourth Section 1556-1578, *BKI*, XXVIII (1880), p. 428.

46. *BUB*, Letter from Governor-General van Diemen of Batavia to the Laksmahana of Johor, dated 22 September 1639, fols. 589-90.

47. The King of Johor was still living in Patani and was planning to return to this site on the Johor River as soon as it was fortified.

48. *BUB*, Letter from Governor-General van Diemen to the King of Johor, dated 20 April 1640, fol. 138.

49. J. E. Heeres, *Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel* ('s-Gravenhage, 1895), p. iv.

50. Pieter van Dam, *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie*, Second Book, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage, 1931), p. 330.

51. *Dagh-Register* 1640-1641: 10 September 1640, p. 3; *ibid.*, 28 September 1640, p. 36.

52. Heeres, *op. cit.* p. 231.

53. The English East India Company was formed on 31 December 1600 mainly for the trade in spices of the Moluccas. But in face of harsh competition from a larger, better-equipped and financed Dutch East India Company, it abandoned its factories in Patani, Hirado (Japan), and Siam in 1623, and retained only those at Aceh, Jambi, Japara, and Macassar. It now began to concentrate principally on Indian trade. See D. K. Bassett, 'Introduction' to L. A. Mills, 'British Malaya, 1824-1867', *JMBRAS*, III, ii (Nov. 1925), pp. 3-8.

54. *BUB*, Governor-General van Diemen to Governor van Twist of Malacca, 3 July 1641, fol. 256.

55. Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power* (London, 1957), p. 2.
56. C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (London, 1965), p. 5.
57. Ibid. p. 11.
58. Ibid. pp. 18-20.
59. Ibid. pp. 20-1.
60. Petrus Johannes Blok, (Ruth Putnam, tr.) *History of the People of The Netherlands*, vol. 1 (New York, 1900), p. 289. J. K. J. de Jonge, *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië (1595-1610)*, vol. 1, ('s-Gravenhage/Amsterdam, 1862), pp. 91-129.
61. J. A. van der Chijs, *Geschiedenis der stichting van de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Leyden, 1856), pp. 110-11.
62. Wilson, op. cit. pp. 2-3.
63. Heeres, op. cit. p. LXVI.
64. Blok, op. cit. vol. 3, p. 327.
65. Boxer, op. cit. p. 96.
66. P. Mijer, 'Punten en artikelen, in vorm van Generale Instructie', 26 April 1650, in *Verzameling van instructiën, ordonnaciën en reglementen voor de Regeering van Nederlandsch-Indië* (Batavia, 1848), p. 115.
67. Ibid. p. 89.
68. Pieter Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 1609-1648* Second Edition, vol. 1 (New York, 1961), p. 183.
69. Boxer, op. cit. p. 95.
70. Blok, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 76.
71. Geyl, op. cit. pp. 183-8.
72. Ibid. p. 189.
73. Blok, op. cit. vol. 4, pp. 203, 205. Although some of Blok's conceptions are out of date, his general picture of Dutch society and the early efforts of the Dutch provinces to create a viable state remains of great interest.
74. Boxer, op. cit. p. 96.
75. Ibid. p. 96.
76. Dianne Lewis, *The Dutch East India Company and the Straits of Malacca, 1700-1784*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Canberra, 1970), pp. 32-3; S. Arasaratnam, 'Some Notes on the Dutch in Malacca and the Indo-Malayan Trade 1641-1670', *JSEAH*, X, iii (Dec. 1969), p. 481.
77. KA 1374, OB 1691, Dag-Register of Malacca, under date 20 Dec. 1689, Letter from the Dato Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, fols. 170-1.

II

JOHOR'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BASES OF POWER

JOHOR emerged in 1641 a power considerably reduced in territory and prestige yet still possessing the economic and political goals and the priorities of its predecessor, the Malay Kingdom of Malacca. In 1641 the Kingdom of Johor only consisted of the Kelang River, the Penagie (Lower Linggi) River, the Siak River, the Kampar River, Bengkalis, Ungaran, Karimun Islands, Bulang, Bentan, Lingga and surrounding islands, the islands of Singapore, Rio Formosa (Batu Pahat River), and Muar.¹ Several important areas had gained their independence since the heyday of the Kingdom of Malacca in the late fifteenth century. It had then consisted of Pahang, Terengganu, Kelantan, islands on the Straits of Singapore, the Riau-Lingga Archipelagos, Kampar, Siak, Indragiri, and the population of Rokan. In addition Malacca had gained through treaties the tin from Kelang, Selangor, Perak, Bernam, Manjong, Bruas, and Kedah.² Nevertheless, the author of the *Hikayat Hang Tuah*, looking back to this period in the middle of the seventeenth century, was filled with the sense of propriety and pride in Johor's place in the history of the Malay world. He portrayed Johor as an equal power with the Dutch and ruling jointly over (Dutch) Malacca.³ In fact, while it had lost much of its former power, Johor was fully aware of future possibilities now that the Portuguese threat was gone and the Acehnese Orang Kaya in the court were more preoccupied with maintaining their control of the Acehnese crown than in extending Aceh's borders. Freed from these restraints the Kingdom of

Johor began to function as efficiently as it had in the past and began reviving the international trade in its ports.

The area of Johor itself had little to offer, but its port was usually bustling with foreign traders. They were attracted to Johor because of the latter's reputation of being able to provide both an accessible and excellent market of goods, as well as the necessary facilities for the efficient conduct of trade. The Dutch envoys to the court of Johor in the second half of the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries were impressed by these facilities but did not think it necessary to elaborate what they were. One can safely assume that they were quite similar to those which their immediate predecessor Malacca provided in an earlier century: warehouses (underground, if possible, because of the danger of fire), properly-trained officials to handle the business of organizing and conducting trade, acceptable customs duties, fixed weights and measures, sufficient resources for the refitting and repairing of ships for the home journey, and desirable trade products.⁴ Johor's skilful handling of trade goods and its ability to reprovision ships cheaply and quickly (*menagierse aequipage*) were singled out by the admiring Dutch as an important inducement to foreign traders. Such considerations were important since time was precious to traders highly dependent on the winds of the monsoon to convey them from their homeports to foreign ports and back home again. Governor Thomas Slicher of Malacca wrote to Batavia in May, 1687, that:

The number of ships going to Riau [then the capital of Johor] is so great that the river is scarcely navigable as a result of the many trading vessels in it ... traders are attracted to Riau because of its *menagierse aequipage*. Here the tin traders are paid half in *contant* [specie] and half in cloth; whereas, in Malacca they are given whatever cloth available and not the newest styles as in Riau.⁵

Johor boasted the ability to provide the latest styles in cloth and the best of bargains. Dutch missions to the various cities on the Johor River and on Riau marvelled at the trading activity they found there. Some of the things traded were gold, eaglewood, kelembak,⁶ pedro porco,⁷ birdsnest, ivory, camphor, tin, rattan, wax, pepper, salt, rice, copper, spiauter, white Chinese silk, porcelain, iron Chinese pans, cloth (Guinees,⁸ etc.), red cloth (*laken*), Japanese gold thread, and opium.⁹

Trade was conducted on a system of patronage in Johor. Each Johorese or foreign trader sought the patronage of a powerful

individual within the kingdom, such as the Bendahara, the Raja Indra Bongsu, the Temenggong, the Laksamana, or the Kadi. For a sizeable share of the profits from the client's trade, the patron guaranteed him protection against hounding creditors and sometimes even against crimes. In 1687 the Dutch envoys to Riau made some revealing observations on how trade was conducted under the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil: (my paraphrasing)

Of the traders here the Paduka Raja [Tun Abdul Jamil]'s factors are the largest in number and principal ones involved in the buying and selling of wares. The Paduka Raja even sent his two sons the Sri Bija di Raja and the Laksamana to Siak several months ago to trade there. When an Englishman came two years ago to ask permission to trade and to establish a lodge, the Paduka Raja granted the first but not the second. The Paduka Raja is profiting immensely by the trade which is pouring into Riau, and he is not ready to give anyone an advantage over his own factors. Four or five Macassarese ships tried to obtain a pass from the Paduka Raja so they could go to Aceh, but he refused because he wanted to keep the entire trade in his hands in Riau. Traders on Riau do not dare spend their own money but must receive the money from the Paduka Raja who takes 25 per cent of the total. With such methods the Paduka Raja manages to profit considerably by the number of traders at Riau.¹⁰

When Dutch envoys went to Johor in 1706, they were impressed with the increasing trade in Johor and commented that all the goods were being monopolized by two Moors and three or four Chinese who operated under the patronage of the most important Orang Kaya in Johor. Malacca freeburgers ignored Dutch prohibitions and also contributed toward the growth of trade in Johor. In 1706 three Malacca freeburgers, the Captain of the freeburgers Bruyn Borenken,¹¹ the Moorish trader Sedelebe, and the Chinese La Kwa, established three factories in Pancor.¹² It was the ruler and the Orang Kaya, however, who provided the money with which these traders bought their goods.

About eight to ten Chinese junks usually appeared every year and sold their goods on credit within two or three weeks. These buyers, who were normally under some Orang Kaya's patronage, would then leave to sell their newly bought wares for the products which the Chinese wanted. Such a system encouraged great rivalries among the leaders of the kingdom and provided an open arena where the real power wielded by a certain individual became openly evident to all. It was the operation of this system of patronage

which made the Dutch comment critically on the state of affairs in Johor where 'everyone did as he pleased as if there were no king or government'.¹³

By gaining the patronage of an important personage within the kingdom, a trader, whether from Johor or abroad, could easily obtain a Dutch pass and sail unmolested beyond Malacca to ports in Aceh, Perak, or Kedah. Malacca was instructed by Batavia to extend the passes to the Orang Kaya of Johor as a courtesy; thus ships of many different nations were able to trade in the area under the protective umbrella of the seal (*cap*) of their patron and the pass from the Dutch. In this way the Johor Orang Kaya and leaders gained still greater revenue as a result, ironically, of a Dutch practice of issuing passes intended to diminish the importance of native entrepôts.

The wealth from international trade served to enhance the prestige of the Johor leaders and strengthened the traditional political forces which assured the well-being of the kingdom. At the apex of this traditional power structure of Johor was the ruler. Without his presence to justify all activity and to reward the labours of the people with titles and robes of honour, the kingdom would be indistinguishable from many other riverine or estuary settlements in the Malay world. He enhanced the status of the kingdom, and his glory and splendour were shared by his subjects. When the last ruler of Malacca was fleeing from Bentan, he was assured by his minister that he could find ten countries for him.¹⁴ Land and people could always be found, but not rulers with an illustrious and impeccable lineage. Despite the repeated destruction of the capitals of Johor by the Portuguese and the Acehnese in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, only in 1564 and in 1613 was the ruler of Johor actually taken prisoner. But on both of these occasions another ruler from the same royal family was again set on the throne by the conquerors. In all of the other cases the ruler eluded his pursuers and re-established his residence as before, thus assuring the perpetuation of the kingdom.¹⁵ It did not matter that the land was ravaged and the people scattered. As long as the ruler and the dynasty survived, there was no danger of the dissolution of the kingdom and a reversion to an earlier situation of small, individual *kampung* under a minor chieftain like those located on any number of places on the rivers, estuaries, or coasts of the Malay world.

Through the efforts of the whole kingdom, wealth through trade, piracy, and wars flowed to the ruler's coffers; in turn, these faithful subjects were rewarded not with material goods alone, but with the prestige of having a ruler from a royal family of an ancient and illustrious line. It was this practice which elicited the following remark from the last ruler of Malacca when asked by the Bendahara why all the wealth of the kingdom had been given in dowry which left nothing but 'the bedragoned sword of kingship' for his successor, the Sultan Muda: 'If the Sultan Muda has but the sword of kingship, he will have gold as well.' To this remark the author of the *Sejarah Melayu* added in explanation: 'That is to say, where there is sovereignty, there is gold.'¹⁶

The ruler's exalted and indispensable role in the society is reinforced by the attitude expressed in the *Sejarah Melayu*:

... it has been granted by Almighty God to Malay rulers that they shall never put their subjects to shame, and that those subjects however gravely they offend shall never be bound or hanged or disgraced with evil words. If any ruler puts a single one of his subjects to shame (*memberi 'aib*), that shall be a sign that his kingdom will be destroyed by Almighty God. Similarly it has been granted by Almighty God to Malay subjects that they shall never be disloyal or treacherous to their rulers, even if their rulers behave evilly or inflict injustice upon them.¹⁷

By this pact a Malay ruler is made responsible solely to Almighty God, while the Malay subject is admonished to be loyal since only the hand of God is able to render appropriate justice to a ruler. This was the ideal expounded in the court literature, which, if not followed totally in practice, conditioned the relationship between ruler and his subjects. In the total framework of the kingdom, it was the symbolic position of the ruler which assured its survival, and not the strengths or weaknesses of the particular individual clothed with the dignity of that office.

While the presence of the ruler was indispensable in guaranteeing the survival of the kingdom, he alone could not assure the proper functioning of the government:

... for no ruler, however great his wisdom and understanding shall prosper or succeed in doing justice unless he consults with those in authority under him. For rulers are like fire and their ministers are like firewood and fire needs wood to produce a flame.¹⁸

For the proper governing of the community, the ruler depended upon his ministers who served as the purifying filter which protected

the sacred kingship from the vulgarities of mundane affairs of state. The areas of the Kingdom of Johor outside the immediate vicinity of the principal settlement on the Johor River were governed by individuals appointed by and accountable to a chief minister at the court. An episode in the *Sejarah Melayu* illustrates what was expected of these ministers by the ruler. When one of the ministers was accused of poor management of his fief, he replied:

... As for the business of us who administer territory, what concern is that of yours? For territory is territory even if it is only the size of a coconut shell! What we think should be done we do, for the Ruler is not concerned with the difficulties we administrators encounter, he only takes account of the good results we achieve.¹⁹

The ruler was unconcerned with the manner in which these ministers managed their fiefs as long as there was peace in the kingdom and wealth continued to flow to the ruler's coffers. In case of rebellion or other disturbances in an outlying area, the chief minister himself was despatched to the scene to supervise the normalization of affairs. In such cases it was common for the official in whose area of jurisdiction a disturbance had occurred to be removed and another favourite of the chief minister put in his place. When a chief minister fell out of favour with the ruler, the area would again be placed at the disposal of the ruler to be assigned to another chief minister or to be disposed of in whatever way he saw fit. Yet from an examination of the Dutch sources for the seventeenth century, it appears that more often than not, even a chief minister out of favour with the ruler retained certain traditional areas as apanages.

Ideally, the ministers acted on behalf of the ruler and were the guardians of those matters which constituted a threat to their sovereign lord, hence a threat to the kingdom. Yet because international trade was a vital concern of the kingdom both in terms of revenue as well as enhancement of power and prestige to the ruler, the chief ministers of Johor had ample opportunity to serve their ruler and themselves. In the years of Johor's prosperity in the second half of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the abilities of the ministers were severely tested in trade, diplomacy, and warfare. Despite the apparent independence and authority exercised by some of the chief ministers in this period, the rivalry between the Bendahara and the Laksamana families vividly illustrated the fact that their position and power depended ultimately not on their own

innate shrewdness and ability, nor on their wealth, but on the sanction of the ruler.

In addition to the ruler and his chief ministers, the Council of the Orang Kaya formed a third important component in the power structure of the Kingdom of Johor. The chief minister in theory consulted the Council when acting on the wishes of the ruler or in attending to other matters of government. Neither the Dutch nor the Malay records describe the composition or the specific functions of the Council. In a report by a Dutch envoy to Johor in 1687 the most important Orang Kaya bore the titles of Dato Bendahara, Paduka Raja, Tuan Pikrama, Laksamana, Temenggong, Sri Bija di Raja, Sri Nara Mentri, Sri Nara di Raja, Sri Bija Wangsa, Paduka Sri Maharaja, Sri Pikrama Raja, Sri Mahawangsa, and Maharaja Indra Mara Denda.²⁰ Although the envoy does not refer to these individuals as constituting the Council, the fact that they were considered to be the most prominent of the Orang Kaya and had the honour of greeting the Dutch envoy at the *balai* indicate that these may have composed some of the more important members of the Council of the Orang Kaya. In 1710 ten members of the Council of the Orang Kaya accompanied the Raja Muda on his voyage to Bengkalis, Batu Bahara, Selangor, and Linggi. Those named are the Sri Nara di Raja, Sri Bija di Raja, Sri Bija Wangsa, Raja Indra Muda, Sri Setia, and Tun Lela Putra.²¹ No clues are given as to how the Council was selected or whether only those holding certain titles became members. Three of the titles mentioned in 1687 are also found in the 1710 list of a few of the members of the Council.

These principal Orang Kaya formed individual centres of power within the kingdom. Through trade they obtained the revenues necessary to acquire followers and slaves who owed their allegiance to them and fought under their command in battle.²² Consequently, they were sensitive to the successes or failures of the chief minister in attracting trade to Johor's ports and in protecting their trading ships. The Orang Kaya proved to be a force capable of righting any imbalance in the exercise of power as a result of a usurpation of proper roles or an excessive accumulation of wealth by any chief minister or any other Orang Kaya. When they were ignored or abused, they lent their assistance to a rival contender in order to improve their position within the kingdom. When they were courted, they responded favourably and contributed toward a successful

working relationship among the ruler, the chief minister, and the Orang Kaya.

The Orang Laut formed the fourth and a vital component of the power structure of Johor. Because of their intense loyalty to the rulers of the Malacca dynasty, they formed an effective counterforce to the strength of the Orang Kaya. 'Orang Laut' is a term applied to the island and coastal people who inhabit the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, the Pulau Tujuh group, the Batam archipelago, and the coast and off-shore islands of eastern Sumatra and southern Malay Peninsula. Although 'Orang Laut' is a convenient term, it obscures the reality of numerous tribes and status groups subsumed under this rubric for sea-faring peoples in the Malay world. The more powerful and prestigious Orang Laut groups were associated with the larger islands, and especially those which were favourably situated on major sea trading lanes. They were the Orang Suku Bentan from the island of Bentan, Orang Suku Mepar from the island of Lingga, Orang Suku Bulang from the island of Bulang, and the Orang Suku Galang, mainly from the Galang islands.²³ In addition there were the Orang Laut on the island of Singapore under their chieftain the Dato Raja Negara, and the Orang Pesukuan (Orang Suku Bulu, Bekaka, Kilang, Timiang, Mnau, and Pulau Boya) who were all vassals of the ruler of Johor.²⁴

The Orang Laut gained their livelihood from the sea through piracy and the gathering of sea-products such as sea-slugs (*trepang*), two types of sea-weed (*agar-agar* and *sangu*), and turtleshell for the China trade, and by collecting forest products and making *kajang*²⁵ mats for the archipelago trade.²⁶ Years spent sailing these waters in search of sea-products made the Orang Laut familiar with the numerous sunken shoals and dangerous reefs. Furthermore, their great mobility and the necessity to operate within the monsoon system helped them gain an intimate knowledge of a large number of islands and coastlines on the east and west coast of the Malay Peninsula.²⁷ A knowledge of the monsoonal changes and the treacherous reefs and islets in these waters could give a weaker force a superior advantage over a much stronger foe. Commenting on the 'piracy' of these sea peoples in the early nineteenth century, T. J. Newbold wrote:

... what they mainly depend upon for safety and success is their skill in paddling, (Malay pirates scarcely ever attack except during the lull between the land and sea-breeze, or in a calm), the swiftness of their boats,

and their knowledge of the intricate channels between the islands or over the bars of the rivers, into which they generally contrive to escape, baffling their pursuers, and often leaving them a-ground on some of the numerous shoals or mudbanks, which their own superior knowledge enables them to avoid.²⁸

The relationship between the Orang Laut and the rulers of the Malacca-Johor royal family may be a very old one dating from the period of greatness of the Srivijaya-Palembang Empire between the seventh to the eleventh centuries, and again re-established at the end of the fourteenth century with a refugee prince who became the founder of the Malacca dynasty. According to a reconstruction of this early period of Malay history by O. W. Wolters, when Parameswara (Sri Tri Buana in the Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu*) was consecrated in the *abhiṣeka* rites in Palembang in 1391-2, he rejected the Javanese overlordship over his kingdom and appealed for the re-establishment of the glorious Srivijaya-Palembang past. One ruler who heeded this call and put his resources and his kingdom at the disposal of the Palembang lord was the ruler of Bentan.²⁹ It was he who acknowledged the superior spiritual power of the Parameswara as a result of his consecration. He believed in this new opportunity for recapturing Palembang's former greatness as an international entrepot in which he, as lord of numerous ships and men, would become a vital part. Although Parameswara's pretensions at Palembang were quickly dashed by the Javanese, who would brook no competitors to their hegemony in the area, he retained the loyalty of the rulers of Bentan and his Orang Laut followers.

Parameswara's flight was naturally to Bentan, the source of the ships and manpower which had probably been the mainstay of Srivijaya-Palembang's fleets in former times and whose ruler had responded favourably to Parameswara's consecration and ambitions for Palembang. Nevertheless, Parameswara never considered Bentan as a suitable site for his kingdom. According to Raffles MS 18 the ruler of Bentan tried to persuade him to remain in Bentan, but he replied: 'If I am not permitted to go, then I shall die, whether I sit down or stand up or whatever I do.'³⁰ During the period of Srivijaya-Palembang's greatness the islands were a source of strength to the Palembang maharaja, but never the centre of the court. Even as the Malays in Malacca in the fifteenth century condescendingly referred to a Bentan title, Tun Talanai, as being of the 'backwoods',³¹

Parameswara and his Palembang followers would have been grateful but slightly contemptuous of Bentan since it was less civilized and a backwater area of the Srivijayan empire.

The ruler of Bentan responded as a loyal vassal and willingly provided whatever was needed by Parameswara in order to begin a new capital city elsewhere. According to the Raffles MS 18, the old ruler of Bentan (who is mentioned as a queen) acceded to Sri Tri Buana's request for men, elephants, and horses to establish a city at Temasek (Singapore) with the words: 'We will never oppose any wish of our son (*anak kita*)', and then sent men, elephants, and horses 'without number'.³² In Wolters' reconstruction of this period, the ruler of Bentan remained by Parameswara's side during the latter's stay in Singapore between 1391-2 and 1396-7³³ and was rewarded with the office of Bendahara, a dignity higher than all others save the ruler's. This ruler of Bentan, now known as Bendahara Tun Perpatch Berjajar in the Raffles MS 18, was further rewarded by Parameswara by having his daughters marry the son and grandson of Parameswara.³⁴

Tomé Pires, a Portuguese observer writing in the early sixteenth century, states that the Orang Laut followers of Parameswara discovered the sites of Bertam and Malacca for their lord when he was expelled from Singapore. They told him that 'We too belong to thy ancient lordship of Palembang; we have always gone with thee'. So pleased was he with the sites that he rewarded them with titles; thus, 'they strove to please him and their honour always lasted right down to the coming of Diogo Lopes de Sequiera [1509] to Malacca'.³⁵ Pires also mentions that the second ruler of Malacca abandoned the Bertam court and 'sent all the Celate (Orang Laut) mandarins to live on the slopes of the Malacca hill to act as his guards'.³⁶ Malacca thus became the site chosen to perpetuate the glorious Srivijaya-Palembang traditions. The ruler of Bentan accepted the suzerainty of the superior overlord from Palembang, was lavishly rewarded, and became closely allied with the royal family. His followers were assigned the honourable and highly important task as the ruler's personal guards, and their honour lasted even beyond the coming of Diogo Lopes de Sequiera to the very end of the seventeenth century.

The loyalty of the Orang Suku Bentan to the Malacca dynasty probably extended back in time to the early days when the Maharajas of Srivijaya-Palembang seized the initiative in the waters of the

Malay world and made the Orang Laut of the Riau-Lingga archipelago an important part of their system of governance and prosperity. When Parameswara attempted to continue this tradition at the end of the fourteenth century, he received the total loyalty of the ruler of Bentan and his followers. An important relationship between the court and the Orang Laut was re-established and maintained successfully until the death of the last scion of this ancient dynasty in 1699.

The Orang Suku Mepar of Lingga seems to have entered much later into an arrangement with the rulers of Malacca and Johor. Their traditions say that they originated from Terengganu and only later moved to Lingga. While they were still living in Terengganu, their leader was killed by the Raja of Pahang. The three sons of the murdered leader appealed for redress from the ruler of Malacca who was sympathetic to their grievances and pacified them by giving them the mandate to govern the nomadic tribes of Lingga and the surrounding islands.³⁷

Other Orang Laut *suku* served the Malacca-Johor dynasty, but when or how they became part of the kingdom is not known. In the nineteenth century some of these *suku* still retained functions in the Johor court. The *suku* which provided the fighting forces of the ruler were the Orang Suku Bentan under a *hulubalang*, the Singgera under a *batin*, the Kopet under a *jinang*, and the Bulo, Mepar, Galang, Gelam, Sekanna, and Sugi.³⁸ Rowers for the ruler's fleets were obtained from the Orang Suku Ladi, Galang, Gelam, Sekanna, Sugi, Klong, Trong, Moro, and Tambus.³⁹ Smithwork and the making of weapons were the sole preserve of the Orang Suku Mantang.⁴⁰ Whenever these Orang Laut came and served the ruler, the latter's only obligation was to provide them with food. There were also other functions served by the other *suku*, such as the transport of envoys and letters to rulers in foreign countries by the Orang Suku Mepar; the providing of *agar-agar* and *sangu* by the Orang Suku Kasu (Selat), Trong, Sugi, and Moro; the service in the kitchens and the furnishing of water and firewood by the Orang Suku Nam;⁴¹ the supplying of wood and carpentry for the ruler by the Orang Suku Ladi; and the caring of the ruler's hunting dogs by the Orang Suku Tambus.⁴²

Unlike their descendants in the nineteenth century, who were characterized as shy people, avoiding contact whenever possible, and being on the very periphery of the Malay kingdoms, the Orang

Laut in the earlier centuries played an important role in Malacca and in its successor state, Johor. The Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* refers to the Orang Laut serving in various capacities as rowers, fighting men, and messengers of the ruler of Malacca. It was the Orang Laut who were summoned to fetch their ruler who had fled an exile from his capital in Bentan after a Portuguese attack in 1526.⁴³ They were readily accessible and in sufficient numbers to guarantee the safety and the well-being of the exiled ruler and his new capital, wheresoever he felt inclined to settle within his widely scattered lands. Throughout the period of constant harassment and attacks from both the Portuguese and the Acehnese in the sixteenth century and the first third of the seventeenth century, the seemingly totally defeated and impoverished Malay ruler could still quickly assemble a fleet of considerable size to launch a counter-attack or to re-establish a new capital somewhere in his kingdom. The reason for this resilience was the availability and willingness of the Orang Laut groups to support the ruler explicitly throughout the changes of fortune of the kingdom.

In the seventeenth century they evinced an unswerving loyalty to the person of the ruler which accentuated the importance of their role in the Kingdom of Johor. Nowhere was the sacredness of the ruler of the Malacca-Johor dynasty more totally accepted than within the ranks of the Orang Laut. Their complete trust and loyalty to the Malacca-Johor ruler is difficult to explain because it was not merely wealth which bound them to the ruler. Despite chests of rials and gold which the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil possessed, he was not able to buy the loyalty of the Orang Laut against a child ruler in 1688. In face of the evidence from contemporary VOC records, which contain letters and verbal reports from Malays themselves, and from later Malay histories dealing with this period, one is inclined to seek a reasonable explanation for the Orang Laut's loyalty to the Malacca-Johor royal family from a suggestion made by O. W. Wolters. After an analysis of the sources dealing with late fourteenth century Srivijaya history, he suggests that the future founder of the Malacca dynasty had undergone in Srivijaya an *abhiṣeka* ceremony, in which 'a consecration rite was performed and accompanied by the prince's assumption of a new name identifying him with a god'.⁴⁴ Wolters further suggests that the ruler of Bentan had known of this special religious ceremony; yet, 'only a sovereign's robes of honour were worth expecting in return for

promises of loyalty'.⁴⁵ Judging from the sequel to these events in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the intensity of the devotion of the Orang Laut to the successors of the Malacca dynasty, it appears more likely that the Orang Laut responded whole-heartedly to the performance of the *abhiṣeka* ceremony by Parameswara and believed less in the promise of 'robes of honour' than in the special powers acquired by him in this ceremony. The 'divine' quality of kingship is defined by an Arabic word, *daulat*, but precedes the coming of Islam to the courts of Malacca. In the times of the Srivijaya princes the word may have been *śakti*, 'the supernatural power associated with the gods'.⁴⁶ B. Anderson describes the Javanese idea of *kasektén* as incorporating in the Western sense the idea of power, legitimacy, and charisma.⁴⁷ The concept of *daulat* in the Malacca-Johor kingdom definitely expressed the force of legitimacy and charisma, but the conception of power in the Western sense was absent. Individual rulers possessed external power because of their individual actions, but the non-spiritual power was irrelevant and inapplicable to the idea of *daulat*.

To the Malays and the Orang Laut, the special qualities would have placed the ruler in a special realm above the common people and worthy of veneration. The concept was such an awesome one that along with the belief in *daulat* grew a special abhorrent sin described as *derhaka*, treason to the ruler — the *negeri* (community). The Malays regarded *derhaka* with such repugnance that transgressors received unusual punishments from a special force surrounding kingship (*timpa daulat*). In one especially vivid case of *derhaka* being struck by *daulat* described in the *Siak Chronicles*, a wound inflicted on the foot of the traitor remains unhealed for four years and grass grows in the wound itself.⁴⁸ The Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* tells a story of a treasury officer (Bendahari) of Malacca who betrays his ruler to the Batara (ruler) of Majapahit in revenge for the shameful murder of his daughter. For this act of *derhaka* he is punished by 'the will of Almighty God' and his house and wife are turned into stone.⁴⁹

As long as the rulers of the Malacca-Johor kingdoms could claim descent from this refugee prince of Srivijaya who founded Malacca, they became the inheritors of that special quality of kingship associated with an ancient and prestigious line. In this way they maintained the allegiance of the Orang Laut who exhibited a devotion

to the Malacca ruling house approximating the relationship of an ancient family and its personal retainers.

The influence of the Orang Laut in the kingdom prior to the nineteenth century was considerable owing to their large numbers in relation to the Malays. The Dutch calculated in 1714 that out of 6,500 soldiers which the ruler of Johor could assemble from all of his territories, approximately 700 would come from the islands off the coast of Pahang; 2,000 from Riau; 500 from Lingga; and 400 from Bengkalis and the Siak River.⁵⁰ (See Appendix F) These were areas of principally Orang Laut populations; thus, even discounting the figures at the capital Riau, which had a substantial Malay population in addition to the Orang Laut, the latter still constituted at a conservative estimate about one-fourth of the military manpower of the kingdom. A VOC official visiting Riau in July 1714, observed that according to his estimation there were no more than 2,000 men on the island, 'the rest live in the surrounding islands called Singapore, Pulau Papan, Pulau Bawang, and Brouwer Straits, etc.'⁵¹ Manpower, especially armed manpower, was a weighty factor in the politics of the Kingdom of Johor, and thus the role of the Orang Laut assumed great significance.

The dual role of the Orang Laut, as the rowers and fighting men in the ruler's fleet and as patrols in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was a source of strength and, to a much lesser extent, of weakness in the Kingdom of Johor. Except in times of actual warfare the Orang Laut were usually encouraged by the ruler to provide protection for his own traders and to others wanting to trade in Johor, while molesting all other traders. It would have been against Johor's own interests to maintain these fleets idle near the capital city; consequently, the capital was always vulnerable to surprise attack, as occurred often in the sixteenth century and in the destruction of Johor Lama in 1673. Yet because the Orang Laut were not confined to the capital but were either on patrol or back on their own islands, it was possible for the ruler whose capital was destroyed by the enemy to assemble these forces within a short time and regain the initiative. Only a few months after the Dutch reported 'the complete destruction' of Johor Lama in 1673 and the large booty and numerous prisoners taken, a Johorese fleet appeared at the mouth of the Jambi River and threatened 'victorious' Jambi. The Orang Laut were mainly responsible for the rapid recovery of the kingdom, as they had been in the time of the refugee rulers of Malacca. On one

occasion after Banten had been conquered by the Portuguese in 1526 and the population scattered, one of the principal Orang Kaya, the Paduka Tuan, told his son Tun Pekerma to "Go and collect all the people living on the coast (the Orang Laut), and we will then go and fetch the Ruler". Tun Pekerma went accordingly and called the coast tribesmen who thereupon assembled.⁵² This source of manpower and ships did not customarily reside in large numbers in the capital and therefore did not suffer the effects of an attack on the capital.

The ruler of Johor appreciated the Orang Laut's particular talents in encouraging traders to frequent ports of Johor and in discouraging economic competitors, and he assiduously employed them against Johor's chief rivals, the Dutch, in the Straits of Malacca. The Orang Laut boats were sent out to patrol the waters, not to enforce a system of passes as did the Dutch guardships, but to demonstrate the ability of Johor to wreak a fearful punishment on those who patronized its competitors and to afford protection to those who responded to its offer of trade at its ports. The Orang Laut were particularly effective when the capital of Johor was located at Riau on the island of Banten. Riau was ideally located to keep a close watch on the movement of ships since it was about sixteen miles from the Johor River, twelve to sixteen miles in the Straits of Singapore, and twelve to sixteen miles from the Hook of Barbukit.⁵³ From this vantage point the Johorese could more effectively direct their Orang Laut toward passing ships to bring them to harbour and also keep a watch on any invading fleet. The Orang Laut had a further advantage in being able to operate within their own familiar waters. Whenever the capital was moved to Riau the effectiveness of the Orang Laut was greatly enhanced.

The Orang Laut fulfilled a function in the Kingdom of Johor in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries similar to that which they had performed in Srivijaya-Palembang from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries. They patrolled the Straits of Malacca, which was a major world trade artery between the East and the West, and protected or attacked any shipping passing through their home waters. From early times the Chinese emperors had seen the value of maintaining strong friendly kingdoms in this area to assure the peaceful passage of their trading ships. The Dutch in The Netherlands and in Batavia in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries appreciated the wisdom of this old Chinese trade policy and pro-

moted the friendship with the Kingdom of Johor as a means of controlling the activities of the Orang Laut, in spite of objections from the Dutch in Malacca. As long as the Kingdom of Johor was able to maintain control of the activities of the Orang Laut, the Dutch in Batavia saw the value of promoting the friendship with this Malay kingdom, even at the cost of the prosperity of its outpost, Malacca. The VOC concern for peace in the Straits provided Johor with an advantageous bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Dutch, which was far greater than its size and its importance in the total Asian trade of the VOC warranted. The leaders of Johor were quick to recognize the Dutch priorities in the Asian world and soon came to appreciate the value of operating within a new frame of reference in the Malay world, the Dutch treaty system. The prosperity of Johor was largely attributed to the ability of Johor's leaders to respond to the new economic opportunities provided by this system. By adapting their trade policies to utilize fully all favourable provisions within the treaties, they brought large revenues to the kingdom thereby strengthening their position and enhancing their prestige in the Malay world.

1. *Dagh-Register* 1640-1641: 3 April 1641, p. 226.

2. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 29-30.

3. Kassim Ahmad (ed.), *Hikayat Hang Tuah* (Kuala Lumpur, 1966), pp. 490-1.

4. Meilink-Roelofs, op. cit. pp. 40-5.

5. KA 1327, OB 1688, Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 10 March 1687, fols. 787r-788v.

6. Kelembak is considered to be the best quality of eaglewood.

7. Kidneystones found in the porcupine, monkeys, goats, and used for curative purposes. According to C. Lockyer, 'Pedro de Porco Siacca, valued at ten-times its weight in Gold; they are oftener found about Bencallis than anywhere else They are dark brownish Colour, smooth on the outside; but the first coat being broken, they appear darker and stringy underneath To it are attributed the Virtues of cleansing the Stomach, creating an Appetite, and sweetening the Blood.' C. Lockyer, *An Account of the Trade in India, etc.* (London, 1711), p. 49.

8. Spiauter or tutenage was an alloy of zinc obtained from China. Guinees, also called cambaijen or negroskleeden, were checkered cotton material important for the purchase in Africa of slaves for the West Indies trade and the African trade. K. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* (Copenhagen, 1958), p. 20.

9. Ibid. Report of Willem Valentyn on Mission to Johor, 15 July 1687, fols. 833r-v.

10. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1687, fols. 853v-861v.

11. When the Englishman Charles Lockyer was in Malacca in the beginning of the eighteenth century, he remarked that 'Minheir [Mr.] Broenken' was considered to be the most important trader in Malacca. Lockyer, op. cit. p. 68.
12. KA 1621, OB 1707, Report of Assistant Johan de Wolff to Batavia on Mission to Johor, dated 20 Sept. 1706, fols. 25-26.
13. KA 1636, OB 1708, Report of Johan de Wolff on Mission to Johor, 28 Jan. 1707, fols. 32-33.
14. C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952), p. 189.
15. In 1564 Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah was brought to Aceh and there put to death, but one of his sons was sent back to Johor to rule. According to all the sources, except for the Bustanu's-Salatin, Raja Muzaffar was the one who succeeded his father on the throne of Johor. See R. O. Winstedt, 'History of Johore (1365-1895 A.D.)', *JMBRAS*, X, iii (Dec. 1932), p. 21. In 1613 another Sultan Alauddin of Johor was brought back to Aceh by the conquerors and died there. He was succeeded by his brother Raja Seberang who was brought back from Aceh to become ruler of Johor. See P. A. Tiele, 'De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel', *BKI*, XXXV (1886), p. 303.
16. Brown, op. cit. p. 187.
17. Ibid. pp. 26-27.
18. Ibid. p. 124.
19. Ibid. p. 66.
20. KA 1327, OB 1688, Report from Willem Valentyn to Batavia, 15 July 1687, fol. 829v.
21. KA 1687, OB 1711, Verbal Report of Raja Lela Putra and Wan Abdul envoys from the Raja Muda of Johor, 12 July 1710, fols. 552-554.
22. Isaak Commelin, *Begin ende Voortgang van de Vereenigde Nederlandsche Geocroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, vol. 2 (Amsterdam, 1646), p. 19.
23. J. G. Schot, 'De Battam Archipel', *IG*, IV, ii (1882), pp. 164-5.
24. J. R. Logan, 'The Ethnology of the Johore Archipelago', *JIA*, I (1847) p. 336.
25. Palm-frond which is woven into mats and used for boat coverings, roofs, etc.
26. E. Netscher, 'Togtjes in het gebied van Riouw en onderhoorigheden', *TBG*, XIV (1864), p. 236.
27. Speaking of the Riau-Lingga archipelago and the Pulau Tujuh Islands a nineteenth century Dutch naval officer, G. F. de Bruijn Kops, remarked: 'These islands are separated by numerous straits. Only a few of these straits, however, are navigable by ships; the rest are so narrow and crooked, that it is even inadvisable for small vessels of light draught to venture through them [Three is a] multitude of outlets and salt water creeks Tides at times are very strong in the straits. The north monsoon blows from May to October. In the changing months, many and protracted calms occur, varied by heavy squalls.' G. F. de Bruijn Kops, 'Sketch of the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago', translated from the Dutch, *JIA*, VIII (1854), pp. 386-7.
28. T. J. Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, vol. 1 (London, 1839), p. 38.
29. O. W. Wolters, *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 139-40.
30. Brown, op. cit. p. 29.
31. Ibid. p. 191.
32. Ibid. p. 31.
33. Wolters, op. cit. p. 147.

34. Ibid. pp. 142-3.
35. Armando Cortesao (ed.), *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*, vol. 2 (London, 1944), pp. 233-5. In view of what was told to Pires in the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was interesting to read recently of a certain belief held by the Duano, an aquatic people who live in the estuaries on the western coast of Johor on the Straits of Malacca. A French anthropologist who spent some time with the Duano in 1967 mentions certain intriguing statements made by the Duano whom he interviewed: 'The Malays came here after us; furthermore, the first *raja* of this country was one of ours'. See Chr. Pelras, 'Notes sur quelques populations aquatiques de l'Archipel nusantarien', *Archipel* III (1972), p. 144.
36. Cortesao, op. cit. p. 246.
37. Schot, op. cit. p. 165.
38. Ibid. vol. V, i (1883), pp. 472-3.
39. Schot, op. cit., vol. V, i (1883), pp. 472-3.
40. Ibid. p. 473.
41. Ibid. p. 473; J. G. Schot, 'Het stroomgebied der Kateman, bijdrage tot de kennis van Oost-Sumatra', *TBG*, XXIX (1884), pp. 575-6.
42. Schot, op. cit. 'De Battam ...', vol. V, i (1883), p. 473.
43. Brown, op. cit. p. 191.
44. Wolters, op. cit. p. 124.
45. Ibid. pp. 125-6.
46. R. J. Wilkinson, *A Malay-English Dictionary* (Romanized), vol. 2 (London, 1959), p. 1004.
47. B. Anderson, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture', in Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca/London, 1972), p. 4.
48. *Sejarah Melayu* (i.e. Siak Chronicles), Cod. Or. 7304, in the University of Leiden Library, p. 405, lines 5-6.
49. Brown, op. cit. p. 51.
50. KA 1746, OB 1715, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 12 August 1714, fols. 146-9.
51. Ibid. Report of Anthony van Aldorp on the Lay-out of Riau, 24 July 1714, fols. 210-11.
52. Brown, op. cit. p. 191; Tiele, op. cit. First Section 1509-1529, *BKI*, XXV (1877), p. 395.
53. KA 1668, OB 1709, Second Malacca Register, *Memorie van Overgave* of Gov. Pieter Rooselaer of Malacca to Willem Six, 26 Dec. 1709, fol. 30.

III

JOHOR WITHIN THE DUTCH TREATY SYSTEM

IN the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the VOC imposed the concept of *mare clausum* or 'closed seas' in the inter-Asian trade. This was an outgrowth of an attitude first developed by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century when they were the dominant European traders in Asia. They attempted unsuccessfully to impose a monopoly on certain spices and demanded that all other nations obtain their passes in order to trade in specific areas. According to the justification expounded by Seraphim de Freitas, the spokesman for the Kingdom of Portugal in 1625, the Portuguese were merely exercising the Asian concept of the free high seas limited by claims of navigation and fisheries of countries bordering the seas.¹ The Dutch entered into the picture at the end of the sixteenth century and rejected the Portuguese practice of quasi-possession of the seas. Yet when the Dutch became the dominant power in the area in the beginning of the seventeenth century, they adopted the Portuguese and Asian traditional policy of issuing *cartazes* (passports for foreign ships),² and later enforced the concept of the closed seas and its corollary of preferential trade against the English and the Portuguese. Their justification was that 'the principle of the natural freedom of trade...could be limited by conclusion of treaties by which the parties excluded other countries from trade in the territories of the contracting Ruler'.³ With this as one of the guiding principles of the VOC toward the Asian kingdoms, the treaty became of utmost importance and shaped the nature of the Johor-Dutch relationship in the Straits of Malacca.

Treaties were a recent phenomenon in the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago and were only introduced in the beginning of the sixteenth century by the Portuguese. By the middle of that century the Macassarese and Buginese states in south-west Celebes had already developed the art of treaty-making, and the Kingdom of Goa compiled a collection of treaties called the *ulukanaya*.⁴ These documents were regarded with such great respect by the Kingdom of Goa that they were preserved among the sacred regalia.⁵ The Kingdom of Johor never pursued the art of treaty-making with as much enthusiasm as the Kingdom of Goa, but it quickly learned to appreciate the treaty as a new element of statecraft to acquire the leverage to deal with the Dutch.

By 1641 the Dutch were firmly established at Malacca and were maintaining the Portuguese system of tolls and passes. Despite a more vigorous enforcement of this system by the Dutch, Johor gained an advantage in trade over its Malay neighbours as a result of a treaty signed with the Dutch in 1639 and renewed and elaborated in 1642 (but unfortunately no longer extant). The Johor ruler and Orang Kaya were granted certain trade privileges by the Dutch as a courtesy to these important individuals and as a token of appreciation for their role in the conquest of Malacca. Rarely was a request from a Johor ruler or Orang Kaya for a pass to trade in some distant place refused, and as long as a Johor or foreign ship bore the *cap* of the ruler or an Orang Kaya, it was guaranteed freedom from Dutch molestation on the seas. Although the system of passes was burdensome, the leaders of Johor were aware of its immediate benefits. For the greater part of a century Johor fought a constant battle for survival against the Portuguese and Aceh. What freedom of trade there was for Johor was only obtained after long struggles with these two powers in the Straits of Malacca. The appearance of the Dutch in Johor in the beginning of the seventeenth century finally provided Johor with an ideal ally who not only concurred on the necessity of removing or restricting the activities of Aceh and the Portuguese, but also had the force to do it. By entering into treaties with the Dutch, Johor was given favourable treatment and allowed to trade almost without restriction, something which it was unable to do when the Portuguese and Aceh were dominant in the area.

The most important aspect of the treaties with the Dutch in the eyes of the leaders of Johor was the Dutch guarantee of protection from Aceh. A brief glance at Aceh-Johor relations up to 1641

would suffice to explain the great importance this aspect of the Dutch-Johor treaty meant to the latter. With the Dutch treaty system providing Johor with these opportunities for regaining its place as a leading Malay economic and political power in the area, Johor would have been foolish to abandon or ignore it. Johor came to appreciate the significance which the Dutch attached to the treaty and the manner in which this could guarantee its own security and prosperity. As Johor grew increasingly more confident and less afraid of the danger from Aceh, it began to operate with greater freedom within the agreed Dutch-Johor treaty arrangements. It exercised its own rules of trade within the Dutch-imposed restrictions since it believed this only proper for a nation with its stature in the Malay world. Free trade was merely an ideal state which in practice was circumscribed by conditions imposed by one or more nations recognized as the dominant power(s) in the area. This had been the case in the Malay world since Srivijaya, and this was the situation again in the seventeenth century.

In the early years Johor had much to gain from adhering to the treaties with the Dutch. Later, however, it began to view its relationship with the Dutch much more critically. There followed a constant stream of accusations and counter-accusations from both sides concerning the evasion of the treaty provisions. Johor never abandoned the treaties and continued to profess faith in them because of its steadfast belief that, since Johor had assisted the Dutch against their enemies, the Dutch would return the favour someday. Even with the harsh disillusionment which came when the Dutch refused to lift a finger to avenge Jambi's invasion of Johor in 1673, the leaders continued to hope that the treaty would be a sufficient deterrent to would-be aggressors. Perhaps this hope, more than any overarching concern for greater freedom of trade (which in practice was being achieved anyway), spurred the leaders of Johor to try to preserve the treaty system with the Dutch.

The written agreements were but one, and the more minor, dimension in the relations between the Dutch and Johor. Of greater importance was the unwritten code of conduct between these two sovereign powers. Both the Dutch and Johor soon learned to operate within the confines of an unwritten code of conduct in which both recognized the limits of their demands. They went through the gestures of treaty-making, professions of good-will, friendship, and of strict adherence to all agreements, all the while understanding that

their mutual concern for peace in the Straits as a prerequisite for trade inexorably bound them together. As long as Johor occupied only a minor part in the entire inter-Asian trade and could contribute toward the peace in the strategic Straits of Malacca through which the important VOC cargoes from both East and West flowed, the Dutch in Batavia tolerated Johor's economic growth and arrogance at the expense of their outpost at Malacca.

Both the Dutch and Johor recognized the extent to which they could push their claims without upsetting the unwritten working relationship which had evolved since 1641. The Dutch demanded and were satisfied with articles guaranteeing a monopoly on certain trade items, but they were always cautious in not applying the articles too vigorously. In this relationship Johor was ultimately the superior partner. It fulfilled its part of the bargain by maintaining control over its territories and preserving the peace in the Straits of Malacca, thereby working also in its own interest. A friendly Johor with a tight control over its dependencies was a state of affairs which the Dutch appreciated in these years.⁶ In return the Dutch provided Johor with a number of guarantees and services which were instrumental in Johor's rapid economic and political recovery in the seventeenth century. Firstly, peace was restored in the area and Johor assured protection from its enemies. Secondly, the ruler, chief officials, and the Orang Kaya of Johor were given trade privileges at Malacca and special courtesy passes for their role in the conquest of Portuguese Malacca in 1641. These concessions provided the impetus for the revitalization of Johor's trade and assured it of certain important economic advantages over its Malay neighbours who were not given these privileges. Thirdly, Dutch Malacca became another outlet where Johor could buy and sell its goods and also obtain such necessary products as gunpowder, lead, saltpeter, and guns for its own defence. Fourthly, the subordination of the interests of Malacca to that of Batavia made it possible for Johor to plead its case with the higher Dutch authorities in Batavia who were often sympathetic to Johor's complaints. Finally, the Dutch offered their services as mediators in the disputes between Malay powers which guaranteed a degree of order and predictability in the affairs of the area. This created an atmosphere most conducive to trade and contributed greatly toward Johor's success as an international entrepôt.

The early friendly relations between the Dutch and Johor had been occasioned by the desire to destroy their mutual enemy, the Portuguese. This happy and fruitful alliance had then culminated in the joint conquest of Portuguese Malacca in 1641. These early years after the conquest of Malacca were difficult times for both the Dutch and the Johorese as they attempted to establish a framework in which both could operate freely and profitably without jeopardizing their newly-made alliance in the Straits of Malacca. They alternated cautious probes with more violent thrusts and acted and reacted at each other's moves until slowly a semblance of stability prevailed in the area. It was not surprising, therefore, that almost immediately after the successful conquest of Malacca signs of disaffection with the alliance appeared in the form of a complaint by the Laksamana of Johor. He accused the Dutch of failure to implement certain short-range promises which the commanders at Malacca had made to the Johorese during the siege. The Dutch Commander Cooper had promised earlier on to restore to Johor all the ordnance seized by the Portuguese and to return all Johorese who had fled to other kingdoms. Meanwhile, Cooper had died and had been replaced by Willem Kaartekoe, under whose command the fortress Malacca was finally conquered. Instead of fulfilling the agreements made by the previous commander, Kaartekoe returned only half the Johorese guns, two chains of five tael⁷ weight to the two Johor commanders, *sirih*⁸ silver plates to seven other Johor Orang Kaya, two *corge sarassa*⁹ for the ruler of Johor, but nothing for the Laksamana. Of the rest of the guns, two were given to Aceh, one sold to Rokan, one to a Dutchman, and one or two elsewhere. The request for the repatriation of a certain Encik Cili, who had deserted the ruler of Johor and had taken service with the Portuguese at Malacca, was denied. But the final insult was the complete ignoring of the position of the old Laksamana on the island of Banten when the gifts were distributed.¹⁰ It was the Laksamana who had personally forbidden all Johorese from trading with Portuguese Malacca under the strictest of penalties and who was responsible for closing all of Malacca's avenues of trade.¹¹ Yet it was he whom the Dutch neglected when the spoils were distributed.

For these all too blatant signs of disregard for their Johor ally, the Dutch were made to feel the displeasure which they had brought upon themselves. No missions were sent to Batavia or Malacca between March and October 1641, and all Malacca's inhabitants

were forbidden to trade at Bengkalis or any other place within the Kingdom of Johor.¹² The Dutch soon became aware of the increased activity of the Orang Laut in the area and began contemplating steps against them.¹³ When the Dutch sent a request to Johor for wood and 200 men to build a bridge, sloops, oars and fences,¹⁴ as well as permission for the inhabitants of Malacca to trade at the capital of Johor, Makam Tauhid, the Laksamana refused to send anything or anyone and explained that everyone had gone to fetch their ruler in Patani. He also deferred the question of trade at Bengkalis and other areas until the return of the ruler.¹⁵ The Laksamana had been given the authority to rule in Johor in the absence of the ruler and would have been able to make the necessary decisions desired by the Dutch. He decided, however, to retaliate against the Dutch by deferring any action until the ruler returned and once again assumed his authority in Johor.

Although offended by the disrespect shown him and the Kingdom of Johor by the Dutch, the Laksamana was amenable to their suggestion of a peace with Aceh because of certain turn of events in the latter kingdom. The death of Sultan Iskandar Thani of Aceh on 15 February 1641 led to a consolidation of power among the Orang Kaya who now decided to install the Sultan's wife on the throne instead of another powerful monarch. This move was probably prompted also by the fear that the throne would be claimed by someone closely in league with the hated Kingdom of Johor. It was rumoured that the Bendahara of Johor was offered the crown and was going overland from Patani via Perak to rule in Aceh.¹⁶ At the end of March the Johor envoys were sent on a Dutch ship to Aceh where they were treated rudely by the Acehnese Orang Kaya. The latter refused to grant the envoys an audience with the Queen on the pretext that they were not of high enough rank. Their real objection and fear, however, was the strong possibility of overtures being made by the Johorese for a marriage between their ruler and the Queen of Aceh.¹⁷ They agreed to a peace with Johor through Dutch mediation but with the stipulation that 'each occupy his own kingdom, no other Johor envoys come to Aceh, and all hostile actions be stopped'.¹⁸

Frustrated in its efforts to nullify the threat from Aceh through marriage, Johor now turned to other means to accomplish this purpose. Rivers and islands belonging to Aceh came under attack by the Johorese, and Pahang was again incorporated into the Johor kingdom.¹⁹ The justification given by Johor for this action was that

Aceh no longer had any claims to Pahang since the latter had reverted to Johor at the death of its last legitimate male ruler, Sultan Iskandar Thani. Since it was the *adat* in Pahang that wives could not inherit from their husbands, the present Queen of Aceh could not legally claim Pahang as her rightful property as a result of her marriage to Sultan Iskandar Thani.²⁰

The Dutch were disturbed by these turn of events since they were attempting to mediate a peace between Aceh and Johor and had already requested that Aceh refrain from sending any armadas to destroy Johor's ports.²¹ In order to intimidate Johor and make her more reasonable to Dutch appeals, a Dutch force was sent to fell trees into the Penagie River and thus prevent the illegal trade being conducted by Naning and Rembau with foreign ships.²² These areas were subject territories of Johor, and the message would not have been lost to the Johor leaders. But it soon became apparent to the Dutch that there was a struggle for power within Johor involving the leadership and direction of the Laksamana. Despite the difficulties with the Laksamana of Johor, the Dutch realized that he, more than any other in the Johor kingdom, was favourably inclined toward them.²³ Whether it was this reason or the fear that the Laksamana's successor would prove even more intractable, the Dutch quickly abandoned any further counter-measures against Johor and intervened on behalf of the Laksamana. When word arrived from Johor that the Laksamana had fallen out of favour with the ruler because of his familiarity with the Dutch,²⁴ two Dutch envoys were sent to Johor from Malacca on 17 January 1642 to plead the innocence of the Laksamana. In a letter to Sultan Abdul Jalil, Governor van Twist of Malacca reminded the ruler that 'the Laksamana had worked for his glory'.²⁵

When the envoys arrived at Makam Tauhid, however, they found the Laksamana in greater favour with the ruler than ever before. He enjoyed such trust that he was the closest adviser to the ruler in all matters and appeared to be still a friend of the Dutch in spite of everything. Sultan Abdul Jalil reiterated his friendship for the Dutch and told them not to believe evil things said of the Laksamana because '... he is a good and excellent man, who has always performed great, wise, and outstanding services for me'.²⁶ After some discussion a written agreement was made between Johor and the Dutch that all Johor ships sailing north of Malacca would stop at the city to obtain passes and would pay $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ rials per head. Their goods

would not be detained nor be forced to unload, sell, or pay tolls. Where goods were voluntarily sold, a toll of 10 percent would be charged, as had been the custom in the past.²⁷ Johor ships not sailing past Malacca would not require passes, but those bound for Jambi, Java, Pahang, Patani, Ligor, Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China and other far-away places would be allowed to do so at the discretion of the Governor-General in Batavia. It was further agreed that all slaves fleeing to the other side would be restored for one-half their value.²⁸ Another point of agreement reached was that inhabitants of Malacca trading in the ports and rivers of the Kingdom of Johor would not be burdened with new levies.²⁹

Sultan Abdul Jalil and many of the Orang Kaya complained that some of their subjects who had gone to the Penagie River without a pass had been put in chains.³⁰ Sultan Abdul Jalil reminded Malacca that if the Dutch had committed a misdeed against him, he would have sent them to the Governor-General to be punished. Likewise, if his subjects did wrong to the Dutch, they should send them to him so he himself could punish them.³¹

While the Dutch were becoming aware of the delicate subject of sovereignty, the Johorese were also learning the value of appeasing the Dutch, especially the chief officials of the VOC in Batavia. Although Jan Jansz. Menie, the envoy sent by Malacca, had refused to accede to the ruler of Johor's request for passes for his ships, Governor-General Antonio van Diemen in Batavia was so pleased with Johor's promise to send five sloops, oars, and fences to Malacca that he granted the ruler of Johor fifty passes for his ships to go to Patani, Siam, Cambodia, and the coast of Java.³² Van Diemen also rejected Malacca's suggestion that the Dutch prevent the Javanese and the Bantamese from going to Johor's capital at Makam Tauhid.³³

Cultivating the friendship of the Dutch became even more imperative to the Johor ruler because of the threat from an entirely new quarter: Mataram.³⁴ In February 1642 the ruler of Palembang went with a retinue of thirty large and ten small boats on a visit to Mataram. The Dutch Chief Merchant Hendrik van Gent reported to Batavia that the ruler of Palembang was contemplating the annexation of Johor, Indragiri, and other countries with Mataram's help.³⁵ Since the Dutch seemed to be the only power in the area capable of controlling Mataram, the ruler of Johor sought deliberately to appease the Dutch. Johor's decision to send five sloops of

wood to Malacca was intended to remove the ill-feeling in Batavia at Johor's seizure of Pahang and activities against the Acehnese. Malacca was able to report in June 1642 that Rembau, Naning, Muar, and other places around Malacca under the overlordship of Johor, were now peaceful.³⁶

The Dutch were quick to react. Instructions from Batavia to the new Governor Jeremias van Vliet of Malacca on 29 September 1642 emphasized that he was to tell the ruler and the Laksamana of Johor not to fear any attack from Mataram and Palembang because the Dutch, as faithful allies, promised to protect Johor against all its enemies.³⁷ A few months after assuming his post in Malacca, Governor van Vliet despatched an envoy to Johor with specific instructions to remove the Johor ruler's fear of attacks from Mataram, Palembang, and Manila. He was to assure Johor that many of the 100 ships brought by the Pangeran of Palembang from Mataram had been destroyed by the Dutch because of their harassment of Dutch ships. A treaty had been subsequently signed at Palembang. In so far as Johor's fear of reprisals from Manila because of Johor's participation in the conquest of Malacca was concerned, the envoy was to guarantee Dutch protection and to emphasize the weakness of the Spaniards.³⁸

Meanwhile, a threat of a more serious nature struck Johor in the form of an epidemic, most likely similar to that which had by that time decimated large numbers of the population in Malacca.³⁹ It was rumoured in late 1642 that the Bendahara had succumbed to the illness and that the Laksamana, as well as many other Orang Kaya, were now suffering from this epidemic. Considerations of both health and auspiciousness may have encouraged the ruler of Johor to move the site of his capital to the other side of the river.⁴⁰ It may have been from this illness that the old Laksamana died, for no mention is made of his death in either Dutch or Malay records, but his son, Tun Abdul Jamil,⁴¹ assumed the title of Laksamana sometime in the 1640s.

The Kingdom of Johor recovered from the epidemic, and in June 1643 Batavia complained that Johor was becoming much too self-assured as a result of its 'recently acquired prosperity'. It accused Sultan Abdul Jalil of refusing to send any envoys to Batavia or Malacca, while not neglecting to establish relations with the ruler of the Kingdom of Goa in Macassar.⁴² Batavia also ordered Governor van Vliet of Malacca to send a Dutch mission to Johor to ask the

ruler to explain his seizure of Pahang and to account for the Acehnese prisoners and guns captured in Pahang. The Queen of Aceh had gone to Batavia and demanded that the Dutch make Johor return her subjects and all captured weapons from Pahang.⁴³ A mission from Johor later informed Malacca that Johor would not be separated from Pahang, nor would it return any guns to the Queen of Aceh. On the contrary, it threatened to recover Perak and Deli from the Acehnese.⁴⁴

Tun Indra Segera was sent as an envoy by the ruler of Johor to the Dutch in Malacca on 10 September 1643 to inform them that both Perak and Deli had once been part of the Johor kingdom but had been seized by Aceh a few years before. At first laughingly and later in great seriousness, Tun Indra Segera asked whether the Governor-General would take it amiss if Johor were again to regain these places and extend its borders.⁴⁵ Strengthened by the conviction that the Dutch would never abandon Johor because of its contribution to the conquest of Portuguese Malacca, Johor's leaders refused to be intimidated by Aceh. They thus decided to retain Pahang and perhaps even recover their former territories in this time of Acehnese weakness. Both Deli (formerly a part of the Kingdom of Aru) and Perak had at various times acknowledged the overlordship of Johor. Under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) Aceh had conquered Deli in 1612 and again at about 1620,⁴⁶ and Perak in 1620. Deli was considered to be of some importance to Johor, for in early 1641 the Laksamana refused to send any envoys to Aceh 'unless the Acehnese first returned Deli...'.⁴⁷ Although the Dutch records contain no explanation why Johor insisted on regaining Deli, a clue may be found in Tomé Pires's account of the Kingdom of Aru from the early sixteenth century:

The Kingdom of Aru is a large kingdom, bigger than any of those mentioned up to now in Sumatra, and it is not rich through merchandise and trade, for it has none. This [king] has many people, many *lancharas*⁴⁸ His mandarins and his people go robbing at sea.... They must have a hundred *paraos*⁴⁹ and more whenever they want them....⁵⁰

Even at the height of Malacca's power the Kingdom of Aru was considered capable of launching a fleet which numerically was equal, or even superior, to that of Malacca.⁵¹ It possessed large numbers of men and warships, both valuable components for any Malay ruler with ambitions of overlordship in the area. In 1540 Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah of Johor defeated the Acehnese in Aru and in-

corporated that kingdom into his own. But some time between 1564 and 1567 Sultan Mansur of Aceh recovered Aru from Johor, and according to the Portuguese historian Pinto, made his oldest son ruler of that kingdom.⁵² The succeeding ruler of Aceh, Sultan Alauddin (1596-1604), was not of the same forceful character as Sultan Mansur and allowed Johor to recover Aru.⁵³ By the beginning of the seventeenth century the Kingdom of Aru was no longer mentioned, although Deli was known as part of the area formerly under the Kingdom of Aru. Deli was reconquered by Aceh in 1612 and remained under its loose overlordship until sometime in the 1660s. Both Aceh and Johor may have recognized the value of acquiring the overlordship over this kingdom in order to gain access to the reputable fleets of Aru, now Deli.

Johor's belligerence, brought about by an ever increasing prosperity unhindered by external threats, soon became a source of friction with the Dutch. As if to terminate any further discussion on the future of Pahang, the ruler of Johor referred to himself in a letter to Batavia on 5 May 1644 as: 'The King of Johor, who rules in the land of Johor and Pahang.'⁵⁴ Acts such as this made the Dutch characterize the Johorese as 'overbearing Malays who have already become too obstinate and haughty as a result of their unaccustomed prosperity'.⁵⁵

The reason for Johor's success in the trading sphere was rightly attributed by Governor-General van Diemen to the fact that now Johor ships could sail the waters unmolested as a result of the Dutch conquest of Malacca.⁵⁶ Not only had the Dutch been responsible for restraining or eliminating Johor's enemies in the area, but they had also committed themselves by written agreement to grant certain trade privileges to the Johorese. In the absence of any formidable trade competitor except the still relatively new and inexperienced Dutch in the Straits of Malacca, Johor thrived on these Dutch concessions which were denied the other Malay powers. The agreement that Johor ships sailing west of Malacca should stop in Malacca to get a pass without having to unload, sell, or pay tolls on the goods became a particularly valuable windfall for the Johorese. In the following years the Johorese were adamant in their claim that they were allowed to trade in Malacca toll-free as a result of a contract signed with the Dutch. On the other hand, the Dutch were equally obstinate in disclaiming any knowledge of such an article in

their agreement. However, they still bowed to the wishes of the Johorese rather than alienate them.⁵⁷

In the early months after the fall of Portuguese Malacca in 1641, the Johorese had come to doubt the sincerity of Dutch promises. Yet in the ensuing months and years the friendship of the Dutch had proved profitable and therefore highly desirable. Sultan Abdul Jalil reacted immediately after receiving alarming reports about his rebellious Minangkabau subjects in Rembau and Tampin from Governor van Vliet of Malacca. Eager to demonstrate his grave concern while seeking a solution which would satisfy the Dutch authorities in Batavia, he wrote:

Jeremias van Vliet, Governor of Malacca, has sent me a letter in which he says that those of Rembau robbed the goods of Jorge Fernandes, and that the people of Tampin had killed Christians and stolen their goods.⁵⁸ At this news I commanded my people to call Lela Maharaja [head of Rembau]. When Lela Maharaja appeared before me I asked him: 'Is it true that the people of Rembau robbed the goods of Jorge Fernandes and that they murdered the Christians and stole all of their goods?' Lela Maharaja answered: 'I spoke to Jan Jansz. Menie [Dutch Syahbandar in Malacca] about the goods of Jorge Fernandes. I arrested these people and delivered them to Jan Jansz. Menie. Jan Jansz. Menie questioned them but they denied this ... so Jan Jansz. Menie said that it is now done ... and happened in the time when the Portuguese still occupied Malacca. Lela Maharaja also explained that he had had killed those who had murdered the Christians in Tampin.'

Five days after Lela Maharaja left for Rembau, a letter from Jeremias van Vliet arrived reporting how those of Rembau had killed the Captain de Vries and Jan Jansz. Menie, *temenggong* (*sic*) of Malacca, which pained me very deeply since he [Menie] was an especially good friend of mine. Thus I have sent Sri Maharaja Lela and Raja Lela Wangsa to greet de heer General in Batavia [Governor-General Antonio van Diemen]. Sri Maharaja Lela and Raja Lela Wangsa are two important gentlemen whom I greatly trust. I have also despatched Hang Kamis and Hang Sekam to Malacca to discover what happened in Rembau. I have sent my people to call Lela Maharaja and all the people of Rembau who killed Captain de Vries and his people. And if they do not come at my summons, then I shall consider them traitors and enemies....

Furthermore, I would like to inform de heer General that the people of Rembau who killed Captain de Vries and Jan Jansz. Menie are not my people, but are Minangkabaus, who have only rented my land (*die alleen mijn land hebben gehuurt*).⁵⁹

Sultan Abdul Jalil was clearly disturbed by these developments which threatened to dissolve all friendly ties between Johor and the Dutch. He despatched important envoys to Batavia and two others to Malacca with letters explaining all the steps he had taken to punish those responsible and to reaffirm his desire to maintain the friendship with the Dutch. He even attempted to explain a subtle distinction in Malay jurisdiction over subjects which exonerated him from any guilt by association. Sultan Abdul Jalil emphasized the differences between 'my people' (who were presumably the Johor Malays and the Orang Laut) and the Minangkabaus. The latter presented homage and tribute to their Malay overlord and in turn were allowed to settle within the kingdom. In this sense the Minangkabaus were considered to be tenants since they enjoyed the usufruct of the Malay overlord's land only through his consent.

The Dutch refused to believe that the ruler of Johor was sincere in wanting to punish the wrong-doers and continued to suspect his role in these troubles.⁶⁰ Thus when Sultan Abdul Jalil sent the Sri Perdana Menteri with a force to the Sagamat River to prevent the people of Rembau from fleeing to Pahang, the Dutch again suspected his motives.⁶¹ Fortifications were built by the Johorese at Kelang and Pahang, and the Paduka Sri Maharaja, who had led Johor's fleets in the siege of Portuguese Malacca in 1640-1641, was sent to Muar to carry out the operations against Rembau.⁶² These operations were a result of Sultan Abdul Jalil's professed intention of punishing those in Rembau responsible for the death of Jan Jansz. Menie and Captain de Vries. The Minangkabaus had not heeded his summons and were now endangering the friendly relations with the Dutch. In order to demonstrate his faithfulness to the contract signed with the Dutch, he was willing to punish his rebellious Minangkabau subjects and thereby remind the Dutch of their promises to the Johorese. The contract had thus far proven valuable in safeguarding Johor from its enemies and in boosting Johor's international trade, and Sultan Abdul Jalil was not prepared to forego these benefits for the safety of some rebellious tenants.

In the midst of this activity, news arrived from Patani which made the Johorese abandon their fortifications and return immediately to their capital, Batu Sawar. Sultan Abdul Jalil's youngest brother had married the Queen of Patani some time before February 1644 and had ruled as king while recognizing the overlordship of Siam. The Dutch were made aware of this marriage for the first time in

late February 1644, by a letter from the Bendahara of Patani. He wrote that 'the Queen was married to the youngest brother of the Yang Dipertuan of Johor and was expecting a child'.⁶³ The rule of the king from Johor must have been hateful to the nobles of Patani, not only because he was an outsider, but also because their positions within the court were threatened by the Johorese entourage of the foreign ruler. By 13 May 1645 news reached Malacca of the flight of the Johor king, and the massacre of his mother, family, and retinue by the Patanese. Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor recalled his forces under Sri Paduka Raja in Muar and summoned ships and men from Bengkalis, Ungaran, and Bulang to avenge the massacre and restore the fugitive ruler in the Kingdom of Patani.⁶⁴ Although many of Johor's troops were at Muar, Sultan Abdul Jalil could still call upon a large reserve of Orang Laut men and ships from Bengkalis, Ungaran, and Bulang. The latter place alone responded to the call with eighty armed perahus.⁶⁵

Despite every indication that a war was imminent between Patani and Johor, sometime in October or November 1645 a Patanese envoy arrived at Johor and effected a reconciliation.⁶⁶ The peace made it possible for Johor to resume its former lucrative trade and continue to enjoy 'a great reputation among the nations in the area'.⁶⁷ Johor also felt protected from another possible source of trouble, Mataram, since the Dutch gave the assurance that they would 'keep a watch out'.⁶⁸ Although the troubles with the Minangkabaus in Naning and Rembau continued to plague the Dutch, the Johorese now felt that the Dutch had managed to gain the upperhand and that the danger point in their relationship had passed. In March 1645 a Dutch punitive expedition of 400 men under Arnold de Vlaming van Oudthoorn had forced the Minangkabaus to surrender,⁶⁹ and on 29 March 1646, another successful expedition under Valerius van Gistelen compelled them to ask for pardon for their rebellion and murder of Captain de Vries and Syahbandar Jan Jansz. Menie. They asked for peace and sent twelve delegates to Malacca to arrange a settlement of the conflict. Only then did Batavia realize that Governor van Vliet had contributed to the prolonging of the war by demanding an impossible three days for the rebels to fulfil his conditions for surrender.⁷⁰ Thus Batavia ended the affair by pardoning those responsible and making them return the stolen goods and slaves.⁷¹

With the cessation of hostilities in Naning and Rembau, Johor was again confident of winning the favour of the Dutch and thereby gaining yet more trade concessions. The reply from the new Governor-General van der Lijn in 1646 to a letter from the ruler of Johor began on a friendly tone comparing Johor and Batavia as 'man and wife bound to one another by sincere love and harmony'. Nevertheless, he was forced to refuse the ruler's request that the Coromandel ships coming to Johor be granted permission to bypass Malacca and its tolls.⁷² In these years the leaders of Johor were just learning those avenues of enquiry which were profitable and the safe limits in trying the patience of the Dutch. Johor believed rightly in these early years that the Dutch saw no threat in having foreign traders appear in Johor's ports as long as these traders paid their tolls in Malacca. Only toward the last quarter of the seventeenth century, with Johor's increasing prosperity and control over the tin in Siak, Selangor, Kelang, and Sungai Ujong, did the rules of the game change. By this time Johor had had several decades of experience dealing with the Dutch and was capable of maintaining a prosperous entrepot while maintaining a *modus vivendi* with the Dutch within the strict confines of a treaty system.

Several factors indicate the extent to which Johor had regained its initiative in the waters of the Malay world. The Indian Muslims began to frequent Johor in large numbers bringing cloth which was a valuable item of barter for the much-desired products of the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago.⁷³ An English ship with a fairly large cargo of cloth from Surat went to Johor in 1647 in preference to Aceh with its 'sober market'. Although it left claiming not to have sold very much, he promised to return the following year with a better assortment of cloth and establish a permanent residence in Johor.⁷⁴ It seems evident by his statement that the trade in Johor was profitable enough to warrant establishing a permanent post in that kingdom. An Englishman Philip Wylde who visited Johor on 27 July 1647 asked the ruler for custom-free trade for the English. At first he was given permission to build warehouses, but after consultation between the ruler and the Orang Kaya, 'it was concluded to be dangerous to let the English have any residence in his country, by reason they deny the privilege to the Dutch, which might cause wars to the disquieting of his (the ruler's) wonted quiet living'.⁷⁵ An Armenian from Malacca who was in Johor when *The Supply* arrived reported later to the Dutch that the captain of

the ship was a friend of the ruler's who had been granted a lot of concessions during his first visit. The Englishman had been given a piece of land to build a lodge, but when he requested similar privileges in the other lands belonging to Johor, the ruler was displeased and also withdrew his early concession for a lodge to be erected in Johor.⁷⁶ It appears that all of these cases refer to the same Englishman who also noted in another visit in 1648 that the Gujerati were the predominant traders in Johor.⁷⁷

Realizing the importance of the Indian trade, Sultan Abdul Jalil requested and received permission from Batavia in April 1648 to send a ship to the Coromandel coast without having to stop at Malacca.⁷⁸ The Johor ship left on 25 February 1649 with only a small cargo in order to see how profitable it would be to establish direct trading relations with India.⁷⁹ After trading on the Coromandel coast and in Bengal, the ship returned to Johor with ninety-five bales⁸⁰ and fourteen chests of all types of cloth. This attractive cargo was enough to convince Sultan Abdul Jalil of the value of direct trade. On 8 January 1650 he again sent an envoy to request from Malacca toll-free passes for his ships to the Coromandel and to Bengal. Malacca referred the request to Batavia, which refused to authorize these ventures with the pretext that the Dutch were at war with these areas.⁸¹ Nevertheless, by the following year the Dutch were forced to grant a free pass for a ship belonging to the ruler of Johor to go to the Coromandel since the Dutch ran out of 'reasonable excuses'.⁸²

In addition to outfitting his own ships for the journey to India, Sultan Abdul Jalil saw an even more profitable and simple way of getting Indian cloth. He asked Dutch permission to send some of his people with capital on Dutch ships to trade in Coromandel. His requests were thought by the Dutch to be highly prejudicial to their own interests, and they refused to allow this practice to begin.⁸³ Sultan Abdul Jalil's annoyance at this refusal soon became evident in his strongly worded demand that the Dutch either return his subjects who had fled Johor and had received permission to settle in Malacca, or else face the possibility of the friendship between the Dutch and Johor turning to enmity. He further claimed that a place called Kasang, located on the border of Malacca and the Kingdom of Johor, which had been seized by the Dutch, actually belonged to him.⁸⁴ When the Dutch refused to recognize Johor's claim to Kasang, the Johorese seized several of the inhabitants of

that village and threatened to return and take them all away.⁸⁵ Sultan Abdul Jalil decided to appeal to Batavia, but when Batavia also refused to acknowledge his claims, he finally abandoned the entire pretense.⁸⁶ Unwilling to allow the Johorese to profit too greatly at their expense and yet greatly conscious of the only too recent harassment by an offended ruler of Johor, the Dutch decided to tolerate a limited amount of buying on the ruler's behalf. In 1657 the Dutch bought thirty bales of cloth from the Coromandel coast and brought them to Malacca where they were delivered to the ruler's envoy, Raja Mudeliar.⁸⁷

While seizing every opportunity to participate in the cloth trade in India, Sultan Abdul Jalil did not neglect another arm of the inter-Asian trade: China. He asked Batavia for a free pass for his ship to Taiwan and the assurance that it would not be destroyed nor be forced by Dutch ships to pay tolls, 'in respect for the old alliance'.⁸⁸ This pass was finally given, and Malacca even granted Sultan Abdul Jalil's request for a pilot to take the ship to Taiwan.⁸⁹ The junk sent out by the ruler of Johor was wrecked on the northern reef off Taiwan and sank, but most of the goods and people on board were rescued.⁹⁰ A second junk outfitted by Sultan Abdul Jalil in 1655 fell into the hands of the Manchus, but he remained undaunted. Preparations were again made soon thereafter to send yet another junk to China.⁹¹

Although Sultan Abdul Jalil's early efforts to establish a direct trading link with China with his own junks were not very successful, the Chinese themselves recognized the growing importance of Johor and began sending their junks there. In 1651 the Dutch noted fifteen junks arriving in Taiwan, of which six belonged to the Taiwan community, three were outfitted to go to Manila, two to Batavia, one to Johor, and the rest to the China coast.⁹² In 1654 more Chinese traders arrived in Johor. Governor Thyssen of Malacca guardedly remarked in a missive to Batavia that it would be nice to have the Chinese junks in Malacca, but of course he could not prevent them from going to Johor for fear of antagonizing the Johor ruler.⁹³ At the end of April 1655 richly laden junks belonging to the refugee Ming general Coxinga at his headquarters on Taiwan appeared in Johor and greatly boosted Johor's trade. To prevent Coxinga from trading in Johor, the Dutch sent at least two yachts to the Hook of Barbukit and Pedra Branko to prevent the junks from entering the Johor River.⁹⁴ Johor was beginning to be recognized

by the Chinese as a favourable trading centre, and the Dutch reported with dismay that in 1657 three Chinese junks had again been to Johor. In face of this damaging competition Batavia finally decided in 1657 to allow one or two junks a year to go to Malacca to boost its trade.⁹⁵ This measure proved ineffective because by 1660 Johor continued to be an attractive market for the Chinese traders.⁹⁶

Having examined the possibilities of trade with his own ships to India and China, Sultan Abdul Jalil now explored a third arm of the inter-Asian trade in East Indonesia. In 1643 he had established ties with the powerful Kingdom of Goa in Macassar which controlled much of the spice trade in East Indonesia. Friendly relations between these two kingdoms would have been encouraged by Malays whose ancestors had fled to Macassar from Malacca after 1511 and from Patani, Minangkabau areas, Pahang, Champa, and Johor in the years thereafter. According to an old Macassarese (Goa) palm-leaf manuscript, these newcomers submitted themselves to the authority of the rulers of Goa and were guaranteed certain rights which protected them from the Macassarese.⁹⁷ In time these Malays became trusted and gained access to the court. They are attributed with the improvement of the customs of the court and the introduction of Malay dances, such as the sword or dagger dance.⁹⁸ It would not have been too difficult, therefore, for the ruler of Johor to have gained the confidence of the ruler of Goa and to have sought some trading accommodation which would have been mutually beneficial. The Dutch, however, resented the intrusion of the Johorese into their hard-earned spice monopoly and confiscated a Johor junk found at Banda.⁹⁹ Batavia then wrote and politely asked Sultan Abdul Jalil not to permit his people to go to Ambon or Banda again.¹⁰⁰

The success which Sultan Abdul Jalil had achieved in the trading sphere was apparent by 1659. In that year a Spanish frigate under the command of Captain Joan der Geese (Juan de Jesus) was blown off course on a trip from Canton to Manila and landed in Johor. This Spanish captain sold a large quantity of Manila gold and silver for other goods in Johor and informed the Dutch that he was so favourably impressed with the state of trade in Johor that he planned to go there every year.¹⁰¹ He appeared to have kept his promise, for he was available in Johor as a messenger for Sultan Abdul Jalil in a dispute with the Dutch in 1662.¹⁰²

The presence of Europeans in the Straits increased the volume of goods exchanged and greatly added to the wealth of Johor.

Johor was willing to accomodate any trader in its waters and assure him the safety and facilities for a profitable transaction of business, but it was also aware of the need for safeguarding its economic interests against these traders. An English merchant was allowed to rent a house for six months in Johor while he conducted his trade, but his request for permission to build a lodge was politely rejected.¹⁰³ Another English trader sought unsuccessfully for permission to build a lodge at Bengkalis, an island belonging to Johor at the mouth of the Siak River and one of the main centres of trade in the Kingdom of Johor.¹⁰⁴ The establishing of a lodge would have meant an unfair advantage of one particular group and the consequent diminishing of the influence of Johor in its own ports. In 1687 several Macassarese traders requested passes from the Paduka Raja of Johor in order to sail to Aceh under Johor's privileged protection of the Dutch. This request was refused because the Paduka Raja wanted to assure the continuing importance of Johor as an international entrepot and prevent traders from frequenting rival ports.¹⁰⁵ Johor had ceased to be a backwater port, and large revenues now flowed into the treasury of the ruler since he benefited from a tax of $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cargo of all ships trading in Johor.¹⁰⁶

One factor contributing to the development of Johorese trade was the willingness of the ruler to respond to crises quickly and firmly. When two of his ships were rudely handled in Siam, he sent his Orang Laut to Siam to avenge these ships.¹⁰⁷ With the Johor Orang Laut ready to intervene on behalf of Johor's trading ships whenever necessary, a reputation was created which facilitated Johor's trade in the area. Even the Dutch were uneasy at the thought of Aceh and Perak being assisted by Johor with its 'strength of ships and sea-people who could cause us great amount of harm'.¹⁰⁸

Enjoying an unaccustomed prosperity and perhaps not yet aware of the value of tin in world trade, Sultan Abdul Jalil could afford to be magnanimous in relinquishing his tin to the Dutch. He had been so pleased with the mission from Malacca under Syahbandar Abraham Steen that he sent a return mission on 12 January 1651 with two of the most important people in his kingdom. Sultan Abdul Jalil wrote to Governor Thyssen agreeing to his proposal of allowing all the tin which normally went to Johor from Rembau, Sungai Ujong, and Kelang, amounting annually to about 150 bahars, to be taken to Malacca.¹⁰⁹ This especially generous concession by Sultan Abdul Jalil was probably followed by

misgivings, for by May 1652, the Dutch were already complaining that the tin from these areas, which was supposed to be brought to Malacca and sold for fifty rials a bahar, was going instead to Rooch (?) in Bentan.¹¹⁰

In 1662 the Johorese accused the Dutch of forcing two Chinese junks from Amoy and Canton to leave Johor and go to Malacca. The Spanish Captain Juan de Jesus was deputed to Malacca with a letter from the ruler and Orang Kaya of Johor regarding this matter. According to the Spaniard, the Johorese were so angered by this affront that the Laksamana had even seriously suggested that if Sultan Abdul Jalil so desired he would go to Malacca and bring the Chinese junks back by force. Instead, Sultan Abdul Jalil decided to send his Syahbandar Raja Mahkota to inquire about this matter. On 21 April 1662 the Raja Mahkota and the Raja Indra Muda appeared in Malacca and presented the demands of the ruler. Just prior to their departure the Laksamana had sent an envoy ahead to Malacca to explain that the Cantonese junk owed a certain Nakhoda Momin a large sum of money and the latter now wanted to have this debt settled in Chinese goods.¹¹¹ By offering this more mundane explanation for Sultan Abdul Jalil's demand for the return of the Chinese junks, the Laksamana hoped to make it more readily comprehensible to the commercially-minded Dutch. What had antagonized the ruler was not merely the trade which was lost to Johor, but more importantly, the flagrant disregard of Johor's sovereignty. The Dutch had trod upon a most sensitive aspect of Malay trading nations: the ability to provide protection for traders in their waters. It was imperative that the ruler of Johor prevent any further recurrence of such degrading actions and to provide a satisfactory explanation for traders who frequented his ports.

Despite the great clamour and veiled threats which preceded the mission, everything ended quietly. The representatives of Johor left Malacca content to know that the Chinese junks had not been *forced* but had gone to Malacca of their own volition. This episode irritated the Dutch and made them characterize the Johor ruler as 'being somewhat haughty and arrogant'.¹¹²

Another equally serious 'transgression' of Johor's sovereign rights by the Dutch was the practice of despatching cruisers to patrol the waters of Johor to prevent any followers of Coxinga from trading in Johor. After being pushed out of southern China by the Manchu

invaders, Coxinga had gone to Formosa in 1662 and destroyed the lucrative trade of the Dutch and all traces of Dutch influence on that island.¹¹³ The Johorese testily informed Malacca that any Dutch ships they encountered in the waters of Johor would be considered as enemies, and that the Chinese subjects of Coxinga would *not* be molested in Johor. Sultan Abdul Jalil told the Dutch that the cruising of their yachts and sloops off his coasts was contrary to the reciprocal treaty signed between the two nations.¹¹⁴ He thus sent envoys to Malacca to discover whether the intentions of the Dutch were for war or for peace, 'which one or the other made no difference whatsoever to him'. He added, nevertheless, that he thought he detected a Dutch desire for peace, and if this were so, he would be willing to abide by a peaceful settlement.¹¹⁵

Johor expressed a belligerence toward the Dutch which reflected a confidence in the stability of their relationship bred of two decades of cautious friendship and rivalry. Johor was no longer a small, struggling Malay state, too absorbed with its own safety to be concerned with trade; on the contrary, Johor was now basking in its exhilarating prosperity. The Dutch at Malacca began measuring the successes of Johor by the decrease in shipping which touched at Malacca. Although Governor Jan Thyssen of Malacca complained to Batavia in September 1662, of the large numbers of ships going to Johor to the detriment of Malacca,¹¹⁶ there was little question in the minds of the Johorese that ultimately Batavia would prevent any punitive measures being taken against Johor.

Because of Johor's angry reaction to the Chinese junks 'being brought' to Malacca, Governor Thyssen carefully informed the cruisers off Bengkalis in late 1662 to allow Cantonese junks to go to Johor if they so desired in order to prevent any further cause of displeasure to the Johorese.¹¹⁷ The Chinese junks found a good market in Johor from among the large numbers of Indian traders who frequented its shores. Despite the Dutch attempt to keep the Indian trade, especially the Indian Muslim traders (called the 'Moors' by the Dutch), from going to Johor, they were powerless against the Moor-Johorese combination. Governor Thyssen reported that ever since Johor had been accorded special privileges in Malacca, among which was the freedom from tolls and inspection, many of the Moors sailed ships under the banner of the Sultan Abdul Jalil, the Raja Muda, or any of the Orang Kaya of Johor.¹¹⁸ Through marriage to the families of the ruler or the Orang Kaya, some of

these Moors acquired immunity against Dutch control. A Moor tradesman, a brother-in-law of Sultan Abdul Jalil, appeared in Indragiri with 10 to 12,000 *rijksdaalders*¹¹⁹ of cloth and 30,000 *rijksdaalders* belonging to Sultan Abdul Jalil, despite the fact that in 1663 the Dutch had forbidden Moors from going to Indragiri.¹²⁰

The Dutch could do very little to prevent traders from going to Johor and its dependencies, especially Bengkalis and Indragiri. Ships coming from the West bypassed Malacca to go to Bengkalis to repair and get provisions, while Javanese ships on their homeward journey also put in at Bengkalis.¹²¹ Since west coast Sumatra was now under Dutch control, the interior Minangkabaus preferred to get higher prices by bringing their products to the east by means of the rivers which have their origins in the Padang Highlands and their embouchures in the Straits of Malacca or the South China Sea. The tin and gold from Minangkabau were bought mainly by the Moors and then brought to Bengkalis. From Bengkalis ships went daily to yet another profitable Johor port in the dependency of Indragiri where there were usually large numbers of Moorish traders, in defiance of a Dutch order 'forbidding' them access to Indragiri.¹²²

An agreement reached between Johor and Aceh in 1665 contributed still further to the growth of Johor trade. The Acehnese now brought their goods directly to Bengkalis and Johor, thus attracting the Chinese to these ports.¹²³ Products from Johor's territories of Muar, Kelang, Sungai Ujong, Rembau, and elsewhere, were free from Dutch tolls and added to the variety of goods in the ports. Many of Johor's Orang Kaya were able to evade Dutch restrictions and collect tin from Perak, which caused the Dutch to lament the fact that Johor was now getting 'the major part of the tin from the tin quarters'.¹²⁴ Johor had even become an established market for Japanese copper which it received from Patani through Chinese traders. By capitalizing fully on their privilege of trading toll-free in Malacca, the Johorese bought up the greater part of the cloth brought from Coromandel. With this cloth they traded everywhere in the archipelago and acquired other desired products for their trade.¹²⁵

The increasing prosperity of the Johor ruler and the Orang Kaya was reflected in the growing numbers of ships which were sponsored by the Johorese seeking passes from the Dutch at Malacca to trade in distant areas. When the Raja Muda and the Laksamana requested permission to go to Perak to buy tin in 1664, the Dutch granted

this request and extended the further courtesy of allowing them to trade freely at Deli and elsewhere.¹²⁶ The Dutch mentioned the numerous ships which appeared in Jambi from time to time. In late 1664 the Laksamana again requested permission to send four of his ships to the Gulf of Siam.¹²⁷ The Raja Muda wanted a pass in 1666 for a ship under his patronage to trade in Coromandel,¹²⁸ while Sultan Abdul Jalil in that same year requested passes for his ships to Porto Novo, Masulipatam and Pulicat, and his brother for his ship to the Coromandel.¹²⁹ The number of ships sailing to India and elsewhere with Dutch passes increased so rapidly in later years that the Dutch sought through treaty negotiations in 1685, 1689, and 1713 to limit this practice, but with little success. The trade provisions of the treaties made with the Dutch between 1639 and 1642 had become such a windfall for the Johorese that in later years they were reluctant to abandon them. The success with which the Johorese operated under these treaties made Governor Balthasar Bort of Malacca (1666-1678) rue the day when the Dutch signed these treaties with the Kingdom of Johor.¹³⁰

With Joan Maetsuycker occupying the office of Governor-General in Batavia (1653-1678), Johor was able to pursue its interests with little fear of retribution from that quarter. Maetsuycker sought as much as possible to avoid difficulties with the English and the native princes in accordance with the instructions given to him by the Heeren XVII. Unlike Coen and van Diemen, who considered Batavia to be a separate sovereign entity in Asia, Maetsuycker, in his twenty-five years as Governor-General, subscribed to the reasoning of the Heeren XVII who saw Batavia merely as an entrepot to increase the profits of the VOC and maintain dividends at a high level.¹³¹ As an extension of this policy for maximizing profit, the Heeren XVII had encouraged Maetsuycker to assault the Portuguese trading empire in Asia. Colombo, an important Portuguese cinnamon port in Ceylon, fell once again to the Dutch after a long siege in 1656; Tutucorin, Manar, and Jafna, and northern Ceylon surrendered to the VOC in 1657; and Negapatam, 'which formed the keypoint of the Portuguese position on the Coromandel Coast', fell into Dutch hands in 1658.¹³²

These unimpeded activities of the VOC in Asia were soon arrested by developments in Europe. Reports were rife in 1660 of negotiations to effect a marriage of Charles II of England and a princess of Portugal, and Portugal's inclination to deliver its possessions in

India to England after the marriage. The fearful spectre of becoming embroiled in a struggle with England in Asia spurred the VOC to effect their conquests of Portuguese trading centres while they still remained in Portugal's hands. In October 1661 the VOC conquered Quilon and Kranganur, and finally succeeded in capturing Cochin in January, 1663, after a long siege. All of these conquests of Portuguese possessions on the coast of India occurred after peace had been signed between Portugal and The Netherlands in August 1661. The treaty itself was not ratified until 14 December 1662. These conquests could thus be justified by the VOC since no word of the final ratification would have arrived before January 1663.¹³³ Maetsuycker, however, firmly advocated that the VOC maintain its position by leaving the Asian trade to the natives and 'plucking the fruits of prosperity' by taxation.¹³⁴ Although it was during his administration that the conquest of the Kingdom of Goa in south-west Celebes occurred in 1667, it was part of the continuing policy of the VOC to maintain the spice monopoly in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago at whatever cost. With Maetsuycker's attention in these years focused on India, Ceylon, and Macassar, he would not have been easily persuaded by VOC officials in Malacca to view Johor as a dangerous economic threat which needed to be destroyed.

Johor had found its alliance with the VOC to have been a valuable aspect of its trade policy. Without the presence of the Dutch in Malacca as another outlet for sale of goods and market for purchases of Indian cloth, as a partially effective control over Johor's competitors, and as a protective umbrella for Johor against Aceh, Johor would not have recovered its economic equilibrium so rapidly after 1641. Johor soon found still another good reason for maintaining its alliance with the VOC when it saw the value of Dutch mediation in the Johor-Jambi wars which threatened to ruin Johor's source of livelihood, its international trade.

1. C. H. Alexandrowicz, *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 67-8.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 74-5.

3. *Ibid.* p. 58.

4. G. J. Resink, 'Centuries of International Law in Indonesia', *Indonesia's History between the Myths* (The Hague, 1968), pp. 200-1.

5. A. A. Cense, 'Eenige aantekeningen over Makassaars-Boeginese geschiedschrijving', *BKI*, CVII (1951), p. 47.

6. The Dutch in Batavia were vindicated in their earlier policy toward Johor when in the eighteenth century a greatly weakened Johor kingdom could do little to prevent the wars and piracies which plagued the Straits of Malacca.

7. Tael is a measure of weight of about 1/16 of a catty. A catty is equal to about 1½ pounds.

8. Betel-leaf prepared for chewing with areca-nut, gambier, and lime.

9. Corge, sometimes coorge, is a mercantile term for a score (i.e., twenty). Sarassa is a patterned (either printed or woven) cloth used as a waist cloth in the Malay Archipelago.

10. *Dagh-Register* 1640-41: 3 October 1641, pp. 465-6.

11. KA 1040, OB 1640, Missive from Philips Lucasz. to Batavia, 14 Oct. 1639, fols. 1258-1259.

12. KA 1045, OB 1642, *Dagh-Register* of Malacca, under date 5 Aug. 1641, fol. 362v.

13. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Twist of Malacca, 18 Oct. 1641, fols. 489, 479.

14. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to King of Johor, 8 May 1642, fols. 206; *Dagh-Register* 1640-41: 3 April 1641, p. 222; KA 1045, OB 1642, Instructions to Jansz Menie on Mission to the Laksamana of Johor, 7 Feb. 1641, fol. 549v.

15. *Dagh-Register* 1640-41: 3 April 1641, p. 222; 3 Oct. 1641, p. 460.

16. *Ibid.* 25 July 1641, p. 362.

17. This plan of the Johorese came to the attention of Governor-General van Diemen who sought to prevent it since 'the might of Aceh and the prosperity of Johor' would be damaging to Malacca. *BUB*, Instructions from van Diemen to Pieter Soury on Mission to Aceh, 14 May 1642, fol. 212.

18. KA 1045, OB 1642, *Dagh-Register* of Malacca, under date 10 July 1641, fol. 342r; *Dagh-Register* 1640-41: 7 Sept. 1641, pp. 423-4.

19. *Ibid.* 25 July 1641, p. 364; *BUB*, Instructions from van Diemen to Soury, 14 May 1642, fol. 212.

20. KA 1059bis, OB 1646, Missive from Gov. van Vliet of Malacca to Batavia, 4 Oct. 1643, fol. 652r.

21. *Ibid.* 9 Sept. 1641: Letter from the Queen of Aceh to Gov.-Gen. van Diemen, pp. 428-9.

22. *Dagh-Register* 1641-42: December, 1641, p. 95.

23. *Ibid.* March, 1642, p. 128.

24. KA 1047, OB 1642, Missive from Gov. van Twist of Malacca to Batavia, 9 Jansz. 1642, fols. 635v-636r.

25. *Dagh-Register* 1641-42: February, 1642 (Letter dated 16 Jan. 1642), pp. 116-7.

26. *Ibid.* March, 1642, Letter from Sultan of Johor to Malacca, dated 16 Feb. 1642, p. 130.

27. KA 1050, OB 1643, Report of Menie on Mission to Johor, 8 Feb. 1642 fol. 217r.

28. *Dagh-Register* 1641-42: March, 1642, p. 128.

29. J. E. Heeres, *Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel* ('s-Gravenhage, 1895), p. 92.

30. *Dagh-Register* 1641-42: March, 1642, pp. 128-9.

31. *Ibid.* Letter from Sultan of Johor to Malacca, dated 16 Feb. 1642, p. 130.

32. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to King of Johor, 8 May 1642, fol. 206.

33. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Twist of Malacca, 14 May 1642, fol. 241.

34. *Dagh-Register* 1641-42: Sept. 1642, p. 170.
35. N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw', *IG*, XXVⁱⁱ (1903), p. 1924.
36. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Twist of Malacca, 27 June 1642, p. 318.
37. *BUB*, Instructions from Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to the newly-appointed Gov. of Malacca, Joan van Vliet, 29 Sept. 1642, fol. 622.
38. KA 1051, OB 1644, Instructions from Gov. van Vliet to Hans Croeger on Mission to Johor, 23-4 Jan. 1643, fols. 477r-v, 478r-v.
39. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Twist of Malacca, 14 May 1642, fol. 233.
40. This same Dutch report mentions that the ruler had subsequently changed the name of the capital from Makam Tauhid to Batu Sawar. *Dagh-Register* 1641-42: Oct. 1642, p. 177.
41. *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), line 3.
42. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Vliet, 19 June 1643, fol. 408.
43. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Vliet of Malacca, 19 June 1643, fols. 417-18.
44. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Vliet, 7 Nov. 1643, fol. 798.
45. KA 1059bis, OB 1646, Missive from Gov. van Vliet of Malacca to Batavia, 4 Oct. 1643, fol. 652r.
46. B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, vol. 1 (The Hague/Bandung, 1955), p. 54; P. A. Tiele, 'De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel', Ninth Section 1618-1623, *BKI*, XXXV (1886), pp. 246-7.
47. *Dagh-Register* 1640-41: 3 April 1641, p. 222.
48. A lancaran is a kind of fast-travelling boat.
49. A perahu is a Malay boat with no deck.
50. Armando Cortesao (ed.), *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*, vol. 1 (London, 1944), pp. 146-8.
51. The Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* says that the fleet of Haru (Aru) was three times the size of the Malacca fleet. Even if this were an exaggeration to accentuate the bravery of Malacca's men, the Aru fleet must have been of substantial size to have given such stiff resistance to the Malacca forces. C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu or the Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952), pp. 120-1.
52. Tiele, op. cit. Fourth Section 1556-1578, *BKI*, XXVIII (1880), pp. 426-7.
53. Ibid. Sixth Section 1598-1605, *BKI*, XXX (1882), p. 152.
54. *Dagh-Register* 1643-44: 5 May 1644, p. 67.
55. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to Gov. van Vliet, 2 May 1644, fol. 97.
56. Heeres, op. cit. Gov.-Gen. van Diemen and Council in Batavia to the VOC Authorities in Holland, 22 Dec. 1643, p. 143.
57. The most prominent example of a variant Malay and Dutch text of a treaty was that of 1685. See Appendixes A and B.
58. For a detailed account of the origins of the troubles with the Minangkabaus and the outcome, see 'Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678', translated by M. J. Bremner, in *JMBRAS*, V, i (Aug. 1927), pp. 60-8.
59. *Dagh-Register* 1643-44: Letter from Yang Dipertuan of Johor to Gov.-Gen. van Diemen, received 5 May 1644, pp. 67-9.
60. Ibid. July-Oct. 1644, p. 131.
61. *Dagh-Register* 1644-45: Jan.-March 1645, p. 73.
62. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn of Batavia to Gov. van Vliet of Malacca, 27 April 1645, p. 167; *Dagh-Register* 1644-45: Jan.-March, 1645, p. 73; March-May, 1645, p. 76.

63. *Dagh-Register* 1643-44: 24 and 27 Feb. 1644, p. 31.
64. *Dagh-Register* 1644-45: July-August 1645, p. 86.
65. *Ibid.* p. 86.
66. *Ibid.* Oct.-Nov. 1645, p. 92.
67. *BUB*, Instructions from Gov.-Gen. van Diemen to E. Pieter Soury on his Mission to Palembang, Jambi, and Johor, 16 July 1644, p. 407.
68. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Cornelis van der Lijn to Yang Dipertuan of Johor, 10 June 1645, fol. 248.
69. Heeres, op. cit. 'Instructions for E. Jan Thyssen as Vice-Governor of Malacca', 2 Nov. 1646, p. 327.
70. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn to Gov. van Outshoorn of Malacca, 22 May 1646, fol. 173.
71. *Ibid.* fol. 174.
72. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn to King of Johor, 25 Oct. 1646, fols. 206-7.
73. *Generale Missiven*, vol. 2, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn to Heeren XVII, 21 Dec. 1646, p. 291.
74. Heeres, op. cit. van der Lijn and Council to Authorities of the VOC, 31 Dec. 1647, p. 344.
75. William Foster, *The English Factories in India, 1646-1650* (Oxford, 1914), pp. 168-9.
76. KA 1064, OB 1648, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 4 Oct. 1647, fol. 199r.
77. R. O. Winstedt, 'A History of Johore (1365-1895)', *JMBRAS*, X, iii (Dec. 1932), p.
78. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn to King of Johor, 15 April 1648, fol. 71.
79. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn to Gov. Thyssen of Malacca, 12 August 1649, fol. 98v.
80. The Dutch word used is *packen*. A bale is usually about 110 pieces of various kinds of cloth.
81. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn to Gov. Thyssen of Malacca, 9 July 1650, fol. 179; KA 1071, OB 1651, Missive from Gov. Thyssen to Batavia, 30 January 1650, fol. 100v.
82. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Carel Reniersz. of Batavia to Thyssen in Malacca, 6 Sept. 1651, fol. 330.
83. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. J. Maetsuycker to Gov. and Council of Malacca, 9 March 1655, fol. 29; *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Malacca, 25 June 1656, fols. 245-6.
84. KA 1100, OB 1656, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Aug. 1655, fol. 241r.
85. *Ibid.* fol. 248r.
86. KA 1104, OB 1657, Missive from Thyssen to Batavia, 30 Sept. 1656, fols. 133v-134r.
87. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Gov. and Council in Malacca, 23 June 1657, fol. 254.
88. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. van der Lijn to King of Johor, 4 July 1649, fol. 50.
89. KA 1072A, OB 1652, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 26 Jan. 1651, fols. 797r-v.
90. *Generale Missiven*, vol. 2, Gov.-Gen. Reniersz. to Heeren XVII, 19 Dec. 1651, pp. 541-2.
91. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Gov. and Council in Malacca, 25 June 1656, p. 245.
92. *Generale Missiven*, vol. 2, Gov.-Gen. Reniersz. to Heeren XVII, 19 Dec. 1651, pp. 541-2.

93. KA 1093, OB 1655, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 10 July 1654, fols. 317r-v.
94. KA 1100, OB 1656, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 1 April 1655, fols. 221v-222r.
95. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Gov. and Council of Malacca, 23 June 1657, fol. 255.
96. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Gov. Thyssen and Council of Malacca, 23 June 1660, fols. 201-2.
97. These rights were freedom from having their (1) places of trade entered into by the people of Goa; (2) homes entered into by the people of Goa; (3) children taken away and parcelled out among the people of Goa; and (4) property and goods confiscated if a Malay should commit a crime. Abdurrahim, 'Kedatangan orang Melaju di-Makassar', unpublished manuscript in Ujung Pandang in author's possession, p. 2; Abd. Razak Daeng Patunru, 'Sedjarah ringkas dari orang2 Melaju di Makassar (Sulawesi Selatan)', *Bingkisan*, 1, viii (Dec. 1968), p. 6.
98. Abdurrahim, op. cit. pp. 1-2.
99. *Generale Missiven*, vol. 2, Gov.-Gen. Reniersz. to Heeren XVII, 24 Jan. 1652, p. 581.
100. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Reniersz. to King of Johor, 28 May 1651, fol. 199.
101. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Gov. Thyssen and Council of Malacca, 17 June 1659, fol. 364; KA 1119, OB 1660, Missive from Gov. Thyssen to Batavia, 5 March 1659, fol. 441v.
102. KA 1130, OB 1663, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 10 May 1662, fols. 462-3.
103. *Dagh-Register* 1661: 28 Nov. 1661, pp. 382-3.
104. KA 1126, OB 1662, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 11 Nov. 1661, fol. 707. In the peace arranged by the Dutch between Aceh and Johor in 1641, Aceh returned all the lands on the Siak and Rokan Rivers to Johor. Sultan Abdul Jalil then appointed syahbandars in these important trading areas whose principal task was levying of taxes. See W. M. H. Schadee, *Geschiedenis van Oost-kust Sumatra*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 1918), pp. 9-10.
105. KA 1173, OB 1672, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 13 Jan. 1671, fol. 1389v.
106. KA 1126, OB 1662, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 11 Nov. 1661, fol. 706.
107. *Generale Missiven*, vol. 2, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Heeren XVII, 19 Jan. 1654, p. 687.
108. *Ibid.* p. 687.
109. KA 1072A, OB 1652, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 26 January 1651, fols. 796v-797r.
110. *BUB*, Gov.-Gen. Reniersz. to Gov. Thyssen of Malacca, 11 May 1652, fol. 163.
111. KA 1130, OB 1663, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 10 May 1662, fols. 462-3.
112. KA 1128, OB 1662, *Generale Missiven* from Batavia to Amsterdam, 26 Dec. 1662, fols. 120-2.
113. W. Ph. Coolhaas, 'Malacca under Jan van Riebeeck', *JMBRAS*, XXXVIII (1965), p. 178.
114. KA 1128, OB 1662, *Generale Missiven* from Batavia to Amsterdam, 26 Dec. 1662, fols. 128-9.
115. KA 1130, OB 1663, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 18 Sept. 1662, fols. 1137-8.

116. Ibid. fol. 1138.
117. KA 1130, OB 1663, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 23 Nov. 1662, fols. 1450^v-1451^{r-v}.
118. KA 1149, OB 1667, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 17 March 1666, fols. 1940-3.
119. A silver coin of The Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, etc., which varied in value, but was commonly about one rial, which was about 2½ Dutch guilders. It would have been approximately US\$85.
120. KA 1143, OB 1665, Missive from Gov. van Riebeeck of Malacca to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1665, fol. 2015.
121. KA 1137, OB 1665, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck of Malacca to Batavia, 19 Jan. 1664, fol. 67; KA 1139, OB 1665, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck to Batavia, 13 Aug. 1664, fol. 1905.
122. KA 1143, OB 1666, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck of Malacca to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1665, fol. 2015.
123. Ibid. fol. 1392.
124. Ibid. fols. 1391-2.
125. KA 1173, OB 1672, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 13 Jan. 1671, fol. 1389^v.
126. KA 1137, OB 1665, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck to Batavia, 29 Feb. 1664, fols. 317-18, 1044.
127. KA 1139, OB 1665, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck of Malacca to Batavia, 13 Aug. 1664, fol. 1906.
128. KA 1145, OB 1666, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck of Malacca and B. Bort to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1666, fol. 2085.
129. KA 1149, OB 1667, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 17 March 1666, fols. 1947, 1973.
130. KA 1149, OB 1667, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 31 March 1666, fols. 1943-4.
131. Heeres, op. cit. vol. 3, p. LXVI.
132. C. R. Boxer, 'Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry', paper presented at a conference at the University of Utrecht in The Netherlands sponsored by the Institute of Hispanic, Portuguese, and Ibero-American Studies, 25 Feb. 1958, pp. 15-17, 32-3, 40. See also Pieter Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 1648-1715*, vol. 2 (London, 1964), pp. 68-70.
133. Geyl, op. cit. p. 70.
134. Ibid. p. 350.

IV

THE JOHOR-JAMBI WARS

WITH the confidence bred of a realization of its renewed strength in the Straits of Malacca, Johor sought to recover from Jambi an area between Indragiri and Jambi called Tungkal. In 1629 Johor had demanded the restoration of Tungkal,¹ but nothing was resolved at that time. Tungkal remained under Jambi until 1655, when, at the instigation of the Johorese, the people of Tungkal rebelled against Jambi and placed themselves under the protection of Johor. The ruler of Jambi was angered by this development since he had given Tungkal to his wife as a wedding gift. Although he had written at first to Batavia requesting Dutch assistance in case of war with Johor over Tungkal, which 'consisted of several villages',² the Jambi ruler recognized Johor's position of power and preferred to resolve their differences peaceably. In August 1658 the Dutch received word of the imminent marriage between the royal houses of Jambi and Johor.³

In 1659 the Raja Muda (Raja Ibrahim)⁴ of Johor appeared in Jambi with a large retinue and married the daughter of the Pangeran Ratu (ruler) of Jambi.⁵ This marriage raised bright prospects for a mutually profitable alliance between these two kingdoms. The Raja Muda, who remained in Jambi until September 1660, urged the Pangeran Ratu to reject Mataram's suzerainty and refuse to give obeisance to the Susuhunan.⁶ As long as Jambi remained a vassal of Mataram, there was no possibility of any lasting arrangement with Jambi which could benefit Johor or the Raja Muda.

It was an especially happy match since the Raja Muda was the son of Sultan Hammat Syah of Johor (1613-1623) by a Jambi

princess, who had later returned to Jambi after the death of her husband in 1623.⁷ But the strong personal ties between the Raja Muda and the royal family of Jambi became a source of worry to Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah of Johor (1623-1677) who now had misgivings about the feasibility of this union in terms of his own authority. After the death of Sultan Hammat Syah, the Laksamana had been instrumental in placing the present ruler on the throne, but only on the condition that the throne revert to Sultan Hammat's son on his majority.⁸ The Raja Muda was two years of age when he fled with his mother to Jambi in 1623, but by the time he reached his majority, Sultan Abdul Jalil was much too well-ensconced to relinquish his position without a struggle. It appears that Sultan Hammat's son was then given the title of Raja Muda, or heir to the throne, as an appeasement. Sultan Abdul Jalil may not have thought in terms of a threat to his own power when this marriage was proposed, but after the marriage had already been concluded, he entertained doubts and caused a protracted war between Jambi and Johor which went on for almost two decades.

The long, sporadic conflict between Johor and Jambi in the latter half of the seventeenth century highlights certain features considered important to Malay maritime kingdoms and emphasizes the new role slowly being assumed by the Dutch in the area. The principal cause of the conflict was Johor's disregard for the proper code of conduct between two Malay kingdoms and a slight to the sovereignty of Jambi. In order to retain its self-respect and to rebuke the offender, Jambi responded with a deliberate insult which could not possibly be misconstrued by Johor in this world of strict adherence to highly conventionalized behaviour. In the war which followed, the most vulnerable aspect of both kingdoms was their international trade, hence the grave concern for a victory in the 'battle of the sea lanes'. The value of Johor's Orang Laut *suku*, from the islands principally to the south of Johor, and Jambi's Orang Laut *suku*, from the shores and islands off its coast, was accentuated as they battled to destroy their enemy's trade, the source of his revenue. Throughout these years the Dutch became equally afraid of the damage to their pepper trade in Jambi and to trade in general flowing through the Straits of Malacca. Motivated by their self-interest, the Dutch soon found themselves in a position of the go-between in the conflict between Jambi and Johor. In this unaccustomed role, which closely approximated that of a political overlord, the Dutch established

their reputation as a mediating force in the Malay world.

In May 1660 Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor informed the Dutch that the ruler of Jambi had offended him. He also indicated his great displeasure with the Raja Muda who was still in Jambi and expressed his suspicion of Jambi's intentions toward Johor. Fearing the worst he asked the Dutch for assurance that they would come to his assistance if Jambi should persuade its overlord Mataram to attack Johor. Preparations were then made to send a fleet to cruise in the waters off Jambi with the faint hope of snatching the Raja Muda of Johor from the hands of the ruler of Jambi.⁹ The manoeuvre worked; the Raja Muda returned to Johor in September 1660 and promised to return to get his bride 'when he had built a house for her'.¹⁰

The Raja Muda may have intended to bring his bride to Johor, but Sultan Abdul Jalil was too wary of the threat which the Raja Muda could pose to his own position if bolstered by Jambi to have allowed it. He realized that by preventing the Raja Muda from fetching his bride he was seriously undermining relations with Jambi. Preparing for the worst, he sought Dutch assurance of military assistance if Mataram, Jambi's overlord, should attack Johor in this quarrel.¹¹ So afraid was Sultan Abdul Jalil of Mataram that he ordered a galley to be placed continually on the alert at his palace to take him away at a moment's notice if this became necessary.¹² He was aware of the dangerous consequences which could result from toying wilfully with the sensitivities of the Jambi ruler in such a delicate situation, but his evaluation of the priorities had adjudged the threat of a legitimate Johorese claimant to the throne greater than that of Jambi and Mataram. Before 1641 such a hubristic assessment of Johor's strength *vis-à-vis* this powerful combination of Jambi and Mataram would have been ludicrous. But Johor had recovered much of its self-confidence and, more importantly, had received the assurance of protection from its militarily-respected and useful ally, the Dutch. The latter's long-standing friendship with Johor was the principal reason for Johor's manoeuvrability in the Malay world in these years.

In 1663 Sultan Abdul Jalil felt compelled to defend his position, however precarious, to Jambi. He explained that the danger of an impending Portuguese invasion of Malacca had prevented him from granting the princess of Jambi's request to join her husband in Johor.¹³ Disturbed by the dangerous turn of events, the Raja

Muda hoped to exonerate himself by sending his own personal envoys in 1664 to the Jambi court explaining that it was Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor who was responsible for the delay in fetching his bride.¹⁴

As the exchanges between the rulers of Johor and Jambi became increasingly heated and an armed conflict highly probable, the influence of the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil of Johor rose in the court. He was a person in close confidence with the ruler,¹⁵ and he may have encouraged or even suggested the idea of a threat posed by the Raja Muda in this marriage alliance with Jambi. Indeed, not long after the separation of the Raja Muda and the princess of Jambi, the Raja Muda became betrothed to the daughter of the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil. The Laksamana, furthermore, soon proved to be the direct beneficiary in the ensuing war with Jambi, for his task as admiral of the fleets made his role especially valuable and appreciated among the Johorese.

The Dutch began receiving news of warships and preparations of war on both sides. Greatly inflated reports reached the Dutch of the appearance of 600 warships under the Laksamana of Johor at Batu Pahat, about twelve miles from Malacca, in May 1664, and of some fifty ships and 2,000 men at Lingga several months later.¹⁶ Fearful of the disastrous consequences for Dutch trade, especially in Jambi, Malacca sent a mission under Manuel de Motta which attempted unsuccessfully to settle the differences between these two states.¹⁷ The situation was still unchanged in May, 1665, when Jambi again sent an ambassador to Johor demanding that the Raja Muda either fetch his bride or obtain a divorce.¹⁸

Still hopeful of some satisfactory solution to this impasse, the Dutch sent Jacob J. Pitt to Johor on 30 November 1666. After the usual greetings and ceremony were concluded, Pitt explained his mission to Sultan Abdul Jalil. The latter said that he was inclined toward peace but it would not be easy to attain because the Johorese had already clashed with the Jambinese at Lingga. Some eight months before, the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi had sent envoys to Johor asking the Raja Muda to have compassion on his wife since Palembang was planning to attack his country. Three months later another Jambi envoy arrived in Johor to inform him of a Palembang invasion and the burning of four of Jambi's districts in the interior. According to Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor, it was out of love for his wife and his father-in-law that the Raja Muda of Johor had then

set out with twenty-five warships to Lingga to gather a larger force for an attack on Palembang. At Lingga he was met by the Pangeran Purba from Jambi who conveyed the Pangeran Ratu's request that the Raja Muda should not go to Palembang but instead go to Jambi to meet him.

The next morning, however, the Pangeran Ratu himself appeared with twenty-four warships. They greeted each other with all respect and then headed toward Jambi together, ostensibly to fetch the Raja Muda's bride. Toward evening they were joined by sixteen more ships under the Pangeran Dipati Anum of Jambi who was clearly in command of the entire Jambi operation. The next day four more ships came and lined themselves two on each side of a half moon which the Jambi ships had formed around those of Johor the evening before. The Raja Muda had noticed all the manoeuvring but had remained quiet throughout. Some Jambinese tried to board his ship, but he prevented this without causing any open conflict. When two more Jambi ships joined the fleet, the Raja Muda decided it was time to make his escape and thus fought his way out, returning with two ships and thirty-two prisoners.¹⁹

The Pangeran Ratu of Jambi related another version to the Dutch in a letter to Batavia dated 22 December 1666. According to his version, the Raja Muda of Johor had requested that he send the Pangeran Purba to him. When the latter returned from his visit to the Raja Muda, he informed the Pangeran Ratu of the Raja Muda's intention to destroy the ruler of Palembang. The Pangeran Ratu then decided to go with the Pangeran Dipati Anum to talk to the Raja Muda at Lingga, at which time it was agreed that they should all go to Jambi. On their way back to Jambi it started to rain, and so they decided to anchor at one of the islands near Lingga. When the rains lifted, they realized that the Johorese had weighed anchor and started rowing toward the boats of the Pangeran Ratu and the other Orang Kaya. They went by and fired some shots at the Pangeran Ratu and at the Jambi Orang Kaya and then took flight.²⁰

Both the Jambi and the Johor versions of the incident coincide in the major outlines, but it is difficult to know which side had begun the hostilities. It was merely one of a number of provocative incidents between Jambi and Johor which characterized their relations since the marriage between the Raja Muda and the Jambi princess in 1659.

Although Sultan Abdul Jalil expressed his anger at the treachery of Jambi, he appeared even more perturbed by an insult to his person conveyed by the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi through a specific and studied breach of etiquette. He explained to Pitt that it was the custom that the name and seal of both rulers and commoners be placed in the middle of the letter. However, in the last two letters he received from Jambi, the Pangeran Ratu had put his name and seal on the top of the letter, thus clearly and arrogantly indicating that he was greater than the ruler of Johor.²¹ Such studied insults were a traditional Malay practice of indicating displeasure or anger without the unpleasantness of direct confrontation.²²

Despite the insult, Sultan Abdul Jalil swallowed this bitter morsel and accepted Dutch mediation because it would please the Dutch. On 5 December 1665 he made known his intention of calling a cease fire and sending an envoy to Batavia at the first opportunity to discuss a settlement. He then requested that the Dutch envoy go to Jambi to convince the Dutch Chief Merchant Andries Bogaert to try to intercede and make Jambi lay down its arms. In reply to the Pangeran Ratu's wish to know what was to become of his daughter, Sultan Abdul Jalil assured him that the Raja Muda was sending the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil to the Jambi River to fetch his wife while he remained in Lingga to await his bride. Only if the Pangeran Ratu either refuse to allow the Raja Muda to claim his bride, or reject his offer of mediation outright, would he then carry on with the hostilities.²³

The readiness of Sultan Abdul Jalil to accept the mediation of the Dutch was not occasioned through fear or weakness. Pitt observed in a letter sent to Malacca on 3 December 1666, while still on his mission to Johor, that Johor had about 100 large and small grabs fully outfitted for war and in a state of readiness. These ships were mounted with beautiful metal cannons and guns, and the men were all well-armed. Pitt was greatly impressed by the armoury of the Johorese and remarked that the Dutch had no conception whatsoever of Johor's capabilities because of the indifference with which the Dutch had formerly viewed Johor as a power.²⁴ Unfortunately, the Dutch were unable to bring the two belligerent powers together on mutually acceptable terms. Exasperated by the lack of any progress in the Dutch efforts at mediation, the Johorese sent seven ships to the mouth of the Jambi River in May 1667 and burned all the fishing huts and the fruit orchards in

the area. Shortly thereafter Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil appeared at the head of fifty perahus and destroyed several huts and a Dutch warehouse in Jambi.²⁵

The 'war' between Jambi and Johor was marked by an occasional show of force by either side against the other's capital. In the eyes of the Dutch the assembling of armadas and their appearance in the rivers of their enemies without undertaking anything more substantial may have seemed farcical. In April 1669 a Chinese junk arrived from Johor and reported a new armada being prepared by the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil for an invasion of Jambi.²⁶ This force appeared at the mouth of the Jambi River in August 1669 and waited there eight days for the enemy to come down-river. When no one appeared, the Johorese left and threatened to return in three months with twice the force to give Jambi its due.²⁷ A letter from Kiai Demang Suranegara of Jambi to Batavia received on 3 September 1669 reported a victory of Jambi over Johor, which resulted in 1,318 Johorese prisoners and a booty of forty guns and two cannons. The Johorese, on the other hand, were reported to have taken only 550 Jambinese prisoners.²⁸ This 'battle' is not recorded anywhere in the comptoirs and was apparently a fabrication.

In August 1670 Jambi attacked Indragiri and Tungkal and made slaves of 917 people. The Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil of Johor quickly assembled a fleet consisting of eighty-two ships mounted with small cannon and twenty-three grabs with three to five pounders plus other guns to retaliate against Jambi. The Dutch Chief Merchant de Haes first sent a letter and then went personally to the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil to ask the Johor fleet to leave the river and to agree to VOC arbitration. After an hour's conference, the Laksamana told de Haes that, without the consent of the ruler, he could do nothing. Nevertheless, the Laksamana agreed to Dutch mediation even though the Dutch could not guarantee that Jambi would keep its word. Only when Jambi refused to negotiate did Johor launch the attack.

After burning several *kampung* and taking some prisoners, the Johor fleet went down-river hoping to intercept the Pangeran Adipati of Jambi who was expected to return shortly from Palembang. The latter was warned and thus returned overland. The Pangeran Adipati then vowed that 'with the change of monsoons he would go to Johor with a combined Jambi-Palembang fleet to take revenge'.²⁹ Then

in January 1671 the Johor fleet enticed the Jambinese down-river and inflicted yet another defeat on them with the assistance of troops from Indragiri.³⁰

These pitched battles between Johor's and Jambi's forces were few and far between, but the real war for control of the trading lanes was a daily occurrence. The methodical attacks on the ships of the enemy kingdom and on those traders who dared to have any commercial or political intercourse with the enemy were an even greater danger to the state than the occasional armada which inflicted casualties in the capital city. Both of these maritime kingdoms were the heirs of a trading pattern and system of governance which extended back to the very early years of the Christian era. The success of such kingdoms as Srivijaya-Palembang and Malacca can be attributed to certain basic requirements: attractive local and foreign trade items, the proper facilities, a favourable atmosphere for trade in the port itself, and waters free from piracy.³¹ When these basic requirements were met, trade was attracted to these ports and wealth flowed into the coffers of these kingdoms. In the same way trade to both Johor and Jambi was a matter of great importance because it brought wealth; and wealth made possible the supplying of a military force to maintain these kingdoms and to provide all the necessary accoutrement of kingship which contributed to the kingdom's pride and prestige. The war between Johor and Jambi was thus conducted in a way very foreign to Western conventional methods. Pitched battles did occur and did heighten the tension considerably in both countries involved, and there was always a remote possibility of a successful surprise attack on the enemy capital city. The real battle, however, occurred daily in the seas between Jambi and Johor because the very survival of these kingdoms depended upon their ability to attract the trade to their ports. Very often this involved not only attacking enemy ships but also any neutral ships frequenting the enemy's ports. If Jambi and Johor had confined their hostile activities to the occasional mass battles, Dutch trade would have been less affected and therefore Dutch interference less likely. As it was, the Dutch were trying every means to arrange a peace settlement and prevent any further loss of Dutch trade in the area.

In September 1669 Malacca reported that a Jambinese, a certain Kiai Lela, had robbed several fishermen at the Serlang River, sixteen miles south of Malacca. He informed the Syahbandar of Malacca

of his intention to prevent any ship from going to Malacca, Muar, and Bengkalis since these were Johor areas. He had then gone with four ships to the Pisang Island to wait. When the Dutch went to investigate, they heard that he had already gone to the east coast of Sumatra with the aim of raiding Johor's territories and enslaving the inhabitants.³² Javanese and Malay ships began complaining that they no longer had any protection against Jambi's 'pirates' at Bengkalis.³³ Such a complaint was painfully embarrassing to Johor because it revealed Johor's inability to provide the necessary protection for traders in its ports. Since safety in its waters was a primary prerequisite for any Malay trading kingdom which aspired toward international entrepot standing, the leaders of Johor were quick to see the ramifications of further delay in dealing with these Jambinese. Johor began an immediate campaign against these Orang Laut who, as it soon became apparent, had specifically selected areas of Johor as their targets on the orders of the ruler of Jambi. The latter openly admitted that these Orang Laut were under his command and promised to call them back if the Dutch would help in resuming the talks.³⁴

In a war where the disruption of trade meant the severing of the life-lines of these kingdoms, the role of the Orang Laut assumed great importance. They were used by Johor and Jambi so effectively that both were willing to concede the damage wrought on their kingdoms. Thus when the Dutch in 1671 again offered to mediate in the conflict — mainly because their trade had greatly diminished with the absence of safety in the waters due to the war — both Jambi and Johor appeared amenable to this offer, despite the failure of the 1666 arbitration. Adrian Weylant was thus sent to Johor on 12 February 1671 to reach a settlement of the war.

A delegation from the Sultan Abdul Jalil greeted Weylant and then escorted the letter to the royal audience hall (*balai*) with the beat of the royal drums and the playing of reed pipes, as was the custom since the days of Malacca. In the Malay world it was the letter which represented the sender and not the messenger; thus the missive was accorded every respect and courtesy in accord with the status of the sender.³⁵ When the letter was read to Sultan Abdul Jalil at the *balai*, he appeared pleased at the intention of the Dutch to mediate in his quarrel with the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi. *Sirih* was then served to conclude the welcoming ceremony.

The next day Weylant visited the chief officials of the kingdom

who were the Raja Muda, the Bendahara, the Laksamana, the Paduka Tuan, and the Temenggong. They all felt that Sultan Abdul Jalil was favourably inclined toward mediation, but that he would only agree on the condition that Jambi return the Orang Laut leader Sekam. He had deserted the Johor fleet and was apparently playing a leading role in the Orang Laut attacks from Jambi. This seemingly innocuous stipulation in fact reflected the Johor ruler's awareness that the real war was being conducted in the shipping lanes of the Malay world. He fully realized that trade and the Orang Laut were the bases upon which his secular power rested; consequently, he sought to shore up any breach in the ranks of his Orang Laut which may have been caused by this desertion and thereby guarantee the adequate protection of the trade of his kingdom. As long as the Orang Laut leader Sekam was free to roam the seas preying on the Johorese and terrorizing foreign traders from entering Johor's ports, there was no hope of a workable peace with Jambi. Despite Johor's initial willingness, Sultan Abdul Jalil and his officials now would not consent to mediation unless Jambi further agreed to send: (1) envoys to Johor where the peace negotiations would be held; and (2) an envoy of high rank to explain why the Jambinese had been raiding Johor's lands in the last three years. Only after these conditions for talks were agreed upon would Sultan Abdul Jalil then consider what measures he would adopt.³⁶

What Sultan Abdul Jalil was actually demanding was a total submission of Jambi with the help of the Dutch. Both Malay kingdoms clearly understood that if Jambi were to send envoys to Johor for peace talks, it would be at a grave disadvantage negotiating in enemy territory. If Jambi had consented and sent envoys, as well as a high ranking official to explain the piracies committed against Johor by Jambi, Johor's prestige would have soared because it would be interpreted as a dictation of Johor's terms to the defeated Jambi. Jambi and Johor understood the significance of these conditions, and it was obvious to all but Weylant that the mediation was bound to fail. Weylant became first aware of something amiss in the whole proceedings when the Laksamana of Johor complained to him that the Dutch missive from Malacca written by the Malay scribe of the Dutch, Encik Hollanda, was so full of foreign words that it was incomprehensible.³⁷

A few other subsequent Dutch missions to Johor were similarly accused or else berated for sending an incompetent interpreter, or

someone who did not understand the Malay language (*bahasa*). Whenever the Johorese deeply felt that something was not proper, that a certain mission had not served to deal with the problem with which the Johorese were most deeply concerned, they expressed their dissatisfaction by blaming the lack of knowledge or facility with the language. In the nineteenth century the Johor rulers were still wont to accuse the Dutch of sending inadequate interpreters since their dissatisfaction could not easily be expressed in comprehensible, tangible terms to the Dutch. The period of the nineteenth century in Johor was not one of great pride among the Johor rulers, and they lamented the failure to maintain *bahasa* as a symptom of the decay of society.³⁸ To the Malays *bahasa* was essential not only as a means of communicating daily needs and discussing ideas, but as a symbol of what was considered vital and meaningful in their way of life. By rejecting an ambassador or interpreter because of his incompetence in *bahasa*, the Johor leaders were often not referring to the inability of the individual to communicate on an ordinary level, or even a higher level, of ideas. What they were trying to convey was their own deep dissatisfaction that certain basic concepts which they believed essential for the survival or maintenance of a certain Malay world view and their place in this world view would be undermined. The acknowledgement of sovereignty, 'national' = *negeri* self-respect, and the proper conduct among kingdoms was highly important in the Malay world and became the necessary starting point for any fruitful relations between two powers. What the Dutch treaties with Johor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed toward, and what the Dutch and the English in 1824 perhaps became unwitting accomplices in, was the undermining of these very basic beliefs concerning the nature of their kingdom and their sovereignty. When the Anglo-Dutch treaty divided the Malay world, the Johorese were left to scramble desperately and despairingly to try to recover their own identity by searching in the past and attempting to reconstruct a period when Johor was still a respected Malay nation, the acknowledged successor of Srivijaya-Palembang and Malacca, and to discover some answers in the past for questions plaguing them in the nineteenth century. The Buginese-Malay historians of the nineteenth century would have endorsed the philosophical justification for the writing of all Buginese-Macassarese histories: 'It is feared that we [rulers, makers of history] will be forgotten by our children, and grandchildren,

and by their descendants, and thus result in (1) having too high an opinion of ourselves; and (2) having foreigners call us useless or of little worth.³⁹ To have expected a sympathetic response to these problems of *bahasa* from a non-Malay, especially a commercially-oriented European, would have been both unprofitable and risible. These were added reasons for the lack of communication between the two parties.

The Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil was highly suspicious of the presence of the Dutch mission in Johor because he was convinced that they had come there to assess Johor's strength. Eight days after Weylant's arrival, the Laksamana despatched two envoys, the Raja Indra Muda and the Sri Amar Segera, ostensibly to deliver the ruler's letter to Malacca, but in actuality to spy out Malacca's defences. In this letter the Sultan Abdul Jalil accused the Dutch of failing to uphold the provisions of the 'treaty' signed with Johor.⁴⁰ By refusing to assist Johor against Jambi, the Dutch were blatantly contravening an article of the 'treaty' in which it was agreed by both parties that the enemy of one would be the enemy of the other. Furthermore, the Dutch were acting quite contrary to normal acceptable conduct between allies by diverting Chinese junks and other trading vessels from going to Johor. Sultan Abdul Jalil demanded an end to such practices, then concluded his letter by questioning seriously the Dutch intention of upholding the 'treaty' at all.⁴¹

Governor Balthasar Bort of Malacca sent an immediate reply assuring Sultan Abdul Jalil that all ships would be allowed to go to Bengkalis, provided they first came to Malacca to pay tolls. He assured him that the Dutch had no intention whatsoever of breaking any treaty with Johor.⁴² The Dutch were now desperately anxious to work out some settlement between Johor and Jambi because both were their allies and both were becoming alienated at the procrastination of the Dutch in committing themselves to one or the other side. Unwilling to be drawn into any conflict between native states, the Dutch downplayed their political commitments and emphasized their role as middlemen. Jambi had already reacted favourably to Dutch efforts in February 1671, and left it to the Dutch to decide a time and place for the talks. Jambi's agreement was conditioned on the inclusion of Indragiri in any peace settlement since the latter was involved on the side of Johor.⁴³

When Weylant's mission returned to Malacca in the beginning of

March 1671, there was little cause for rejoicing. A Portuguese in Johor, Manuel Dias, had told Weylant that the people of Rembau had approached the ruler of Johor several times wanting to know when they should attack Malacca. Weylant's report that there were 100 Johorese ships fully equipped and in a state of readiness accentuated Dutch fears and suspicions of Johor's duplicity.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Johor's conditions for the talk all but wrecked whatever chances there were for bringing the two warring parties together. When Jambi was notified of these conditions, it understood immediately that what Johor was demanding was its submission and admission of culpability. In reply, Jambi's ships were again sent out to prey on Johor shipping at Bengkalis and elsewhere, thus exhibiting Jambi's contempt for Johor's demands.⁴⁵ The faint hopes for peace which the Dutch thought they detected were abruptly dashed by the resumption of the Johor-Jambi struggle for control of the seas.

Ships arriving in Malacca from Johor reported that in July 1671 Johor had sent a strongly-equipped fleet to Bentan.⁴⁶ Hoping desperately to ward off an imminent invasion of Jambi which could be disastrous to their factory and their pepper trade there, the Dutch quickly sent a letter to Sultan Abdul Jalil asking him to meet the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi so a new effort could be made to obtain a peace satisfactory to both sides.⁴⁷ Although this offer was again accepted by Sultan Abdul Jalil, nothing further resulted.⁴⁸ The only reports were of daily Johorese raids on the east coast of Sumatra.⁴⁹

When Weylant went on a second mission to Johor two years later in January 1673, there was no sign that it was seriously being affected by the war or desperately seeking Dutch intervention to end the hostilities with Jambi. What was encountered instead was a haughtiness which could only have arisen out of Johor's belief that it had matters under control. Weylant was met at the mouth of the Johor River by an Orang Laut who conducted him upstream to Johor Lama. On arrival he noticed the construction of a new lodge upriver from the city where all of Johor's weapons were being made. He was then accompanied to the *balai* by two soldiers and six Orang Laut. In the letter which Weylant ceremoniously presented to Sultan Abdul Jalil was a request that Johor consider the English their enemy since the latter were at war with the Dutch. Sultan Abdul Jalil refused to consider such an idea and even gave specific orders that the English ship lying in his harbour remain unmolested.⁵⁰ He was willing to guarantee the safety of the English ship, and every other ship in his

harbour, not in order to antagonize the Dutch deliberately, but to emphasize his readiness to guarantee the inviolability of all trading vessels within his waters.

Since Johor's viability as a Malay power was dependent upon the trade which it could attract to its shores, it would have been disastrous to Johor's reputation as a trading emporium if the trading nations could never feel certain of their safety while in Johor. Moreover, the Dutch refused to give assistance to Johor against its enemies in direct contravention of their treaties with Johor, while they demanded Johor's upholding of the treaties by aiding the Dutch against their enemies. To add insult to injury, the Dutch had sent twelve metal guns and gunpowder to Jambi and had even turned away Johor ships going to Bengkalis to defend the latter from Jambi's raids.⁵¹

The meeting proceeded in an inconclusive fashion and then quickly ended without any decision being made. Weylant sought the intervention of the Raja Muda in expediting matters with Sultan Abdul Jalil, but the Raja Muda explained that his influence in the court was even less than that of the most minor Orang Kaya. Nevertheless, he promised to speak to his cousin Sultan Abdul Jalil, which yielded no results and forced the Dutch envoys to abandon their mission and return to Malacca empty-handed.⁵²

Sultan Abdul Jalil's annoyance with Dutch action in the waters off Johor's territories forced the Dutch to be somewhat more circumspect in their actions against trading ships bound for Bengkalis. Dutch cruisers in that area were ordered not to compel any ship, especially Javanese and Malay ships, to go to Malacca, 'out of respect for the Johorese king and to prevent giving him any cause for displeasure'.⁵³ The Third Anglo-Dutch war was in progress in Europe, and the Dutch were afraid of antagonizing the Johorese and having a second war on its hands when it was necessary to preserve all the armaments and manpower for any unforeseen attack by the English.⁵⁴

In the beginning of May 1673 several Malays from Bengkalis arrived in Malacca and gave a somewhat garbled report of an invasion of Johor. It seemed that a combined force from Jambi and Palembang had gone undetected up the Johor River right up to the city of Johor Lama. Several houses in the outskirts of the city were burned to the ground, but somehow the ruler's residence (*istana*) escaped destruction. Although the Raja Muda had fought and killed

an important Jambi Orang Kaya, the Johorese were forced to abandon the city to the invading force.⁵⁵

A month later the Dutch were able to get a full picture of what had happened by piecing together a number of separate reports by Malay and Moor eye-witnesses of the event. On 4 April 1673 when the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi was away in Palembang for the final preparations of a marriage of his son to a princess of Palembang, his son, the Pangeran Dipati Anum, led a fleet of warships in a surprise attack on Johor.⁵⁶ They burned and depopulated the city with very little opposition, and then forcefully seized the English yacht, the *Concordia*, which was lying at anchor in the harbour.⁵⁷ According to three survivors of the *Concordia*, about twenty Orang Kaya of Johor, among whom were the Raja Muda, the Bendahara, and the Syahbandar, approached Edward Locke, the Captain of the ship,⁵⁸ to ask for guns and assistance against the Jambi fleet which was coming upriver. When Locke refused to promise them any help, they hurriedly boarded their boats to escape the approaching Jambi fleet. No sooner had they got into the boats when the Jambi fleet came into view, forcing the Johorese to abandon their boats and seek refuge in the jungle.

The entire population of Johor Lama followed the lead of their ruler and the Raja Muda and fled to the jungle at the approach of the enemy. The Laksamana, meanwhile, escaped with his own boat to one of the islands. After three days of pursuit, Jambi's forces returned to the city with the bound Bendahara of Johor in tow. The unfortunate Bendahara was taken away to Jambi as a war prize, along with a sizeable number of foreign traders and Johorese and their slaves who had been starved out of their hiding places in the jungle.⁵⁹

In late October the Resident Gerritt Pott from Jambi reported that Jambi's fleet had consisted of sixty-four light boats and about 2,000 land and naval troops. When the victorious expedition finally returned from Johor on the first of June, the fleet had grown to approximately 204 ships, among which were twenty to twenty-six grabs, and many junks and trading vessels belonging to Minangkabaus and Javanese. The impressive booty consisted of four tons of gold,⁶⁰ ninety-five pieces of metal and iron cannons and other guns, plus 1,268 prisoners from an original number of 3,500. Many of the prisoners had escaped from time to time, but there were still fourteen important Johor Orang Kaya among those still in the

hands of the Jambinese. The most valuable prisoner was the Bendahara who preferred to place his life in the hands of the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi rather than escape. He was therefore allowed to leave Johor for Jambi on his own ship with all his possessions and retinue. The Pangeran Ratu had later given him a kris as a gift and asked him to settle in Jambi.⁶¹

The booty taken at Johor Lama is one of the best indices available in the Dutch contemporary records of the prosperity and the importance of Johor by 1673. There were originally only sixty-four light boats in the Jambi fleet, but on its return it had grown to 204 ships. Since there seemed to have been little resistance, the Johor Orang Laut could not have been in the vicinity of the city. The large majority of the ships taken as prizes, therefore, must have been merchant ships trading at Johor Lama. Among these ships were 'many trading junks belonging to the Minangkabaus and Javanese'. In addition there were four tons of gold and a large number of guns which were captured, attesting to the wealth accumulated by Johor over the years since 1641.

On 31 July 1673 Governor Bort of Malacca received a letter from the chief Johor official of Muar, the Orang Kaya Sri Bija di Raja. The latter informed Bort that his master, Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah of Johor, had come to Muar and commanded him to ask the Dutch for assistance against Jambi. Bort was in a predicament and had to explain that, since both Johor and Jambi were Dutch allies, the Dutch could not help one without alienating the other. In desperation Sultan Abdul Jalil proposed that the Dutch place Muar under their temporary custody to prevent its being attacked by Jambi.⁶² Rumours soon reached the Dutch that Sultan Abdul Jalil had fled to Pahang, which the Dutch called 'a place of no importance and with a small population', and had abdicated in favour of the Raja Muda. The latter was now at Singapore because the Johorese were reluctant to return to their old city where everything was destroyed and where '... the trees and undergrowth had reclaimed the land'.⁶³

Despite the destruction of Johor, the very nature of the forces which supported the kingdom made possible its rehabilitation. The ruler, whose presence was indispensable for the coherence of the polity, escaped to safety to Pahang. Thus the symbol of the *negeri* survived and facilitated the establishing of a new capital with very little upheaval. The most important of his Orang Kaya, the Lak-

samana Tun Abdul Jamil, eluded the Jambinese and fled to safety among the islands, thereby assuring his continuing influence in the governing of the kingdom. Finally, the Orang Laut forces were unaffected by the attack and were easily assembled within a short time by the Laksamana.

All the elements which assured a successful kingdom were present after the destruction of Johor Lama in 1673, but the priorities had now shifted somewhat. In addition to regaining the confidence of foreign traders, an equally important task was to avenge the humiliation suffered at the hands of Jambi. In order to accomplish these goals, tradition as well as practicality demanded the services of the Laksamana. This new role thrust the Laksamana into a position of great power in the kingdom, and his cautious hand guided the course of Johor history from this time on until his death in 1688.

1. P. A. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel*, vol.2, Second Series, documents XLV: Jan Oosterwyck, Chief Merchant at Jambi to Gov.-Gen. van Diemen, 15 March 1630 ('s-Gravenhage, 1890), p. 167.

2. *Generale Missiven*, vol. 3, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Heeren XVII, 24 Dec. 1655, p. 16.

3. KA 1116, OB 1659, Missive from Gov. J. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 8 March 1658, fol. 588r.

4. This is the personal name given in the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, JMBRAS, X, i (Jan. 1932), p. 1, lines 5-6. The genealogy in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* confuses the Raja Ibrahim who becomes ruler in 1678 with that of his namesake who was Raja Muda until his death in 1675. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Singapore, 1965), p. 9.

5. *Generale Missiven* vol. 3, Gov.-Gen. Maetsuycker to Heeren XVII, 16 Dec. 1659, p. 288.

6. N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw', *IG*, XXVIIⁱⁱ (1905), p. 1270.

7. *Dagh-Register* 1624-1629: 17 Sept. 1624, p. 81.

8. D. K. Bassett, 'Changes in the Pattern of Malay Politics, 1629-c.1655', *JSEAH*, X, iii (Dec. 1969), p. 430.

9. KA 1123, OB 1661, Missive from Gov. Jan Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 10 July 1660, fols. 425r-v, 426r.

10. KA 1126, OB 1662, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1661, fol. 75; Macleod, op. cit. pp. 1272-3.

11. KA 1123, OB 1661, Missive from Gov. Thyssen of Malacca to Batavia, 10 July 1660, fols. 425r-v.

12. *Dagh-Register* 1661: 28 Nov. 1662, pp. 384-5.

13. *Dagh-Register* 1663: 6 Feb. 1663, p. 30.

14. *Dagh-Register* 1664: 9 July 1664, p. 264.

15. KA 1137, OB 1665, Jambi Register, Missive from Bogaert and Council in Jambi to Batavia, 14 June 1664, fols. 1030-1.
16. *Dagh-Register* 1664: 9 July 1664, p. 264.
17. KA 1140, OB 1665, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck of Malacca to Batavia, 5 Dec. 1664, fol. 175.
18. KA 1143, OB 1666, Missive from Gov. Riebeeck of Malacca to Batavia, 31 May 1665, fol. 591.
19. KA 1150, OB 1667, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Dec. 1666, fols. 369^r-372^v.
20. *Dagh-Register* 1666/1667: 22 Dec. 1666, pp. 208-9.
21. KA 1150, OB 1667, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Dec. 1666, fol. 373^r.
22. In the Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu*, the Sri Agar 'diraja', a subject of the ruler of Malacca but also serving as Bendahara of the ruler of Perak, indicates his annoyance at the low status of the official sent to summon him to Malacca by having rice served to the official in a bamboo stalk and curry on a pot cover. These signs were quickly understood by the official who then returned to Malacca. See C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952), p. 196.
23. KA 1150, OB 1667, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Dec. 1666, fol. 374^{r-v}.
24. Ibid. 28 Dec. 1666, fols. 318-19.
25. KA 1156, OB 1668, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1667, fols. 818-19.
26. KA 1162, OB 1670, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 15 April 1669, fol. 946^r.
27. Ibid. Report of Hendrik Ijsbrantsz. from Jambi to Gov. Bort of Malacca, 6 Aug. 1669, fol. 999.
28. *Dagh-Register* 1668/1669: 3 Sept. 1669, p. 405.
29. Macleod, op. cit. pp. 1267-77.
30. KA 1173, OB 1672, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 13 Jan. 1671, fol. 1390^{r-v}. When the ruler of Indragiri died in January, 1669, the heir apparent, who was raised in Johor and obviously under the influence of Johor, was brought to Indragiri in March, 1669, and made ruler. Since that time, Indragiri's interests closely coincided with those of Johor. KA 1162, OB 1670, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 11 March 1669, fol. 933.
31. O. W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce* (Ithaca, 1967), pp. 242-3, 249.
32. KA 1162, OB 1670, Missive from Bort to Batavia, 2 Sept. 1669, fol. 978^v.
33. KA 1173, OB 1672, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 24 Feb. 1671, fol. 1423. A Malay kingdom often seemed to characterize its enemy's ships as pirates. The Malay kingdoms, however, did recognize genuine 'pirates' who served no ruler but their immediate leader in attacking native vessels for plunder.
34. KA 1173, OB 1672, Instructions to Adrian Weylant on Mission to Johor, 4 Feb. 1671, fols. 1426^{r-v}.
35. The same deference to the letter and not the ambassador is also seen in seventeenth century Ayuthia. See Jeremy Kemp, *Aspects of Siamese Kingship in the Seventeenth Century* (Bangkok, 1969), p. 12, quoting from Simon de La Loubere, *A New Historical Relation of the Kingdom of Siam* (London, 1963; original published London, 1693), p. 108.
36. KA 1173, OB 1672, Report of Adrian Weylant on Mission to Johor, 2 March 1671, fol. 1449^r.
37. Ibid. fols. 1445^r-1451^r.

38. One of the Malay writers at the Court of Riau in 1853 regretted the passing of the traditional *bahasa* for the *bahasa* of the 'holanda' government in 1824. See Cod. Or. 1999, Leiden University Library, p. 20.

39. H. J. Friedericy, 'De Standen bij de Boegineezen en Makassaren', *BKI*, XC (1933), p. 469.

40. The Johor leaders always referred to the 'treaty', although the concessions they claimed were the result of two or more treaties signed between the Dutch and Johor between 1639 and 1642. The provisions of these treaties, unfortunately, have not been preserved, and one can only surmise what they were from references to the treaties by both sides. The leaders of Johor were wont to refer to the 'treaty', which incorporated all agreements made with the Dutch, rather than to any specific treaty.

41. KA 1173, OB 1672, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 24 Feb. 1671, fols. 1422^{r-v}.

42. Ibid. 19 March 1671, fols. 1439^v-1440^r.

43. Ibid. 24 Feb. 1671, fols. 1421^v-1422^r.

44. Ibid. 19 March 1671, fols. 1438^v-1439^r.

45. Ibid. 24 Feb. 1671, fol. 1423^r.

46. Ibid. 28 July 1671, fol. 1489.

47. Ibid. 21 August 1671, fol. 1501^r.

48. Ibid. 27 August 1671, fol. 1527^v.

49. *Dagh-Register* 1672: 21 Jan. 1672, p. 16.

50. KA 1184, OB 1674, Report of Harmen van Harren, Gerritt Mameke and Adrian Weylant on Mission to Johor, 15 Jan. 1673, fol. 643.

51. Ibid. fol. 644.

52. Ibid. fols. 639-46.

53. Ibid. Orders for Dutch Cruisers in the Waters of Malacca, 14 April 1673, fol. 690^r.

54. KA 1184, OB 1674, Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1673, fol. 625^v.

55. Ibid. 6 May 1673, fol. 688^r.

56. Ibid. Missive from Resident in Jambi to Batavia, 5 April 1673, fol. 319^v.

57. Ibid. 21 June 1673, fols. 732^{r-v}.

58. Edward Locke was a famous Madras merchant who visited Bantam and eastern Java in the *Good Hope* in February-July 1670 and 1672. He was taking shelter in Johor from the Dutch because of the Third Anglo-Dutch war when he was killed. See D. K. Bassett, 'The British Country Traders and Sea Captains in South East Asia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *Journal of the Historical Society of University Malaya*, I, ii (1961), pp. 11-12.

59. KA 1184, OB 1674, Report of Three Moorish Sailors on Board the *Concordia*, May, 1673, fols. 741-3.

60. In the Dutch records 'a ton of gold' is used to refer to 100,000 guilders.

61. KA 1184, OB 1674, Jambi Register, Resident of Jambi to Batavia, 23 Oct. 1673, fols. 393^{r-v}.

62. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 31 July 1673, fol. 744^r.

63. Ibid. fol. 744^v.

V

THE LAKSAMANA AND THE ADVERSARIES OF JOHOR

THE 'total' destruction and 'miraculous' recovery of Johor in 1673 are reported in the contemporary VOC records, but they are plainly illusions conjured up by Dutch observers. The latter attempted to report activities in the Malay arena in absolute and quantitative terms without any understanding of the power structure within Johor and the functions and the character of a capital of a far-flung maritime kingdom such as Johor. The capital was merely the residence of the ruler; except perhaps for the ruler's *balai* and the mosque, the rest of the capital was mainly *atap* houses on stilts which could be destroyed and rebuilt with very little effort. Mobility characterized the populations of these settlements, and it was not uncommon to have entire settlements move from one site to another with little detectable upheaval. When a ruler decided that a site was inauspicious as a result of sickness, fire, or war, he would then change his residence and thereby cause an entire settlement to abandon its *atap* houses, fruit trees, and crops, and move on. It occurred frequently in the history of Johor because the kingdom was vast and encompassed both the Malay Peninsula and east coast Sumatra, as well as the islands off these areas. All of these places offered a potential site for a new capital.

The Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* describes the peregrinations of Sultan Mahmud in his flight from Malacca in 1511 in search of a capital. All that was necessary to build a capital and re-establish the centre of the kingdom was the ruler. When the Jambi fleet burned Johor Lama and brought away large numbers of

Johorese, the kingdom was not defeated but only temporarily dislocated. The ruler escaped destruction and thus ensured the continuity of the kingdom. The population was dispersed — some captured and others escaped to the jungle — but the resilience of a mobile people inured to frequent dislocations, coupled with the preservation of the ruler and his source of strength, the Orang Laut, assured the reconstitution of the kingdom within a short time at another site. The rapidity with which the Johorese regained their balance and put Jambi on the defensive attests to the strength of the Johor polity. Malays arriving in Malacca reported a rumour that Sultan Abdul Jalil had abdicated in favour of the Raja Muda soon after the flight from Johor Lama.¹ But in August or September 1673 Governor Bort in Malacca received a letter from the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil of Johor in which he said that 'he had been left by the King of Johor to restore affairs there [in Johor] and that he would go to the island of Bentan to protect it and to outfit ships'.² This important undertaking is also recorded in the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*. According to this Malay source, the Laksamana was told by Sultan Abdul Jalil to go to the island of Bentan and build a settlement on the Carang River, which was called Riau.³ By entrusting the restoration of the kingdom to the Laksamana, as the latter claimed in his letter to Governor Bort, Sultan Abdul Jalil was merely recognizing a well-known fact that the Laksamana was the most able individual for the task.

The very first step taken by the Laksamana was to go immediately to Riau on the island of Bentan to establish his base of operations. He recognized that he had to regain the confidence of the traders and make Riau as attractive a trading centre as Johor Lama had been before it was destroyed. In October 1673, only a few months after the destruction of Johor Lama, the Laksamana sent a shipload of Banjarmasin pepper to Malacca and asked to be paid in Spanish money.⁴ The request for Spanish rials may have been prompted by the Laksamana's desire to buy tin from Siak because traders in Siak would only trade tin for Spanish oblong rials.⁵ By encouraging the resumption of the former trade relations which Johor had with various areas, the Laksamana hoped to re-establish the old trading pattern at the new centre on Riau.

When the Dutch realized that the Laksamana was the effective governing power in the Kingdom of Johor, they treated him with great respect and described him as '... seriously trying to restore the

fallen reputation of Johor ... a courageous man who has always demonstrated his affection for the Dutch'. They were even more impressed when the Laksamana's fleet defeated that of Jambi in late 1673, only a few months after the burning of Johor Lama.⁶ But it soon became apparent to the Dutch leaders in Malacca that 'trying to restore the fallen reputation of Johor', and 'affection for the Dutch', were incompatible in the Laksamana's terms of reference. The Laksamana had indicated his bitterness at the refusal of the Dutch to provide any assistance whatsoever to Johor. Not only were his requests for arms against Jambi flatly refused, but he was also made to pay tolls in Malacca. Such disrespect shown to a Johor Orang Kaya, especially to the Laksamana, was unpardonable. He thus threatened 'to come and visit' Malacca after he had finished with Jambi.⁷ The Dutch seemed impervious to the Laksamana's bitterness and continued to offer their services as mediators. But in October 1674 the Laksamana informed the Dutch that he was going to continue his war against Jambi. The latter kingdom had not ceased its raids against Johor, nor taken steps to bridle its Orang Laut leader Sekam who had robbed Johor of 600 of its inhabitants.⁸

The death in late 1675 of the Raja Muda of Johor, whose ill-fated marriage to the princess of Jambi had unleashed the destructive Johor-Jambi wars, gave hope to both Jambi and the Dutch that peace could now be arranged with Johor,⁹ but there was little change in the direction of affairs in the kingdom. The priorities had not altered, and, with the death of the Raja Muda, the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil became even more powerful within the realm. With the ruler having entrusted him with the duty of restoring the fortunes of Johor, and with the absence of the ruler from the centre of activity in Riau, the Laksamana was free from the restraints of any individual in the kingdom.

Johor's growing belligerence caused the Dutch in Malacca some concern. In an attempt to intimidate Johor, they sent a number of sloops and yachts to the waters off Johor's coast. This show of force was also intended to convince Johor that the Dutch were prepared to protect the small tin states in the interior of Siak if they wished to trade with Malacca. A fair amount of tin was already coming down the Siak River to Bengkalis, and these newly-found tin areas promised to produce another 400 to 500 bahars of tin yearly.¹⁰ The Laksamana was quick to realize the importance of these tin mines and despatched his son the Sri Perdana Menteri to

Bengkalis to try to persuade a ship from Kabon (one of the newly-found tin areas) not to go to Malacca but to Johor.¹¹ Thus began the battle between Johor and the Dutch at Malacca for control of the tin mines of Siak.

Tin was always a welcome commodity for the VOC because it was useful as a means of obtaining specie in India for its vital cloth trade on the Coromandel Coast.¹² The VOC had also discovered the value of tin, both as a ballast for their Indiamen returning to The Netherlands with their light cargoes of spices and cloth, as well as an item of trade in Europe where it was used in such alloys as brass and pewter.¹³ Tin first appeared in the VOC's auctions in Amsterdam in 1667 and 1668,¹⁴ and henceforth Malaccan tin was sold in great quantities in Europe. Malacca was now asked to collect between 100,000 and 400,000 lbs. of tin annually for the profitable market in Europe. In pursuit of this goal the Malacca government was encouraged to obtain from the native rulers in the area monopoly rights to their tin.¹⁵

The prospects of a sizeable quantity of tin coming from the new areas in Siak were most welcome to the Dutch in Malacca. Immediately after establishing a firm foothold in the Straits of Malacca, the Dutch had sought to monopolize the tin production of the area by signing treaties with the Sultan of Kedah on 18 June 1642,¹⁶ the head of Junk Ceylon (Phuket) on 18 March 1643,¹⁷ and with the Governor of Bangery on 1 January 1645.¹⁸ Thus, there were understandably bold efforts made now to prevent others from benefiting from the newly-found tin mines in Siak. The first move was made by the Laksamana of Johor who sent the Sri Perdana Menteri to Bengkalis to convince the Minangkabau settlements (*nagari*) of Kabon and Kota Rena in the interior of Siak to trade their tin with Johor instead of the Dutch. He then tried to settle the dispute between the Raja of Kunta and the other rajas in Rokan which had prevented the mining of the tin.¹⁹ The Raja Kunta, however, proceeded with his original intention of going to Malacca with a letter from the rajas of Kunta and Kota Rena expressing their desire to trade with Malacca. Realizing the importance and vulnerability of this mission, the Dutch decided to provide a return escort of two yachts and two sloops, as well as a personal emissary from the Governor of Malacca, to Sultan Mogol of Lantar, a state which had hindered the passage of Raja Kunta.²⁰ By this gesture the Dutch made their intentions fully known to Johor that they were

determined to get the newly-found tin to Malacca. A treaty was signed at Malacca on 11 January 1676 between the Dutch and the heads of the new tin *nagari* of Kota Rena, Kabon, and Giti, in which the latter promised to sell all of their tin to the Dutch for forty rijksdaalders a bahar.²¹

Relations between the Laksamana and the Dutch grew steadily worse and were exacerbated by the struggle for jurisdiction over the tin from the interior of Sumatra. When Governor Bort of Malacca tried to send a letter from the ruler of Jambi and his own letter to Sultan Abdul Jalil in Pahang asking for peace, the ship carrying the missives was not permitted to proceed further than Bentan. The Laksamana sent the ship back with a letter to the Syahbandar of Malacca, saying he had stopped the ship because he suspected that it contained an appeal for peace to which he was not at all inclined. He told the Dutch to stop interfering in Johor's affairs and ended his letter with a complaint that the bearers of the letters were men of too low a rank to be permitted to present letters to a ruler of Johor.²²

The Dutch were annoyed by the Laksamana's high-handed behaviour and accused him of reading the contents of the letter. It was difficult for the Dutch to see in this act anything but a reflection of a head-strong individual, jealously protecting his position in the kingdom by screening everything and everyone coming into contact with the ruler. Since the Laksamana's exercise of all governing powers within Johor had the blessings of the Sultan Abdul Jalil, it would have been superfluous to erect a protective barrier around the latter. In this episode he was clearly upset that the Dutch authorities had attempted to bypass him and seek some accommodation with the Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah without his knowledge. As a leading official of Johor governing the kingdom with the consent of the ruler, the Dutch action was a clear affront to the Laksamana's sense of his own dignity and a diplomatic *faux pas* which he could not condone. Therefore, he not only rejected outright any consideration of peace but further accused the Dutch of insensitivity and impropriety in despatching unworthy envoys to bear a letter to the ruler of Johor.

Although the Laksamana's reaction to this entire episode was angry and, in the eyes of the Dutch, somewhat unconscionable, he was much too wary of Johor's limitations *vis-à-vis* the Dutch to risk an open military confrontation. Nevertheless, he would have

recognized that the discovery of tin in the interior of Siak could be a very important source in enhancing Johor's status as a trading emporium. Spurred on by the desire to make Riau as profitable an entrepot as Johor Lama had been, the Laksamana was prepared to take certain bold measures against Johor's competitors in order to attain his goal.

Johor's warships began cruising between Jambi and Indragiri and attacking any ship going to Malacca, especially those from the coast of Java which carried rice and other provisions. The Dutch sent a complaint to Sultan Abdul Jalil and the Laksamana of Johor with a warning that if they were to encounter these Johor ships they would have to be considered as pirates.²³ A Moorish ship from Surat and a Portuguese ship from Bengal both on their way to Siam were forced by the Laksamana of Johor '... to have a taste of the trade there [Riau] and in Pahang'.²⁴ So eager was the Laksamana to bring trade to Riau that he was willing to use some 'persuasion' to divert ships from Johor's main competitor in the area, Malacca. As part of the Laksamana's policy, the tin sent down the Siak River by the Minangkabaus and intended for Malacca was detained by the Johor Syahbandar on the Siak River. The Laksamana then bought the tin for only thirty rijksdaalders a bahar, instead of forty rijksdaalders a bahar which the Dutch were offering. On one occasion he used this tin to acquire an entire cargo of cloth from a ship from Surat trading in Riau.²⁵ A Dutch official sent to Siak to observe the state of the tin trade on the Siak River succeeded in releasing the tin intended for Malacca but detained by the Johor Syahbandar. However, he saw no way of guaranteeing an easy flow of that mineral since severe pressure was being applied by Johor to prevent these tin-producing states from delivering their tin to Malacca.²⁶ The tin was going instead to Bengkalis, which attracted a great number of Moorish traders. Governor Bort of Malacca thus strongly recommended a strict enforcement of the system of passes for ships because the presence of these Indian traders attracted native ships to Bengkalis to the detriment of Malacca.²⁷

While seeking to regain its former status in the trading world, Johor did not neglect its role of affording protection to its subject territories. After the destruction of Johor Lama, Sultan Abdul Jalil took immediate precautions to assure the safety of his defenceless dependencies while the forces of Johor were being reassembled. He asked the Dutch to serve as guardians over Muar, Rio Formosa,

and Bengkalis as a temporary expedient until Johor could extend its own protection over its lands.²⁸ The Dutch agreed to do this and later returned these lands to Johor.²⁹ Jambi, meanwhile, had taken advantage of the temporary helplessness of Johor's forces to extend its campaign to other areas which belonged or were closely allied to Johor. In November 1673 the Syahbandar of Bengkalis, the Orang Kaya Setia Raja, requested from the Dutch three small guns, ten larger firearms, bullets, and gunpowder because of Jambi's attempt to conquer Bengkalis.³⁰ The following month it was the head of Rokan who appealed to Malacca for protection against Jambi forces which had burnt and ravaged his country.³¹ Indragiri, however, managed to hold its own against Jambi and provided Johor with a powerful ally with whom to mount a retaliatory attack. The ruler of Indragiri and his brother Raja Bongsu had gone with all the Orang Kaya in twelve ships to meet the Raja Muda of Johor and coordinate their activities.³² Other Johor territories such as Sungai Ujong, Rembau, and Kelang took advantage of their newly-found independence from Johor and started sending their tin supply to Malacca instead of to the new centre of the Kingdom of Johor at Riau.³³

In 1677 the Minangkabau settlements of Rembau, Sungai Ujong (both dependencies of Johor), and Naning (a dependency of the Dutch) asked for and received a new ruler called Raja Ibrahim from their overlord at Pagar Ruyong in the mountain fastness of Central Sumatra.³⁴ This Minangkabau prince claimed to possess many of the attributes of the Pagar Ruyong rulers, including magical powers. Sultan Abdul Jalil was quick to inform Malacca that Raja Ibrahim, accompanied by 3,770 men from Sumatra, intended to wage war with the Dutch.³⁵ The first reaction of the Dutch was to suspect that Johor intended to combine with the Minangkabaus against them. Another rumour quickly spread that the Laksamana of Johor was coming to Malacca at the head of a fleet of thirty ships each with 100 men on board to participate in a Minangkabau siege of Malacca.³⁶ But the Johorese viewed this development with as much, if not more, alarm than the Dutch. The presence of a Minangkabau ruler in the midst of Johor's dependent territories posed a distinct threat to the influence of Johor in the Malay world and a direct challenge to its sovereignty. In the past both Rembau and Sungai Ujong had been presented as a fief to one of the Orang Kaya and had always acknowledged Johor's overlordship. With the appearance of Raja Ibrahim

both Rembau and Sungai Ujong shifted their allegiance from Johor to this ruler from Sumatra. Indragiri, meanwhile, was desperately fighting off an invasion instigated by the Minangkabau Sultan of Kuantan located in the interior of Indragiri.³⁷

In this period the Minangkabau communities on the Malay Peninsula and the east coast of Sumatra existed on the periphery of the dominant Malay kingdoms and acknowledged the political overlordship of either a Malay ruler or the Dutch. When Malay Malacca fell to the Portuguese in 1511, there was a long period in the sixteenth century when the Minangkabau settlements operated quite independently from the Malay overlords who were occupied with defending themselves from Acehnese and Portuguese attacks. With the capture of Portuguese Malacca by a combined Dutch-Johor force in 1641, the fortunes of Johor soared. It re-established its trading links throughout the archipelago, with India, and with various Chinese ports, reaffirmed its alliances with neighbouring lands, and reasserted its authority over its dependencies on east coast Sumatra and on the western coast of Malaya. The Minangkabaus once again became responsive to the wishes of the court of Johor and were made accountable for their rebellion against the Dutch from 1644 to 1646. Although the old relationship seemed to have been re-established, a slow change was now occurring in the Minangkabau settlements in Malaya and the east coast Sumatra as a result of developments in the Minangkabau heartland (*darat*) and coastal areas (*rantau*)³⁸ in Sumatra.

Aceh had maintained control over the Minangkabau townships along the west coast of Sumatra down to Padang since 1621. The Pagar Ruyong monarchy, meanwhile, had lain dormant in the Padang Highlands exercising little or no political influence over its subjects.³⁹ Acehnese control over many of the eastern coastal states of Sumatra prevented the monarchy from seeking release from political and economic restraints by means of contact through the rivers which originated in the Minangkabau homelands and flowed out to the east. Having been so long isolated from his subjects, his principal sources of revenue, the Yamtuan Sakti⁴⁰ could barely repress his disbelief and gratitude when informed in 1667 that the Dutch had 'recovered' his lands on his behalf⁴¹. He understood the nature of the Dutch conquest well enough to accept the proffered arrangement and thereby reclaim his overlordship and re-establish his prestige among his subjects.

Both the west coast *nagari* as well as the *nagari* in the eastern *rantau* became responsive once again to the wishes of the Pagar Ruyong court. When a Dutch employee, Tomas Dias, visited a court of one of the rulers of Pagar Ruyong somewhere in the Padang Highlands in 1684, he was told that this particular ruler had jurisdiction over the entire interior of east coast Sumatra. The area was known to be quite heavily populated with about 300 rajas or heads of villages.⁴² On his journey Dias kept a record in which he noted the population figures of the Minangkabau towns he visited along the route. The figures seem exaggerated but reflect a contemporary observer's impression of a substantial Minangkabau population. He reported, for example, that Air Tiris had a population of 10,000 inhabitants, of which 500 were traders; and in the court of the ruler of Pagar Ruyong lived 8,000 people.⁴³

These large populations were not unusual but typical of the settlements in the Minangkabau homeland. In 1696 an outgoing Dutch Resident at Padang reported the following population figures for a few of the areas of the heartland: 'Menangkabau' where the emperor lived, 1,000; Suruasso, 4,000; Padang Ganting, 10,000; and Sungai Tarab (or Padang Tarab), 1,000.⁴⁴ Another Dutch official in 1717 commented on the 'populous' region of the Lima Kaum in the region (*luhak*) Tanah Datar,⁴⁵ and when Sir Stamford Raffles visited the Minangkabau heartland in the early nineteenth century, he was favourably impressed by the 'extensive population and high state of cultivation' of the area. He remarked that '...On a moderate calculation, the population, within a range of 50 miles around Pageruyong, cannot be estimated as less than a million.'⁴⁶

The Dutch were instrumental in encouraging Minangkabau trade and migration to the eastern and western *rantau* by removing Acehnese control on both coasts of Sumatra. The Dutch and the Johorese now began eagerly establishing trading links with the large Minangkabau populations in these east coast states and with the Minangkabau traders now coming down in greater numbers from the interior. Increased competition for gold, pepper, and tin, made the eastern outlet a favoured route among the Minangkabaus.⁴⁷ The Pagar Ruyong rulers looked more and more toward the east in the latter half of the seventeenth century and exerted their sacral as well as temporal power to assure the steady flow of trade and revenue from these areas to their court.

When the Dutch decided to subscribe to the claims of the ruler of Pagar Ruyong and serve as his regent in the west coast Sumatra *nagari* in 1667, they greatly enhanced the prestige of the Pagar Ruyong court.⁴⁸ The Pagar Ruyong royal family had always inspired great respect and allegiance among the Minangkabaus in the *rantau* areas of east coast Sumatra, but the prestige which they acquired in the late seventeenth century as a result of Dutch activities in west coast Sumatra was sufficiently high to convince several Minangkabau leaders to claim the sanction of the Pagar Ruyong court. The ambitions of several such individuals in the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago were facilitated by their claim to have been sent by the royal family. Whether these individuals were genuine scions or messengers of the royal family of Pagar Ruyong is not known. Their significance lies in the large number of followers they accumulated in the eastern *rantau*, thus justifying the belief in the efficacy of the spiritual control of the Pagar Ruyong rulers over most Minangkabaus.

These two factors, therefore — the growing number of Minangkabaus moving into the eastern *rantau* areas of Sumatra to participate in the new opportunities of trade, and most important of all, the renewed prestige and vigour of the Pagar Ruyong court — were indirect consequences of Dutch policy. One could thus attribute to the Dutch the dubious honour of providing the necessary ingredients for the type of Minangkabau activities which occurred in the Straits of Malacca in the latter part of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The uprising of the Minangkabaus under Raja Ibrahim was but the first of several revolts which plagued the Kingdom of Johor in this period.

So formidable seemed the Minangkabaus under Raja Ibrahim that when a rumour spread that the Minangkabaus had captured Malacca, it was readily believed by the Johorese. The Johorese Syahbandar of Bengkalis reacted to this news by treating the non-Dutch Malacca inhabitants trading there with great disrespect. Consequently, when Dutch ships arrived repudiating such rumours, he was forced to take refuge with the Laksamana on the island of Bentan.⁴⁹ On hearing the rumours even the Laksamana of Johor believed them to be true. He took this opportunity to detain several ships bound for Malacca and to persuade them to trade in Bentan.⁵⁰

In February 1678 the Dutch received word that many Minangkabaus with their families had come from Java to aid the Minang-

kabau Sultan Kuantan in his war against Indragiri.⁵¹ A united Minangkabau effort from both sides of the Malacca Straits against the Dutch seemed imminent, for it was rumoured that the Sultan of Kuantan had held secret negotiations with the Minangkabaus on the Malay Peninsula. It was feared that with the return of the dry season a joint attack would be made against Malacca.⁵² A report from Dutch ships in the Siak River helped to ease the minds of the Dutch at Malacca to some extent. These ships observed that there were only 2,000 Minangkabaus who had come from Java, instead of the greatly exaggerated figure given by first reports. Furthermore, they understood that the representatives from Naning and Rembau were not succeeding in convincing the Sultan Kuantan of a joint Minangkabau project against the Dutch.⁵³

When the Minangkabaus attempted unsuccessfully to penetrate into the suburbs of Malacca, Raja Ibrahim realized that his forces alone were not sufficient to attempt any major attack on Malacca and thus attempted to attract manpower on the basis of some common bond. His failure to gain the assistance of the Sultan of Kuantan by appealing to their common cultural heritage made him seek a much wider bond to attract non-Minangkabau support. He found the solution in Islam. In a retaliatory raid against the village of Rembau, the Dutch by chance found a letter in one of the huts from Raja Ibrahim addressed to the great *haji* and all the Buginese and Macassarese at Kelang. The letter called on all Muslims to take up the sword against the infidel Dutch and promised that all those who died in the strife would be immediately transported to heaven. The spectre of a *jihad*⁵⁴ caused some nervousness among the Dutch in Malacca. They wrote to the Syahbandar of Kelang and strongly urged him not to send the Buginese and Macassarese to this deceiver who wanted to wage an unjust war.⁵⁵

With the Minangkabau-Muslim threat looming over Malacca, the new Dutch Governor Jacob J. Pits hurriedly sent a letter to Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor expressing his sincere wish that their old friendship would continue.⁵⁶ Since Sultan Abdul Jalil was becoming uneasy at the prospect of a powerful Minangkabau entity undermining his own authority in the Malay world, he welcomed the opportunity of renewing the ties of friendship with the Dutch. He sent a letter to the people of Rembau commanding them to end their hostilities and to seek a renewal of the friendship with the Dutch or else face his displeasure and severe punishment. He

threatened to send the son of the Laksamana with a large force to attack them and destroy everything there if they disobeyed.⁵⁷

Fortunately for both the Dutch and the Johorese, the rebellion ended as quickly as it had arisen. Malays from Kelang and Muar told the Dutch in October 1678 how Raja Ibrahim had been murdered by the people of Rembau who refused to continue the war against the Dutch.⁵⁸ The circumstances surrounding the death of Raja Ibrahim were not completely known, but in 1680 a certain Buginese called 'Baggia' claimed that he had murdered Raja Ibrahim in Rembau.⁵⁹

A letter from Pahang meanwhile arrived in Malacca to announce the death of Sultan Abdul Jalil at Pahang on A.H. 1088, 26 Ramadan [22 November 1677],⁶⁰ after an illness of ten days. He was succeeded by his nephew who intended to return within two or three months to re-establish the seat of the kingdom once again on the Johor mainland.⁶¹

The Dutch sent a mission to Riau on 11 November 1678 to congratulate the recently-arrived ruler of Johor, Sultan Ibrahim Syah, and bring news of the appointment of Rykloff van Goens as the new Governor-General in Batavia.⁶² On 18 January 1679 Sultan Ibrahim and the Laksamana returned the honour by sending letters of felicitations to the new Governor of Malacca and to the new Governor-General in Batavia. In the formal missive Sultan Ibrahim informed the Dutch that he had granted their request to carry on the tin trade with Kelang and Selangor but had refused to send an envoy to Batavia to discuss peace with Jambi since the latter continued to harass Johor's ships. With regard to the trading of tin at Kelang, the Dutch would be permitted to trade only with the Syahbandar of Kelang and not with the common people. While forbidding the Syahbandar of Bengkalis from hindering the tin trade between the Dutch and their allies Kabon, Kota Rena, and Giti, Sultan Ibrahim nevertheless required ships of these nations carrying tin to Malacca to report to the Syahbandar of Bengkalis on their journey to and from Malacca. Were they to refuse to do this, he threatened to deny them the privilege of sailing on the Siak River and thus force them to use another river to transport their tin.⁶³

It was clearly evident by the conditions imposed by Sultan Ibrahim that he intended to handle the Dutch as he did all other traders within his kingdom. The Dutch were undeniably a valuable

component in the Asian trading world. Moreover, they had proven their military strength by overthrowing Acehnese domination on the west and east coasts of Sumatra, defeating the Kingdom of Goa in south-west Celebes, and suppressing Trunajaya and the Macassarese refugees on Java. Johor had great respect for the Dutch as an economic and military power in the Straits of Malacca, but it was never intimidated by them. It continued to believe that its long-standing friendship with the Dutch, which culminated in their joint victory over Portuguese Malacca in 1641, would be sufficient to overcome any potentially dangerous disputes between them. On the matter of Dutch trade on the Siak River, therefore, the ruler of Johor regarded the Dutchmen merely as one of the many traders seeking to gain advantages in his kingdom. He granted the Dutch the privilege of trading within his lands, but he affirmed his total control of the trade as was only proper as rightful ruler over these areas.

To prevent any danger to this new entente between the Dutch and Johor, Governor Pits reiterated strongly in his instructions to the Dutch cruisers not to give Sultan Ibrahim any cause for displeasure and not to force any native ships to go from Bengkalis to Malacca.⁶⁴ Sultan Ibrahim and the Laksamana of Johor profited from this decision when a number of their ships provided with Dutch passes sailed unmolested to Aceh and bought large quantities of Indian cloth. With this cloth Johor was assured of a lively trade since the native Malayo-Indonesian traders eagerly bartered their products for Indian textiles.⁶⁵

While the restoration of Johor's trade was one of the principal concerns of the Laksamana after 1673, an equally important priority was the wreaking of vengeance against Jambi for its destruction of Johor Lama. In the beginning of 1674 the Laksamana and the Raja Muda were able to raise a sizeable force to threaten Jambi.⁶⁶ Later that April Johor again sent a fleet of 150 and 110 ships on two different occasions to the Jambi River.⁶⁷ Disturbed by these frequent appearances of Johor's fleets in its waters, Jambi decided to seek powerful allies.⁶⁸ It made overtures to the Dutch, but the latter were not eager to become involved in any native wars. Mataram, Jambi's nominal overlord, was equally reluctant to offer help since it was just recovering from the throes of rebellion. When Jambi's appeals to Bantam and the English also went unheeded, it turned in desperation to the refugee Macassarese prince Daeng

Mangika and his large following temporarily residing in the Kingdom of Bantam.⁶⁹

The numerous roving bands of refugees from south-west Celebes were a common phenomenon in the Malay world in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and were a ready source of manpower for the rulers in the area. It was these little understood, much maligned adventurers who were to infuse new elements into the Johor polity and, with the Minangkabaus, irrevocably change the course of its history. Yet in the seventeenth century little was known of the Buginese and Macassarese outside their sphere of influence in eastern Indonesia except that they had acquitted themselves admirably in the wars in Macassar in 1667 and 1669, fighting alongside or against the Dutch. In the last third of the seventeenth century large numbers of Buginese and Macassarese began appearing in various parts of South-East Asia. This stream of refugees from south-west Celebes continued unabated throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries, providing fresh blood and much-needed manpower to earlier groups of their compatriots who by choice or circumstance were already established or acclimatized to their new environment. It was this constant infusion of new recruits from Celebes which invigorated the Buginese and Macassarese settlers and adventurers and made it possible for them to maintain strong cultural and political ties with their former homeland. Many, in fact, considered their absence from Celebes as a temporary situation resulting from war disruptions, personal enmities, or desire to make one's fortune and see the world.⁷⁰ The Dutch comptoir at Macassar reported the exodus of many Buginese-Macassarese nobility in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and their return after a few years and sometimes after a lengthy period of time away. There were, nevertheless, large numbers of Buginese who remained in their newly adopted homes because the circumstances which had forced them to flee from Celebes remained unchanged during their lifetime, and/or because the situation in their new environment proved to be very favourable.

At first this phenomenon was attributed by most contemporary observers to the upheaval resulting from the defeat of the Kingdom of Goa and its allies in 1667 and 1669 by the Dutch and their Buginese allies. Wars were but one factor in the continuing outflow of refugees from south-west Celebes in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. An even more important cause of this pheno-

menon, which has been ignored in previous works, was the new oppressive overlord-subject relationship introduced by the ruler of Bone, Arung Palakka, and enforced by the Dutch. The union forged by necessity between the Dutch and their Buginese allies, Bone and Soppeng, in 1666-1667 propelled Arung Palakka to the forefront and made him the indisputable leader of the whole of south-west Celebes. Unwilling to antagonize Arung Palakka, who was considered to be the linchpin of their policy in East Indonesia, the Dutch lent the weight of their guns to his ambitions and thereby contributed toward the upsetting of the traditional political relationships which had characterized previous conquests.

The traditional Buginese-Macassarese form of overlordship was not totally odious and often meant very little to isolated petty kingdoms except the delivery of one-tenth of the crops and certain numbers of armed men on demand — all of which were the traditional acknowledgement of subservience and allegiance.⁷¹ In this loose system of overlordship, each petty kingdom conducted its internal affairs under its own leaders. Although the entire peninsula of south-west Celebes only measures approximately 100 miles from east to west, and 200 miles from north to south, the number of petty kingdoms proliferated and defied total effacement and absorption up until the middle of the seventeenth century. The reason for this may be sought in the strength of the *gaukeng* and *toManurung* tradition. The *toManurung* were heavenly beings who descended from heaven to bring the laws and customs (*adat*) and the royal families to the individual states, while the *gaukeng* was an object with sacral-magical properties which was also believed to have descended from heaven. This *gaukeng* is regarded as the protective spirit of the community in which it was discovered and is found in both major centres as well as in isolated villages. It serves an important function as a social integrator and cohesion-maker in these communities.⁷² The existence of many petty states, each with its own *toManurung* and *gaukeng*, is a characteristic peculiar to the political geography of south-west Celebes. Through the centuries these petty kingdoms tended toward a confederation with other small or fairly large political entities, either by force or by choice. In uniting into a confederation each group retained its individuality and its social and political cohesion centred around its own *gaukeng* and *toManurung* tradition.⁷³

Despite the tendency of certain major kingdoms to extend their boundaries through conquest of their neighbours, the smaller units survived. The peculiar nature of the various alliances made by the Macassarese and Buginese attests to the fact that the political entities, no matter how small, preserved their independent existence. The larger kingdoms in no way attempted to impose their values and sacred objects on a conquered state but were satisfied with a loose vassalage system.⁷⁴ Even at the height of power of the Kingdom of Goa in the middle of the seventeenth century, each separate group maintained its own identity and own ruler under the umbrella of Goa. Non-interference in the selection of a ruler of another state was an aspect of statecraft to which these kingdoms particularly adhered. It is no wonder that, in the chronicles of the Kingdom of Goa, Goa's Chief Minister refuses to comply with the request of the leaders of the vanquished Bone that the ruler of Goa become the ruler of their kingdom. Instead, the Chief Minister of Goa reminds them that '...There is an *adat* that if we choose a ruler, the people of Bone may not take part; if the people of Bone choose a ruler, we may not take part.'⁷⁵ Only with the presence of Dutch forces in Macassar as a watchdog on affairs in south-west Celebes in the late seventeenth century was the traditional political relationship between conqueror and conquered (as exemplified in Goa's relations with its subject states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) set aside and an unnatural, debilitating one introduced.

Arung Palakka was all too aware of the extent to which he could pursue his ambitions unopposed and blessed by the Dutch in Macassar. Throughout his long reign, which began in effect in 1667 (although he did not become actual ruler of Bone until 1672) and ended with his death in 1696, he consolidated his position in Bone by removing any rival claimant to the throne and by appointing his own choice on the throne of Goa, Bone's most dangerous enemy.⁷⁶ By seeking to dominate the subject states, even to the point of placing his own representatives in positions of power, Arung Palakka rejected the traditional framework of subject-overlord relationship and in the process alienated the ruling groups in the various states. Many of the nobles of Goa were unwilling to live under a ruler hand-picked by their worst enemy⁷⁷ and resented the forced oath-taking which Arung Palakka demanded of them.⁷⁸ Even a traditional ally such as Soppeng was made to accept the individual selected by

Arung Palakka as its ruler.⁷⁹ The Buginese states of Wajo and Luwu, which had sided with Goa in the 1667 and 1669 wars with Bone and the Dutch, incurred the wrath of Arung Palakka, who not only interfered directly with the selection of their rulers, but also made certain that these states never recovered their former military and economic strength to challenge him.⁸⁰

Throughout the period of Arung Palakka's effective rule from 1667 to 1696, he was constantly outfitting expeditions to suppress rebellions or calling on allies to wage major wars. He conducted military campaigns against Goa in 1669 and 1677, against Wajo in 1670, and against Luwu in 1676. Even with these states somewhat pacified, revolts were forever erupting in Mandar and Toraja which could only be suppressed by force. It was said of Arung Palakka by his wife Daeng Talele that if he were not waging war, he would be repairing his fish nets, or smelting, or doing something else, because he was not happy idle.⁸¹ By the end of his reign, areas had seen so much devastation that trade fell and the people grew more and more impoverished. The frequent demands for manpower to execute his wars and punitive campaigns were a source of discontent and sorrow throughout the land. The campaigns against the elusive and fierce pagan Torajas alone extracted a costly toll among Arung Palakka's troops.⁸²

These wars, coupled with Arung Palakka's implacability in his enmities toward the Macassarese, Wajorese, and any person or group who had somehow antagonized him, were but extensions of his policy of maintaining direct control of the internal and external affairs of every state from his court at Cenrana in Bone or at Bontualala in Macassar. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Kingdom of Goa had pursued a policy of conquest and had extended its hegemony over much the same areas as had Arung Palakka by 1696. But the method of overlordship under Goa provided for the preservation and the continuity of the individual petty kingdom and its governing personnel and apparatus. Wars were as numerous, but there were no large-scale migrations such as those which resulted from Arung Palakka's wars and new methods of control bolstered by Dutch arms. To these methods must be attributed the principal reason for the continuing exodus of Macassarese and Buginese from south-west Celebes during the reign of Arung Palakka. Daeng Mangika was just one of the numer-

ous Macassarese-Buginese refugee princes who roamed the seas of South-East Asia and left an indelible impression in the history of many of the kingdoms in the area.

When the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi realized the grave danger which Johor posed to his kingdom, he sent emissaries to persuade the Macassarese prince, Daeng Mangika, and his following to come and settle in Jambi. Daeng Mangika was the son of I Mappaosong Karaeng Bisei (1674-1677), ruler of the Kingdom of Goa who was dethroned by Arung Palakka and the Dutch in 1677.⁸³ He and his retinue had followed the well-travelled route of Macassarese and Buginese refugees through Sumbawa, East Java, and finally to the Kingdom of Bantam.⁸⁴ At first the ruler of Bantam had welcomed these Macassarese refugees because of the influence of his most trusted adviser, the Macassarese Sheikh Yusuf, and because he regarded this new source of armed manpower as a great asset in any future confrontation with the Dutch.⁸⁵ But by the time the Jambi emissaries arrived in Bantam asking Daeng Mangika and his following to settle in Jambi, relations between Bantam and the Macassarese refugees had reached a very low point. At first Daeng Mangika showed some hesitation, but he later accepted the invitation after the following conditions had been met:

1. If he should go to Jambi with his people, he would require that the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi, their lord, install and honour him with a position which would empower him to rule, together with the ruler of Jambi, over the Jambinese, Macassarese, and other inhabitants in his land as he had done in Macassar [i.e., Kingdom of Goa].

2. Jambi and Macassar should always be one.

3. There should be one lord, but he should not make heavy demands on him [Mangika] and not forbid his [Mangika's] friends and relatives from coming to Jambi.⁸⁶

Daeng Mangika and his following then sailed to Palembang where they were met by the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi, the Pangeran Dipati Anum, and the Jambi nobles. There, in full view of the Macassarese and the people of Jambi and Palembang, the contract made at Bantam was again renewed between the Pangeran Ratu of Jambi and Daeng Mangika.⁸⁷

In return for Daeng Mangika's offer of fealty to the Pangeran Ratu, the latter placed all the Macassarese already residing in his kingdom under Daeng Mangika's jurisdiction.⁸⁸ Not long after this, however, the Pangeran Ratu became disturbed by the large

numbers of Macassarese and Buginese who sought sanctuary with and offered their services to Daeng Mangika. These refugee groups from Celebes had first gone to the receptive Kingdom of Bantam. However, after the troubles which had arisen between the Macassarese and Bantam in the late 1670s, many of the Macassarese were forced to seek other more favourable and sympathetic kingdoms. The defeat of the Macassarese forces in East Java in 1677 and 1679 had caused still other groups to seek safety among their own kind elsewhere in the archipelago.⁸⁹ In 1679 Daeng Mangika's position of power in Jambi shone forth like a beacon to foundering Macassarese and Buginese in the area. Whether it was the hope for spoils under a successful leader, the comfort of safety among one's own kind, the persistent belief that they would form the nucleus of a force which would be the vanguard for the reconquest of Macassar, or the hope for a new start in a new land, these groups flooded Jambi. This new development thoroughly frightened the ruler of Jambi who now demanded the return of all Macassarese who had once been under his personal command and the revocation of the agreement with Daeng Mangika.⁹⁰

The situation steadily deteriorated until the Macassarese and the Jambinese finally came into conflict during a Johor invasion. In May 1679 300 Johor ships arrived at the mouth of the Jambi River. Forty smaller ships were despatched upriver and succeeded in seizing the guns of an unoccupied fort and throwing them into the river. Only when the Jambinese finally realized that they were there did the Johorese flee down-river. That evening the Johorese disembarked some 1,500 to 1,600 men who went upstream at daybreak, fought for some three to four hours, and then returned. While the Johorese established themselves on a sand-bar and blockaded the river downstream, the Jambinese used their ships to form a blockade against ships going upstream. Unexpected assistance from the desertion of the Pangeran Dipati Anum and his Macassarese brother-in-law Daeng Mangika with some 300 Macassarese soldiers enabled the Johorese to succeed in a second attack which broke all Jambinese resistance and left the entire city at the mercy of the invaders.⁹¹

The Pangeran Dipati Anum now took control in Jambi and agreed to certain reparations in order to effect the withdrawal of Johor's forces. He agreed to give to the Laksamana a sum of 10,000 rijksdaalders in cash, two metal cannons, and all the gold and people taken from Johor in compensation for the destruction of Johor

Lama in 1673. As partial fulfilment of the reparation, he gave the Laksamana 3,000 rijksdaalders in cash, three catties gold, two metal cannons, and 300 people, with the promise that he would deliver the remainder within two or three years.⁹² To assure the future payment of these reparations Jambi was forced to deliver two hostages to Johor: a Raden Turas and a Raden Mas Kulup, two sons of the Pangeran Dipa Negara, an important noble in Jambi.⁹³

After the Macassarese betrayal of Jambi there was little hope of their settling peacefully again within their newly adopted homeland. On 17 October 1679 Daeng Mangika and 500 of his followers left with thirteen ships to go to Palembang, to which place they had been invited by the ruler.⁹⁴ The Dutch demanded that they go to Batavia and be sent back to Celebes, but they refused and continued to hold out in Palembang.⁹⁵ Daeng Mangika sent messengers to the ruler of Bantam asking permission to settle once again in his land, but the latter had had enough trouble with his Macassarese guests and was unwilling to admit more.⁹⁶ It was rumoured that Daeng Mangika preferred to go to Indragiri or Sukadana rather than to Batavia. Some sixty or seventy ships of Macassarese and Malays, so it was believed, were kept in readiness to leave Palembang for one of these places.⁹⁷ This proved to be merely wishful thinking by the Palembangers who reported this to the Dutch, for in April 1680 a new report arriving from Palembang mentioned that Daeng Mangika and his followers had built houses and had settled in that kingdom.⁹⁸

The conquest of Jambi by Johor in 1679 marked the fulfilment of the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil's foremost objectives since 1673: to place Johor back on its feet and to avenge the humiliation which it had suffered at the hands of Jambi. By 1679 the Laksamana also witnessed the dissipation of the threat from Raja Ibrahim and the Minangkabaus and the emasculation of Macassarese-Buginese power under Daeng Mangika. Although the Minangkabaus and the Macassarese-Buginese had not been decisively eliminated as a force in the affairs of the Malay kingdom, they had been temporarily checked. The subjection of Jambi, however, remained the culmination of the Laksamana's ambitions for the assumption of supreme authority in the kingdom. By the very nature of the tasks which he sought to achieve, the Laksamana could not avoid enhancing his own position of prestige and power while working for the interests of the kingdom. Any activity of the Laksamana was supposedly

undertaken in the interests of Johor and with the acquiescence of Sultan Ibrahim during the first two years of his reign. It would have been difficult for any Orang Kaya in the kingdom to accuse the Laksamana of exercising powers beyond his office without seeming to be against the honourable objectives which the Laksamana professed to be pursuing. The methods which the Laksamana had used to attract trade to the kingdom did bring the ships back again, and the coffers of the state and the Laksamana were much the richer for it. The victory over Jambi was his crowning achievement which vindicated his policies and left him in an unchallenged position of authority within the kingdom.

1. KA 1184, OB 1674, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 31 July 1673, fol. 744v.

2. Unfortunately, the Laksamana's letter itself is not included in the papers from Malacca, and the quote is only a paraphrase by Governor Bort of Malacca in his missive to Batavia. The paraphrased section in Dutch reads: 'dat hy [the Laksamana] van den Coningh tot Johor gelaten is, om de saecken daer weder to herstellen, en dat hy nae 't Eylandt Bintan soude vertrecken, om 't selve te beware, en daer vaertuygen toe te rusten...'. *ibid.* 27 Sept. 1673, fol. 763r.

3. Ernst Ulrich Kratz, *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* (Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 43.

4. KA 1185, OB 1674, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1673, fol. 771r.

5. KA 1426, OB 1694, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 5 August 1693, fol. 189v.

6. KA 1185, OB 1674, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 21 Dec. 1673, fol. 636r.

7. KA 1192, OB 1675 Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 9 Feb. 1674, fols. 185r-v.

8. KA 1193, OB 1675, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Oct. 1674, fol. 103r.

9. KA 1196, OB 1676, Private Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Heeren XVII in Amsterdam, 23 Dec. 1675, fol. 382r.

10. *Ibid.* fols. 382r-v, 383r-v.

11. KA 1200, OB 1676, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 20 March 1675, fol. 354r.

12. Tapan Raychaudhuri, *Jan Compagnie in Coromandel, 1605-1690, A Study in the Interrelations of European Commerce and Traditional Economics* ('s-Gravenhage, 1962), p. 194.

13. Dianne Lewis, *The Dutch East India Company and the Straits of Malacca, 1700-1784*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Canberra, 1970), pp. 77-8.

14. K. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* (Copenhagen, 1958), p. 19.

15. Lewis, *op. cit.* pp. 78-9.

16. J. E. Heeres (ed.), *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, vol. 1 (The Hague, 1907), pp. 365-6.

17. *Ibid.* p. 402.

18. Ibid. p. 438.
19. KA 1200, OB 1676, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 20 March 1675, fols. 355^{r-v}.
20. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 7 May 1675, fols. 361^v-362^r.
21. KA 1209, OB 1677, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 30 March 1676, fol. 361^r. A text of the treaty can be found in E. Netscher, Bijlage VI, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (Batavia, 1870), p. xii.
22. KA 1209, OB 1677, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 3 July 1676, fols. 380^v-381^r.
23. Ibid. 2 Sept. 1676, fol. 390^r.
24. Ibid. fol. 390^v.
25. Ibid. Instructions from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Hendrick Temmer on Mission to Siak, 27 Oct. 1676, fol. 418^r.
26. KA 1211, OB 1678, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1677, fol. 1294^v.
27. KA 1211, OB 1678, Missive from Gov. Bort to Batavia, 12 June 1677, fols. 1296^{r-v}.
28. KA 1192, OB 1675, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 9 Feb. 1674, fol. 185^r.
29. KA 1733, OB 1714, Report of Jan Lispencier and Thimanus Molinaeus on Mission to Johor, 13 Feb. 1713, fol. 106.
30. KA 1185, OB 1674, Letter from the Ruler of Pagar Ruyong, Sri Sultan Sri Pada Muda Alam Shah, to Malacca, received 3 Nov. 1673, fol. 644.
31. KA 1185, OB 1674, Letter from Ruler of Rokan to Malacca, received 6 Dec. 1673, fols. 645^v-646^r.
32. KA 1192, OB 1675, Letter from Resident Adriaen van der Walle of Indragiri to Batavia, 12 May 1674, fol. 221^v.
33. KA 1185, OB 1674, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 21 Dec. 1673, fol. 636^v.
34. In Governor Bort's words: 'He [Raja Ibrahim] declares himself a cousin of the King of Johor, but is, in fact, a fugitive Mohammedan priest, who according to rumour, was driven out, on account of his turbulence, by his own people in Sumatra and by Achin, where he tried to secure support and adherents.' Balthasar Bort, 'Report of Governor Balthasar Bort of Malacca 1678', tr. by M. J. Bremner Introduction and notes by C. O. Blagden, *JMBRAS*, V, i (Aug. 1927), pp. 68-9.
35. KA 1217, OB 1678, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 30 May 1677, fols. 312^{r-v}.
36. Ibid. fol. 314^r.
37. Ibid. fol. 312^r; *ibid.* Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 12 June 1677, fols. 326^v-327^r.
38. Strictly speaking the *rantau* (coastal areas) is only applied to the actual Padang Lowlands on the west coast of Sumatra. See P. E. De Josselin de Jong, *Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan*, Leiden, 1951, p. 9. It came to be applied, however, to any area outside the heartland where there were large numbers of Minangkabaus.
39. A. K. Dasgupta, *Aceh in Indonesian Trade and Politics: 1600-1641*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Ithaca, 1962), p. 92.
40. Term of address for the Raja Alam of Pagar Ruyong, whom the Dutch referred to as the 'Emperor of the Minangkabaus'.
41. KA 1237, OB 1680, Diary of a Mission of Raja di Hilir and Khatib Muda sent by the Dutch at Padang to the Minangkabau court on 13 Sept. 1668, fols. 1051^v-1052^r.

42. KA 1292, OB 1685, Report of Tomas Dias on Mission to the Court of Pagar Ruyong, 10 Jan. 1684, fol. 382r.
43. F. de Haan, 'Naar Midden Sumatra in 1684', *TBG*, XXXIX (1897), pp. 355-6.
44. N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw, VI. De Westkust van 1683 tot 1700 (slot)', *IG*, II (1906), p. 1444.
45. KA 1787, OB 1718, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Resident Coenraad Hofman of Padang to Batavia, 15 April 1717, fol. 13.
46. Lady Sophia Raffles, *Memoirs of the Life and Public Services of Sir Stamford Raffles*, vol. 1 (London, 1835), p. 421.
47. KA 1292, OB 1685, Report of Tomas Dias on Mission to the Court of Pagar Ruyong, 19 Jan. 1684, fols. 382ff; de Haan, op. cit. pp. 328-56.
48. KA 1746, OB 1715, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Hofman of Padang to Batavia, 30 April 1714, fols. 116-7.
49. KA 1217, OB 1678, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 26 July 1677, fols. 348v-349r-v.
50. Ibid. fol. 350r.
51. KA 1228, OB 1679, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1678, fol. 535r.
52. Ibid. fols. 540r-v.
53. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 23 April 1678, fol. 542r-v.
54. A Muslim Holy War.
55. KA 1228, OB 1679, Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 16 August 1678, fols. 557r-v.
56. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Jacob Jorisz. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 16 Oct. 1678, fols. 568v-569r.
57. KA 1237, OB 1680, Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1679, fols. 877r-v.
58. KA 1228, OB 1679, Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 16 Oct. 1678, fol. 569r.
59. KA 1248, OB 1681, Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1680, fols. 29v-30r.
60. KA 1219, OB 1678, Letter from Sultan Ibrahim of Johor to Malacca, received 26 Dec. 1677, fol. 760v.
61. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Bort of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Dec. 1677, fol. 757r; KA 1228, OB 1679, Report of Snickers and Temmer on Mission to Johor, 11 Nov. 1678, fol. 616v.
62. KA 1228, OB 1679, Report of Snickers and Temmer on Mission to Johor, 11 Nov. 1678, fol. 616v.
63. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 20 Jan. 1679, fols. 608r-v.
64. KA 1237, OB 1680, Instructions for Dutch Cruisers in Malacca's Waters, 6 March 1679, fols. 818r-v.
65. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1679, fol. 871v.
66. *Dagh-Register* 1664: 26 May 1664, pp. 133-4.
67. Ibid. 14 April 1664, pp. 95, 130.
68. H. F. de Graaf, *De Regering van Sunan Mangkurat I* (The Hague, 1962), *passim*.
69. *Dagh-Register* 1664: 13 Dec. 1664, p. 337; *Dagh-Register* 1665: 14 Sept. 1665, p. 248.

70. There are various references in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* and in Buginese-Macassarese texts of the penchant of these south-west Celebes peoples to go 'awandering' (*mengembara*).

71. KA 1745, OB 1715, Macassar Register, Governor Sipman to Batavia, 27 April 1714, fol. 48; KA Macassar to Batavia, *passim*.

72. H. Th. Chabot, *Verwantschap, Stand, en Sexe in Zuid-Celebes* (Groningen/Jakarta, 1950), pp. 134, 239.

73. P. J. Kooreman, 'De Feitelijke toestand in het gouvernements gebied van Celebes en onderhoorigheden', *IG V* (1883), p. 194.

74. Chabot, *op. cit.* pp. 74, 77.

75. Abdurrahim and G. J. Wolhoff, *Sedjarah Goa* (Makassar, n.d.), p. 71.

76. A. Ligtoet, 'Transcriptie van het Dagboek der vorsten van Gowa en Tello', *BKI*, XXVIII (1880), pp. 145-6.

77. A. J. A. F. Eerdmans, *Algemeene geschiedenis van Celebes*, 1st afd., unpublished ms. in Koninklijk Instituut van Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden, The Netherlands, pp. 202, 229.

78. *Dagh-Register* 1681: 29 July 1681, pp. 458-9.

79. KA 1469, OB 1697, Macassar Register, Instructions from President Prins to the Interpreter Jan Ferdinandus on His Mission to Soppeng and Bone, 18 Oct. 1696, fols. 88-90.

80. KA 1326, OB 1688, Macassar Register, Missive from President Hartsinck of Macassar to Batavia, 31 May 1687, fols. 229^r-230^r; P. B. van Staden Ten Brink, *Zuid-Celebes*, bijdragen tot de krijgsgeschiedenis ... (Utrecht, 1884), p. 116.

81. KA 1274, OB 1684, Macassar Register, Missive from Macassar to Batavia, 29 May 1683, fol. 464^v.

82. KA 1274, OB 1684, Macassar Register, Missive from President Cops of Macassar to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1683, fol. 511^r; KA 1326, OB 1688, Macassar Register, Missive from President Hartsinck to Batavia, 6 Aug. 1687, fols. 271^{r-v}; KA 1425, OB 1694, Macassar Register, Missive from President Prins to Batavia, 6 May 1693, fols. 501^v-502^r.

83. De Graaf, *op. cit.* p. 64; *Dagh-Register* 1682: 2 Jan. 1682, p. 2.

84. *Dagh-Register* 1679: 11 August 1679, p. 363.

85. De Graaf, *op. cit.* p. 64.

86. *Dagh-Register* 1679: 31 October 1679, pp. 483-5.

87. *Ibid.* p. 482.

88. *Ibid.* pp. 483-4.

89. *Dagh-Register* 1677: 27 April 1677, p. 105; *Dagh-Register* 1679: 18 June 1679, p. 177; *Dagh-Register* 1680: 22 Feb. 1680, p. 85; J. K. J. de Jonge, *Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië*, vol. 5-6 ('s-Gravenhagen, 1862-5), pp. 166-71.

90. *Dagh-Register* 1679: 31 October 1679, pp. 482-3.

91. N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw', *IG*, XXVII^a (1905), p. 1284.

92. *Dagh-Register*: 1679 23 Oct. 1679, p. 470.

93. *Ibid.* p. 481; Macleod, *op. cit.* p. 1284.

94. *Dagh-Register* 1679: 16 Nov. 1679, p. 513.

95. *Ibid.* p. 513; 16 Dec. 1679, p. 575.

96. *Dagh-Register* 1680: 5 Feb. 1680, p. 57; *ibid.* 4 March 1679, p. 96.

97. *Ibid.* 17 Jan. 1660, p. 26.

98. *Ibid.* 6 April 1880, p. 147.

VI

THE GLORY OF JOHOR AND THE LAKSAMANA

THE death of Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah in November 1677 added a small complication to the Laksamana's own personal ambitions. The new ruler Sultan Ibrahim Syah no longer saw the need to remain away in an 'unpopulated and unimportant' land like Pahang, now that the danger from Jambi was considerably minimized and Riau was flourishing. His uncle Sultan Abdul Jalil had allowed the Laksamana to exercise full authority without restraint from the throne, but Sultan Ibrahim was less inclined to rely exclusively on the abilities of the Laksamana. Sultan Ibrahim's presence in the centre of political life of the kingdom was sufficient to curb any extravagant exercise of authority on the part of the Laksamana. When Jambi was still defying Johor and being a painful reminder of an unfinished task, the Laksamana could justify whatever usurpation of power as being in the interest of Johor. After the conquest of Jambi in 1679 and the highly satisfactory agreement on reparations, the Laksamana was then placed in a peculiar position. His status was greatly enhanced among the grateful Johorese, but his task as saviour and champion of the Johorese was now completed. He no longer was in a position to arrogate still more power and have a reasonable justification for it. The times were peaceful, and the people could thank the Laksamana for contributing a large part toward this state of affairs; but he could no longer rationalize his newly usurped powers among the other Orang Kaya. His reluctance to relinquish his hard-earned authority was to bring internal matters to a head several years later.

Exulting in Johor's recent victory over Jambi, Sultan Ibrahim sent envoys to Kedah to demand the return of some Johorese refugees living there. To his great satisfaction, he received an appeal for friendship and a promise for the immediate repatriation of some forty Johor subjects.¹ Relations with the Dutch were also at a high point. When Johor requested permission to send ships loaded with pepper directly to Aceh to trade, it was granted as a matter of courtesy despite the fact it was against VOC policy.² This privilege was an especially important one for Johor. Now that normal relations were restored with the pepper-rich state of Jambi, there was a steady flow of 'illegal' pepper to Johor. The departure from Jambi of the Macassarese under Daeng Mangika in June 1680, had encouraged the pepper planters in the interior to send large amounts of pepper down-river. Most of this pepper was now being taken by the Johorese or by the Jambinese themselves and transported to Aceh or Johor.³ By September 1680 some thirty-five to forty Johor grabs heavily-laden with pepper had already gone to the capital of Johor at Riau from Jambi.⁴

The ever-increasing numbers of foreign ships anchored at Riau attested to Johor's growing prosperity since the destruction of Johor Lama in 1673. Indragiri gold went to Riau where the English, Siamese, Patanese, and Chinese bought it at a price much higher than that offered by the Dutch. Due to the lack of cloth at Malacca, traders preferred going to Riau where cloth was available as a drawing power for native goods.⁵ Since the Moorish traders supplied the cloth which was so valuable in the inter-Asian trade, the Dutch attempted to prevent the Moors from going to the native harbours. The Dutch, however, had insufficient ships to patrol the areas and the Moors continued to by-pass Malacca and its exorbitant tolls. Johor aggravated the situation further by capitalizing on 'an old practice' of the Dutch of allowing it to send three, four, or five ships yearly to trade directly with Aceh.⁶ Instead of sending the yearly quota of ships with the occasionally approved limited amounts of contraband cargo, Johor was now sending between eight to twenty ships annually to Aceh carrying slaves, large supplies of such unpermitted goods as pepper and copper, and returning with sizeable quantities of Indian cloth. With this cloth Johor was not only supplying the surrounding areas, but also attracting the gold and pepper trade of Jambi and Indragiri. Furthermore, Sultan Ibrahim supplied ships from Patani, Aceh, and other

non-Johor Malays with his passes so that they could trade without fear of Dutch interference.⁷

Sultan Ibrahim's only cause for concern was the rumour of a large Macassarese force preparing to invade Indragiri. Since Johor considered Indragiri to be within its sphere of influence, it appealed to the Dutch for assistance against the Macassarese. The Dutch promised to maintain a close watch on these 'pirates' and to protect the trading areas and the 'rice bowls' of Bengkalis and Siak.⁸ As in 1673, when the fugitive Sultan Abdul Jalil requested Dutch protection for Bengkalis, Rio Formosa, and Muar against the Jambinese, Sultan Ibrahim now appealed to the Dutch to use their influence to restrain the Macassarese. But instead of an attack on Indragiri, Daeng Mangika and his followers joined Palembang in an attack on Jambi in December, 1680. A force of fifty to sixty ships, twenty Macassarese ships under Daeng Mangika and his chief lieutenant Nakhoda Bongsu, and 3,000 Palembang land troops, besieged Jambi and blockaded all entrances into the city.⁹ When it became apparent that there would be no assistance forthcoming from the side of the Dutch, the ruler of Jambi surveyed the field, examined all the alternatives, and executed a painless *volte face* which exemplified the flexibility of all Malay alliances: he called upon his arch-enemy Johor on 12 December 1680 to help save his country from Palembang and the Macassarese.¹⁰

On returning from Riau, the Jambi mission found the Macassarese force under Nakhoda Bongsu at the mouth of the Jambi River. Afraid to approach any closer, it returned to Riau. The ruler of Johor sent six ships to assess the situation, but they were refused entry into the river. They were told that if Johor gave any assistance to Jambi, Palembang would make war with Johor. This impertinence, combined with concern at Palembang's growing strength, convinced Johor of the necessity to assist Jambi.¹¹ Three days later the Laksamana of Johor went to Jambi with sixteen large and forty small well-armed grabs and was followed shortly thereafter by another fleet. The Laksamana, still finding the Palembang force too strong, turned back his fleet and sent two grabs to gain reinforcements from Bengkalis.¹² The Dutch voiced their support of Johor because they were particularly concerned about the growing strength of the Macassarese and Buginese in the Malay world and in Java. Ever since the Dutch had defeated the Macassarese and their allies in extremely hard-fought battles in 1667 and 1669, they

were paranoiacally convinced that all the refugee Macassarese and Buginese were involved in a nefarious plot to establish a network to eradicate all traces of the Dutch in this part of the world. They were, therefore, greatly relieved to know that the Laksamana of Johor had succeeded in assembling a fleet of 100 ships and 2,000 men by March 1681 and had gone again to assist Jambi.¹³ The Laksamana of Johor sent a message to Pangeran Aria of Palembang and to Daeng Mangika saying that he had come to make peace. As Daeng Mangika approached the Johorese with three well-armed boats, the Laksamana saw that the Macassarese were all dressed in chain armour (*baju rantai*). He called out to Daeng Mangika that he was not to come aboard with so many men, but the latter kept coming. The Johorese then fired and killed him. The Palembangers under Pangeran Aria were allowed to return safely.¹⁴ Heartened by the news of the death of Daeng Mangika, the Jambinese and Johorese inflicted a disastrous defeat on the joint Macassarese-Palembang forces. It was later estimated, although much too highly, that 1,000 of Palembang's best Macassarese and Malays had been killed in the fighting.¹⁵

Johor's prestige soared as a result of its trading and military successes. It was boosted even higher with the arrival of a French ship the *Vautoir* in 1680, which delivered a letter from King Louis XIV of France to the ruler of Johor. So pleased was Sultan Ibrahim that he deputed four Johor ships to accompany the *Vautoir* to its final destination, Siam.¹⁶ The pride that was Johor's had been made possible by the Laksamana who had taken the reins of government after the destruction of Johor Lama in 1673 and had restored the kingdom to an enviable position in the Malay world. In the process he had become so powerful within the kingdom that his influence was clearly evident in Riau. The Dutch were so accustomed to dealing solely with the Laksamana and assessing the situation in Riau in terms of the Laksamana's ubiquitous presence and influence, that they believed that he had usurped the kingship in everything but name. To the Dutch Sultan Ibrahim seemed more 'a prisoner than a ruler'.¹⁷ It was certainly true that all other officials and Orang Kaya were intimidated by the great power arrogated by the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil and his sons, and did not dare become too familiar with the ruler lest they incur the wrath of the jealous Laksamana. Nevertheless, the ruler was untouched in his position as the reigning monarch who delegated

powers to and legitimized the actions of his chief officials — the true governors and administrators of the kingdom. As with his predecessors in Malacca, he could well say that he was not concerned with the difficulties of the administrators but only took account of the good results they achieved.¹⁸ For the Laksamana's 'good results' he was awarded the title of Paduka Raja.

During this period of Johor's economic resurgence, Siam began to take an active interest in Johor's role in the archipelago trade. In 1681 two representatives from the King of Siam arrived in Johor bearing gifts for Sultan Ibrahim and an offer of men and material to help rebuild the area of Johor which was destroyed by Jambi in 1673.¹⁹ The interest shown by Siam in its southern neighbour reflected its policy of trade expansion under King Narai and his close personal adviser Constant Phaulkon in the 1680s,²⁰ as well as a recognition of Johor's importance as an entrepot in the archipelago trade. In January 1682 another mission arrived from Siam headed by the Phra Klang who conducted talks with the Paduka Raja.²¹ The despatching of such an important Siamese official to lead the delegation once again indicated Siam's strong desire to reach some agreement which would strengthen its influence in the archipelago. The Paduka Raja would also have been aware that friendship with such a powerful nation could only enhance Johor's prestige and provide it with an important diplomatic clout in any future dealings with the Dutch or with any of its Malay neighbours.

Once the negotiations had been completed, Johor could well afford to be magnanimous in receiving envoys from Palembang in June 1682 seeking assurance that the Paduka Raja would not attack their country.²² Nor was the Paduka Raja particularly concerned that a rebellion was in progress among Johor's Minangkabau subjects along the Siak River. He confidently mobilized Johor's forces to deal with this problem swiftly. According to reports from the interior of Siak, a Minangkabau named Raja Hitam had arrived recently from Borneo and had let it be known that he was a relative of the Yamtuan Sakti of Pagar Ruyong. He was subsequently chosen to be ruler of the Minangkabaus in Siak. As soon as he had received the allegiance of these people, he led them into a revolt to overthrow Johor's authority in the region.²³ At first the Paduka Raja tried to arrange a peace settlement with Raja Hitam, but when this failed he resorted to a blockade and succeeded in forcing the Minangkabaus to capitulate. In a letter

to the Dutch on 10 January 1683, the Paduka Raja related how he had allowed those Minangkabau rebels who wanted to surrender to go unharmed. He then attacked Raja Hitam's hut at about nine or ten o'clock in the evening and put the Minangkabaus to flight. According to the version reported to the Dutch by Minangkabaus from the interior, the Paduka Raja gave his word to Raja Hitam that if he surrendered he would be able to leave unmolested. When Raja Hitam did surrender, the Paduka Raja had him slain.²⁴ Whatever methods the Paduka Raja may have used, he effectively demonstrated Johor's ability to protect its territories and to preserve the peace, aspects which were important in assessing the power and prestige of a Malay kingdom.

The Paduka Raja felt secure enough by 1683 to afford the luxury of a business plus pleasure trip. In his company were numerous grabs, a konteng, and eleven perahus, bearing a large train of women and musicians. His first stop was Bengkalis where he installed a new Syahbandar and gave express orders to do everything possible to restore trade relations with the interior Minangkabaus. The very fact that an uprising had occurred in the territory which the old Syahbandar of Bengkalis had been assigned to administer had *ipso facto* proven his negligence and thus caused his removal from office. This lucrative post was now bestowed on another favoured individual. The Paduka Raja then continued on to Muar to speak with another administrator, the Raja Mahkota. The latter was ordered to send people to Riau because of the likelihood of war with Palembang.²⁵ After Palembang's defeat at the hands of Jambi and Johor, the Pangeran Aria, son of the ruler of Palembang, had sworn that he would not sit on his mat nor chew betelnut until he had conquered both of these kingdoms. Johor and Jambi had meanwhile consulted each other and had agreed to strike first.²⁶

In their now familiar role as mediators, the Dutch at Malacca sent Captain Hendrick Temmer to Siak to persuade the Paduka Raja to give up his intention of attacking Palembang. The Dutch were concerned that outbreak of war would inflict grave damage on their profitable pepper trade in Palembang. At Siak Temmer found it very difficult to deal with the Paduka Raja, whom he described as 'arrogant and inflated with his own importance'.²⁷ Since the Paduka Raja had reserved much of the governing authority for himself and his sons, while ignoring the traditional sharing of duties and powers with the Orang Kaya, Temmer rightly assumed

the Paduka Raja's unquestionable control of the government. The Paduka Raja exercised his powers to the fullest and may have over-reached himself in enjoying privileges which were the sole preserve of a reigning monarch. No one dared to become too familiar or have any consultations with the ruler without the knowledge of the Paduka Raja. Temmer was told by one of the Orang Kaya that several years ago the ruler had sent the Temenggong and his people to Siam without the prior knowledge of the Paduka Raja. On the Temenggong's return to Riau, he and his followers were attacked by the Paduka Raja and the Temenggong murdered in full view of the ruler. The latter dared not speak out against the Paduka Raja for committing this outrage for fear of revealing other suspected advisers whom he wanted to have by his side.²⁸ Temmer was convinced that the Paduka Raja, and not the Sultan of Johor, was responsible for all the misdeeds committed against the Dutch and the Orang Kaya of that kingdom. He called the Paduka Raja 'the greatest opponent and destroyer of VOC trade that they had ever known in Indonesia [Indië], not only with regard to Malacca, but also with respect to Batavia and the whole Eastern sector'.²⁹

The Minangkabaus in upriver Siak at Patapahan understood the hierarchy of authority in the kingdom and refused the Paduka Raja's letter of appeal to come down-river once again to trade with the Johorese. They insisted instead on a letter from Sultan Ibrahim of Johor. Since the Dato Bendahara of Patapahan claimed to be of nobler origin than the Paduka Raja and, moreover, to be holding office on behalf of the Pagar Ruyong ruler, only a letter from Sultan Ibrahim would be acceptable.³⁰ The Minangkabaus were also aware of the Paduka Raja's and Sultan Ibrahim's roles in the Raja Hitam affair. After Raja Hitam had been treacherously murdered by the Paduka Raja, the latter brought Raja Hitam's two wives to Riau. Without the Paduka Raja's knowledge, Sultan Ibrahim had had these two women later released and escorted back to their parents at Padang Tikar in Siak.³¹ The Minangkabaus regarded this benevolent act as one befitting the sovereign ruler of the Kingdom of Johor and as evidence that only he could exercise any restraint on the Paduka Raja. He alone could guarantee their safety from the designs of the Paduka Raja if they decided to come down-river once again to trade with the Johorese.

The Paduka Raja told Temmer that Sultan Ibrahim wanted to punish Palembang because he was angered by the Pangeran Aria's threat to attack Johor. According to the Paduka Raja, he and some of the Orang Kaya had tried to dissuade the sultan from his intention and had asked the Dutch to write to their ruler.³² Later Temmer discovered that a disreputable individual called Kiai Demang Kecil of Palembang had written to both the Sultan of Johor and the Paduka Raja repeating what the Pangeran Aria had supposedly said. Although the Pangeran Aria was powerless without the consent of his father, the ruler of Palembang, the Paduka Raja continued to spread the story fully cognizant of the dangers inherent in this course of action.³³ He even intimated to Temmer that should Johor be successful in its invasion of Palembang, it would give the VOC the same privileges which the VOC now enjoyed there.³⁴

Jambi's willingness to ally with Johor against Palembang prompted this premature offer to the Dutch. At first the Paduka Raja had been annoyed with Jambi for agreeing to send a yearly tribute, the *bunga emas*, to Siam in return for its protection.³⁵ Since Jambi's defeat at the hands of Johor in 1679, the Paduka Raja may have expected at least prior consultation before the move. This source of annoyance was now set aside since Jambi had responded favourably to the Paduka Raja's request for an alliance against Palembang.³⁶ With the likelihood that Jambi would be embroiled in a war with Palembang, the ruler of Pagar Ruyong quickly despatched a letter to Jambi expressing his grave concern with this new development. He urged Jambi not to invade Palembang, or at least allow him four to five months to call home some four to five thousand of his subjects working in the pepper gardens in the interior of Palembang.³⁷

Despite the appearance of calm and confidence in the Kingdom of Johor, there were indications of some opposition to the Paduka Raja among the other Orang Kaya. In March 1683 the Dutch received a letter for the first time in a long while from the Bendahara of Johor.³⁸ He asked permission to send a Punggawa Laut to Rembau to remove all the rebellious officers and replace them with new ones.³⁹ Although traditionally the Bendahara was the head of the government and the leader of the Orang Kaya, he had been unsuccessful in regaining that status since the beginning of the seventeenth century. The many years of 'usurpation' of authority by the Laksamana family had become especially acute after the

destruction of Johor Lama in 1673. Soon not only the Laksamana Paduka Raja but many of his sons became titled officials, and they ruled Johor like a family enterprise. Discontent had long smouldered among the Orang Kaya and especially the Bendahara, but no one except the ruler himself dared to oppose the Paduka Raja and his family. There arose a steady polarization between the Paduka Raja and his family on the one side, and the ruler, the Bendahara, and many of the Orang Kaya on the other. Although the letter from the Bendahara seemed innocuous enough to the Dutch, it indicated that he had gained sufficient stature in the government to have dared to send his own missive to the Dutch in Malacca. In September 1683 the internal struggle emerged in the open and revealed the significance of the Bendahara's sudden assertion of authority. In late 1683 Sultan Ibrahim and his loyal supporters felt secure enough in their position to move to the former site of Johor on the mainland in spite of the Paduka Raja's opposition.⁴⁰ Perhaps the ruler himself finally admitted that the Paduka Raja's arrogation of power had upset the proper relationships within the kingdom and constituted a threat to his own being.

With Sultan Ibrahim no longer in Riau to legitimize or justify the Paduka Raja's authority, the latter had to resort to the ever-ready justification for his exercise of power: threat of war. In a letter to the Governor of Malacca in November, 1683, the Paduka Raja resurrected the fear of impending conflict with Palembang. According to the Paduka Raja some Palembang deserters had fled to Riau and informed him of Palembang's plans to invade the kingdom. Observers sent by the Paduka Raja to verify this story noted war preparations being made in Palembang and later met Jambi envoys who proposed a joint attack on Palembang. They also discovered that Palembang intended to demand from the ruler of Johor the restitution of cannons and guns which had been seized as part of the war booty in 1681. Only if this request were refused would they contemplate an invasion of Riau.⁴¹

In February 1684 the Paduka Raja wrote to the Dutch Chief Merchants at Palembang and Jambi informing them of the imminent Palembang attack on Riau with the aid of Macassarese mercenaries. Since the Dutch had told him earlier that Palembang belonged to them, he wanted to inform the Dutch that if war broke out, the blame should not be imputed to Johor.⁴² As on a number of other occasions, however, the rumours of attack proved merely that; they

were more indicative of the internal situation within Johor than of the state of affairs within the Straits of Malacca.

Although the Paduka Raja was placed in an awkward political position with the absence of Sultan Ibrahim on the Johor mainland, he nevertheless was the architect of Johor's thriving trade at Riau and continued to do everything possible to safeguard it against all competitors. When the Paduka Raja heard that several Minangkabau *nagari* had traded with the Dutch, he sent letters to these *nagari* asking them to consider the examples of Macassar, Bantam, Tikos, Pariaman, and many other states which the Dutch had finally conquered under the guise of treaties and trade. These letters appeared to have had some effect in preventing further trade with the Dutch. Thomas Dias, who had gone up the Siak River in 1683-4 to investigate the possibilities of Dutch trade with the Minangkabaus in the interior, had to keep reassuring the various towns that they had nothing to fear from the Paduka Raja.⁴³ Apparently the Paduka Raja had not always used written persuasion to enforce his monopoly of Minangkabau goods.⁴⁴ A letter from the Yamtuan Sakti of Pagar Ruyong to Malacca complained of the destruction which the Paduka Raja had wrought on Minangkabau villages.⁴⁵

The Dutch mission under Tomas Dias was viewed with alarm by the Paduka Raja, who considered the mission a violation of the treaty and an encroachment of Johor's sovereignty. In a letter to the Dutch in July 1684 the Paduka Raja asked to know why the Dutch had sent people up the Siak River when the 'world and all of Indonesia [Indië]' knew that Siak and Bengkalis belonged to Johor. It was also puzzling to him that the Dutch would seek the 'Emperor of Minangkabau's', and not the Sultan of Johor's permission, and thereby transform the brotherhood of these two peoples into enmity. The Paduka Raja remarked: 'I believe that if any nation were to commit a misdeed against us, the Dutch would help that nation to do it.'⁴⁶ After a realistic assessment of the position of Johor and the Dutch in the Malay world, he ended his letter with the recognition of the strength of the Dutch and of Johor's desire to maintain the treaty. To prevent any misunderstanding he asked the Dutch to inform him of any misdeed by his people so he could correct them.⁴⁷ The Paduka Raja was careful to keep his diplomatic channels open to the Dutch. Even in his efforts to persuade or intimidate the Minangkabaus to trade with Johor, he described the Dutch in a way he understood them to be; but he never gave the Dutch any pretext

for taking retaliatory steps against him. He had learned through years of dealing with them that they were the best guarantors of Johor's prosperity and security. The written word, the sacred European treaty, could be an effective tool when used properly.

One aspect of the treaties signed by the Dutch and Johor had proven worthless but especially instructive to the Paduka Raja: that clause which stated that the enemies of one would be the enemies of the other. After the humiliating destruction of Johor Lama in 1673 by Jambi, the Paduka Raja had invoked the treaty asking for Dutch assistance but had been politely refused since the Dutch had a similar treaty with Jambi. Certain economic clauses, however, yielded most favourable results. Johor received certain trade advantages over its Malay neighbours which allowed it to expand its own emporium under the watchful eye of Malacca. It was not the Johorese but the Dutch themselves who brought about the decline in trade in Malacca by their fixed prices and high tolls and the sacrificing of Malacca to the interests of Batavia. The Johorese under the Paduka Raja merely provided the goods and offered better prices than the Dutch, while usually maintaining the letter — though not the spirit — of the treaty. Criticism levelled at the Paduka Raja by the Malacca governors was more often directed at his successes rather than at his contraventions of the Dutch treaty.

Malacca had no clear-cut guidelines with regard to the trade in Siak or elsewhere in the Straits of Malacca at this time. Dutch officials in Malacca were issued directives from Batavia which reflected the vacillation between strict reinforcement of monopoly practices and an acquiescence in free and open trade.⁴⁸ As a result the Johorese themselves were often confused at sudden changes of attitudes of the Dutch in Malacca. The letters sent to Malacca from the Johor leaders contain many references to Dutch practices which had once been permitted and subsequently scrapped with little warning to the Johorese. This situation resulted in unnecessary tension between Malacca and Johor over Siak.

Being in a frustrating position of watching a major competitor thrive at their expense, the Dutch in Malacca occasionally resorted to harassment of the Johorese. The Syahbandar at Bengkalis complained to the Dutch in May 1684 that a Dutch captain had prevented all ships, even small perahus from Kampar or those only carrying women and children, from going there. Even more infuriating, this Dutch captain had dared to fire on his *balai*.⁴⁹ The Syahbandar

pointed out that such things had never happened under the former Malacca Governors Bort and Pits. He threatened to go directly to the ruler of Johor and the Paduka Raja to inform them of this outrage. Let it not be said, he told the Dutch, that we were the ones seeking to break the alliance through any deception.⁵⁰

In late July of that same year the Johor Syahbandar of Bengkalis again wrote to Malacca demanding an end to harassment by Dutch cruisers. He asked whether orders had been given to the Dutch cruisers to force all ships from Bengkalis to go to Malacca and to prevent any Johor ship from going to Indragiri or Kampar to get rice. In addition, many small boats carrying salt from Riau had been fined, boarded, and their goods plundered.⁵¹ The Syahbandar of Malacca replied that he was surprised to hear of such conduct by Dutch cruisers because no such order had been issued, and that such action was clearly in conflict with the directives of the Governor.⁵² A sudden denial of having sent such orders may have been once again merely a change of heart by a governor with no clear guidelines to adopt in this situation. He may also have been encouraged to abandon an earlier order because of a rumour that Johor would turn against the Dutch and assist the English in taking Malacca. The Paduka Raja had to assure Malacca in November 1684 that the Johorese were building up their fortifications and preparing a fleet, not for the purpose of joining the English 'who were coming with 100 ships to attack Malacca', but for purely defensive purposes and as a precautionary measure.⁵³

Although the Dutch were unconvinced by the Paduka Raja's argument, the Paduka Raja had cause to worry about his own position of power within the kingdom since the departure of Sultan Ibrahim from Riau. While Sultan Ibrahim was alive and not sanctioning his activities, even the large fleet and greatly strengthened fortification could not prevent the Paduka Raja from slowly losing his authority and influence among the Johorese. But on 5 March 1685 a ship from Pahang brought news to the Dutch that the Sultan Ibrahim Syah of Johor was dead, and that three of his wives who were suspected of poisoning him had been put to death.⁵⁴ Upon hearing of the sultan's death, all the inhabitants of Singapore shaved their heads as was their custom.⁵⁵ The infant son of one of the late ruler's wives was then proclaimed sultan. The daughter of the Paduka Raja continued to rule as queen, although she herself had no children by Sultan Ibrahim.⁵⁶ The death of Sultan Ibrahim on

16 February 1685 brought no disruption in Johor; affairs were carried on as usual because the Paduka Raja had everything firmly under control.⁵⁷ With the removal of the one real danger to the Paduka Raja's authority, he could now rule the Kingdom of Johor with impunity. The new ruler Sultan Mahmud Syah was much too young to offer any opposition to his policies, and having his daughter as a regent to the young sultan made possible once again the clothing of his activities with the mantle of legitimacy.

With the Paduka Raja once again securely exercising his authority within Johor, the VOC could expect little hope for any improvement of the economic situation of its outpost in Malacca. Both Governor-General Rykloff van Goens (1678-1681) and his successor Cornelis Speelman (1681-1684) would not have hesitated to use force in achieving the commercial aims of the VOC, much in the style of Coen and van Diemen. They were, however, in office too short a period to have made much impact on the affairs of the extensive VOC establishment in Asia. Van Goen's attention on affairs in Ceylon and India worked toward the advantage of Malayo-Indonesian kingdoms such as Johor, which was a competitor but not a real economic threat to the total Asian trade interests of the VOC. It was during his administration, nevertheless, that Ceribon in Java was annexed, making the VOC a territorial power in the archipelago.⁵⁸ Speelman became embroiled in the Javanese wars of succession and eliminated the Kingdom of Bantam as a major rival entrepot to Batavia in 1682. His more important concerns on Java occupied his short administration, and at his death in 1684, affairs on the island were still in a state of turmoil.⁵⁹ Both van Goens and Speelman had higher priorities in mind than the economic challenge posed by Johor to their outpost Malacca. They were unwilling to undertake new wars while Java was still a problem and while Johor continued to keep the peace in the vital Straits of Malacca.

Governor-General Joannes Camphuys (1684-1691) subscribed to former Governor-General Maetsuycker's belief that the VOC would be best maintained if it left the Asian trade to the Asians and taxed these traders.⁶⁰ In Europe, meanwhile, the Heeren XVII felt that too much money had been expended on 'donations' and 'fortifications' in the East.⁶¹ A policy of retrenchment now ensued at a time when Europe was at war and the revenues from the Asian trade were greatly needed in The Netherlands. Camphuys' general

agreement on the directives of the Heeren XVII led him to abandon any belligerent policy toward foreign and native traders. In view of Camphuys' attitude, he would have welcomed the attempt at renewal of a trade treaty rather than a resort to force, in order to promote VOC trade interests in Johor.

The instructions dated 9 March 1685 given to the Syahbandar Francois van der Beke and Lieutenant Jan Rosdom from Governor-General Camphuys and the Council of the Indies in Batavia reflected the areas where Johor competition had been especially harmful to Dutch trade. With a young new ruler on the throne of Johor, Batavia believed it an opportune time to obtain certain trade advantages from this kingdom. These envoys were to seek sole trading rights with Johor and its dependencies and were to remind Johor that, by trading with the Moors, English, and the Danes, it was contravening an early treaty made by Cornelis Matelief de Jong and Raja Seberang some seventy-nine years ago in 1606. They were to attempt to obtain Dutch rights to trade on the river of Siak, Kelang, Selangor, and Sungai Ujong to the exclusion of all other nations. Johor's ships were to be granted the privilege of bringing in fish, roe, salt, etc., but the Dutch were to reserve the prerogative of boarding these ships to see that no cloth or specie was on board. The trade in cloth was to be exclusively the preserve of the Dutch. A limit on the number of Johorese ships sailing toll-free to Aceh was to be imposed as follows: two ships for the ruler, one for the Bendahara, one for the Paduka Raja, one for the Laksamana, and one for all the Orang Kaya together. Finally, they were to come to some agreement on the return of runaway slaves.⁶²

Prepared with these instructions these two Dutch envoys arrived in late March 1685 and were greeted by two Orang Kaya sent by the Paduka Raja. Since the forty-one day mourning period for the death of Sultan Ibrahim had not ended, no negotiations took place until seven days after their arrival. When the official mourning ended on 27 March, they were brought to the *balai* and presented to the five year old Sultan Mahmud Syah, born of one of the former sultan's concubines, accompanied by the Queen Mother, daughter of the Paduka Raja. Because of the minority of the young ruler, the Paduka Raja and his sons governed the kingdom. The Bendahara had only his title without the authority or the influence which customarily resided in the office. There was great discontent within the ranks of the Orang Kaya with the Paduka Raja's audacity in con-

ducting the government without deferring whatsoever to the advice of the Bendahara or any other Orang Kaya outside his own faction. Already many of the most important positions and honours had been usurped by the sons of the Paduka Raja: one son had been appointed the Laksamana, another the Temenggong (whose position he had filled after the murder of the former Temenggong by his father in 1678), a third son the Sri Perdana Menteri, a fourth the Sri Bija di Raja, a fifth the Sri Nara di Raja, and a sixth the Sri Amar di Raja.⁶³ The common people expressed their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs, especially with regard to the treatment of the young ruler. They believed that he was not being shown the full respect and consideration which he should be given in accordance with the old customs of the land. They deplored the practice of the child-ruler sitting on the lap of the Queen Mother on the throne instead of on the lap of the Bendahara.⁶⁴

On a private visit to the home of the Paduka Raja, the envoys found all of the Paduka Raja's sons there together with the Syahbandar Raja Mahkota. They talked generally about trade, and the envoys expressed surprise that there were English, Danish, and Portuguese ships in Riau harbour. The Paduka Raja explained that it would be committing a great disrespect if he were to forbid these nations to come to Riau. On the question of the proposed terms of the treaty brought by the envoys, the Paduka Raja replied bluntly that to accept them would mean a loss of revenue for him. As for the idea of limiting Johor to only six ships a year, he considered it unthinkable. The Paduka Raja promised, nevertheless, to speak to the Orang Kaya at length about the Dutch proposals.

Having expressed his distaste for the Dutch proposals, the Paduka Raja pursued a certain matter with the envoys which was of particular concern to him. He asked them whether it was true that they had sent a representative to the court at Pagar Ruyong, and, if so, why they had done this. When the Dutch replied that they had sent an envoy to Pagar Ruyong to affirm their friendship with the Minangkabaus and to promote trade, the Paduka Raja remarked that this was all very strange since the Minangkabau Sultan of Kuantan was conspiring to war with the Dutch. Only about three months before a certain Raja Sempurna had been sent by the Sultan of Kuantan to Sultan Ibrahim, the late ruler of Johor, to ask his assistance against the Dutch. Sultan Ibrahim had sent the envoy back with a ring and a seal to signify his intention of giving the

Sultan of Kuantan the help he needed. According to the Paduka Raja, Sultan Ibrahim wanted to participate in a war against the Dutch but the Paduka Raja had told him that such a thing could not be tolerated because of the friendship between the two powers.

The negotiations for the treaty proceeded slowly but finally a draft was agreed upon by both parties. A copy of the treaty was made in both Malay and Dutch and presented to the Paduka Raja. After examining the contract he accepted all provisions except that which gave the Dutch free trade on the rivers of Kelang, Sungai Ujong, Selangor, and on the east coast of Sumatra. The Paduka Raja explained that since Johor had never prevented Dutch trade in these areas, it was unnecessary to include this provision in the treaty. On 6 April 1685 the contract was finally signed by the Paduka Raja, the Bendahara, the Laksamana, and the Temenggong.⁶⁵

Only when the Malay and Dutch texts of the treaty were brought to Malacca was the discrepancy between the two versions discovered.⁶⁶ The tone and the provisions of these versions differed so radically that it was impossible to recognize them as being the same treaty (See Appendixes A and B). It is quite unlikely that from the very beginning the Paduka Raja had intended to deceive the Dutch and to humiliate them with the Malay version of the treaty. Relations between Johor and the Dutch had undergone a few difficult times but had been on the whole as friendly as two economic competitors could possibly be. The Paduka Raja recognized, moreover, that there was more to gain by cultivating than alienating the Dutch. From a passing comment in the report of the envoys to Riau, it appears that the whole misunderstanding was probably caused by the incompetence of the Dutch interpreters. The report mentions that the Paduka Raja had asked that a report of all the runaway and stolen slaves and *dividoren*⁶⁷ be made in Malay, but 'through lack of a good interpreter', the Dutch could not comply.⁶⁸

When the Dutch realized what had happened, they wrote to the Paduka Raja explaining carefully that the Malay and Dutch versions were different and that they wanted the Paduka Raja to accept the latter. The Paduka Raja read the Dutch version of the treaty and became annoyed at the presumption of the Dutch in asking him to relinquish so many of Johor's privileges. While expressing his obvious displeasure with the Dutch version, he avoided language which could alienate a useful ally in the Dutch. He wrote in reply: (my paraphrasing)

How can you Dutch say that the 1606 treaty signed by Matalief and Sultan Alauddin had required all ships going to Johorese lands to stop first at Malacca! Johor had participated alongside the Dutch in that unsuccessful siege of Malacca [in 1606] and was the first nation in all Indonesia [Indië] to show any respect or esteem for them when they had no place in Indonesia. It may be true what you wrote that the Susuhunan of Mataram, the Kings of Bantam, Palembang, Jambi and other countries had allowed the Dutch to trade in their lands, but Johor had never — from the past up to the present — ever made such a contract with the Dutch. Since I knew that the Dutch only wanted to be able to carry on their trade, I had allowed them to do so in the Siak River, as can be seen in both the Dutch and Malay versions of the 1685 treaty. But how could the Dutch write in their version of the treaty that I would be allowed to send only one small boat a year to trade in Siak? If Siak did not belong to Johor, then perhaps such a stipulation would be possible. If I had signed such a document, you could very well have wondered whether I had my senses about me.

Insofar as excluding other nations is concerned, I see no reason why I should forbid the English, the Danes, or the French from trading at Siak, for they are not our enemies. When the English Captain Lock sought the protection of the King of Johor in 1673, the latter readily gave it.

I also made it quite clear to the Syahbandar van der Beke that I did not want any Dutch or Black Christians trading in specie or cloth in Siak. The Governor of Malacca can well verify the fact that although I had sent many ships to the Siak River I had never sent any ships with cloth. If I should be so inclined, I will send these ships and many other ships with my *cap* to the Siak River.

The Dutch may consider it a disadvantage not to be allowed to build a lodge on the river nor buy any other goods but tin and gold. As was agreed with the Syahbandar [van der Beke] and the Lieutenant [Rosdom], the Dutch would be allowed to bring only specie and cloth to trade for gold and tin in the Siak River at a designated place called Pasir Sala. Why are the Dutch angry that a definite place was set out for them?

I want an end to the cruising of Dutch ships in Siak's waters. These ships would only be allowed to stop for water, wood, *sirih*, and *pinang*.⁶⁹ The Shahbandar agreed to all of the provisions found in the Malay version of the treaty, but now it seems that I cannot believe the Dutch.

I also understand that the Governor believes that some deceit had been intended in the writing of the Malay contract. I am well aware that the Dutch are more powerful than ever, but we of Johor are old friends of the Dutch, and also masters of Bengkalis and Siak.

You also ask that no ships be allowed to trade in cloth and that they all be provided with *caps*. This would be impossible since there are so

many ships from different places going to all parts of Johor's territories.

It would be difficult to exchange those slaves who have already fled since they have gone to such scattered places in Johor. Anyway, the number of slaves which have escaped to Johor from Malacca and *vice versa* is about equal.

I will order the Johorese *nakhoda* to sell their pepper and tin in Malacca whenever they can get the price I have set for them. Concerning the trade with Aceh, the Johorese had always been allowed this since the Dutch had been in Malacca. It is true what you say that trade with Aceh was never allowed under the Portuguese, but it was only because Aceh and Johor were at war with each other.

You should send over some envoys to Riau to rework the old treaty so that there would be no more complaints and difficulties between the Johorese and the Dutch. When I and the Johor and Pahang Orang Kaya read the Dutch version of the treaty, we realized the great discrepancy between that and the Malay version. We, therefore, could not put our *cap* on the Dutch treaty and are sending it back with the hope that the Dutch would not be angry.⁷⁰

This letter answered point by point why the Paduka Raja could not have signed the Dutch version of the treaty and would not now. Asking the Paduka Raja to relinquish all the advantages which he had himself fought so long to establish was tantamount to asking him to sell his riches and to don beggar's rags. The very foundation of the Paduka Raja's authority in the Kingdom of Johor was based on the revenue which he received from the lucrative trade in Johor's territories. When the Dutch envoys arrived in Riau to renegotiate the 1685 treaty, they found the Paduka Raja to be a self-assured, all-powerful individual very much in command of the situation in the kingdom. He was quite taken aback by the terms of the treaty which the envoys had hoped he would consent to. His answer to them was quite simply that he would be working against his best interests if he signed the treaty. He had no reason whatsoever to want any drastic changes in the patterns of trade and diplomacy between Johor and the Dutch. What the Dutch were asking of him was to repudiate all of his successes and play the game the Dutch way. It was presumptuous of the latter to believe that he would agree to this, and when the Paduka Raja was informed that the Dutch version of the contract was radically different from his own Malay version, he could not help but wonder whether it was the intention of the Dutch to acquire some pretext to snatch away the entire trade of Johor by force. The Governor of Malacca had been

very obvious in mentioning to the Paduka Raja that such countries as Mataram, Bantam, Palembang, and Jambi, had allowed the Dutch to trade in their lands. These countries had all felt the iron fist of the Dutch, and the inference could not have easily escaped the experienced Paduka Raja.

It was thus with an indignant yet cautious tone that the Paduka Raja wrote the reply paraphrased above. It is a straight-forward document explaining why it could not have been through any deceit on his part that there were two versions of the treaty. Very patiently and methodically the Paduka Raja touched upon the various aspects of the Dutch versions to explain why he could not accept them. He knew that Johor would be no match against the Dutch, and so he avoided language which could be interpreted by the Dutch as bellicose and threatening. In milder and more subdued terms than such circumstances would normally call for, the Paduka Raja told the Dutch that it was true that they were much more powerful than the Johorese, *but Johor was an old friend of the Dutch and also master of Bengkalis and Siak*. Consequently, Johor had the right to determine what was best for these two areas.

Having firmly argued his case, the Paduka Raja politely but adamantly dismissed any Dutch attempts to persuade him to sign their version of the treaty or to renegotiate a new one. There was little else that the Dutch could do but accept the Malay version in which the VOC, and not the Dutch freeburgers or Black Christians of Malacca, would be allowed to trade on the Siak River. Ships of the VOC were not to go beyond Pasir Sala and could only carry on a trade in tin and cloth alongside other foreign traders given this right by Johor. The Dutch decided not to expend any more words and letters concerning this treaty but to wait until the majority of Sultan Mahmud before raising the issue again. The only thing they could do was to depend on their old friendship and the sincerity of the Paduka Raja and the Orang Kaya of Johor.⁷¹

During another Dutch mission in Riau in November 1685, the Paduka Raja complained about a Dutch lodge in Siak. The meeting, however, ended amiably with the Paduka Raja telling the envoys not to think evil of him since he was an old man.⁷² Governor Schagen of Malacca later sent a letter assuring the Paduka Raja that the Dutch only wanted to anchor in the Mandau River and not build a lodge there. What they hoped to do was to erect a shed

as a shelter for their cloth and for their sick. They had no intention whatsoever of hindering the 'inhabitants of the territory of the Kingdom of Johor'.⁷³

At times the confrontations between Johor and the Dutch over Siak reached dangerous proportions. During one of these occasions the Paduka Raja decided that Johor's interests would be best served by seeking support from its powerful Siamese allies. He wrote to the King of Siam complaining of Dutch harassment of his ships going to Siak and Bengkalis. Not long thereafter a Siamese ambassador appeared in Batavia asking the Dutch to cease their actions against the Paduka Raja in these areas. Somewhat taken aback by Siam's meddling in Johor-Dutch affairs, the Batavia authorities assured the Siamese envoy that steps would be taken to remedy the situation. They then wrote to the Paduka Raja demanding an explanation of the entire episode. On 4 January 1687 the latter sent a reply to Governor-General Camphuys in Batavia saying it was true that he had lodged a complaint with the Siamese ambassador who was then in Riau, but it was before he had received a reassuring letter from Malacca. He saw no reason why he should not have complained to a powerful ruler: 'If the Dutch had done no evil to me, why should I have then complained to Siam?'⁷⁴

Having weathered a potentially explosive situation with the Dutch over Siak, the Paduka Raja gained the assurance to pursue his policy of making the various areas of east coast Sumatra more responsive to Johor's wishes. In March 1686 the leaders of Patapahan, one of the most important collecting points of Minangkabau goods located in interior Siak, went to Riau to have talks with the Paduka Raja. Patapahan, which had once been under Aceh's domination and had later recognized Johor suzerainty in 1643,⁷⁵ signed an agreement with the Paduka Raja assuring him that all trade which came from the Minangkabau heartland to that collecting place would be delivered to Riau. The Patapahan traders usually left their cloth with the Syahbandar of Bengkalis and then brought down the gold, which amounted to about four or five thousand taels yearly.⁷⁶ To cement this bond between Patapahan and Johor the Paduka Raja gave the Penghulu of Patapahan the title of honour of Dato Bendahara.⁷⁷ Dutch ships which wanted to trade with Patapahan had to pay tolls to the Johor Syahbandar at Bengkalis according to the ship's size and cargo. The tolls normally amounted to 40, 70, 110, 125, or 150 rijksdaalders.⁷⁸ Many Minangkabaus

were also going to Koa and Kampar which the Paduka Raja had developed into trading centres where the Minangkabaus could obtain salt and cloth for their goods.⁷⁹ It was this state of affairs which made the Dutch in Malacca comment enviously on the overabundance of cloth in the interior of Sumatra and the major flow of tin from the Minangkabau lands to Riau.⁸⁰

In May envoys from the Panglima of Deli came seeking Johor military assistance in a civil war in which the other faction had called in the help of the Bataks. Ten grabs and ten perahus were sent in June over Bengkalis to Deli under the Sri Perdana Menteri and the Sri Bija di Raja, two sons of the Paduka Raja. After their mission to Deli, they proceeded to Batu Bahara. The latter, Panai, and other surrounding areas were then slowly brought under Johor's protection.⁸¹ Indragiri was wrenched away from its brief flirtation with Malacca and drawn into Johor's camp through a marriage between the Raja Muda of Indragiri and the daughter of the Paduka Raja.⁸²

These successes of the Paduka Raja were a direct consequence of his successes in the economic field. Many of these Malay rulers on the east coast of Sumatra would not have been averse to being drawn into the sphere of influence of a powerful and prosperous kingdom which could guarantee a profitable economic arrangement. It was clearly evident among all the native kingdoms, and especially the Dutch in Malacca, that Riau had succeeded in becoming a noteworthy international entrepot. In a report to Batavia, Malacca grudgingly acknowledged the success of the Paduka Raja's economic policies:

The Paduka Raja leaves no stone unturned in his policy of pulling the rug from under the Company's feet or undermining the rights and advantages of Malacca. The number of ships going to Riau is so great that the river is scarcely navigable as a result of the number of trading vessels in it. Cloth, rice and other necessities are sold there at prices higher than in Malacca; thus the trade keeps climbing. The last Governor of Malacca remarked in his *Memorie*⁸³ that in a period of three years the king and the nobles of Johor had outfitted 106 ships for trade in Aceh. From these ships, which must have brought large quantities of cloth to Riau, in addition to what the foreign ships from Kedah, Ujong Salang, and Tennasserim delivered, the Paduka Raja should have had a most delightful profit. Every year the Danish ships carry large quantities of cloth as well as Moorish traders who come and replace those other Moorish traders who

had been left behind to sell cloth. These ships bring the latest styles and thereby attract the native pepper and tin traders to Riau.⁸⁴

It was especially satisfying to the Paduka Raja to note that even the inhabitants of Malacca were coming to Riau to supply their own needs.⁸⁵ The Malacca citizens complained of lack of rice and were forced to go to Riau where there was an over-abundance. The Paduka Raja, however, refused to sell because he claimed that he was storing the grain in preparation for a war with Jambi.⁸⁶ Javanese ships appearing in Riau to trade were greater in both size and quantity than those which went to Malacca.⁸⁷ When it was discovered that these ships at Riau from the east coast of Java had all been supplied with Company's passes, the Dutch began paying more serious attention to the Javanese trade and even dared to stop one of the Paduka Raja's ships going to East Java. The Paduka Raja was insulted by this action and reminded the Dutch of their treaty obligations as he understood them:

... from the past until now it has never been the practice nor been agreed upon by contract between us that Johorese ships going elsewhere to trade had to have a pass. It was my understanding, therefore, that this was also true everywhere along the east coast of Java wherever there are Company Residents.⁸⁸

To reaffirm the friendship and prevent any major differences between the VOC and Johor, the Dutch at Malacca despatched a mission under Willem Valentyn which arrived on Riau on 2 May 1687. He noticed about 500 to 600 boats in the Riau River, among which were many large vessels. Twenty-six large galleys were being completed on dockyards, while another forty ships were in complete readiness at Lingga. In addition some fifty to sixty ships were at that time buying rice in Java.

Among the vessels lying at anchor in the river were six large ships from the King of Siam. They had brought as special gifts for the ruler of Johor two cannons, bullets, gunpowder, and other goods, as well as the traditional trade goods such as rice, salt, etc. Apparently a precedent had been set by the King of Siam of sending to the ruler of Johor two to three cannons plus other goods every year. There were also three large Chinese junks, two large ships from Palembang laden with pepper, Portuguese ships from Manila, English ships, native vessels from Buton, Java, Malacca, Kampar, Aceh, Kedah, Perak and from Johor's dependencies Terengganu,

Pahang, Sedili, Dungun, Rembau, Muar, Bengkalis, Siak, Pulau Tinggi, Tioman, Pulau Auer, Pulau Temaja, Siantan, Bunguran, Pulau Laut, Sarasan, Subi, Tambelan, Sudala, and Lingga. Two months before the arrival of the Dutch mission, a Danish ship from Tranquebare had left after having brought 300 bales of various kinds of cloth, as well as twenty to thirty Moors to stay back and assure a healthy profit on the sales.⁸⁹

A formal welcome ceremony for the Dutch missive and envoy was held at the sultan's *balai* before 1,000 people, including Chinese, Moors, Siamese, and others. After the ceremony, Valentyn was conducted to the Paduka Raja's compound where they spoke more freely with each other. The Paduka Raja began by raising a recurring issue in Jambi-Johor relations: the raiding of each other's territory and the kidnapping of people. This time the Paduka Raja complained that ninety-seven Johorese had been stolen by Jambi's pirates and delivered to their overlord. When he demanded the return of these inhabitants, the ruler of Jambi only returned twelve and claimed that the others had escaped.

Having aired this grievance with Valentyn, the Paduka Raja turned to a subject which he knew was a source of great concern to the Dutch. He told Valentyn that he and the heads of Terengganu had received an appeal for assistance against the Dutch from a Minangkabau Raja Sakti who had been chased off the Pagar Ruyong throne. The Dutch had been plagued for several years by this Raja Sakti who claimed to have ruled in Pagar Ruyong and then lost his throne to a usurper.⁹⁰

Valentyn took careful note of the political situation at Riau and made the following observation:

The Dato Bendahara exerts no influence on the Orang Kaya, and it is the Paduka Raja and his sons who hold all the important offices and maintain control over the government. The Paduka Raja maintains close supervision and exercises great authority over the people, which is no mean feat since these Malays are most imaginative and it is difficult for any single individual to retain their respect.

The Johorese are in a constant state of vigilance at their five fortresses, which, although inadequate against a European attack force, would be sufficient against any native attack.⁹¹

Valentyn was favourably impressed by the great numbers of traders whom he found in Riau, but it was difficult for him to believe

that there were so many people on Riau since only the Johorese, some Orang Laut, and a few Moors actually lived on the island.⁹²

To assure the continuing success of Riau, the Paduka Raja did not relinquish the traditional manner of dealing with competitors. He sent out his own 'cruisers' under the Orang Laut Panglimas Kudang, Langit, and Sunting to patrol the waters between Kedah and Malacca and to rob all 'Christian' ships.⁹³ In February 1688 Governor Slicher of Malacca wrote to the Paduka Raja beseeching him to punish the Orang Laut of Johor who had been raising havoc among the inhabitants of Malacca. He mentioned specifically a Panglima Kudang who lived somewhere around Riau who recently attacked two boats owned by Chinese inhabitants of Malacca on the Penagie River.⁹⁴ A month later the Orang Laut struck again. This time the victims were seven ships on their way to Malacca loaded with pepper and carrying an ambassador from Jambi. The ambassador, a certain Moor called Nakhoda Makhdum, was killed, and his concubine and son brought to Riau. Among the booty taken by these Orang Laut were seventy-one men, women, and children whom they had kidnapped from Kuala Lambur in Jambi. Seventeen of these were brought on one of the Paduka Raja's ships to be sold as slaves in Aceh, and twenty-three were returned to Jambi's ambassador in Riau.⁹⁵

Governor Slicher wrote another letter to the Paduka Raja asking him for compensation and for the punishment of those involved. The young ruler of Jambi had asked for peace, and now the Governor wanted the Paduka Raja to keep the peace.⁹⁶ Since the Dutch had helped put the young ruler of Jambi on the throne by force in October 1687, they were not planning to sit back while the Paduka Raja trampled him underfoot. Although the Paduka Raja was irritated by the tone of Slicher's letter, he formulated a strong yet discreet reply, always conscious of the value in maintaining good relations with the Dutch: (my paraphrasing)

I was much aggrieved to read your letter which seemed to imply that I was an insincere person, a thief, and a pirate, who had nothing in common with honest and good people. The Governor has preferred to believe the Moors and to consider me a liar, an untrustworthy person, when I informed him that the Orang Laut of Jambi had robbed me of ninety-seven of my people, and that I had only received twelve of them back from the ruler of Jambi. When the Dutch were warring with Jambi, the Orang Laut from Jambi attacked my subjects at the mouth of the Indragiri river and

kidnapped five people and stole four of their yachts with their goods. I sent five boats with my Orang Laut to look for these pirates, and as they were going up the Jambi river they met the boats carrying Nakhoda Makhdum. The latter fired five shots at my people, and so they had to defend themselves. When they returned the fire, the crew on the Jambinese boats jumped into the river and swam away. Several people were killed, and everything was confiscated except for those bags of pepper which had become wet and were consequently thrown overboard The Nakhoda Makhdum reaped his just reward for firing the first shot.... If I committed some act which was contrary to the old treaty, then the Governor should inform me of this. Then *I myself would judge this matter and punish this breach*. I assure you that I have never intended in the least to contravene the contract but have always wished for its continuance.⁹⁷ [Italics mine.]

The Paduka Raja had to tread very warily in this case because the Nakhoda Makhdum had been a big trader in Malacca, and Jambi had become in effect a protectorate of the Dutch after they had forced Sultan Ingalaga off the throne and put his son Pangeran Dipati Anum in his place in 1687. Nevertheless, the Nakhoda Makhdum's activities were damaging to Riau's trade, and Jambi had to be taught a lesson. The Paduka Raja had been clearly upset by the tone of Governor Slicher's letter, and he showed his annoyance in the opening lines of his reply. What had been particularly galling to the Paduka Raja was Governor Slicher's openly accusatory attitude dispensing with the niceties of diplomatic exchanges between two sovereign powers. In his reply the Paduka Raja felt obliged to reassert his prerogatives and privileges as the regent of a sovereign lord. Only he himself was proper to judge his own actions and to seek a just punishment if need be. He was careful, however, to express his desire for a continuation of the friendship and treaty between Johor and the Dutch.

The Dutch had to be content with this letter of explanation because they had their hands tied with the strong possibility of war breaking out again in Jambi.⁹⁸ The Dutch commandant there said that he had only fifty men, many of whom were ill, and Batavia could not afford to send any more. The Paduka Raja had promised to send assistance but he made this conditional on the type of reply he received from the Governor. In these circumstances, the Dutch could hardly do more than swallow their pride and overlook the acts of piracy committed by the Paduka Raja's Orang Laut. The

Dutch in Malacca explained to Batavia that the Paduka Raja had not actually given orders to the Orang Laut to murder the Nakhoda Makhdum or kidnap the Jambinese; he had only commanded that the pirates be caught. Thus they did not feel that the Paduka Raja had committed a breach of the contract.⁹⁹ The Dutch realized that the Paduka Raja, who did not especially like the ruler of Jambi, was also jealous of the Dutch victory over Sultan Ingalaga, the old ruler of Jambi, and so they trod very carefully in this affair.¹⁰⁰

So ensconced and formidable seemed the Paduka Raja in his position of authority in the Kingdom of Johor that when the Dutch began piecing together reports of his overthrow they could hardly believe this possible. A Malay *nakhoda* who had gone to Riau on 4 May 1688 complained that he could not sell his goods there because the ruler of Johor, Sultan Mahmud, and the Bendahara were about to leave for Terengganu, Kampar, or Siak, with 200 large and small vessels all well-manned and provided with war munitions. Their fortresses were being strengthened, and the inhabitants were busy selling their goods and furniture for specie. It was reported that Paduka Raja was planning to send his envoys to Batavia as soon as possible.¹⁰¹ This new development caused a typical Dutch reaction whenever there was news of large movements of people and ships in Johor: all comptoirs in the area were warned of a possible Johor attack.¹⁰² Even though the Paduka Raja had promised to offer the Dutch assistance against Jambi and had been pleased with the reply he had received to his letter,¹⁰³ the Dutch were still not taking any chances. Then in late June news filtered into Malacca that the Paduka Raja was shorn of power and fleeing a refugee from Riau.

According to a tantalizing but incomplete report by Encik Tunang, an inhabitant of Riau, the Paduka Raja had met in council with the Bendahara and the Orang Kaya in early June 1688, and it was decided to send Sultan Mahmud and the Bendahara to Pahang (or Terengganu). The Orang Laut expressed their reluctance to go because of the difficulty in gaining a livelihood there. In view of this argument, the Bendahara asked whether Sultan Mahmud should leave without his people, and if it were not better that he should go instead to Johor to re-establish his royal residence. As a solution to this problem, the Paduka Raja recommended that Sultan Mahmud, the Bendahara, and several Orang Kaya go ahead to Pahang (or Terengganu) and the Orang Laut remain with him on Riau.

The Bendahara once again objected and said he did not have any boats capable of making the journey. The Paduka Raja promised to present him with two grabs for this purpose.

When the promised grabs still had not arrived after six days, the Bendahara told his followers that he interpreted this as a bad sign which could only mean that the Paduka Raja intended to kill him. The latter was told what the Bendahara had said, and so he went immediately the following day to the Bendahara to deny that this was his intention. He swore that such a thought had never occurred to him, and he asked why the Bendahara had not sent his people to get the grabs. Not receiving any answer from the Bendahara, the Paduka Raja returned home and had Sultan Mahmud and his stepmother (the Paduka Raja's daughter) brought to him. He then informed Sultan Mahmud and all of his people that they were to sail the next morning, and those who wanted to accompany Sultan Mahmud would have to pay the costs of the trip. For some unknown reason unexplained by Encik Tunang, Sultan Mahmud and his stepmother the Queen went secretly that evening to the Bendahara's house. As soon as they entered the house, the lights were put out 'with good intentions of embracing the Queen Mother and the King'. The Queen managed to escape to the Paduka Raja, but Sultan Mahmud remained in the hands of the Bendahara.

Realizing his dangerous position the Paduka Raja immediately put to sea, whereupon the Bendahara, who had meanwhile gathered his followers, had the drums beaten and the reedpipes played as a sign that Sultan Mahmud was with him. The stature of the ruler was great enough to induce several of the Paduka Raja's ships to return to land where they were quickly remanned and sent out by the Bendahara. Their orders were to overtake and kill the Paduka Raja, his relatives, and all others who were with him in the four grabs and three to four small perahus.¹⁰⁴

A Chinese trader arriving in Malacca on 21 June 1688 related how one morning he saw seventeen grabs and thirty small vessels lying off the island of Bayan. On a closer look he realized that these ships were carrying the Paduka Raja and his relatives. The trader later met the followers of the Paduka Raja's brother at Singapore and was told that the Paduka Raja was fleeing from a battle which had taken place the evening before in Riau.¹⁰⁵

On 20 June the Bendahara sent letters to the regent at Rio Formosa, and to Orang Kaya Tun Pikrama, head of Muar, commanding

them to come quickly with their people to Riau because the Paduka Raja had taken up arms against him. They were told how Sultan Mahmud, his stepmother, the Sri Bija di Raja (son of the Paduka Raja), and the Sri Amar Wangsa, had gone to the Bendahara's house where, after a short visit, fighting broke out between the followers of the Paduka Raja and those of the Bendahara. This had resulted in several deaths on both sides. When the Paduka Raja understood what was happening, he left Riau in great haste, although his daughter, the sultan's stepmother, and his son, the Sri Bija di Raja, remained at the Bendahara's house. One of the other sons of the Paduka Raja, the Laksamana, sailed with his wife and family to Lingga and held himself neutral in the conflict.¹⁰⁶ Another son, the Sri Perdana Menteri, went to the Johor Syahbandar at Bengkalis to ask for two large grabs and twenty-five men. When the Syahbandar refused his request, the Sri Perdana Menteri quickly left for Tanjung Jati off the coast of Siak.¹⁰⁷

On 26 June Tun Pikrama of Muar had assembled his men and was on his way to Riau when he received another letter from the Bendahara informing him to go to Johor instead of Riau. The Sultan, the Bendahara, and all of the Orang Kaya were ready to abandon Riau and re-establish the capital on the Johor River. The Bendahara also mentioned that he had sent the Paduka Sri Maharaja and Tun Raja di Raja¹⁰⁸ with six grabs and four small vessels in pursuit of the Paduka Raja who had been sighted with only one grab in the Singapore Straits. Their orders were to bring him back dead or alive. Among the new Orang Kaya in power were the Sri Pikrama Raja, who was raised to be Laksamana, and the Bendahara and the Sri Amar Wangsa, who became the principal ministers in the kingdom.¹⁰⁹

The Dutch received a letter on 2 July 1688 from the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid in which his version of the *coup* is related: (my paraphrasing)

After the Paduka Raja had made ready a fleet of twenty grabs with two masts, twenty small grabs with one mast each, sixty banting,¹¹⁰ and sixty-three perahus, he let it be known that he wanted to bring the ruler to another place. He also called me to him and told me that I, my wife, family, and several other Orang Kaya, should make preparations with the ruler. He confided to me that the Governor and Syahbandar of Malacca had requested ten ships and 120 panchallangs¹¹¹ from Batavia to be used in an

attack against Riau. The Paduka Raja intended to strike first, and so he wanted to send the ruler, all of his wives, and me to another place.

After I left him, I called together some of the Orang Kaya to discuss what the Paduka Raja had said. We decided that the Dutch had no intention of attacking Riau since it could not be considered as anything more than a garden. The Dutch had laid low such important places as Bantam and Macassar; why would they bother with Riau? It was also revealed that the Paduka Raja was planning to have the following Orang Kaya killed because of their opposition to him: Tuan Pikrama, Sri Amar Wangsa, Sri Agar di Raja, Raja Mahkota, and some other officials. In order to frustrate the Paduka Raja's plans, we decided to bring the ruler to the home of Sri Pikrama Raja while the Paduka Raja was holding a meeting with his sons. When the Paduka Raja received word that the ruler was being held by the Dato Bendahara's supporters, he and his followers took to their boats and a fight ensued. The Orang Laut were informed by a sign that the ruler was with the Dato Bendahara, and so they came with the entire fleet over to the side of the Dato Bendahara. Thus the Paduka Raja with his wives, children, and relatives amounting to approximately thirty people fled on four grabs carrying gold, jewels, and silver. At Pulau Bayan they were joined by the Paduka Raja's son, the Laksamana.

I managed to surround them and capture two of their grabs, and then they fled with only three grabs carrying the Paduka Raja and his sons, the Laksamana, the Temenggong, the Sri Nara di Raja, the Sri Perdana Menteri, the Sri Bija di Raja, and the Sri Amar di Raja. In pursuit were twenty grabs with two masts, thirteen with one mast, and forty-three bantings and perahus.¹¹²

Then on 5 August 1688 a certain Encik Khatib reported the demise of the Paduka Raja: (my paraphrasing)

The fleet sent out by the Dato Bendahara caught up with the Paduka Raja at the island of Rakit off the coast of Terengganu. A heavy fight took place which lasted from the evening till the next morning. The Paduka Raja fought so fiercely and desperately that, if it had not been for the flight of his brother Akhir and his two sons the Laksamana and the Temenggong to Pahang, the Dato Bendahara's forces would have been defeated. He continued, nevertheless, to ward off his attackers, and when he ran out of shot, he used the Spanish rials he had on board his grab as missiles for his cannons. In this way he was able to hold off the attackers for quite some time before he was finally forced to go ashore to seek safety in the jungle. It took the Bendahara's men ten days before they captured the Paduka Raja. Of the treasure he had brought on his ship when he fled from Riau, only 200 catties or twenty taels of gold were left, along with a

chest of Spanish mats¹¹³ and two gold pinang boxes. The rest of the treasure, which included the royal jewels and ornaments and an old sword and shield, had been thrown into the sea during the pursuit [but was later recovered].

When the Paduka Raja was captured, the Dato Bendahara ordered a slave to kris him. The Paduka Raja wanted to know why he was being executed by such a deformed individual [*mismaakte mensch*] and was told that the Dato Bendahara had it so ordered. Later the same slave krisped the Paduka Raja's son, the Sri Bija di Raja. The other son, Encik Tahil, was also krisped as they sailed past Pahang and his body thrown overboard.

The Paduka Raja's daughter, the stepmother of the ruler, was forbidden by the Dato Bendahara from landing until the announcement of her place of exile was made by the Council composed of himself and the other Orang Kaya.¹¹⁴

A Malacca inhabitant who was at Muar informed the Dutch that the Council had decided to drown the Queen and her sister who was betrothed to the Raja Muda of Indragiri.¹¹⁵

The only Malay text which describes the overthrow of the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil is the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*. In the very succinct style of this text, the Paduka Raja is said to have left Riau on 14 Sya'ban 1100 A.H. (4 June 1689)¹¹⁶ pursued by Tun Tima and several *hulubalang* at the order of Sultan Mahmud. At Bidan the pursuers succeeded in capturing and putting to death the Sri Bija di Raja and his brother. They were then buried at Tanjung Kalam in 1100 A.H. Their/his children (*anaknya*) escaped to Patani.¹¹⁷

In this account no mention is made of the eventual fate of the Paduka Raja who should have been the major concern of the chronicler. Instead, only the capture and death of his two sons are mentioned. Upon examining the manner of describing this event, however, one notices a logical tightness which makes one question the inconsistency of the facts presented. The event begins with the flight from Riau and ends with the final capture and death at Tanjung Kalam. As a way of drawing the episode to a conclusion, the chronicler reiterates that the flight from Riau occurred on the 14th day of Sya'ban, in the year 1100 A.H., and his/their death (*matinya*) in the year Ha, 1100 A.H. Since the Paduka Raja was the principal figure in the flight and hence the subject of the event, it is difficult to believe that the chronicler would have terminated further discussion of this episode with such finality in the recapitulation without any mention of the fate of the Paduka Raja. Another Malay source,

the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, states unequivocally that the death of the Paduka Raja occurred in Terengganu in 1099 A.H. (1687/1688 A.D.).¹¹⁸ It is possible that through a copyist's error the final fate of the Paduka Raja was inadvertently omitted and that of his two sons slightly confused in the *Peringatan*.

A Malay trader who gave a second-hand account to the Dutch of these events more than a month after they occurred stated that not only the Paduka Raja, but his two sons the Sri Bija di Raja and Encik Tahlil, had been captured. The Paduka Raja and his son the Sri Bija di Raja were reported to have been both krisped by the same deformed slave, while the other son, Encik Tahlil, was only killed later and his body thrown overboard somewhere off the coast of Pahang. The two unnamed individuals in the *Peringatan* who are said to have been killed and then buried at Tanjung Kalam would have probably been the Paduka Raja and his son, the Sri Bija di Raja, who were both killed at the same time.

The events in Johor reveal certain features of Johor society which were rarely brought within the purview of the Dutch. During the decisions being made for the removal of the sultan and the Bendahara to Pahang or Terengganu, the heads of the Orang Laut expressed their dissatisfaction because of the difficulty in gaining a livelihood in their new destination. The Orang Laut, nevertheless, were the ruler's personal retainers, and the Bendahara suggested an alternative solution by which the ruler would not be separated from them. Since the Orang Laut were numerically and militarily an important factor in the kingdom, the Paduka Raja was not ready to abandon this source of strength so easily. He instead suggested that they remain with him, acting as the chief minister and on behalf of the sultan, to meet the 'external threat'.

How emasculated were the influence and authority of the Bendahara and how vital were the services of the Orang Laut became evident when the Bendahara had to admit that since the Orang Laut were to remain on Riau, he had not one vessel capable of making the trip to Pahang or Terengganu. Thus the Paduka Raja had to promise to provide the necessary grabs to transport the Bendahara to his destination.

The relationship between the Orang Laut and the ruler is the most interesting aspect of the power structure of Johor which emerges from this upheaval in Johor. Everyone in the kingdom, and most especially the Bendahara and the Paduka Raja, recognized

the strength of the Orang Laut and their deep loyalty to the person of the ruler. It mattered little whether the ruler was an adult or a child, for the governing process continued under a powerful minister acting on his behalf. As long as no discontent was expressed toward the activities of a chief minister (thus the preference of the Paduka Raja for a young ruler), the minister ruled supreme.

There was, however, one important check on overly ambitious officials, and that was other ambitious officials. In 1688 the Bendahara felt that he was being once and for all removed literally and figuratively from the centre of the kingdom. He therefore decided to gamble on a desperate move. He abducted the young ruler from the clutches of the Paduka Raja's people and then openly defied the Paduka Raja. Realizing the gravity of the loss of the royal person from their control, the Paduka Raja and his family and followers quickly took to their boats with all the riches they possessed plus some of the royal regalia. Even gold and the possession of the regalia proved inadequate to retain the loyalty of the Orang Laut who manned the Paduka Raja's ships. The Bendahara had the drums of sovereignty (*nobat*) beaten and the reed pipes (*nafiri*) played to indicate to those Orang Laut with the Paduka Raja that the ruler was with the Bendahara and therefore sanctioning his authority. This was sufficient sign for the Orang Laut to abandon the Paduka Raja and return to their true lord and master, the ruler of Johor. The shift of Orang Laut allegiance was sufficient to transform in an instant the haughty, all-powerful Paduka Raja to an impotent refugee fleeing for his life.

The successful Bendahara and his accomplices from among the Orang Kaya now sought to restore a proper functioning of government which entailed the restoring of the important role of both the Bendahara and the Council of the Orang Kaya. Throughout the Bendahara Tun Habib Abdul Majid's account of the *coup d'état*, he emphasized his consultation with the Orang Kaya before arriving at any decision. It was a particularly sensitive issue because the Paduka Raja had openly usurped all powers of the Bendahara and the Orang Kaya and reserved the most important titles and offices for his sons. By way of expressing the Paduka Raja's odious usurpation of the rights of the Orang Kaya and the justification for the removal of the Paduka Raja from his position, the Bendahara accused the Paduka Raja of an attempt to murder several of the important Orang Kaya in the kingdom. For such a heinous crime

against the Orang Kaya and for his 'deformed', highly improper acts while serving on behalf of the sovereign ruler, the Bendahara thought it fitting that he be executed by a deformed slave. Thus, in the eyes of the Malays, justice was done.

The Dutch, enormously relieved to hear that their greatest and shrewdest rival was now out of the way, pronounced his epitaph with the words: 'And thus was the end of that inconstant and awe-inspiring regent of Johor.'¹¹⁹ Indeed, the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil's accomplishments after about a half-century as head of the government in Johor were awe-inspiring. After he had been appointed to fill his father's position as Laksamana in the 1640s, he assumed the leadership of the government and guided Johor carefully in its efforts to develop into a respectable Malay power with a port city which could rival its predecessor, the international emporium Malacca. Strengthened by a happy and profitable alliance with the Dutch, Johor was able to pursue aggressive and successful economic and political policies after 1641 under the direction of the Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil. Hostilities with Jambi resulting from a marriage between the Raja Muda of Johor and a princess of Jambi in 1659 contributed toward the Laksamana's own goals and ambitions. Since the warfare was mainly confined to mutual raidings of the enemy's lands and the attacking of the enemy's ships on the seas, the role of the Laksamana was greatly enhanced within the kingdom. But his greatest opportunity came with the unexpected invasion by Jambi and the destruction of Johor Lama in 1673. The Sultan of Johor sought refuge in Pahang and gave the Laksamana a free hand in the restoration of the kingdom. The Laksamana thus pursued a two-pronged goal: (1) to wreak vengeance on Jambi; and (2) to restore the image of Johor in the Malay world and make its principal port a truly international trading mart. From his base at Riau he moved carefully and methodically seeking the assistance or neutrality of the Dutch and the psychological, prestigious, and even the material support from Siam and Pagar Ruyong in his war with Jambi. At the same time he did not neglect to utilize Johor's economic privileges guaranteed by treaty with the Dutch to further Johor's trade policies. In 1679 the Laksamana gained a total victory over Jambi and imposed a humiliating reparation arrangement which more than compensated for the loss of Johor's gold, men, pride and prestige in 1673. By this time, also, the Laksamana realized his second objective, which was attested to by the numerous missives

from Malacca to Batavia complaining of Johor's large international trade to the detriment of Malacca. Johor's relative unimportance in the Dutch Asian trading network and its ability to preserve the peace at the southern end of the Straits of Malacca were factors which made Batavia reluctant to undertake any serious punitive measures against this mere 'garden'. Since Batavia was also to blame for Malacca's economic woes through deliberate policy, it could not be moved to undertake action against Johor to bolster Malacca's ailing economic position. Thus Johor's development was assured. Yet Johor's freedom from direct Dutch intervention would not in itself have brought Johor the prosperity which won the praise of so many Dutch governors of Malacca. The opportunity was there to be seized, and seized it was by one of the most capable ministers in Johor's history.

The Laksamana became so accustomed to ruling with the complete trust and confidence of the ruler and under conditions which demanded his skill and authority, that it was difficult for him to adjust to a new ruler in 1677 who refused to relinquish his role as head of the kingdom. Differences of outlook between the Laksamana (now entitled the Paduka Raja) and the Sultan Ibrahim encouraged the Orang Kaya, long muzzled and intimidated by the Laksamana. Dissatisfaction within the kingdom could only work toward the Paduka Raja's downfall, but Sultan Ibrahim's death in 1685 eliminated for a time any effective opposition to his authority in Johor. Success bred both arrogance, as well as a fear of losing his position. Both of these factors made him surround himself with his own sons to whom he gave all the most important offices in the kingdom. His contempt and disregard for the privileges and the traditional authority of the Bendahara and the Orang Kaya became intensified and finally led to open conflict in which the power of the ruler of Johor, arising from the total devotion of his personal retainers, the Orang Laut, proved to be the decisive factor. To the very last the Paduka Raja proved to be a brave and enterprising individual. When he was finally engaged in battle by a superior fleet sent out by the Bendahara, he refused to surrender and succeeded repeatedly in repelling his pursuers. Even when he was out of shot he continued fighting using the golden rials in his treasure chests. This is a tableau which best depicts the courage and determination of the Paduka Raja who, more than any other before him, was responsible for making the

Kingdom of Johor a respected economic and military power in the Malay world in the seventeenth century.

1. KA 1248, OB 1681, Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 13 May 1680, fol. 527v.
2. Ibid. fols. 564v-565r.
3. Ibid. Missive from Egbert van Swenne, head of the lodge at Palembang, to Batavia, Palembang Register, 22 June 1680, fols. 437v-438r.
4. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1680, fols. 567r-v.
5. Ibid. 567r-v.
6. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1680, fols. 42r-v.
7. Ibid. Resolution of the Council in Malacca concerning the promotion of Malacca's welfare and trade, 29 Nov. 1680, fol. 51r; *ibid.* *Memorie van Overgave* of Gov. Jacob J. Pits of Malacca to E. Cornelis van Qualbergen, 26 Dec. 1680, fols. 59r-v.
8. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Pits of Malacca to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1680, fol. 564r.
9. *Dagh-Register* 1680: 19 Dec. 1680, pp. 821-2; *Dagh-Register* 1681, 13 Jan. 1681, p. 28.
10. KA 1248, OB 1681, *Memorie van Overgave* of Gov. Pits of Malacca to van Qualbergen 26 Dec. 1680, fol. 85v.
11. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Jan. 1681, fol. 87v; N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw', *IG*, II (1905), p. 1600.
12. KA 1248, OB 1681, Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Jan. 1681, fol. 87v.
13. *Dagh-Register* 1681: 10 April 1681, p. 227.
14. Macleod, *op. cit.* pp. 1592-3.
15. *Dagh-Register* 1681: 10 April 1681, p. 227.
16. KA 1248, OB 1682, Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Jan. 1681, fol. 87v.
17. Ibid. fols. 912v-913r.
18. C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952), p. 66.
19. *Dagh-Register* 1681: 3 Aug. 1681, p. 483.
20. For an account of the manner in which Phaulkon entered into the service of King Narai and his important role within that kingdom, see E. W. Hutchinson, *Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1940); *1688 Revolution in Siam*, The Memoirs of Father de Bèze, translated into English with introduction, commentary, and appendices and notes by E. W. Hutchinson (Hong Kong, 1968); and J. G. Gatty, *Voyage de Siam du Père Bouvet* (Leiden, 1963).
21. The Phra Klang was an important official in Siam whose principal concerns were trade and foreign affairs. KA 1266, OB 1683, Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Jan. 1682, fol. 746r.
22. KA 1266, OB 1683, Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 16 June 1682, fol. 777r.
23. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 14 Dec. 1682, fol. 783v.

24. KA 1274, OB 1684, Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 1 May 1683, fol. 821^v.
25. Ibid. fols. 821^v-822^r.
26. Ibid. fol. 822^r.
27. Ibid. fol. 822^v.
28. Ibid. fols. 822^v-823^r. This murder of the Temenggong by the Paduka Raja is recorded in the *Hikayat Negeri Johor* as having taken place in the year 1678 (A.H. 1089), *Hikayat Negeri Johor* edited by R. O. Winstedt in *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), p. 1, line 9.
29. KA 1274, OB 1684, Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 1 May 1683, fol. 823^r.
30. KA 1274, OB 1684, Report of Hendrick Temmer on His Mission to Bengkalis and Siak, May 1683, fol. 849^v.
31. Ibid. fol. 852^v.
32. Ibid. fol. 850^r.
33. Ibid. fol. 850^r.
34. Ibid. fol. 850^v.
35. Ibid. fols. 848^r, 850^v.
36. Ibid. fol. 853^r.
37. Ibid. fol. 852^r.
38. Netscher thought that the Paduka Raja was the Bendahara and his son the Laksamana. Both Dutch and Malay records indicate that the Paduka Raja was the Laksamana who was given the title of Paduka Raja. He then made his son Laksamana. The Dato Bendahara here is Tun Habib Abdul Majid, a different person from the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil.
39. KA 1274, OB 1684, Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, received 22 March 1683, fol. 835^r.
40. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 16 Sept. 1683, fols. 862^{r-v}.
41. KA 1296, OB 1685, Letter from the Paduka Raja of Johor to Malacca, received 30 Nov. 1683, fol. 3044^v.
42. KA 1292, OB 1685, Letter from the Paduka Raja of Johor to Malacca, 17 Feb. 1684, fol. 292^v.
43. Ibid. Report of Thomas Dias to the Governor and Council of Malacca on His Mission to Establish Relations between the VOC and the Minangkabau Rajas on the Siak River, 19 Jan. 1684, fol. 381^{r-v}.
44. KA 1296, OB 1685, Missive from Gov. Qualbergen of Malacca to Batavia, 6 Dec. 1684, fol. 2995^v; *ibid.* Translation of a Report of Mission to Thomas Dias to Pagar Ruyong, 18 Nov. 1684, fols. 3027^{r-v}.
45. Ibid. Letter from the Emperor of Pagar Ruyong to Malacca, 28 Sept. 1684, fol. 3052^v.
46. KA 1292, OB 1685, Letter from the Paduka Raja of Johor to Malacca, 2 July 1684, fols. 385^{r-v}.
47. Ibid. fol. 385^v.
48. S. Arasaratnam, 'Some Notes on the Dutch in Malacca and the Indo-Malayan Trade, 1641-1670', *JSEAH*, X, iii (Dec. 1969), p. 489. KA Malacca Register, 1641-1699, *Passim*.
49. KA 1292, OB 1685, Letter from the Johor Syahbandar at Bengkalis to Malacca, 23 May 1684, fol. 383^r.
50. Ibid. fol. 384^v.
51. Ibid. Letter from the Johor Syahbandar at Bengkalis to the Syahbandar of Malacca, 24 July 1684, fol. 386^r.

52. Ibid. Letter from the Syahbandar at Malacca to the Johor Syahbandar of Bengkalis, 26 Aug. 1684, fols. 388^{r-v}.

53. KA 1296, OB 1685, Letter from the Paduka Raja of Johor to Malacca, 6 Nov. 1684, fols. 3054^{r-v}.

54. KA 1304, OB 1686, Missive from Gov. Schagen of Malacca to Batavia, 9 March 1685, fol. 758^r.

55. Ibid. fol. 758^r.

56. Ibid. fol. 758^r. Dutch reports of the situation in Johor immediately after the poisoning of Sultan Ibrahim reiterate that the Laksamana's daughter was childless. It is only much later Dutch reports looking back on this event which assumed that since the Paduka Raja's daughter was regent that the young sultan was her son. This assumption was adopted by Netscher and Winstedt because it seemed to explain the great authority exercised by the Paduka Raja while his daughter was regent.

57. KA 1304, OB 1686, Missive from Gov. Schagen of Malacca to Batavia, 26 March 1685, fol. 760^r.

58. Pieter Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 1648-1715*, vol. 2 (London, 1964), pp. 174-5; Petrus Johannes Blok, *History of the People of The Netherlands*, vol. 4 (New York, 1900), p. 521.

59. J. K. J. de Jonge, *Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië*, vol. 5-6 ('s-Gravenhage, 1870, 1872), pp. viii, 1-2.

60. Geyl, op. cit. p. 350.

61. Ibid. p. 353.

62. KA 1304, OB 1686, Instructions for Francois van der Beke and Jan Rosdom as Envoys to the Court of Johor, 9 March 1685, fols. 771^v-774^v.

63. KA 1341, OB 1689, Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca received 2 July 1688, fol. 1583.

64. KA 1304, OB 1686, Report of Francois van der Beke and Jan Rosdom as Envoys to the Court of Johor, 21 April 1685, fols. 796^r-797^v.

65. Ibid. fols. 796^r-806^v.

66. These discrepancies apparently were not unusual. In 1689, the VOC signed what appeared to be a favourable contract with Siam. On closer examination, however, the Dutch realized that the Dutch and Siamese versions differed completely in meaning. The Dutch version said that the VOC would have exclusive trade in tin at Ligor, but the Siamese version mentioned that only *after* the king had been satisfied would the Dutch have exclusive tin trade. See 'Overzicht der betrekkingen', *TBG*, XIII (1864), pp. 423-4.

67. Debt-bondsmen.

68. KA 1304, OB 1686, Report from van der Beke and Rosdom, 21 April 1685, fol. 806^v.

69. Pinang is the areca-nut which is prepared in various ways for chewing with betel-leaf. The entire preparation is termed *sirih*.

70. KA 1315, OB 1687, Dagb-Register of Malacca, under date 15 Sept. 1685, Letter from the Paduka Raja of Johor to Malacca, fols. 1127-1144.

71. Ibid. Letter from Gov. Schagen of Malacca to the Paduka Raja of Johor, 9 Nov. 1685, fols. 1199-1200.

72. KA 1304, OB 1686, Report of Hendrick Temmer on Mission to Siak, 25 Aug. 1685, fols. 882^v-883^r.

73. Ibid. Letter from Gov. Schagen of Malacca to the Paduka Raja of Johor, 9 Nov. 1685, fols. 1198-1199.

74. KA 1318, OB 1687, Letter from the Paduka Raja of Johor to Gov.-Gen. Camphuys in Batavia, 4 Jan. 1687, fols. 790^r-791^r. Through Phaulkon's desire to expand Siam's trade and weaken the Dutch efforts in the East, the Phra Klang

had been sent to Jambi in 1684 and had apparently made overtures to other Malay nations. The Paduka Raja's appeal to Siam was but the beginning of closer ties between the two nations which continued even after the death of the Paduka Raja of Johor.

75. KA 1733, OB 1714, Report of Jan Lispensier and Thimanus Molinaeus on Their Mission to Johor, 13 Feb. 1713, fol. 105.

76. KA 1327, OB 1688, Report of Theunis Jansz. Cleef, Assistant at Siak, 24 Oct. 1687, fol. 877v.

77. KA 1733, OB 1714, Report of Lispensier and Molinaeus on Mission to Johor, 13 Feb. 1713, fol. 107.

78. Ibid. fol. 112.

79. KA 1315, OB 1687, Report of Van Naerssen at Siak, 17 Sept. 1686, fol. 2028.

80. Ibid. fols. 2038, 2039.

81. KA 1315, OB 1687, Missive from Gov. Dirk Comans of Malacca to Batavia, 12 Sept. 1686, fol. 1857.

82. KA 1327, OB 1688, Missive from Gov. Thomas Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 10 May 1687, fol. 787v.

83. *Memorie van Overgave* is a final report written by an outgoing official to his successor.

84. KA 1327, OB 1688, Missive from Gov. Thomas Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 10 May 1687, fols. 787r-788v.

85. KA 1315, OB 1687, Missive from Gov. Comans of Malacca to Batavia, 12 Sept. 1686, fol. 1856.

86. KA 1327, OB 1688, Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1687, fol. 862v.

87. KA 1318, OB 1687, *Memorie van Overgave* of Gov. Schagen of Malacca to Dirk Comans, 12 Jan. 1686, fol. 712v.

88. Ibid. Letter from the Paduka Raja of Johor to Batavia, dated A.H. 1097 (A.D. 1685), fol. 731r.

89. KA 1327, OB 1688, Report of Willem Valentyn on Mission to Johor, 15 July 1687, fols. 828v, 833r-v.

90. This Raja Sakti attempted to gain the support of the Muslim kingdoms in the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago in order to oust the Dutch from the area. Although his call for a *jihad* against the Dutch was unsuccessful, he obtained a sizeable following and constituted a serious menace to the Dutch until his death sometime toward the end of the seventeenth century. See J. Kathirithamby-Wells, 'Ahmad Shah ibn Iskandar and the late 17th Century 'Holy War' in Indonesia', *JMBRAS*, XLIII, i (July, 1970), pp. 48-63.

91. KA 1327, OB 1688, Report of Willem Valentyn on Mission to Johor, 15 July 1687, fol. 832v.

92. Ibid. fols. 832v-833r.

93. KA 1315, OB 1687, Missive from Gov. Comans of Malacca to Batavia, 30 May 1686, fol. 1785.

94. KA 1341, OB 1689, *Dagh-Register* of Malacca, under date 24 Feb. 1688, fol. 1420.

95. Ibid. under date 6 April 1688, fol. 1474.

96. Ibid. under date 6 April 1688, fol. 1476.

97. Ibid. under date 24 April 1688, fols. 1494-1503.

98. Ibid. under date 24 April 1688, fols. 1504-1505.

99. Ibid. under date 2 May 1688, fol. 1512.

100. Ibid. under date 27 March 1688, fol. 357.

101. Ibid. under date 8 June 1688, fol. 1544.
102. Ibid. under date 9 June 1688, fols. 1550-1551.
103. Ibid. under date 21 May 1688, fol. 1520.
104. Ibid. Report of Encik Tunang in Dag-Register of Malacca, under date 30 June 1688, fols. 1575-1577.
105. Ibid. under date 21 June 1688, fol. 1562.
106. Ibid. under date 22 June 1688, fols. 1563-4; *ibid.* under date 30 June 1688, fol. 1579.
107. Ibid. under date 30 June 1688, fols. 1575-6.
108. The *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* mentions that Tun Tima and several *hulubalang* were sent in pursuit. Ernst Ulrich Kratz, *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* (Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 44. Since 'Paduka Sri Maharaja' and 'Tun (?) Raja di Raja' are merely titles, either of these two individuals could have been the Tun Tima indicated in the *Peringatan*.
109. KA 1341, OB 1689, Dag-Register of Malacca, under date 30 June 1688, fols. 1578-9.
110. A two-masted Acehnese sailing ship.
111. A large Malay boat with two masts.
112. KA 1341, OB 1689, Letter from the Bendahara Sri Maharaja of Johor to Malacca, received on 2 July 1688, fols. 1580-3.
113. A Spanish silver mint which was used in the seventeenth century, especially for the rials of eight.
114. KA 1341, OB 1689, Report of Encik Khatib in Dag-Register of Malacca, under date 5 Aug. 1688, fols. 1583-4.
115. Ibid. Report of a Black Inhabitant of Malacca, fol. 1584.
116. Although the day and the month coincide almost exactly with the contemporary Dutch sources, the year given is 1689, instead of the more accurate dating of 1688 as mentioned in both the Dutch sources and in the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*.
117. Kratz, *op. cit.* p. 44:
Maka Tun Tima pun pergilah lalu turun di Bidan lalu berperanglah terdampar didarat lalu dapat dua beranak dengan Sri Bija Diraja lalu dibunuh keduanya. Maka ditanamkan di Tanjung Kalam, adalah sekarang pada tempat itu. Adalah keluar dari negeri Riau itu kepada empat belas haribulan Sya'ban dan matinya kepada hijrat seribu seratus pada tahun Ha dan segala anaknya lepas ke Patani.
118. *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, JMBRAS, X, i (Jan. 1932), p. 1, lines 16-17.
119. KA 1341, OB 1689, Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 7 Aug. 1688, fol. 401r.

VII

THE RESTORATION AND DEMISE OF TRADITIONAL ROLES

IN early July 1688 the fortifications on Riau were completely razed and the entire population was evacuated from the island to begin a new settlement on the Johor River. Once in Johor preparations were immediately begun to build up the defences of the newly-established city with the help of some Siamese. These Siamese were part of a large embassy consisting of forty ships which had been sent by King Narai to Sultan Mahmud prior to the downfall of the Paduka Raja.¹ Since they had secretly given their support to the Bendahara before the actual *coup d'état*, they were now in great favour with the new government.²

The Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid began his task of governing by first re-establishing the proper roles in the kingdom. He redistributed the various offices monopolized by the Paduka Raja's family and restored the proper relationships between the ruler, his ministers, and his subjects. In a short span of three years beginning after the death of Sultan Ibrahim in 1685, the Paduka Raja had appropriated for his sons almost every important office and title traditionally reserved for the Orang Kaya. He had the arrogance and presumption, moreover, to attempt to assume the kingship in everything but name. Equally serious was the charge that he had governed the kingdom during the ruler's minority without any regard for the advice of the Council of the Orang Kaya.

The Bendahara carefully avoided the fatal mistake of the Paduka Raja by always seeking the advice of the Orang Kaya before taking any action. In the successful *coup* against the Paduka Raja, he had

depended heavily upon the Orang Kaya and had consulted them in everything, including the decision to drown the ruler's stepmother. Cooperation with the Orang Kaya was especially vital at this time when the threat from the Paduka Raja's uncaptured sons was still great. Governor Slicher of Malacca warned the Bendahara that he was told of a plot by the Laksamana, a son of the Paduka Raja, to hire some Patanese to kill the Bendahara and bring the young ruler of Johor to Patani. Even more disturbing to the Bendahara was the rumour that King Narai of Siam had summoned the Laksamana to his court.³ Although these rumours later proved idle, the Bendahara was fully aware that the threat of an outside attack was still great. The person of the ruler was obviously very important for any one who wanted to legitimize his actions and to arouse support among the Johorese, especially the Orang Laut. As long as the ruler was safely in his hands there was no danger of a *coup* such as the one he himself engineered against the Paduka Raja. This may have been a factor in the new government's decision to move away from Riau to Johor. With a capital far up the Johor River, the likelihood of any ship sailing undetected upriver and abducting the ruler was remote, and any attempt through the thick jungle was unthinkable. Furthermore, the river still afforded an avenue of escape far into the interior if the attacking force proved too formidable.⁴

While the new government in Johor was still concerned about its ability to withstand any concerted attack led by the Paduka Raja's sons, Dutch envoys arrived on the scene. The death of the able and sagacious Paduka Raja was the opening which the Dutch sought to bring up the question of negotiations of a new treaty. The envoys who had been to Johor in 1685 told the Governor of Malacca that 'this was the best opportunity in the world for the Company to obtain a strongly favourable contract'.⁵ Having had to suffer the humiliating experience of the 1685 treaty, the Dutch had decided to abandon any idea of renewing negotiations until the young ruler came of age. The death of the Paduka Raja removed an experienced negotiator and made the prospects of a treaty favourable to the Dutch much more likely. There were already a few encouraging signs. The Syahbandar of Indragiri, who had opposed Dutch efforts at every turn, had been a protégé of the Paduka Raja and had felt secure in his position. But with the death of his mentor, he had become much more amenable to Dutch requests.⁶

There was a particular urgency in the Company's desire for a new treaty now that the Paduka Raja was dead. The new Johor government had already sought to bring foreign traders to its ports the way the Paduka Raja had done. It was feared that, if they did not begin immediately with the negotiations, the new Johor government would 'taste the pleasant fruits of trade and apply the maxims which the Paduka Raja himself had used'.⁷ The new Syahbandar of Siak appointed by the Bendahara had already proven to be more belligerent than the Paduka Raja's man. On one occasion he testily informed the Dutch that, with the death of the Paduka Raja, the treaty between the two nations had become defunct. His new orders were to prevent those along the Mandau River from selling anything to the Dutch or allowing the Dutch to cut wood.⁸ Although this new Syahbandar was unsuccessful in preventing several Minangkabau *nagari* from going to Malacca with their products, there was a noticeable drop in Dutch trade activities in Siak. The Dutch quickly realized that the new government in Johor would be as assiduous as the Paduka Raja in preventing any encroachment on its lucrative trade. It was not long before the Dutch came to regard the Johorese as being even more shrewd than in the time of the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil, which was praise indeed!⁹

The Dutch had already a taste of what Malacca could be like without Johor competition. When the yearly Danish ship from India to Johor was notified of the Paduka Raja's death, it went instead to Malacca to trade with 200 assorted bales of cloth. With the arrival of the totally unexpected supply in Malacca, the Indragiri ruler and Orang Kaya were obliged to come to Malacca to trade in order to get the much-desired cloth.¹⁰

In March 1689 the Governor of Malacca despatched a mission under the Syahbandar Francois van der Beke to negotiate a new treaty with Johor. The governor's letter to Sultan Mahmud expressed the hope that many of the provisions mentioned in the Malay version of the 1685 treaty would be retracted. He wanted exclusion of all foreign traders; exclusive Dutch trade (exclusive of the Johorese also) in cloth, silk, and specie; exclusive sale of tin and gold to the Dutch; a limitation of the number of Johor ships to Aceh to two for the ruler, one for the Bendahara, and three in total for the Orang Kaya; a requirement that all ships going to Aceh have Dutch passes and be forbidden to carry pepper or tin; the return of all runaway slaves and an end to Rembau's slave raids on Malacca; and finally

an inspection of the five Chinese junks now at Johor in order to see that they were not carrying pepper, tin, spiauter, spices, etc.¹¹ These were almost precisely the same conditions which the Dutch had tried to impose on the Johorese but had met with conspicuous failure in the treaty negotiations of 1685. None of these provisions had been accepted by Johor in 1685; instead, the Paduka Raja had modified certain points so that there was agreement on the exchange of run-away slaves and the permitting of VOC (but not freeburger or black Christian) trade in cloth and tin up the Siak River. Nevertheless, with Dutch doggedness, the Syahbandar Francois van der Beke and the merchant Joannes Bonket set forth to Johor in March 1689 armed with the selfsame articles and arguments.

Upon arrival in Johor the Dutch envoys presented the letter and gifts to the eleven year old Sultan Mahmud, the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid, and to the Orang Kaya of the kingdom. When the envoys mentioned the exclusion of all European traders except the Dutch in Johor, the Laksamana opposed it saying that just this past year a Danish ship at Riau had paid tolls amounting to 1,100 rijksdaalders. The Sri Perdana Menteri also voiced his objection by emphasizing that exclusion of all other nations would be disadvantageous to Johor since the Moors, the Hindus, the English, and the Danes had brought great profit to Johor with their cloth and other goods. On a number of other points, the Bendahara professed Johor's wholehearted friendship for the Dutch, but he himself could not be responsible for relinquishing the Sultan Mahmud's rights and privileges while he was still a minor. He protested that this stipulation of exclusive Dutch trade in Johor's lands would work toward the disadvantage of his master and against the freedom of his subjects. Furthermore, such a provision would very likely be disallowed by the ruler himself as soon as he came of age. Yet after the Bendahara consulted with the Laksamana and the other Orang Kaya on the question of exclusive trade, he consented to the inclusion of this provision in the new treaty. The Dutch envoys were very pleasantly surprised even though 'they knew quite well that they were not dealing with the likes of the former Paduka Raja'. The highly unexpected successful completion of the negotiations was then commemorated by the ceremonial ripping up of the 1685 treaty.¹²

What had made the Bendahara and Orang Kaya change their minds on what was obviously a major concession on their part?

During the trade negotiations matters of more immediate importance came to the attention of the Johorese. Two ambassadors from Sultan Mahmud of Johor returned from Patani with news that the Patanese were coming with a fleet to attack Johor. It was rumoured that with the Patanese force were the former Temenggong, Laksamana, and other sons and friends of the late Paduka Raja. In previous Dutch missives from Malacca to Batavia, references were often made to one of the Paduka Raja's familial relations who was an important personage in Patani. This may have been the source of the support which the Paduka Raja's family received from Patani in these years.¹³ To deal with this threat the Bendahara and the Orang Kaya were preparing thirty galleys and fifty large perahus to go at the next moon to Pahang and Terengganu. There they hoped to gain reinforcements and with this combined strength meet any attack from the north.¹⁴

The new government of Johor was not yet on very stable grounds politically, and it could not afford alienating the Dutch at this critical juncture. It was obvious to the Johorese that the Dutch considered the written contract of great importance, and so there was no reason why they should not sign it as they had with other treaties. Signing on a piece of paper had not prevented the Johorese from carrying on as they pleased before, and there was no reason to think it would be otherwise now. Obtaining Dutch support became of paramount importance in view of the changed circumstances. The Dutch were much more likely to assist an ally who promised them his trade than one who openly spurned them.

Although he signed the treaty, the Bendahara sent a letter to the authorities in Malacca emphasizing both his objections to the treaty and certain privileges which he still retained despite the treaty. He complained that the Dutch leaders in Holland and the Council members [in Batavia] had no compassion for 'this ruler who has no father'. He went on to describe the relations between Johor and Malacca: (my paraphrasing)

One table is large, made of gold, with everything on it of gold; the other is small, made of wood with small porcelain plates on it. The children and the poor go to eat at the wooden table, but when they see the golden table they all want to go there. The owner of the golden table, however, will not allow this. And yet we have seen in our Book, as you also must have seen in yours, that God helps him who helps a small child. The owner of the golden table is not satisfied with his own table but also covets the

wooden table. This must certainly be a puzzle to any one with any understanding in him. But since this is a request from a friend, we will grant it and not go back on our word.

Your ambassadors asked us how many ships we send yearly to Aceh, to which we answered that we were not certain *but it would be as before*. With regard to the Company's request to trade at Kelang, Selangor, Sungai Ujong, and at other dependencies of Johor, we have not mentioned it in the treaty because the ruler is still young, and the people in these places do not know the Dutch ways, which could lead to quarrels and grave difficulties for us.

We would like to have the Dutch grant passes for Johorese ships to go to east coast Java and back.¹⁵ [*Italics mine.*]

Throughout the negotiations a familiar refrain from the Bendahara was that the ruler was like a son without a father, a child too young to understand his position as a sovereign monarch. As a mere regent the Bendahara could not be responsible for granting the Dutch privileges which only the ruler himself could dispense. Both the Paduka Raja in 1685 and the Bendahara now in 1689 invoked this serious limitation on the negotiation procedures with the Dutch, both claiming a disinclination to overstep the bounds of propriety with regard to matters of sovereignty. In their capacity as actual regents they could only govern on behalf of the young ruler but would have been guilty of *lèse majesté* by assuming the powers of sovereignty. This was of real concern to the Malays, and the regents could ignore it only at the risk of their own well-being. During the negotiations with the Dutch both the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil and now the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid had known what was proper according to Malay prescription, but they had also found it doubly convenient in refusing to grant major concessions as a mere regent of the young ruler. The Bendahara was not satisfied simply to exasperate the Dutch by the constant reiteration of this point, but sought fit to inflict a homily on the Calvinistic Dutch: 'And yet we have seen in our Book, as you also must have seen in yours, that God helps him who helps a small child.'

The treaty was a major achievement by the Dutch, but the Bendahara asserted in his letter to the Governor of Malacca that the number of ships that Johor would send to Aceh would be as before. Furthermore, he emphasized that nothing was included within the treaty concerning Dutch trading privileges in Kelang, Selangor, and Sungai Ujong, the chief tin areas in Johor's territories. By mention-

ing these areas specifically, the Bendahara excluded them from the reference in the treaty to exclusive VOC trade in the 'king's lands'. The Bendahara also gained the single minor point which he requested. In January 1690 the Dutch Residents on east coast Java were ordered not to refuse passes to Johor ships wanting to return home, but only to take precautions that these ships were not trading in such goods as cloth and opium.¹⁶

The Bendahara attempted to convince the Dutch that he was assiduously implementing the articles of the treaty. He sent a messenger to the Dutch in November 1689 saying that a Danish ship had wanted to enter Johor to trade but was refused because of the contract with the Dutch.¹⁷ By chance a Dutch physician was in Johor at this time treating a gunshot wound of one of the Orang Kaya and gave another version of the story. He told the Dutch that this particular Danish ship had been allowed to land and to trade in Johor by paying 30 per cent duty and presenting a large gift to the Johorese.¹⁸ The Dutch were irritated by the Bendahara's seemingly blatant lie and accused him of allowing the Danish ship to trade in Johor in contravention of the treaty. Realizing the futility of trying to deny having allowed the Moors on the Danish ship to trade in Johor, the Bendahara took another tack. He explained that these Moors were ambassadors from the King of Tanjungpura (in Borneo) wanting to repay a large debt to the ruler of Johor which had been outstanding since the days of the Paduka Raja. This was the reason that they had let them in Johor, but the Dutch should not think that the Bendahara and the Orang Kaya of the Kingdom of Johor had broken the contract.¹⁹

The Bendahara was playing a very cautious but safe game since the Dutch had never undertaken military action against Johor on the basis of trade, as had the Portuguese a century before. He was thus encouraged to take liberties with the treaties all the while professing Johor's long-standing friendship with the Dutch. In December 1689 the Bendahara sent a letter to Malacca expressing surprise that the Dutch believed that they could trade at Pahang and other villages subject to Johor without having to pay duties. He explained that such a thing was never written in their contract. It was true that the Dutch ships were allowed to trade duty-free in Johor, but not in any other place.²⁰

By interpreting the provisions of the treaty very narrowly, the Bendahara was able to adhere to a document which appeared

detrimental to Johor and use it to promote Johor's interest. The new government came to be acknowledged by the Dutch as being 'smarter than in the time of the Paduka Raja'. The Bendahara and the Orang Kaya of the kingdom were dedicated to the same goals as the Paduka Raja but refrained from any overt acts which could antagonize the Dutch. Although they had signed a contract with the Dutch which was obviously to the detriment of Johor, they had done this deliberately with a clear idea of the priorities of the kingdom during the time of the negotiations. Obviously the written contract meant a lot to the Dutch, and Johor's leaders were aware that affixing their signatures to this paper was a tried and proven method of satisfying them. It had an added advantage of serving as a deterrent to an outside force such as Patani which would think twice before attacking Johor and perhaps becoming embroiled with the Dutch. As long as an external threat existed, the Johorese had to be circumspect without damaging its international trade irreparably. To have refused the Danish ship from trading in Johor would have meant the loss of the native trade goods that year and also a likely possibility that the Danish ship would not try to return the following year. It was a risky role to play, but there was no other way to avoid the dilemma.

The new government continued to send reassurances to the Dutch. It claimed that it was advising all traders who needed a pass to go to Malacca. As a further sign of its good intentions, it had punished many Johorese who had endangered the treaty and had reminded them that the Dutch and Johor were living in friendship.²¹ In August 1690 the Bendahara sent another letter to Malacca in which he duly reported the arrival of several French ships at Johor which he had sent on to Malacca; a Danish ship carrying trade goods and ambassadors from the King of Denmark, whom he had allowed to remain so as not to bring shame to Johor; and several other ships which he had turned away.²² By this method the Bendahara and Orang Kaya hoped to prove to the Dutch that they were upholding their part of the treaty provisions, while pursuing their interests with all the craftiness and determination which had characterized the previous government.

One of the arenas in which the Dutch and the Johorese locked horns was in the interior of Siak where Kabon and Patapahan, two of the most important collection centres for Minangkabau products from Central Sumatra, were at war with each other. As a result of

this conflict there was a cessation of Minangkabau goods coming down-river. The Dutch suspected that the Bendahara and other Johor Orang Kaya were encouraging Kabon against Patapahan and prolonging the war, but they were never certain.²³ During these hostilities Johor's Orang Kaya pressured three of the four *nagari* which had signed trade treaties with the Dutch to refuse to trade with Malacca. Thus the Minangkabaus from the interior who normally went either to Patapahan or Kabon, were now going to Kota Baru on the Kampar River where Johor ships were ready to trade cloth and other goods for their products.²⁴ Even when peace was again restored in upriver Siak, Johor traders continued to monopolize the Minangkabau goods by going directly with their ships to Kabon, Patapahan, and various trading areas in Kampar, bearing gifts as well as the much desired cloth and other goods. Since the Johorese themselves were coming to the collecting centres with all the desired trade products, there was little reason for the Minangkabau traders to go down-river to trade with the Dutch.²⁵

Elsewhere on the east coast of Sumatra Johor's traders were equally active and effective. The Dutch provisional Resident at Indragiri wrote to the Governor of Malacca on 14 December 1690 that three well-armed vessels belonging to the Bendahara and the Syahbandar of Johor were at Indragiri with cargoes of baftas,²⁶ Guinees,²⁷ etc. He was also told that two kontengs with cloth from Johor were expected within a short time.²⁸ This was especially disturbing to the Dutch because they were suffering from a lack of cloth while Johor, with its attractive trade facilities, always seemed to have an over-abundance. It was cloth which made possible the lucrative gold trade of the Johorese in Indragiri,²⁹ and foreign traders were still going to Johor, Bengkalis, and Aceh and supplying these places with all the cloth they needed.³⁰

Johor's profitable trade only accentuated Malacca's economic failures and led to a strain in their relations. To prevent an open split with Malacca, the Bendahara decided to safeguard Johor's position by communicating directly to the Dutch leaders who mattered in Batavia. Thus on 13 April 1691 a letter in the name of Sultan Mahmud of Johor was sent to Governor-General Johannes Camphuys. After the usual complimentary greetings, the letter began: (my paraphrasing)

I am sending my envoys the Sri Bija Wangsa and the Sri Dewa Muda to you because I neglected to do so at the time when the Dato Bendahara and

I assumed our offices. If there should be any oversights in the old treaty, we would like to see them rectified so it may be upheld. I am puzzled that Johorese ships wanting to return home from Java cannot obtain Dutch passes. If these Johorese had done something wrong, then it would be perfectly understandable. If, however, such a practice is being carried out with the knowledge and by order of the Company, then this is a defect in the treaty. When the Syahbandar Francois van der Beke, Joannes Bonket, and the Captain of the Malays were in Johor [in 1689], they wanted me to exclude all English, French, and Danes from trading in Johor and also requested permission to set up a lodge in Siak for Dutch trade. Since the Johorese valued the honour and reputation of having the friendship with the Dutch, they had consented, but not for eternity. This request by these Dutch envoys, nevertheless, had brought the Johorese much disrespect among other countries. It is true that whenever traders go to other lands, they are allowed to trade and are protected; whereas, in Johor, these traders are forbidden to trade. This state of affairs has been damaging to my reputation and has been a particular *crèvecoeur*. Therefore, I request that the Danish ships be again allowed to come and trade in Johor as they once did. Otherwise, without a doubt, the Johorese would be ruined and go into decline.³¹

In an accompanying letter to the Governor-General, the Bendahara added:

Since the request [for a treaty] from the two envoys [van der Beke and Bonket] had been made on behalf of the Company and yourself, I had allowed it, but not for ever and always, and only because my king is still young in years. As long as my king is still young and an orphan, I believed that the Company would show him some favour and be inclined toward him. According to the law [*'t regt* = *adat*?] I have no right in the disposition of the kingdom, so how much less have I the right to give it to others. If I were to do so, I would be cheating my own king. I had no power to grant all the requests of the two envoys forever and always.³²

Since the Sultan was still a minor, both letters were very likely written by the Bendahara to assure the Dutch of Johor's willingness to uphold their long-standing friendship. He was aware of the importance of the mission to Batavia, in which a letter from the Sultan of Johor, although still a minor, would be more respected in accord with the sense of propriety in dealing with a major ruler. It was still necessary, however, for the Bendahara to append his own letter to explain that as a regent he was unable to grant the Dutch everything they had hoped for. His delineation of the responsibilities of the ruler and those of the Chief Minister once again reveals the

importance placed on maintaining the proper roles in the society. Only the ruler could guarantee protection to his traders abroad and to all foreign traders in this kingdom. He also reserved the prerogative of granting or denying anyone the privilege of trading in his lands. As in previous letters from the Paduka Raja and the Bendahara, the right of disposition of the kingdom, i.e. sovereignty, was the precious preserve of the ruler according to the *adat* of the Malays. In his dealings with the Dutch, he always reminded them that every thing was tentative until the ruler himself made the decisions. All action within the kingdom acquired meaning and purpose only when a ruler was present to sanction and justify such action. During the periods of regency of the Paduka Raja and the Bendahara, power was exercised to the fullest by both regents. Yet nothing could be regarded as final until the young sultan attained his majority and provided his stamp of legitimacy and approbation on all previous activity.

In spite of the Bendahara's complaint that the treaty with the Dutch was having damaging effects on Johor trade, there was little indication that the level of economic activity in Johor's ports had diminished. In February 1692 five well-laden Chinese junks came to trade in Johor and announced that there were another five or six junks on their way there. In the interior of Siak Johor received all the tin collected at Kabon and was secretly inciting Kabon against its rival Patapahan in order to destroy the Dutch trade with the latter.³³ Malacca noted great numbers of Johorese ships passing through its port in the early months of 1692 and bemoaned the fact that trade in Johor was increasing noticeably while that of Malacca was declining.³⁴ It was all too obvious that Johor was quickly becoming the 'seat of trade and the food granary' of the area.³⁵ With a sense of failure and resentment the outgoing Governor Dirk Comans of Malacca wrote to his successor Gelmer Vosburgh on 22 October 1692:

By the signing of a new treaty with the Dato Bendahara, to whom the kingdom is entrusted wholly until the majority of the young king, the growth of trade in Johor should have diminished since it was agreed that no European nation, be it French, English, Danes, etc., would be permitted to trade there anymore. Experience has taught us, however, that exclusive treaties made with the natives are observed only until they find other traders with a better market Not only did Johor receive a Danish ship on 5 October 1692 with a large cargo of cloth, but it has also done

everything to hinder Dutch trade in Siak, while the Dato Bendahara carries on a profitable trade by exchanging cloth and Spanish rials for gold and tin. Johorese encouragement of the war between Kabon and Patapahan contributes still further to the disruption of Dutch trade up-river. The Dato Bendahara has become adept at an old Johorese game of providing non-Johorese with passes so they can trade at Malacca or go elsewhere with special privileges only bestowed on the Dato Bendahara and nobles of Johor.³⁶

An English captain arriving in Malacca from Amoy in January 1693 told the Dutch that there were seven Chinese junks from Amoy on their way to Johor and that a large quantity of pepper went yearly from Johor to Amoy.³⁷ The arrival of Chinese junks meant the converging of ships from all over Indonesia, as well as those of the English, Danes, Moors, etc., in the port of Johor to barter their wares. Spiauter was brought by the Chinese yearly in great quantities and sold to the Moors from Aceh and elsewhere for cloth and linen.³⁸ Ships provided with a *cap* from the Bendahara of Johor could go to Aceh to trade Chinese wares without paying duties, fees for passes, or being inspected.³⁹ It was calculated that between 2 August 1692 and 15 April 1693, ships bearing a *cap* from the ruler of Johor, and particularly from the Bendahara, should have paid duties amounting to about 8,697.45 guilders.⁴⁰

The Johorese continued to move in and out of Siak trading at will as if no 1689 treaty had ever been signed. The Dutch soon became resigned to this and gave permission to the Johor Laksamana to go to Siak to trade with two ships carrying cloth and Chinese silk. Although Article 5 of the Treaty of 1689 (see Appendix C) had specifically excluded the Johorese from carrying cloth up the Siak River and had provision for only one small boat a year owned by the Bendahara to trade in Siak, the Dutch in Malacca were unprepared at that time to enforce this provision of the treaty.⁴¹

Johor's trade supremacy in the Straits of Malacca was due to an active policy pursued by its leaders, which included the utilization of the Orang Laut to intimidate its rivals. In May 1693 the Governor of Malacca complained to the Bendahara that some inhabitants of Malacca had been kidnapped by two Johor pirates, Panglima Putih and Panglima Pinang. They had told inhabitants of Pancor, a place located a few miles to the north of Malacca, that they were carrying on their raids only on the people of Malacca.⁴² The Dutch in Malacca became even more nervous later that August when the

Laksamana⁴³ appeared at Pulau Ayer with twenty-five ships. It proved to be a perfectly harmless incident in which the Laksamana despatched an envoy to convey his greetings to the Governor of Malacca and then left for Siak. The Dutch were told that the Laksamana was going on the yearly peregrination to collect tribute.⁴⁴ When he arrived in the Siak River, he sent letters to both Kabon and Patapahan to come down and meet him in the Siak River, but only the former obeyed.⁴⁵ Kabon was then ordered not to sell tin to Patapahan and to work toward the lessening of Patapahan's trade.⁴⁶ Further orders were issued on behalf of the Bendahara to Siak, Selangor, Bengkalis, and other areas on east coast Sumatra, to deliver all the pedro porco to him.⁴⁷

When the Laksamana arrived back in Johor, his ships were filled with booty. He had succeeded in hauling off large amounts of cloth, opium, rice, salt, and other goods from ships which did not intend to trade in Johor. But his enthusiasm had brought him dangerously close to conflict with the Dutch. What worried the Dutch was the talk in Johor that the Laksamana had gone out with his fleet not only for piracy but in order to destroy the Dutch lodge in Siak.⁴⁸ When the Governor of Malacca accused the Laksamana of piracy, the Bendahara defended the innocence of the Laksamana and instead blamed the Dutch for discourteous behaviour. The Bendahara claimed that two Dutch sloops had approached the Laksamana at Tanjung Jati, demanded a pass, and treated him with great disrespect. If the Laksamana had wanted to do them harm, he could very well have done so. While the Bendahara accused the Dutch of harassing his subjects in the area of Tanjung Jati and Perepat Seratus, he also assured them that it was not his intention to break either the old or the new treaties between the ruler of Johor and the Company.⁴⁹

By answering the charges and countering with his own accusations, the Bendahara made it difficult for the Dutch at Malacca to ever provide a valid and strong enough excuse to convince Batavia that drastic action was necessary. The Governor of Malacca explained to Batavia that the Bendahara's letter was an attempt to focus the blame on the Dutch in order to hide Johor's own guilt. Nevertheless, in accordance with Batavia's resolution of 29 August 1693, Malacca would avoid any quarrels with Johor, release any of its ships being held, and restore any confiscated goods.⁵⁰

Johor's successes haunted almost every report going from Malacca to Batavia. In July 1694 Governor Vosburgh of Malacca wrote:

... the tin trade this year has been very scanty in comparison with last year mainly because of the large and daily increasing trade of Johor in the tin quarters. People are saying that recently the Johorese sent a considerable quantity of tin to China on eight to ten Chinese junks, in addition to what the Johorese ordinarily sell to the English and the Danes at a high price or in exchange for opium and cloth.⁵¹

Malacca's long list of complaints about Johor's 'pernicious' trading habits made barely a ripple among the leaders in Batavia. Not only had Batavia ordered in 1693 the restoration of the confiscated cloth and opium belonging to the Bendahara, but it also presented him with the proceeds of the sale of the opium in Batavia in order to avoid any misunderstanding.⁵² New instructions from Batavia called for a cessation of Dutch cruising around Tanjung Jati, the Kampar Straits, the Perepat Seratus, and Siak — which were all areas belonging to Johor — in order to prevent any conflict between Johor and the Company. Javanese and other native ships were to be allowed to sail to these areas without interference, and all Dutch cruisers were strictly forbidden to attack, rob, search, or visit any ship belonging to Johor on pain of severe punishment. As proof of the VOC's desire to uphold the treaty and friendship with Johor, these instructions were to be rigorously applied and all offenders punished.

The Bendahara appeared vindicated in his decision to appeal to the powers in Batavia as an effective line of defence against Malacca. By cultivating the impression of Johor as a small, insignificant kingdom, he hoped to convince Batavia that it was not worthwhile to expend any troops or funds to suppress Johor's activities. Batavia was concerned with greater problems, and therein lay the fundamental reason for Johor's diplomatic manoeuvrability with the Dutch in these years. Malacca was now forced to send reassurances to Batavia that Johorese ships returning from Coromandel could trade toll-free in Malacca, while asking for further instructions on how to deal with other delicate Johor-Dutch problems. Macassarese, Buginese, and others were also coming to Malacca with the Bendahara's *cap* even though they were not Johorese. The ships going past Malacca northwards to Kedah, Perak, Aceh, and other places were increasing considerably in bold contravention of the treaty of 9 May 1689. Between 1 January and 31 December 1694 there were a total of fifty-nine ships from Johor with the Bendahara's *cap* (and

thus toll-free) which went to Selangor, Kelang, Sungai Ujong, Kedah, Aceh, Batu Bahara, Panai, etc.⁵³ There were thirty-nine Johorese ships going from north to south supposedly carrying 195 bahars or 73,125 pounds of tin, but the true amount, according to Dutch estimation, was very likely twice that figure quoted.⁵⁴ In the first three months of 1696 eleven Chinese junks had arrived in Johor as compared with one in Malacca. During this same period ships from the north going to Johor brought 167½ bahars or 62,800 pounds of tin in comparison with Malacca's 132 26/75 bahars or 49,630 pounds.⁵⁵ Danish ships belonging to the Danish East India Company⁵⁶ brought cloth to Johor and, instead of paying tolls or duties, gave gifts each year to Johor worth 1,000 rijksdaalders. Chinese junks were also allowed to trade toll-free and duty-free in return for small gifts to the Orang Kaya.⁵⁷

Johor was still riding a crest of prosperity when the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid died on a Friday, 27 July 1697 (pada tahun Sunnah 1109, pada 7 haribulan Muharram, malam juma'at).⁵⁸ In a short span of nine years the Bendahara had succeeded impressively in preserving Johor's economic and political gains won under the leadership of his predecessor, the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil. When he assumed the position as head of government in 1688, the Dutch were convinced that they had found a kind, malleable individual who would be amenable to Dutch demands. How little the Dutch understood the situation in Johor became apparent as the years went on and Johor prospered while Malacca continued to languish. What the Dutch saw as a transformation of the Bendahara from an ally who had readily signed the 1689 treaty to a deceitful Johorese leader who was no different from the infamous Paduka Raja, was no more than their inability to appreciate Johor's own goals and internal matters. The Bendahara and the Orang Kaya had won a victory over the Paduka Raja's clique in 1688, but there was still a danger then of an attack from the sons of the Paduka Raja with the help of the Patanese. Under these circumstances the major priority of the Bendahara was to preserve Johor against an attempt by the Paduka Raja's sons to return to power. Since the Dutch were in Johor in the midst of treaty negotiations when the news of the threat arrived, the leaders of Johor withdrew their objections and immediately agreed to the draft treaty brought by the Dutch envoys. By signing the treaty, they hoped that the

Paduka Raja's sons and their Patani supporters would be reluctant to attack for fear of becoming embroiled with the Dutch.

Realizing the mistakes which had brought about the downfall of the Paduka Raja, the Bendahara cultivated the opinions and advice of the Orang Kaya and always acted in conjunction with them. Once he felt politically secure at Johor, he turned his attention toward the encouragement of trade. The signing of the treaty of 1689 was definitely a retrogressive step toward this aim, yet it fulfilled an important political objective. The Bendahara's task was now to attempt to continue the thriving trade in Johor while not flagrantly violating the terms of the treaty. While he persuaded foreign traders to frequent the ports of Johor once again, he also wrote assuring, if not convincing, letters to the Dutch in Malacca and Batavia of Johor's declining trade. The Bendahara soon found that his most useful allies were the Dutch authorities in Batavia. The latter were anxious to avoid being embroiled in any native war, especially at a time when Batavia lay vulnerable to attack from France and Spain who were then at war with the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Batavia was reluctant to expend precious men and supplies in a minor conflict against a kingdom which was not a serious threat to overall Dutch trade in Asia nor a menace to Dutch shipping through the Straits of Malacca. There was a danger, furthermore, that any conflict with Johor would conveniently provide their enemies with the proverbial troubled waters to fish in and thereby weaken the Dutch position in Asia. These important considerations of Batavia were the basis for the freedom of action exercised by the leaders of Johor during the entire period under study.

Throughout his government the Bendahara was eager to demonstrate his adherence to all the accepted principles of governing and proper behaviour in his relationships with the ruler and the Orang Kaya. When Sultan Mahmud Syah reached his majority in 1695,⁵⁹ the Bendahara played an inconspicuous role while still firmly holding the reins of government in his hands. How successful he was in exercising a moderating influence on the ruler was not appreciated until after his death when all the excesses of the young ruler became uncontrollable under lesser chief ministers. The Bendahara had been a worthy successor of the Paduka Raja, and by 1697, there was no doubt that Johor was the pre-eminent economic and military power in the Malay world.

After the death of the Bendahara, there was no restraining influence on the cruel nature of Sultan Mahmud. The Bendahara Tun Habib Abdul Majid was largely successful in preventing intolerable excesses on the part of Sultan Mahmud, but sometimes even the influence of a strong minister was insufficient to curb this ruler's sadistic temperament. When the Scottish country-trader Captain Alexander Hamilton was in Johor in 1695, he claimed to have witnessed an especially sordid incident involving Sultan Mahmud:

...I went to Johore Lami at that Time, to traffick with his Subjects, and some China Men, with a Cargo proper for their Turn, and, according to my Custom, went to compliment his Majesty with a Present, in which was a Pair of screw-barrelled Pistols. He desired me to prove them with a Shot, to try how far it would penetrate a Post that was at the Gate, which I did, and he much admired how so little Powder should have Strength to force a Ball so far in the Wood, and begged some Powder and Ball, which I gave him, and the next Time he went abroad, he tried, on a poor Fellow on the Street, how far they could carry a Ball into his Flesh, and shot him through the Shoulder.⁶⁰

The cruel character of Sultan Mahmud is supported by all contemporary European accounts and by the Malay histories. Dutch envoys to the court of Johor in May 1699 characterized Sultan Mahmud as 'still very young and ungoverned, who occupies himself mainly with all sorts of mean pleasures and indecent behaviour'.⁶¹ When the Dutch asked for the Sultan's assistance to prevent piracy, he commanded that when the pirates were caught, 'they should be grasped by their throats and their necks broken'.⁶² The Malay histories are much more respectful of the special nature of Malay rulers and thus attribute Sultan Mahmud's propensity for men's company to a fairy wife whom he had married. The jealousy of his fairy wife had made impossible his having any normal relationships with a woman. They describe graphically Sultan Mahmud's disemboweling a pregnant wife of one of his Orang Kaya because she had eaten a piece of his jackfruit.⁶³

With the death of the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid, Sultan Mahmud was able to exert himself more often in the affairs of the kingdom. The new Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil, son of Tun Habib Abdul Majid, was more willing to condone Sultan Mahmud's activities than was the old Bendahara. When the Dutch demanded the return of three Malacca slaves who had fled to Johor, the Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil had to explain that his master wanted

to keep these slaves in his service and was very reluctant to give them up. The Bendahara reminded Sultan Mahmud of the contract between the Dutch and the Johorese concerning the mutual exchange of runaway slaves, but Sultan Mahmud remained adamant and insisted on buying the slaves. The Dutch had to relent and ask the Bendahara to seek restitution of the slaves, but if Sultan Mahmud still refused, to pay 200 rijksdaalders for them.⁶⁴

In January 1699 Sultan Mahmud sent two representatives to Malacca to announce that he had reached his majority and had already assumed the governing of the kingdom for quite some time. Thus on 1 March the Syahbandar of Malacca and a merchant were sent as envoys to the court of Johor. On arrival on 13 March the envoys paid their respects to the Syahbandar of Johor, who then informed the Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil of the coming of the Dutch envoys and the purpose of their visit. At noon the next day the envoys and the letter from Malacca were escorted from the ships to the *balai* with all due ceremony. After the letter was read publicly, the gifts were distributed much to the delight of Sultan Mahmud. All the necessary visits were then made to the Bendahara, Laksamana and the Syahbandar. When the formalities were over, the envoys broached the subject of runaway slaves and piracy. Sultan Mahmud agreed to tell Pahang to return all Malacca slaves who had sought refuge in that land. He added that he had given Pahang to his mother as a gift and thus it no longer belonged to the Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil. Insofar as the question of piracy was concerned, he promised to take firm action and satisfy the Dutch demands. He despatched four armed vessels to his dependencies of Bengkalis, Selangor, Kelang, and Muar on 28 March. The regents of these places were warned not to tolerate any pirates nor give them refuge in their territories.⁶⁵

On 5 April the envoys returned and reported that the Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil, an old and stately gentleman with a well-regulated life, did not interfere whatsoever in the habits and the 'strange humour' of the Sultan. Although the Bendahara had a strong following, the governing of the land was in the hands of the Syahbandar, who was a moderate man.⁶⁶ Through diligence the Syahbandar was able to control and endure the activities of the young ruler. The trade in Johor, according to the envoys, was not very good, and most of it was under the control of the Syahbandar.⁶⁷

Since the death of the Bendahara Tun Habib Abdul Majid in 1697, power had moved away from the hands of the Bendahara faction and had shifted to another group under the Syahbandar who had managed to gain the favour of Sultan Mahmud. There were already indications that there had been a shift of power in the kingdom when the Dutch envoys were present in the capital city, Kota Tinggi. Pahang, once a fief of the Bendahara, had been suddenly reclaimed by Sultan Mahmud and given to his mother. It was also obvious to the Dutch envoys that although the Bendahara had a large following, the Syahbandar was the one who could both run the government and manage Sultan Mahmud.

The division in the government and the lack of any real leadership after two successive shrewd, strong-willed regents caused Johor's trade to diminish and its authority in the Malay world to wane. In just two years Johor had changed from the acknowledged leading entrepot in the Malay world to a small backwater port. The outgoing Governor of Malacca, Govert van Hoorn, contemptuously dismissed Johor as an economic threat in his *Memorie van Overgave* of 23 November 1700:

With regard to the great trade which was supposed to have been conducted on Riau formerly and on Johor more recently as reported by the gentlemen Qualbergen and Schagen [former Governors of Malacca] in their Memories, I have not found any such thing at all ... the European trade ... seems to have tapered off and ended ... there are no other foreign traders but five to six Chinese junks which appear yearly from China....⁶⁸

The rapidity with which Johor was transformed from a respectable economic and political power built by the wise and energetic policies of two capable ministers to an insignificant port hardly distinguishable from many other Malay petty chiefdoms is a testament to the constant attention and effort necessary to maintain the proper conditions for trade. Trade meant wealth, and wealth meant a certain style and splendour of sovereignty which inspired pride. Under Sultan Mahmud the concern for the maintenance of the proper conditions for trade was allowed to lapse, thus impeding the flow of wealth to the kingdom and to the subjects.⁶⁹

This condition could only have bred discontent among the Orang Kaya and commoners accustomed to the riches which had come to their shores because of the wise policies of the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil and the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid. Furthermore, the Johorese were victims of a sadistic pro-

pensity of their young ruler, whom his own ministers could bridle only with great difficulty. The Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil was an old man who was not accustomed to the kind of power wielded by his predecessor, his father. He interfered little in the government, and only did so to rectify or alleviate any unduly unreasonable actions of Sultan Mahmud toward an outside power, such as the retention of Dutch runaway slaves from Malacca. The Paduka Raja and the Bendahara Tun Habib Abdul Majid had both fought to establish Johor as the predominant entrepot in the area by providing favourable trading conditions and facilities at home, by using a combination of force and persuasion to gain trade, by applying intimidation against competitors, and by a careful manipulation and understanding of their chief rivals, the Dutch. Sultan Mahmud had not been the apprentice of either of these regents and had been carefully closeted so no opposition could use his sacred person against the ruling powers. The new Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil found it more difficult to deal with Sultan Mahmud because the latter had already come of age and now resented the strong control of the Bendahara family.

A symptom of the absence of any strong guidance from the centre was a resurgence of undirected piracy in the Straits of Malacca by the Johor Orang Laut. In September 1698 the Dutch of Malacca complained of the lack of rice because of the great danger of the pirates in the area from the Durian Straits to the Johor River. They received daily reports of large numbers of Orang Laut pirates from these areas who preyed on passing trading ships. As a result the ships from Malacca no longer dared to venture out.⁷⁰ Such a state of affairs had never arisen under the leadership of the Paduka Raja or the Bendahara. Perhaps the new Johor government's inattention to trade, which occasioned Governor Govert van Hoorn's contemptuous remark on the lack of activity in Johor's port, freed the the Orang Laut from their duties to participate in piratical activities for their own personal gain. The Dutch recognized the difference in this unsystematic piracy and that of the previous years by making a distinction between the pirates and Johor's subjects. In their instructions to their cruisers they ordered the Dutch commanders to destroy all pirate ships, while seeing to it that no Johorese ships or people were abused.⁷¹ Once Sultan Mahmud of Johor was reminded by the Dutch of the activities of the Orang Laut, he acted immediately and made them cease their preying on trading ships. The Dutch noticed

a considerable drop in the piracies in the waters off Malacca after the mission to Johor,⁷² thus justifying their belief in maintaining the friendship with Johor to control Orang Laut activities in the Straits of Malacca.

In October 1699 a Moor recently arrived from Johor told the Dutch at Malacca that Sultan Mahmud had been murdered with the complicity of most of the Orang Kaya in Johor. The main reasons given by the Johorese for the assassination of the ruler were his unbearable tyranny, his growing numbers of arbitrary murders, and his outrageous behaviour toward the wives of the Orang Kaya. His practice of forcing the wives of the Orang Kaya to come to him and then mistreating them horribly finally provoked one of the Orang Kaya to commit *derhaka*. With the assistance of thirty to forty armed men and the acquiescence of the other Orang Kaya, this person attacked Sultan Mahmud one morning when he was riding through the market on the shoulders of his servant. Sultan Mahmud offered little resistance and fell to the ground after being stabbed by this Orang Kaya. He was then descended upon by the other men who stabbed the sultan to death. The corpse was dragged naked to the front of the Bendahara's *balai* where the body lay exposed until the afternoon. After the Bendahara had been proclaimed ruler with the consent of the assembled populace, he ordered that Sultan Mahmud's naked corpse be draped with eight ells⁷³ of linen and taken away. The body was then perfunctorily buried with little ceremony.⁷⁴ The Bendahara was proclaimed Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah on 3 September 1699.⁷⁵

The Malay histories substantiate the above Dutch contemporary reports and give an interesting insight into the character of Sultan Mahmud and the turmoil which his actions caused in the kingdom. According to the *Siak Chronicles*, which contains the most descriptive account of this episode among all the Malay histories, Sultan Mahmud had an aversion for women because he was already married to a fairy wife who disliked any rivals. One day the pregnant wife of Megat Sri Rama, one of the Orang Kaya in Johor, was passing by the palace when she spied a jackfruit (*nangka*) within the palace grounds. She began to have an irresistible craving for jackfruit and thus pleaded with the palace guard for a section of it. The guard told her that it was being saved to be served to the sultan when he awoke from his midday nap. When she persisted, the guard finally relented and gave her a piece of the jackfruit. Soon the sultan awoke,

refreshed himself, and asked for the jackfruit. The guard dutifully brought it, but the sultan noticed that a section was missing. He demanded to know what had happened to that piece, and so the guard told him. The sultan laughed and had the pregnant wife of Megat Sri Rama summoned. When she was brought before him, he had her stomach cut open so he could see the child sucking the jackfruit in her womb.

When news of this atrocity reached Megat Sri Rama, he called together his family and decided to commit *derhaka*.⁷⁶ Before embarking on this very serious undertaking, he went to the Bendahara to tell him of his wife's murder and of his plans to take vengeance on the sultan. He then boldly suggested to the Bendahara that this was the time to take action if he wanted to become ruler. The Bendahara thought it best to consult the Temenggong and the Sri Bija di Raja before making a decision, and so the Megat Sri Rama departed. The Bendahara then summoned his brother, the Temenggong, and related what had been said between him and the Megat Sri Rama. After they had discussed the matter at length, they agreed that they were being ruled by a madman.⁷⁷ No one in the country could tolerate the excesses of Sultan Mahmud any longer; thus both the Bendahara and the Temenggong decided to take part in Megat Sri Rama's plot. The Temenggong demanded that should his brother the Bendahara become sultan, he should be made the Yam-tuan Muda and not the Bendahara.

The Bendahara spoke with the Orang Kaya of the kingdom and invited them to join in the plot. Everyone of them voiced his willingness to participate in this undertaking except one, the Sri Bija Wangsa. Since he was an 'incomparable *hulubalang*'⁷⁸ in the Kingdom of Johor, the Bendahara realized that his opposition could mean the failure of the plot. When they tried to convince him to join them, he angrily replied that he would not commit *derhaka*. If the sultan wanted to kill him, he would submit because there was no custom of a subject committing *derhaka* against his lord. He said that if his time had come to die, he was ready to give up his life, but the two brothers, the Bendahara and the Temenggong, would be repaid in kind by Allah for the murder they commit.

Through a subterfuge the plotters succeeded in making the Sri Bija Wangsa's arrest appear to have been initiated by Sultan Mahmud. When the Sri Bija Wangsa was taken to be krissed, he

managed to get hold of the kris and told the assembled Orang Kaya that there was no custom of subjects committing *derhaka* against their lord and that the contract between the people and their lord could not be retracted. He then allowed himself to be krisssed.⁷⁹

With the major obstacle out of the way, the Bendahara and the Megat Sri Rama decided to carry out their plans that Friday when the sultan went to say his prayers. The sultan was riding on the shoulders of one of his retainers and had just reached the lich-gate leading to the mosque when he was attacked and stabbed by Megat Sri Rama. The sultan did not die immediately but managed to stumble back to the palace and inform a *khatib* and an *imam*⁸⁰ of the committing of *derhaka*. Only after his story had been recorded by these people did he die from his wounds.⁸¹

An interesting element mentioned in the *Siak Chronicles* of the murder was the strong opposition of an 'incomparable *hulubalang*' with the title of Sri Bija Wangsa. Since the plotters could not convince him to commit *derhaka*, they decided to have him krisssed. They recognized that he was an important figure within the kingdom whose opposition could be fatal. The title itself does not appear among those used by the Kingdom of Malacca in the Raffles MS 18 Recension of the *Sejarah Melayu*. It could therefore have been either a minor title or one which was of recent origin. The name reappears in 1718 in a very intriguing fashion. During the Minangkabau invasion of Johor under Raja Kecil in 1718, the Johor fleets under the command of the Sri Bija Wangsa deserted to the enemy. He was not the Laksamana but another naval official with as much, if not more, influence on the fleets of Johor which consisted mainly of the Orang Laut. In the naval expeditions sent out against the Buginese in Linggi between 1713 and 1715, the Sri Bija Wangsa was always one of the principal commanders along with the Laksamana. It appears that the title of Sri Bija Wangsa may have been awarded to an Orang Kaya whose principal tasks were organizing and commanding the Orang Laut fleets in battle. The office could have been given to a Malay or to a prominent leader of the Orang Laut. His opposition to the plotters in 1699 would have meant the opposition of the Orang Laut who were an important force in the Johor kingdom. The removal of the Sri Bija Wangsa would thus have been a shrewd and well-calculated move by the plotters. When the sultan was murdered, there was first the report that all the Orang Kaya and the people had welcomed this regicide and had gladly chosen the

Bendahara as their ruler. However, a Dutch ship returning from Johor brought news of great division and jealousy among the Orang Kaya over this deed.⁸² The Orang Laut were so enraged that they not only refused to recognize the new ruler but also threatened to take a fearful vengeance on the Johorese for the murder of their rightful lord.⁸³ But the death of their leader, the Sri Bija Wangsa, may have forestalled any immediate retaliation which could have been fatal to the new regime.

Bengkalis and all the Johor dependencies in the area were stunned by the regicide, and soon reports arrived in Malacca of a plan to avenge the murder of Sultan Mahmud. All Orang Laut who refused to accept the newly-crowned sultan of the Bendahara family were said to be forming a force to invade Johor. The Orang Laut openly announced that they would prefer to place themselves under the ruler of Palembang rather than give allegiance to a usurper. This course of action was contemplated 'because there were no descendants of the old royal blood of the Yang Dipertuan [ruler of Johor] left; thus there could no longer be any King of Johor'.⁸⁴ In this statement the Orang Laut expressed the sense of frustration, bewilderment, and despair shared by many of the Malay subjects of Johor. The enormity of the crime of regicide was compounded by the knowledge that this involved not merely one life, but an ancient dynastic line. By breaking the link in the chain of rulers which tradition traced back to Palembang in some very early past, the subjects of Johor understood that they would now be deprived, and perhaps become victims, of the powers of its *daulat*.

For the Orang Laut, especially, the death of Sultan Mahmud ended an intimate lord-retainer relationship with the Malacca (— Palembang?) dynastic house which was remembered in tradition. While the Orang Laut had fulfilled such important functions as rowers and fighting men in the ruler's navy and gatherers of sea-products for the important China trade, the rulers had provided the Orang Laut with a unity of purpose and a vital role in the kingdom. With the death of the last recognized direct male member of the Malacca ruling house, the Orang Laut were cast adrift and were faced with the prospects of a nomadic sea-life away from a Malay cultural centre. Although their initial reaction to the regicide was shock and thoughts of revenge, they soon had to recognize the alternatives open to them of either rejecting their role in a Malay kingdom and going their own way, or of being reconciled with a

new family as a means of maintaining their accustomed position in Malay society. After a year many of them seem to have drifted back to Johor and offered their allegiance to the new ruling family in the absence of any who claimed the throne of Johor as a direct male descendant of the Malacca family.

The ruler of Palembang was greatly disturbed by the brazen murder of Sultan Mahmud and intended to send a force to Johor to discover why such an audacious act had been committed.⁸⁵ A few months later the ruler of Perak sent envoys with letters to inform the Dutch in Malacca of the horrible murder in Johor and of his intention to revenge this deed. To accomplish this aim, he requested military assistance from the Dutch, or at least gunpowder and guns.⁸⁶ Other Malay rulers may have found the deed as heinous since their traditions preached the qualities of loyalty on the part of the subjects. There was also a very practical reason for the condemnation of the regicide by the rulers: it created a precedent within their own borders. Although regicide was not unknown in the pages of Malay history, such deeds were usually done with circumspection and with always the possibility of accident or natural causes being the factor behind the death. Through traditional stories and beliefs and the study of *bahasa* (which involved the learning of proper, courteous behaviour and language both with one's elders (*tertib*), as well as with one's peer group (*adab*)), the Orang Kaya and the common man were imbued with the idea of the ruler as a Divine Man whose alleged right it was 'to slay at pleasure, without being guilty of a crime'.⁸⁷ From documents such as the *Sejarah Melayu*, the Johorese would have been taught that a compact had been made between their ancestors and their first ruler in which the Malays agreed never to be disloyal even if their rulers 'oppress them and behave evilly'.⁸⁸

The overt act of regicide in 1699 with the participation of the Orang Kaya meant not only the death of a ruler, but the demise of a set of values which had been maintained with regard to the sacredness of the ruler, the depth and extent of loyalty which should be accorded him, and the special nature of his position within the society. If the ruler were no longer 'the sacred lodestone' around which the community evolved and gained its meaning and purpose, he was then just a *primus inter pares* secure in his position only with the mutual consent of the society and not by some supernatural force. Thus the relationship was valid as long as there was a recogni-

tion of the benefits accruing to the parties involved. In this state of affairs the position of the ruler in the Kingdom of Johor became a precarious one dependent upon apparent and visible manifestations of power and on close, personal ties with powerful individuals, rather than the intangible, sacred force of kingship. Yet it never appears that the new Bendahara dynasty recognized these monumental changes in the concept of power, and it continued to conduct itself as in the past until forced to submit to the realities of the power structure in the kingdom in 1722.

So sudden and violent was the assassination that the kingdom was left stunned, frightened of imminent retribution from the sacred force of kingship (*timpa daulat*), and uncertain of the proper course of action in these highly unusual and unprecedented times. The kingdom never completely recovered from the shock, nor from the spiritual upheaval which beset the kingdom in 1699. Throughout the following decades of the new Bendahara dynasty, revolts arose in outlying territories and divisions appeared within the centre of the kingdom itself as the Malays attempted to adjust to an entirely new dynasty without the prestigious and supernatural origins of the former dynasty but with the blood of the former rulers yet hanging over their heads. The Bendahara dynasty had taken a bold step, and the Malay world now watched and waited.

1. KA 1341, OB 1689, Dag-Register of Malacca, under date 10 July 1688, fols. 1594-5.

2. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Thomas Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 26 July 1688, fol. 395r.

3. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 10 Jan. 1689, fols. 435v.

4. In the Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu* Sultan Mahmud Syah appreciated the difference between Bentan and the mainland of Johor. When urged by a faithful servant to abandon Bentan to escape from the Portuguese, Sultan Mahmud answers: 'When I came here, Sri Nara 'diraja, I knew full well that Bentan was an island; and it was because I was determined that there should be no retreating that I took my abode here! If I had thought of retreating, I should have done better to stay on the mainland.' C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu or the Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952), p. 189.

5. KA 1341, OB 1689, Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 26 July 1688, fol. 389v.

6. KA 1348, OB 1690, Missive from Gov. Slicher to Batavia, 8 Jan. 1689, 81v.

7. KA 1341, OB 1689, Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 18 Sept. 1688, fol. 403r.

8. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 10 Jan. 1689, fol. 435r.
9. Ibid. Letter from Bookkeeper Salomon Emaus to Malacca, 28 Dec. 1688, fols. 439r-v.
10. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 6 Nov. 1688, fol. 414r.
11. KA 1348, OB 1690, Letter of Gov. Slicher of Malacca to the Bendahara of Johor, 7 March 1689, fols. 118r-123r.
12. KA 1351, OB 1690, Report of Francois van der Beke and Joannes Bonket on Their Mission to Johor, 15 April 1689, fols. 227r-243r.
13. The Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil's aunt was the mother of Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah of Johor (1623-1677). See *Dagh-Register* 1640-41: 11 Dec. 1640, p. 123. According to the Portuguese, she exercised great authority within the Kingdom of Johor. See C. R. Boxer, 'The Achinese Attack on Malacca in 1629, as described in Contemporary Portuguese Sources', in J. Bastin and R. Roolvink (eds.), *Malayan and Indonesian Studies* (Oxford, 1964), p. 118. She remained in Patani when her son returned to Johor in 1641, and was killed by the Patanese during a *coup d'état* in 1645. See *Dagh-Register* 1644-45: July-Aug. 1645, p. 86. However, close relations between the Paduka Raja's family (the Laksamana family) and Patani may have been maintained after the coup since a reconciliation between Johor and Patani followed shortly thereafter.
14. KA 1351, OB 1690, Report of van der Beke and Bonket on Their Mission to Johor, 15 April 1689, fols. 234r-v.
15. Ibid. Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, 28 April 1689, fols. 249v-250r.
16. KA 1374, OB 1691, *Dagh-Register* of Malacca, under date 31 Jan. 1690, fol. 229.
17. Ibid. under date 21 Nov. 1689, fol. 140.
18. Ibid. under date 29 Nov. 1689, fol. 150.
19. Ibid. under date 5 Dec. 1689, Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, fol. 159.
20. Ibid. under date 20 Dec. 1689, Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, fols. 170-1.
21. Ibid. under date 21 April 1690, fols. 303-4.
22. KA 1375, OB 1691, Letter from Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, August, 1690, fol. 351r.
23. KA 1374, OB 1691, *Dagh-Register* of Malacca, under date 11 May 1690, fol. 315.
24. KA 1375, OB 1691, Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1690, fol. 321r.
25. Ibid. Report of Laurens Thomas on the Situation in Siak, 6 Sept. 1690, fols. 326r-v.
26. Baftas, from the Persian bafta, which means woven. It is a fine cotton cloth the best of which comes from Broach in Gujerat.
27. Guinees, also called cambaijen or negroskleeden, were checkered cotton material important for the purchase in Africa of slaves for the West Indies trade and the African trade.
28. KA 1388, OB 1692, Report of the Provisional Resident Jan Heij on the Situation in Indragiri, 14 Dec. 1690, fols. 346r-v.
29. Ibid. fol. 346v.
30. KA 1375, OB 1691, Missive from Gov. Slicher of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Jan. 1691, fols. 362v-363r.

31. KA 1388, OB 1692, Letter from Sultan Mahmud of Johor to Malacca, received 13 April 1691, fols. 353v-355r.
32. Ibid. Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, received 13 April 1691, fols. 353v-355r.
33. KA 1404, OB 1693, Missive from Gov. Dirk Comans of Malacca to Batavia, 4 May 1692, fol. 557v.
34. KA 1407, OB 1693, Missive from Gov. Dirk Comans of Malacca to Batavia, 4 May 1692, fol. 557v.
35. KA 1404, OB 1693, Dagb-Register of Malacca, under date 21 Feb. 1692, fol. 1046.
36. KA 1407, OB 1693, Memorie van Overgave of Gov. Comans to Gelmar, Vosburgh of Malacca, 22 Oct. 1692, fols. 694v-706r.
37. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Jan. 1693, fols. 773r-v.
38. KA 1426, OB 1694, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 1 April 1693, fols. 168v-169r.
39. Ibid. fols. 168v-169r.
40. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 20 April 1693, fol. 179v.
41. Ibid. Instructions from Malacca to the Resident of Siak, Joannes Weijts 20 May 1673, fol. 201.
42. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 1 May 1693, fol. 185r.
43. This Laksamana formerly held the title of Sri Pikrama Raja and was appointed Laksamana by the Bendahara Sri Maharaja and the Council of the Orang Kaya shortly after the *coup* in 1688. Neither the Dutch nor the Malay records give us any clue as to his personal name or his origin, but the Bendahara would unlikely have chosen a member of the old Laksamana family, his arch-enemy in Johor. KA 1341, OB 1689, Dagb-Register of Malacca, under date 30 June 1688, fol. 1579.
44. KA 1426, OB 1694, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 15 Sept. 1693, fols. 238r-v.
45. KA 1445, OB 1695, Dagb-Register of Malacca, under date 20 Sept. 1693, fol. 226.
46. Ibid. under date 30 April 1694, fol. 321.
47. KA 1447, OB 1695, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 15 July 1694, fol. 333v.
48. KA 1426, OB 1694, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1693, fol. 246v.
49. KA 1456, OB 1695, Dagb-Register of Malacca, Letter from the Bendahara of Johor, under date 24 Nov. 1694, fols. 242-3, 245; KA 1459, OB 1696, Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, 14 Dec. 1694, fol. 31.
50. KA 1459, OB 1696, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1695, fol. 61.
51. KA 1447, OB 1695, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 15 July 1694, fol. 335r.
52. KA 1459, OB 1696, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 4 March 1694, fols. 90-1.
53. Ibid. fols. 90-2.
54. Ibid. fol. 93.
55. KA 1470, OB 1697, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia. 24 March 1696, fols. 65-6.

56. The Danish East India Company was granted a charter by King Christian IV in 1612. In 1616 it sent vessels to the East Indies and established a strong settlement at Tranquebare, located about fifteen miles to the north of Negapatam. The Danish trade was profitable to private persons, especially to the Governor of Tranquebare. Since it seldom received supplies from Denmark and rarely sent home ships with products, the Company was self-sufficient, carrying on trade with the different parts of Asia. See John Harris, 'The History of the Danish Commerce to the East Indies', in John Harris, *Collection of Voyages and Travels*, vol. 1 (London, 1744), pp. 976-7.

57. KA 1470, OB 1697, Missive from Gov. Vosburgh of Malacca to Batavia, 24 March 1696, fols. 66-7.

58. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Singapore, 1965), p. 10; in the Jawi edition edited by R. O. Winstedt in *JMBRAS*, X, ii (Jan. 1932), p. 8, lines 13-15.

59. KA 1470, OB 1697, Letter from Sultan Mahmud Syah of Johor to Malacca, received 17 Jan. 1696, fol. 54.

60. Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1727), p. 51.

61. KA 1515, OB 1700, Missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia, 28 May 1699, fols. 34-6.

62. Ibid. Report by Willem van der Lely and Daniel Rhysdyck on Their Mission to Johor, 5 April 1699, fol. 69.

63. *Sejarah Melayu* (i.e. *Siak Chronicles*), Cod. Or. 7304, in the University of Leiden Library, p. 404, lines 3-5. This story is repeated in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 33.

64. KA 1499, OB 1699, Letter from the Syahbandar of Malacca van der Lely to the Bendahara of Johor, 26 April 1698, fols. 92-3.

65. KA 1515, OB 1700, Report by van der Lely and Rhysdyck on Their Mission to Johor, 5 April 1699, fols. 63-9.

66. Nothing else is known about this Syahbandar from either Dutch or Malay records.

67. KA 1515, OB 1700, Report of van der Lely ..., 5 April 1699, fols. 34-6.

68. KA 1540, OB 1702, Memorie van Overgave from Gov. Govert van Hoorn to Bernard Phoonsen, 23 Nov. 1700, fol. 12.

69. KA 1515, OB 1700, Report of van der Lely ..., 5 April 1699, fols. 34-6.

70. KA 1499, OB 1699, Missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia, 6 Sept. 1698, fols. 100-2.

71. Ibid. Instructions to Heads of Dutch Cruisers, 23 Sept. 1698, fols. 110-11.

72. KA 1515, OB 1700, Report of van der Lely ..., 5 April 1699, fol. 36.

73. An old Dutch or Flemish ell was about twenty-seven inches. Thus eight ells would have been about eighteen feet or six yards.

74. KA 1515, OB 1700, Missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Oct. 1699, fols. 126-7.

75. Pada Hijrah 1111 tahun, pada Tahun Wau, pada delapan haribulan Rabi'ul-awal. *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis* (Johore Bahru, 1956), p. 13, lines 3-4.

76. According to a manuscript entitled *Hikayat Johor serta Pahang*, which was completed sometime after 1917, Megat Sri Rama had been sent by Sultan Mahmud to attack Linggi. He was told of his wife's death after his return from Linggi. *Hikayat Johor serta Pahang*, manuscript in the Johor State Archives, p. 1.

77. According to Malay *adat*, a ruler could be removed from office through consultation and agreement [*muafakat*] of the Orang Kaya, if he were mad or forsook his religion. The Bendahara and the Temenggong went through a conscious process of coming to a decision that the sultan was mad and then seeking agreement from the Orang Kaya. The consultation with the Orang Kaya

was essential and also in accordance with *adat*. 'On Adat of Malay Ruler', (in Malay), Cod. 1999, University of Leiden Library, p. 10.

78. A *hulubalang* is a title of a military leader.

79. 'In this form of execution, the victim had to squat down while the executioner stood over him and drove a long straight-bladed rapier-like kris (*keris penyalang*, *keris panjang*, *keris bahari*) from a certain spot (*tempat penyalang*) within his collarbone down far into his heart.' R. J. Wilkinson, *Malay-English Dictionary*, vol. 2 (L-Z), p. 1005.

80. A *khatib* is a Muslim lay preacher, and an *imam* is a presiding Muslim elder and leader of a congregation who leads the prayers at a Friday service. Together these two individuals have come to represent the 'clergy'.

81. *Siak Chronicles*, op. cit. pp. 403, line 1, to 409, line 14.

82. KA 1515, OB 1700, Missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1699, fol. 12.

83. Ibid. fol. 12.

84. Ibid. fols. 12-13. It is interesting that the Orang Laut believed firmly that the ruling house of Palembang was the logical successor to that of Malacca-Johor. This seems to indicate an acquaintance with the traditions of the *Sejarah Melayu* or of old legends concerning the origins of the kings of Malacca-Johor. In this regard O. W. Wolter's reconstruction of the period of the flight of the Palembang ruler, Paramesvara, to Malacca is especially interesting. See O. W. Wolters, *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (Ithaca, 1970).

85. KA 1515, OB 1700, Missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1699, fol. 13.

86. KA 1530, OB 1701, Missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia, 14 April 1700, fol. 42.

87. W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic* (London, 1965), p. 23.

88. Brown, op. cit. p. 26.

VIII

TRIALS OF A NEW DYNASTY

THE beginning of the eighteenth century saw striking changes in both the VOC and the Kingdom of Johor. Asian spices had been the principal motivating factor of the VOC, and they continued to be a steady and important source of profit. In the middle of the seventeenth century pepper became dominant among VOC products, but it relinquished its position to textiles by the end of the century. In the beginning of the next century, however, both tea and coffee began to make a small inroad in the total sales of the VOC in Europe, and by 1738-40 accounted for 24.92 per cent of total VOC sales in Amsterdam, second only to textiles with 28.27 per cent of the sales.¹ Both coffee and tea drinking had come into fashion in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century, and the VOC was quick to see the possibilities of supplying this market. Coffee and tea, and later other cash crops, were cultivated signalling a new direction in VOC economic policy away from total concentration on the carrying trade and monopoly of certain fixed products in Asia.

These new VOC efforts toward cultivation of cash crops were probably encouraged as a result of a sober assessment of the true strength of the naval forces of the VOC in Asia and the increasing difficulty of continuing to maintain their monopoly efforts. The sad state of the United Provinces of The Netherlands after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession on 11 April 1713 was another factor in the VOC's examination of their position in Asia. With its navy neglected, army weakened by the exhausting wars, and the treasury empty, The Netherlands abandoned its position as an important European power.² A serious blow was dealt to Dutch

commerce with southern Europe, Spanish America, Spain, France, Italy, and the Levant. Even the commerce of the northern regions was now being encroached upon by the Danes and those from Bremen and Hamburg. No longer could The Netherlands maintain its virtual monopoly of the carrying trade, as commercial companies sprang up like mushrooms and England and France became important commercial states.³ Batavia could no longer expect naval and financial support from a homeland which by 1715 had lost its naval superiority and had thereby placed its entire prosperity based on the carrying trade and the fisheries in a highly vulnerable position. The lack of ships and the increased competition from the English made the government of Batavia more conscious of the new difficulties in maintaining its carrying trade and direct trade in Asia. There arose a new development in the affairs of the VOC in the Indonesian Archipelago. On 5 October 1705 the VOC signed a treaty with the Susuhunan of Mataram which made the VOC virtual master over the entire island of Java.⁴

All of these consideration in the first decades of the eighteenth century encouraged Batavia to seek a new and profitable source of revenue in cash crops. When the Heeren XVII ordered Governor-General Johan van Hoorn to encourage the planting of coffee, the latter was able to distribute coffee bushes to princes in the Preanger, to chiefs in the Jakatra and Ceribon highlands and in the districts of Semarang and Kartasura.⁵ The VOC had now become a territorial power with vital economic interests to protect on the island of Java. This new VOC economic venture in the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago confirmed Batavia's established policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Johor and made it even more opposed to any suggestions by Malacca in the eighteenth century to undertake war with any native kingdom in the defence of trade.

Batavia never considered Johor a serious economic threat in the early decades of the eighteenth century. Moreover, it recognized the value of maintaining the friendship with this Malay kingdom which occupied such a strategic position within the Straits of Malacca. Any military action against this kingdom encouraged by Malacca had been adjudged unnecessary and ill-advised by Batavia. The Kingdom of Johor had been in general on friendly terms with the Dutch since the beginning of the seventeenth century, and there was little real cause for military action against it. The VOC also believed from past experience that, even if it destroyed Johor, the

ruler could escape to any of a number of places within his widely-spread kingdom and direct his Orang Laut to prey on Dutch shipping as a revenge.

At the turn of the century, however, the new Bendahara dynasty in Johor had only a semblance of control over the Orang Laut and could no longer depend upon the total loyalty of this traditional source of royal power. The ties which had bound the Malacca royal family to these faithful subjects had been brutally severed in 1699 in the murder of Sultan Mahmud, the last of the dynastic line. Lacking the prestige and reverence which had characterized the previous dynasty because of its acknowledged supernatural origins, the Bendahara dynasty could not invoke its past to arouse loyalty from its subjects. The Orang Kaya themselves were divided over the legitimacy of the new Bendahara family. Their dissatisfaction may have stemmed from the crude manner in which Sultan Mahmud was murdered and his dead body handled, or from a feeling of jealousy that someone among them, with no particularly special qualities, was now occupying the greatly exalted position of Sultan of Johor.

The precarious political situation in Johor caused by the mutual hatred and jealousies within the kingdom, as well as by the threats from the Orang Laut and neighbouring Malay kingdoms, hindered trade in its ports during the first year after the *coup* of 1699. European ships were no longer going to Johor, and the Danes from Tranquebare were now going to Malacca to trade. The Danes claimed that they were poorly paid in Johor and were tired of the 'murderous nature' of the people there. There were no longer foreign traders except for some Chinese junks and Javanese boats with rice and other provisions. Most of the tin from Selangor, Kelang, Deli, Pulau Lada, Pulau Langkawi, Patapahan, Muar, and Rembau was now going to Malacca instead of Johor.⁶ The new ruler of Johor, Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah, was so occupied with the numerous problems besetting his kingdom that he did not announce his accession to the throne of Johor to the Dutch until 13 December 1700, more than a year after the murder of Sultan Mahmud Syah. He sent the Laksamana to Malacca as head of an embassy, which consisted of three other Orang Kaya plus some 325 other people. The Laksamana delivered the new ruler's letters and reaffirmed the old friendship and alliance between the Dutch and Johor.⁷

Although the outgoing Governor Govert van Hoorn of Malacca had remarked scornfully in November 1700 that he could not understand why the two previous governors had complained about the trade in Johor, the new Governor Bernard Phoonsen began to bemoan Johor's recovery. Van Hoorn's term of office had been blessed first by the escapades of Sultan Mahmud and the weak leadership of the Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil (1697-1699), and later by the turmoil which followed the murder of Sultan Mahmud. By January 1701, however, Johor's trade was beginning to reflect the restored stability of the kingdom. The number of Chinese junks going to Johor was again up to ten or eleven a year, and the tin traders were once again frequenting the port of Johor to trade with the Chinese junks. Traders from Kabon, Selangor, Kedah, and Perak announced their intention of not exchanging their wares with the Dutch since they could obtain better prices in Johor from the Chinese traders and with that money buy the Indian cloth also available there.⁸

The Dutch decided that the time had come to send another mission to Johor to renew the friendship with the new Sultan and to see what changes had been brought about. On 6 October 1701 the Syahbandar of Malacca Willem van der Lely and the Ensign Victor Victorszoon arrived in Johor as envoys. They met the Sultan Abdul Jalil and the Laksamana in Pancor on the Johor River and then sailed upstream to the capital city.⁹ Since the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum was still in Bentan, boats were sent to fetch him in order that a proper reception could be accorded the mission from Malacca. The Laksamana clearly resented the fact that everyone had to wait around fruitlessly while the Bendahara was being called. On a visit on board the Dutch ship, he complained about this and said aloud to the Syahbandar van der Lely that the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum was very likely trying to avoid meeting the Dutch. In his former capacity as Temenggong, the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum and the former Johor Syahbandar had promised to pay the Malacca trader Sedelebe 5,000 rijksdaalders or ten catties of gold for the damage done to his sloop when it was attacked in the Johor River. It was the Laksamana's contention that the Bendahara was trying to stay away to avoid payment for damages. Finally after two letters had been sent by the sultan to ask him to hasten his departure from Bentan, the Bendahara arrived on 25 October with a grab and two large kakaps.¹⁰

Official formalities now began with the Dutch envoys offering their congratulations and best wishes on the sultan's accession to the throne and on his brother's assumption of the important position of Bendahara. The Bendahara apologized to the envoys for not having visited Malacca earlier, but his services had been required at home because of the 'sickness of his people in Johor'.¹¹ In reply to various questions posed by the envoys, the Bendahara reported that about two months ago he had sent some perahus, grabs, and kakaps to the mouth of the Indragiri River, Bengkalis, Malacca, Selangor, Perak, Rokan, and Panai to destroy the pirate nests there and to make the waters in the area safe. He had also warned Johor's dependencies not to give aid or refuge to these pirates.¹²

In so far as the Buginese were concerned, he estimated that there were about 600 of them, excluding women and children, who were now living in Linggi without the consent of Johor. Because they had robbed and murdered two Minangkabau traders in Selangor, the sultan intended to drive them out. The Dutch envoys were skeptical of the success of any such undertaking and wondered whether the Bendahara or Sultan Abdul Jalil would one day be forced to come and ask Dutch assistance. Sultan Abdul Jalil added that the Buginese had gone from Selangor to Linggi without his permission. Although the representatives of the sultan depicted the Buginese in the worst possible light, the Bendahara (speaking for the Sultan Abdul Jalil) said that he would send some men there shortly to investigate the type of people they were before deciding whether to allow them to settle there or chase them away.¹³

The envoys brought up the subject of the former Syahbandar of Johor's promise to pay a sum of 5,000 rijksdaalders or ten catties gold to Sedelebe, but the Bendahara (again speaking for the sultan) said that he and the sultan knew nothing of such arrangements. Nevertheless, the sultan called his Orang Kaya together and brought up this matter with them.¹⁴

The Dutch envoys became quickly aware that the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum frequently answered questions directed to the sultan and even expressed an independence of mind contradictory to the sultan's own remarks. The sultan assured the Dutch that he wanted to drive out the murderous Buginese, but the Bendahara contradicted the sultan in his very presence and asserted that he would investigate the Buginese first before deciding whether to allow them to settle in Johor's lands. In 1699 the Dutch envoys

had observed that the old Bendahara, now entitled Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah, was an 'old and stately man with a well-regulated life [who] did not interfere whatsoever in the habits and the strange humour of the king [Sultan Mahmud Shah]'. When he became ruler his unassertiveness mattered less since it was the symbolic position of ruler which was important and not the dynamism of the individual. The actual management of the government was properly left in the hands of his more ambitious brothers the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum, who was principal minister between 1699 and 1708, and the Raja Muda Tun Mahmud, who became the leading minister in Johor between 1708 and 1718.

On 2 November 1701 the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum summoned the envoys to tell them that within two or three days he would be returning to Banten where he hoped to complete work on the grabs. He hoped to have them ready within a month so they could be sent to Linggi and then to Malacca to inform the Dutch of the situation with the Buginese.¹⁵ The large numbers of Buginese in Selangor and Linggi worried the Dutch who still harboured memories of the bitter struggles which they had had in Celebes and Java with these belligerent people. Their activities in Jambi, Palembang, and elsewhere in the waters of the Malay world demonstrated the menace they could pose to the relatively weak kingdoms in the area. In the letters brought by the envoys was an urgent plea to Johor to do everything possible to rid its territories of all Buginese.¹⁶ Bendahara Tun Mas Anum had to assure the Dutch that he was doing all he could to reach a state of preparedness in order to take action against the Buginese.¹⁷ Even the Syahbandar of Malacca felt obliged to communicate with the Bendahara and reiterate that the Buginese in Linggi were completely untrustworthy and needed to be punished.¹⁸

Despite Johor's statements to the Dutch, it followed a policy with the Buginese which savoured more of the traditional manner of dealing with all immigrants within its lands. In October 1702 one of the heads of the Buginese in Linggi, a certain Punggawa toMingo, arrived in Malacca and told the Dutch of his recent visit to Johor. He and another Buginese called toCampo had been summoned to Johor by the Sultan Abdul Jalil and been given permission to return to Selangor and develop it. There had been a quarrel between these two Buginese leaders prior to their visits to Johor. According to toMingo, it was he who was summoned to

appear in Johor, but since to Campo was afraid of being excluded in any agreement reached between the ruler and the Buginese, he too went to Johor a few days later.¹⁹ In November 1702 the Bendahara confirmed the report of Sultan Abdul Jalil's decision to allow the Buginese to return to Selangor from Linggi.²⁰ A small group of Buginese remained for a short time in Linggi under a certain Dato Janggut but later moved back to Selangor.²¹ The Bendahara's letter also contained a brief but revealing note that Sultan Abdul Jalil was sending six ships to Kelang and Selangor to rebuild these places *after the disturbances*.²² There had been considerable unrest in the first few years of the new dynasty, and this was a further indication of the deep opposition encountered by the new ruler in almost every major outlying area within his kingdom. Only in late 1702 was the situation sufficiently quiet to warrant a concerted effort to rebuild the areas in Kelang and Selangor.

The Buginese were given permission to settle peacefully in Johor's lands in 1702 and soon began appearing in Malacca with *cap* indicating that they were in the service of the sultan, the Bendahara, and various other important Johor Orang Kaya.²³ Many of these Buginese and Macassarese found the arrangement with the Kingdom of Johor highly satisfactory because it closely approximated the type of situation which they had earlier known in south-west Celebes before the arrival of the Dutch. As in their homeland these groups could govern themselves in their own territory under their own leaders with little interference from their overlord. The ruler and the Orang Kaya of the kingdom provided the necessary documents and sanctions for trade which could be carried on profitably at the principal port of Johor or in Malacca. The court and the port of Johor thus fulfilled the same functions for these immigrant Buginese-Macassarese that the courts of Goa and Bone at the port of Macassar had fulfilled in their homeland. As long as these conditions continued to exist, both parties were content to maintain this ideal arrangement.

With the improvement of the situation in Selangor and Linggi, the Bendahara turned now to the problem of the rebellious leaders of the Orang Laut. The Orang Laut did not carry out their threat to wreak a fearful vengeance on the murderers of Sultan Mahmud, but they preyed on all ships going to and from Johor. Yet there were groups of Orang Laut who were dissatisfied with their uncertain future outside the fold of the Kingdom of Johor. When the Ben-

dahara appealed to all Orang Laut to seek pardon from the ruler of Johor and reaffirm their loyalty to him, three leaders of the Orang Laut from Pakakas at Kuala Kampar, called Panglima Ussi, Panglima Jamal, and Panglima Kota, led their people to Johor to reach a reconciliation with the new dynasty. When they arrived in Johor, the three leaders were killed and their wives, children, slaves, guns, and everything they had brought along with them, were seized.²⁴ This treachery further alienated the Orang Laut and made them even more distrustful of the new Johor ruler.

In the trading sphere the Bendahara attempted to frighten all economic competitors and to encourage trade to come to Johor, very much in the style of the former Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil and the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid. A burger from Malacca told Governor Bernard Phoonsen in January 1704 of various instances where the Bendahara's policy was being put into effect. Two Palembang ships which traded pepper at Malacca and a ship from Rokan were attacked and overpowered by Johorese on their way home. When a Dutch ship refused to be boarded by Johorese, the Bendahara wrote an angry note to the Dutch in Malacca telling them that they should have complied. He also complained to an inhabitant of Malacca that some of the Dutch had overpowered, robbed, and burned Johor's ships and murdered its people. He claimed that if he wanted to attack Malacca, he could very well do so since he had the strength and the manpower to do this.²⁵ Annoyed by the fact that Dutch sloops had harassed Johor's ships, he wrote immediately to Malacca and demanded that all such belligerent acts be stopped.²⁶

The efforts of Bendahara Tun Mas Anum to promote the trade in Johor proved successful. By 1704 Palembang pepper was now being diverted to Johor instead of Malacca, while Chinese traders once again played a role in stimulating the tin trade in Johor by paying a much higher price per bahar than the Dutch in Malacca. Since Malacca had only a few vessels at its command, it could not prevent the native ships from frequenting Johor's port and taking advantage of the attractive market there. Another practice of the Bendahara's, which had been rewardingly applied by his predecessors, was the policy of granting letters to several select traders and thus guaranteeing them the privileges accorded a chief minister of Johor by the Dutch.²⁷ It was a lucrative practice which was duplicated many times over by the sultan, the other chief ministers,

and the Orang Kaya, all of whom were given special dispensations by the Dutch on tolls and quantities of particular goods which could be traded.²⁸ In December 1705 a special commissioner from Batavia was sent to Malacca to analyse the latter's steadily worsening trade balance. He singled out Johor's prosperous international trade as the most important contributory factor toward Malacca's decline: (my paraphrasing)

Since Malacca introduced in 1676-1677 the ban on trade to Coromandel, etc., and a ban on passes to Moors, Armenians, etc., to Malacca, there had been a considerable decline in trade in various kinds of Indian fabrics [*liijnwaten*]. Having to pay 20 per cent toll on the entire lading, even if only a part of the lading is sold, also contributed to the flight of trade southward to Johor. These traders left their factors in Johor so they could trade the remaining goods at their leisure. As an illustration of the effects of the new policy: Malacca lost f3806.94½ in 1675-1676, just prior to the introduction of these rules; but in 1677-1678, the year after, the losses at Malacca were up to f87520.10-3/9.

Although in 1692 the toll [at Malacca] was dropped to 13 per cent and imposed only on goods sold, the trade remained bad since the Moorish traders were now accustomed to selling their wares in Johor where their factors lived through the entire year. As long as the trade in Johor continues at the present rate with the Moors, Armenians, English, Danes, Portuguese, and other nations, Malacca will not have an opportunity to better its position.²⁹

With regard to the tin trade at Malacca, it began slowing down by 1680. Between 1680 and 1690 there was not much tin available at Malacca because of the abandoning of Indragiri, Siak, etc. There were also the difficulties in the interior of the east coast Sumatra states between Kabon and Patapahan, and between Indragiri and the Kuantan Minangkabaus. An added problem was the Johor Dato Bendahara's [Tun Habib Abdul Majid] ban on all tin going to Malacca from the Johorese dependencies of Kelang and Selangor, the two most important tin-producing states in the area. It will not be possible to improve Malacca's tin trade so long as the traders from the various areas, especially from China, continue to trade in Johor.³⁰

Although the Dutch had gained on paper considerable economic concessions from Johor, the latter was able to continue to trade in goods reserved exclusively for the Dutch and to send its ships into restricted areas, principally through a Dutch courtesy of exempting the ruler and the Orang Kaya from many of the treaty restrictions. Since Batavia had other more important priorities elsewhere in

their entire trading network, and Malacca was too ill-equipped in ships and manpower to enforce the trading provisions of the treaty. Johor's leaders found little opposition to the liberties which they took with the privileges extended to them by the Dutch. Therefore, through a combination of an economically disastrous Dutch policy for Malacca, and a seemingly innocuous trade courtesy, Johor came to surpass Malacca as a trading entrepot.

Johor's awareness of the relationship between Malacca and Batavia can be seen by the difference in reception it accorded to missions sent separately by Malacca and Batavia. The mission from Malacca arrived in Pancor, the new capital of Johor, on 3 December 1705, to deal with the Johorese infractions of the 1689 treaty. Upon arrival the Dutch fired a nine gun salute but received no reply. A Malay came on board briefly to learn the purpose of the mission, and then quickly left. He returned shortly and informed the Dutch that he would be the spokesman for the Syahbandar who was indisposed after a night of merry-making with the sultan. After a two day interval the Syahbandar announced to the Dutch that the sultan was coming on board that day to receive the gifts and the letters. He further requested that the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum's gifts and letters be sent on a covered boat to shore. The Dutch were taken aback by such a suggestion and asked whether it would not be more respectful to the Bendahara to have these things presented to him directly. At this suggestion, the Syahbandar left. Later the Dutch did present the letters and gifts to the Bendahara in person.³¹

The mission was plagued by dilatory tactics of the Johorese to frustrate any efforts to renegotiate the treaty with Malacca. When the commission returned to Malacca in January, 1706, it reported its inability to have even a single conference with either Sultan Abdul Jalil or with the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum. In so far as the Johorese were concerned, the treaty made in 1689 (see Appendix C) was only valid until the majority of the Sultan Mahmud Syah.³² The Dutch had presented to the Johorese a list of complaints which included: (1) admittance of foreign nations to trade in Johor, contrary to articles two and three of the treaty of 9 April 1689; (2) intimidation of inhabitants of tin areas to prevent their trading with the Dutch, contrary to articles five and six of the same treaty; (3) withholding of runaway slaves, contrary to article eight of the same treaty.³³

The only response received by the commission was a letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil in which he denied all of these charges and reminded the Dutch that it was not he, but his father (Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid) acting as regent for Sultan Mahmud, who had made this treaty with the Dutch. The sultan turned the accusing finger on them for refusing to pay the Syahbandar of Siak duties which were the sultan's by right. The letter ended in an indignant tone which conveyed the sultan's outrage at the audacity of the mission from Malacca: 'You accuse us as if we were slaves of the Dutch East India Company whose duty it was to maintain its subjects'.³⁴ In so far as the runaway slaves were concerned, the Bendahara reported that they were in the hands of a certain Encik Panda, now among the Minangkabaus in the interior. He advised the Dutch against any foolhardy attempt to recover these slaves since these Minangkabaus were 'creating disturbances'.³⁵

Batavia was dissatisfied with the results of the mission to Johor sent by Malacca in November, 1705, and so deputed its own mission under Arnout Cleur to the court of Johor in July, 1706. Unlike the mission from Malacca, this mission was greeted with nine cannon shots when it arrived in Pancor on 24 July 1706. That very same day three of Sultan Abdul Jalil's kakaps, flying flags in the stern, appeared with three Orang Kaya to fetch his letters and gifts. The letters were then placed in covered silver salvers and brought along with the gifts back to the kakaps. As they departed they were saluted with thirteen cannon shots by the Dutch and were accompanied all the way to shore by music from the court musicians. The letter proceeded first, borne under two umbrellas (*payung*), followed by the gifts, along with the court musicians and the Dutch envoys. At the royal *balai* the letter was offered to the seated Sultan Abdul Jalil and his council, and after that was given to a Muslim priest to be read aloud in the presence of a large gathering of people. Throughout this ceremony the Dutch envoys waited outside the *balai* in full view of the sultan. They were then admitted to the *balai* and presented to the sultan who was sitting between two rows of Orang Kaya. After the formal welcome and other courtesies were performed, the envoys informed the gathering of Johorese, Javanese, Moors, Chinese, etc., of the purpose of their mission. This being done, they had betel with the sultan and then returned to their ship.³⁶

Later a messenger from the Temenggong came to the Dutch and asked to be given the gifts and letters of the Bendahara who was away on an expedition. The Dutch agreed to this arrangement, and two kakaps with flags in their stern carrying the Syahbandar and other qualified servants arrived to get the Bendahara's gifts and letter. These were then transported to shore with no *payung* or boat-load of musicians but were received with a nine-gun salute. Two days later the gifts and letter for the Laksamana were fetched on one kakap with flags waving, and given a seven-gun salute. Finally came the Syahbandar with a perahu bedecked with flags and a few servants. He received his letter and gifts and a five-gun salute. Since everything was addressed to the old Syahbandar, the Sri Nara di Raja, son of the Laksamana, the new Syahbandar respectfully forwarded these things to the proper person.³⁷ The next morning the Sri Nara di Raja left with five warships to assist the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum who was at Indragiri pacifying rebellious subjects. In a conversation with the Laksamana the Dutch learned that another expedition had been sent to Rembau to keep the troubles there from erupting into anything more dangerous.³⁸

On the second of August the Dutch paid a visit to the Raja Indra Bongsu Tun Mahmud, a brother of Sultan Abdul Jalil, who was greatly honoured and feared among the Orang Kaya and the common people. When the envoys arrived at his *balai*, they found many of the functionaries already waiting there. They exchanged the normal courtesies and then the Dutch apologized for not having brought him gifts or a letter since Batavia did not realize how important a position he held within Johor. Cleur promised to write to Batavia so that the Raja Indra Bongsu would be shown the proper respect which such a prince of royal blood deserved. When Cleur asked the Raja Indra Bongsu to intercede on his behalf with Sultan Abdul Jalil so that they could depart, the Raja Indra Bongsu assured him that they would be able to leave in three or four days. However, the days dragged on and no answer arrived. The Dutch finally became desperate since they had only a month's supply of rice on board and still had to make the journey to Siam. They again pleaded with the Raja Indra Bongsu to speak to the sultan, and so finally the latter gave his consent for their departure.

Present at the customary farewell dinner given to honour the Dutch envoys were the Temenggong, the Raja Indra Bongsu Tun Mahmud, the Laksamana, and the Orang Kaya, but no sultan.

The Temenggong announced that the sultan had an excruciating headache and could not come and say farewell to the Dutch. On the final day of departure the Raja Indra Bongsu expressed the hope to Cleur that the friendship between the Dutch and Johor would continue. In their letters the Johorese reiterated their friendship with the Dutch and pleaded innocent to all charges that they were preventing Malacca burgers from buying tin in Johor and its dependencies.³⁹

While Cleur was handling the official business, several other Dutch members of the mission gathered information by mixing with the populace. They discovered that the English were doing a considerable amount of trading at Pancor. An Englishman had traded 4,000 rijksdaalders worth of goods during his stay of four or five months in Johor,⁴⁰ while three Malacca freeburgers,⁴¹ the Captain of the freeburgers Bruyn Borenken, the Moorish trader Sedelebe, and the Chinese La Kwa, had established three factories at Pancor.⁴² One of the Moors owned a large house there, and a large Muslim temple had been built at Pancor to accommodate the many Muslim traders who frequented this city.⁴³

One of the Dutch officials ranked the official hierarchy in Johor in the following descending order of importance: Sultan, Bendahara, Temenggong, Raja Indra Bongsu, Laksamana, and Kadi; nevertheless, he remarked that the Raja Indra Bongsu Tun Mahmud had probably the greatest influence in the government.⁴⁴ Once there was a quarrel between two individuals, one of whom was a servant of the Raja Indra Bongsu. When one of the parties learned that the Raja Indra Bongsu was the other's patron, he immediately abandoned his claim. It was believed that no one, not even the sultan himself, would dare oppose the Raja Indra Bongsu. One of the envoys described the Raja Indra Bongsu as small of person but by nature a very clever man.⁴⁵ The Raja Indra Bongsu modestly claimed that he was a person who did not meddle in the government and only spent his time in such pleasures as were to be found in the water and in hunting. But according to rumour among the inhabitants of Johor, whatever he or any of those under him did, even murdering or stealing, was allowed by the Council of the Orang Kaya. Another important measure of his influence in the government was the fact that the greatest number of ships sailing from Johor to Malacca was either under the patronage of the Bendahara or the Raja Indra Bongsu.⁴⁶ Sultan Abdul Jalil, on the other hand,

was not considered to be a clever man. He had one legal wife and several concubines and spent most of his time at cockfights.⁴⁷ The most disreputable of all the Orang Kaya was considered to be the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum, while the Temenggong was considered to be a clever individual.⁴⁸ Of all the high officials the Laksamana seemed most accustomed to the ways of the European. He was not only clever but also a very polite person, which caused one of the Dutchmen to remark that the Laksamana was 'the most honest person that one could ever find among this nation'.⁴⁹ The following year another Dutch envoy met the Laksamana and sang his praises, calling him 'a very candid and prudent man who always sought the truth with sincerity'.⁵⁰ Finally, the Muslim *Kadi*, the sultan's high priest, was characterized as being an ingenious, subtle, and evil person.⁵¹ Sultan Abdul Jalil may have turned to Islam and to the *Kadi* in later years when troubles in his far-flung territories became much too disturbing for him to handle. Since his brothers, the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum and the Raja Indra Bongsu Tun Mahmud, had shown much greater skill and energy in dealing with the problems of government, he was content to lay down all pretensions of governing powers which he had exercised between 1697 and 1699 as the Bendahara of Sultan Mahmud. His role now was not to govern but to reign, and thus he occupied himself with religion, a proper task for a righteous ruler.⁵²

The favourable reception of the mission sent from Batavia was especially noteworthy since it had come only a few months after the curt dismissal of the mission sent from Malacca. Relations between Malacca and Johor were strained, and the latter knew that Batavia was its only hope of maintaining good relations with the Dutch. Johor promised to reciprocate and send a mission to Batavia to reaffirm their precious friendship.⁵³ Although the Johorese usually went to Malacca whenever they had anything to say to the Dutch, this time they decided to work directly with Batavia. The Johorese had long realized the jealousy of Malacca toward them and resented the manner in which they were treated. This had been one of the major reasons that the Johorese had decided to ignore the mission sent from Malacca on 25 November 1705.

After the success of the Batavia mission, Malacca again sent envoys in January, 1707. This time they were greeted respectfully by the Johorese. The mission arrived during the Muslim fasting month (*bulan puasa*) which prevented any business transactions for

some time. Once the fast was over and the letters delivered to the Johorese, everything proceeded smoothly. The Dutch envoys were pleasantly surprised at the speed with which Johor acted when they asked for a return of a fugitive in Muar.⁵⁴ Sultan Abdul Jalil sent a letter back with the envoys denying that he was stopping traders from going to Malacca, for he and all the Orang Kaya of Johor sincerely desired to maintain the friendship and treaty with the Dutch.⁵⁵

The marked difference in treatment of this Malacca mission compared with that of 1705 can be attributed partially to the favourable impression made by the Batavia mission of 1706, and partially to the fact that the deceptive temporary lull in the outlying territories of the Kingdom of Johor had been again shattered by revolts against the new dynasty. The Sri Bija Wangsa, the son-in-law of the Laksamana, had been sent by Sultan Abdul Jalil with a grab, a kakap, and fifty men to Batu Bahara and Deli in order to summon the heads of these places to pay the customary respect and offer their homage to the crown of Johor. In the Sri Bija Wangsa's meetings with the leaders of these areas, his arrogance so alienated the latter that they took up arms against him and killed a large number of the Johorese. The Sri Bija Wangsa sent an urgent appeal for assistance, but when none arrived he fled back to Johor with the remainder of his men. The ruler of Johor was infuriated by his thoughtless and peevish actions which had caused the rebellion in Batu Bahara and Deli. He threatened to have the Sri Bija Wangsa *krissed* but finally relented and instead sent the Laksamana with thirty ships to bring these areas to obedience peacefully or through the use of force.⁵⁶

The Bendahara Tun Mas Anum's government was sorely tested by rebellion among the Orang Laut; revolts in Indragiri, Batu Bahara, Deli, Rembau, Selangor, Kelang; and troubles in the interior of Sumatra's east coast among Johor's Minangkabau subjects. Although he had been partially successful in quelling some of the rebellions in Johor's territories, his methods had alienated a number of the influential Orang Kaya within the kingdom. The individual who profited most from the Bendahara's rapidly diminishing influence was the Raja Indra Bongsu Tun Mahmud. He became Raja Muda in 1708 but his power must already have been considerable by 1707. By that year the ships appearing at Malacca with his *cap* were as numerous as those ships under the Bendahara's patronage. It was generally known that the Raja Indra Bongsu did anything his heart so desired,

and there was no one among the Orang Kaya who dared to oppose him.⁵⁷ He assumed the office of Syahbandar and entitled a letter sent to the Dutch dated 1119 A.H., year Wau, 24 Rabi'ul-awwal (26 June 1707): 'Raja Indra Bongsu, Syahbandar, exercising authority over Johor and Pahang, and their dependencies.'⁵⁸ On 2 January 1708 the Dutch in Malacca received yet another letter from the Raja Indra Bongsu 'who governs [het bestier heeft] in Johor and Pahang'. These letters were sufficient evidence for the Dutch to assume quite correctly that the Raja Indra Bongsu had replaced the Bendahara as the most powerful individual in the government of Johor. With the death of the Bendahara Tun Mas Anum on 29 March 1708, all effective open opposition to the ambitions of Raja Indra Bongsu Tun Mahmud was removed.⁵⁹

With complete power in his hands, the Raja Indra Bongsu could now carry out his plans with impunity. He had twelve grabs made ready to carry Raja Ibrahim of Indragiri from Pancor, where he had been residing, to be installed as sultan in his kingdom, although the people of Indragiri preferred another claimant, the Raja Gambala.⁶⁰ This mattered little to the Raja Indra Bongsu who was mainly concerned with having his own choice on the throne and thereby assuring future support for his own ventures. Not long after the death of the Bendahara, a rumour reached Malacca that the Raja Indra Bongsu had been chosen by an assembled Council of Orang Kaya to be the successor to the present sultan. Confirmation of this rumour only reached Malacca on 27 April 1709 when a letter from the Raja Indra Bongsu arrived informing the Dutch that he had been honoured with the title of Raja Muda.⁶¹

Traders enjoying the patronage of the Raja Muda were quick to take advantage of their patron's enhanced stature in order to increase their trading activities. The ever-growing trade of Johor soon forced Governor Rooselaer of Malacca to send a letter to Sultan Abdul Jalil informing him of new restrictions imposed on Johor trade in Malacca. According to the new decision taken by Malacca, all ships stopping in Malacca (including those of Johor) with no intention of unloading their goods would henceforth be refused permission to enter the river and would only be allowed to remain at anchor at Malacca for three days. Those who wished to trade in Malacca could proceed upriver but could not trade in opium on pain of total confiscation of the ship's goods.⁶² As head of the government in Johor, the Raja Muda replied that he and the

Orang Kaya were surprised at such measures and had not taken any steps until they could discuss this development at length with one another. The Raja Muda was annoyed at these measures which appeared to be intended principally against Johor's traders and was moved to make the familiar condemnation on the failure of *bahasa*: 'The bearer of the letter was not only unable to speak the most basic Malay, but also was not qualified [as a messenger]'.⁶³

To add further to the woes of the Raja Muda, his nominee for the throne of Indragiri (Raja Ibrahim) was forced to flee his country. On 10 October 1708 the Raja Muda and the Laksamana went with about 600 men on forty ships with the refugee Sultan of Indragiri to keep him on the throne.⁶⁴ When they reached the mouth of the Indragiri River, half of the fleet under the Laksamana continued upstream with Raja Ibrahim, while the Raja Muda went on a separate mission to Bengkalis.

When the Raja Muda arrived at Bengkalis with seven large grabs and twenty kakaps, he demanded and received from the inhabitants a large sum of Spanish rials; 400 men, women, and children; and eighteen baloks,⁶⁵ to transport everything and everyone to Johor. The armada made one stop at the island of Buru to get more provisions and cattle from the inhabitants and then continued on its way to Johor. These unexpected developments were precautionary measures taken by the Raja Muda to face the threat of a Siamese invasion. There were reports that the King of Siam was sending a fleet of some 100 ships to punish Johor for not controlling its 'pirates'. These Orang Laut subjects of the ruler had not only made the waters of Siam unsafe but had also raided Siamese lands, stealing slaves and friends of the nobility. To prepare for this invasion the Raja Muda had decided to bring men and provisions to the capital city from the various outlying areas.⁶⁶

To complicate matters for the Raja Muda, at about 11 o'clock in the morning of 13 March 1709, fire broke out in an *atap* hut where someone was cooking banana fritters. The fire spread quickly through the city of Pancor reducing it to a heap of ashes. In this conflagration which lasted some five to six hours, 300 wooden and *atap* houses, including the sultan's *istana*, were completely destroyed. The loss of the *istana* was especially painful because it had been only recently built and was quite a magnificent edifice. According to Malay sources the *istana* was about 180 to 192 feet in length with a wooden roof and walls carved both in the Chinese and Malay styles.

The doors were inlaid and outlined in ivory, and on each of the columns of the audience hall were beautiful mirrors and carvings crowned by a scroll-motif capital. Even the railing in the *istana* was of fine latticework of various colours.⁶⁷ The fort, the gunpowder magazine which contained 2,000 pounds of gunpowder, and all the houses of the Orang Kaya, except the Laksamana's, were burned down.⁶⁸ Envoys were immediately sent to Malacca to explain Johor's urgent need to buy fifty to sixty piculs of gunpowder and bullets to protect themselves against the Siamese.⁶⁹

Rumours began to fly fast and furiously as soon as it became known that Siamese troops were moving south down into the Malay Peninsula. On 30 April the ruler of Patani informed his ally Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor that 5,000 Siamese were encamped within a day's trip from his country. He urged that Johor send assistance with all possible haste. Another urgent plea for Johor troops followed soon after with the disturbing news that the Siamese army which had gone to Patani overland was being supported by a fleet of two large ships and 400 small war-boats. Much to the relief of Johor, Patani managed to defeat the Siamese army after twelve days of hard fighting and forced the latter to withdraw. Fortunately for Patani and Johor, the King of Siam died in Ayuthia during these campaigns, and the military expedition returned to Siam.⁷⁰

In order to be in a more advantageous position to cope with any further danger of a Siamese invasion, the Raja Muda advocated the transferring of the capital of Johor from Pancor to Riau on the island of Bentan. The Siamese threat had temporarily abated, but the fear of attack had not diminished. Since a large part of the fighting forces of Johor were made up of the inhabitants of the islands of the Riau-Lingga archipelago, the fleets of Johor could be summoned at a moment's notice to come and defend Riau against a Siamese attack by sea. An enemy fleet could be easily detected by patrolling Orang Laut ships in the Straits, and any battle on sea would give the Orang Laut of Johor's fleets a superior advantage because of their familiarity with the area.

Despite the well-reasoned arguments of the Raja Muda, there was still strong opposition to the move from Sultan Abdul Jalil, the new Bendahara Tun Abdullah, and the Laksamana. The Raja Muda finally resorted to a combination of persuasion and threats to convince Sultan Abdul Jalil to leave Johor and take up his resi-

dence in Riau. While the Raja Muda went ahead to Riau to make the necessary defence preparations and to build the sultan's palace, Sultan Abdul Jalil promised to follow in three months. The other Orang Kaya only agreed to make their intentions known after a three month period whether they would go to Riau or remain in Johor.

Although the capital had been razed by fire and could be considered unlucky, many of the Johorese preferred to remain in Johor and even offered the Raja Muda 4,000 rijksdaalders to induce him to stay.⁷¹ The Raja Muda wanted to meet the Siamese threat openly, but many of the Johorese preferred the safety of interior Johor to the kind of confrontation which a move to Riau would imply. The Raja Muda, however, could not be persuaded and left for Riau with a large number of ships. Despite the initial opposition to the move, months later the sultan, the Orang Kaya, and most of the inhabitants — Malays, Chinese, Moors, and others, even those who had their gardens and plantations in the hills — followed with all their belongings leaving Johor completely desolate.⁷² The *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* dates this move on Monday, 8 Rabi'ul akhir 1121 A.H. (17 June 1709).⁷³

The Raja Muda now had to deal with the same problems which the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil had confronted when the capital of the kingdom was moved from the Johor River to Riau in 1673. He had to convince those who had frequented its ports in the Johor River to come to Riau to trade. A letter was even sent in the name of Sultan Abdul Jalil to a Danish Captain whose ship lay at anchor at Malacca, assuring him of a good market and all the help he needed if he would come and trade in Riau.⁷⁴ In March 1710 another Danish Captain who had spent sixty-two days trading in Riau reported that five Chinese junks had bought up all the tin at that port. Their porcelain, combs, iron and copper pots and pans, etc., were in great demand by the Malays who flocked to Riau to trade with the Chinese.⁷⁵ The Danes further reported that, although there was still some confusion on Riau, the Orang Kaya and their subjects had now accepted the authority of the Raja Muda.⁷⁶

In another move to further Riau's trade, the Raja Muda invoked the Johor-VOC treaty provisions, as had his predecessors before him, to prevent the Malacca inhabitants from participating in the lucrative Minangkabau trade. Since the VOC had abandoned its lodge in Siak and left there altogether in the 1680s, the Raja Muda

insisted that it had relinquished its trading rights in Siak. Furthermore, the provisions of the treaty did not include freeburgers from Malacca.⁷⁷

By making such a distinction in the treaty, the Raja Muda showed himself to be as adept as his predecessors in using the treaty to extract favourable advantages from the Dutch. He was well aware that the trade of Malacca's freeburgers in Siak was essential in obtaining the necessary provisions to supply ships stopping in Malacca. If there were no provisions available in that port, ships would avoid it and dock at Johor instead, which was clearly the Raja Muda's intention.⁷⁸ It was later discovered that a Dutch fiscal in Malacca had encouraged the Raja Muda to insist on this point.⁷⁹

While actively encouraging traders to frequent Riau and discouraging competition, the Raja Muda also devoted considerable attention to the defences of the island. A Dutch mission in Riau in August 1710 was highly impressed by the state of war-preparedness it found there. There were fortresses on the island of Bayan and on the main island of Bentan, all supplied with cannons of various sizes. Grabs and other warships were under construction on the island of Bantang under the supervision of the Bendahara, and another dockyard was in operation on the west side of Lingga where the sea was considered to be about ten or twelve fathoms deep. The newly-built ships on Lingga were sent back through a westward route past the Durian Islands, and northward to Riau, avoiding the reefs and sandbanks which abound in the area.⁸⁰

Although Riau was somewhat protected by its natural surroundings, the Johorese did not neglect the fleets nor the fortifications on the island for very good reason. There were rumours that the Siamese were already on their way to attack the Johor dependency of Terengganu. Equally disturbing was a report that two Johor Orang Kaya with 400 other Johorese, who had refused to abandon the Johor mainland for Riau in 1709, now intended to link up with the Siamese for a joint attack on Riau.⁸¹ This opposition was much greater than the Dutch originally believed; 400 out of a total population of about 3 or 4,000 at the capital was a substantial percentage. Neither the contemporary Dutch records nor the Malay histories present any evidence of a particular policy or practice of the Raja Muda's or of the ruler's which could have so deeply alienated such a large segment of the Johor population. The rebellion does not seem to

have been provoked by the Raja Muda or the ruler, but instead appears to have been the latest of a number of incidents which reflected the dissension within Johor society concerning the legitimacy of the current ruling family of Johor. By refusing to follow the ruler of Johor to Riau, these rebel subjects rejected the overlordship of Sultan Abdul Jalil and the Bendahara family.

The spectre of a combined military force composed of Siamese and rebellious Johor subjects affected the goals and the activities of the Raja Muda. He wanted to leave immediately to meet the Siamese force and to deal with the rebels, but he was overruled by Sultan Abdul Jalil and various Orang Kaya. They felt that the Raja Muda and the Orang Kaya in his following were too inexperienced and untried for such an ambitious undertaking. Since the Raja Muda showed great resentment at this decision, Sultan Abdul Jalil finally bowed to the Raja Muda's wishes.⁸²

With a fleet of sixty ships the Raja Muda sailed off to meet the threat. Among those in the expedition were ten members of the Council of the Orang Kaya, including the Sri Nara di Raja, the Sri Bija di Raja, the Sri Bija Wangsa, the Raja Indra Muda, the Sri Setia, the Tun Lela Putra, the Syahbandar, and the Kadi.⁸³ The fleet had already reached the Hook of Barbukit when one of the Johor Orang Kaya, the Paduka Sri Rama, came from Terengganu with news of the latest developments there. He told the Raja Muda that the Siamese did not intend to invade Terengganu but only to keep an eye on those pirates using Terengganu as a base from which to launch raids in Siamese lands. Most of the Raja Muda's fleet were thus diverted to Bengkalis, while some twenty ships under the Laksamana were sent to Lingga by the Raja Muda in compliance with the decision of the members of the Council of the Orang Kaya.⁸⁴

Dutch observers in Siak reported the arrival of the Raja Muda at Bengkalis with twenty-five to thirty grabs of all sizes and his decision to go from there to Batu Bahara and Selangor.⁸⁵ From Bengkalis the Raja Muda sent the representatives Raja Lela Putra and Wan Abdul to Malacca to buy five to six piculs of gunpowder, but the Dutch refused to part with any of their supplies. They explained that all the gunpowder in Malacca was needed for its defence since the United Provinces of The Netherlands were still at war with Spain and France.⁸⁶ Although the Raja Muda failed to get any gunpowder from Malacca, he believed his fleet sufficiently rested

and equipped to deal with the rebellious subjects in Batu Bahara. When his attempts to subdue Batu Bahara proved to be much more difficult a task than expected, he decided to seek reinforcements from Johor's Buginese subjects in Selangor and Linggi.⁸⁷

Meanwhile, a boat arrived in Riau on 3 September 1710 with the news that the Siamese had conquered Terengganu and a number of other places and were now on their way to attack Riau. Despite the careful defence network painstakingly constructed on Riau for just such an occasion, the island was left vulnerable by the departure of the Raja Muda and a sizeable portion of the fleet.⁸⁸ On 5 September two Johorese boats arrived with a further report that one of the renegade Johor Orang Kaya, Sri Samara (Sri Sama Raja), was at Duyong, a place on the border of Pahang and Terengganu, with 180 perahus and three ships ready to come south to attack Riau. On receiving this news Johor leaders took immediate measures to meet this emergency. Sultan Abdul Jalil quickly banned the export of rice from Riau.⁸⁹ While the Bendahara personally supervised the defences on Pulau Bayan, the Laksamana had several ships made ready to cruise in the Straits of Singapore in order to report any signs of a Siamese fleet. Messengers were sent to the heads of Rio Formosa, Muar, Padang, and Lingga to tell them that their manpower and ships were needed for the defence of Riau. But the most significant step was the despatching of special envoys to the Raja Muda to persuade him to return to Riau immediately with the fleet.⁹⁰

A month had elapsed since the Raja Muda had left Riau, during which time he had diverted his fleet from its mission in Terengganu to go instead to Bengkalis, Batu Bahara and finally Selangor. The Dutch had kept close watch over these activities and believed that the Raja Muda was planning to set up his own locus of power elsewhere in the kingdom and never return to Riau.⁹¹ Such speculations may have arisen since there were ten members of the Council of the Orang Kaya, as well as the Kadi, or the chief religious official of the kingdom, on this expedition. But it would have been unlikely that the Raja Muda would abandon his leading position in the government without a struggle. A more likely explanation, which would also be in character with his past success in gaining the leadership from the former Bendahara Tun Mas Anum, was his decision to seek a way of strengthening his position within the kingdom.

There had been strong opposition from among the Orang Kaya to the move from Johor to Riau. Although 400 Johorese had

decided to oppose their ruler and the Raja Muda, there were other less open but even more dangerous opponents of the Raja Muda who had opted to accompany their ruler to Riau. The pressures from this discontented faction in Riau finally provoked the Raja Muda to undertake a bold plan to outmanoeuvre his enemies within the Kingdom of Johor. Setting up another locus of power in the Johor kingdom would not have solved the problem of dissident Orang Kaya among the Johorese, and it would have meant a conflict of loyalties which would have resulted in civil war. Such a course of events would have been anathema to the Raja Muda who still believed that the presence of the ruler of Johor on Riau would serve to justify the cause of his opponents. When news of a fresh Siamese threat to Terengganu arrived in Riau, the Raja Muda quickly seized upon this opportunity to enhance his position within the kingdom by leading Johor's fleets against the enemy. Before the fleet even reached Terengganu, the Raja Muda received a report that the Siamese 'invasion' was merely Siamese troops sent to keep an eye on piratical activities in that area. The Raja Muda was now faced with the choice of returning to the *status quo* in Riau or of taking advantage of the fact that he had a large force under his command in order to consolidate his position at home. When the welcome news from Terengganu was brought to Riau, the Council of the Orang Kaya immediately summoned the Raja Muda to disband the fleet and send them to their separate areas. The Raja Muda consented to the departure of some twenty ships to their base in Lingga, but he retained the rest of the fleet for his own designs in Bengkalis, Batu Bahara, and Selangor. He had already made contacts with the Buginese in Selangor earlier on so that his renewed association with them succeeded admirably in unnerving his opponents in Riau. The Raja Muda's true plans were never revealed because within a month he again found himself thrust into an enviable position of holding the fate of Riau in his hands. Although a Siamese fleet was reported to have gone to Terengganu to patrol the waters against pirates, a month later came the disturbing rumour of a Siamese conquest of Terengganu and the launching of an invasion force against Riau. With very few options left to those on Riau, the Raja Muda's enemies finally acquiesced in the sultan's summoning the Raja Muda to return home. Thus, in early October 1710 the Raja Muda stopped off in Linggi and then sailed triumphantly home to Riau with his power secure and his prestige greatly enhanced. The long-awaited

invasion never materialized, but by this time the Raja Muda was in firm control of the government.⁹²

With his authority in the kingdom much stronger than it had ever been previously, the Raja Muda now sought to preserve it by encouraging the further growth of Johor's trade. The Raja Muda used gentle persuasion, and when that failed, more forceful methods to provide Johor with many of the products which were highly valued by foreign traders coming to Riau.⁹³ Dutch freeburgers from Malacca were forced to pay one-tenth of their cargo as toll to go up the Siak River to trade,⁹⁴ an amount higher than the Dutch had ever been accustomed to pay in Siak. While, on the one hand, the Raja Muda obstructed Dutch trade in Johor territory, on the other hand, he exercised his rights as a chief minister of Johor by selling his goods in Malacca toll-free.⁹⁵

The lack of reciprocity in the Dutch-Johor trade relationship did not escape the notice of Governor Six of Malacca who complained that Johor was profiting in every respect as a result of its alliance with the Dutch East India Company. Not only was it benefiting handsomely from a treaty which granted it trading privileges with the Dutch, but it was also utilizing the very same treaty to prevent the Company's ships and all Malacca's inhabitants from going to trade on Sumatra's east coast, at Bengkalis, and on the Siak River.⁹⁶ Captain Alexander Hamilton, whose entrée in the Johorese court, especially with Sultan Abdul Jalil and the Raja Muda, was verified by a Dutch envoy,⁹⁷ appeared in Malacca in November 1711 and reported to the Dutch a discourse which he claimed had taken place between the Raja Muda and himself on a recent visit to Riau. He had told the Raja Muda that, if he did not graciously allow Malacca's freeburgers and inhabitants to trade toll-free in Patapahan and Siak, the Dutch could turn to forceful methods. Seemingly unperturbed by this possibility, the Raja Muda replied that if the Company no longer desired to maintain the alliance, Johor could always accept an alliance with France.⁹⁸ The Raja Muda was well aware that the Dutch were involved deeply in a war with France, and he had dealt with the Dutch long enough for him to understand what the impact and the reaction of such a statement would be.

Despite this bravado before a foreigner, the Raja Muda realized the importance of maintaining 'the unwritten rules' governing the relations with his powerful neighbours, the Dutch. The Raja Muda took the occasion of welcoming the new Governor of Malacca in

November 1711 to invoke the 1689 treaty to explain his actions in Siak. He explained that the treaty had allowed the *Company*, but not Malacca inhabitants, to trade up the Siak River in cloth, cotton, and silk. According to this treaty, merchants trading in these goods without the consent of the Sultan of Johor or the VOC would have these goods confiscated. The sultan, the Council of the Orang Kaya, and he had conferred and decided that when the VOC left Siak, the trade there, by default, fell solely to Johor. Nevertheless, Johor still wanted to do what was right and not abandon the treaty, the friendship, or the old peace with the Dutch. The Raja Muda appealed to the Governor and Council at Malacca not to encourage the inhabitants of Malacca to go to Siak to trade since he had already spoken about it with the Company. Having established his case for Johor's fidelity to the treaty of 1689 and of Johor's desire to maintain the friendship with the Dutch, the Raja Muda felt confident in appealing to the same treaty to request a compensation of 8,000 guilders for goods seized by the Dutch from a Johor ship wrecked off Negapatam.⁹⁹

Despite strong protests from Malacca, Johor believed that it was not committing an infraction of any provision of the treaty by enforcing its decision to prevent Malacca's inhabitants from trading in Patapahan.¹⁰⁰ When a rumour reached Malacca that Aceh was seeking Johor's aid in attacking the Dutch stronghold, a frustrated and annoyed Governor Moerman immediately sent a mission to Riau in May 1712 with letters written in the most undiplomatic language. When the Raja Muda read the letter he told the envoys that it was harshly written and seemed to imply that Johor wished to break the alliance. He admitted that he had seized two ships belonging to Malacca's inhabitants which were trading illegally in Kampar, but it had never been the practice for Malacca's governors to grant passes to individuals to go there to trade. Kampar was a possession of Johor and was completely outside Dutch jurisdiction, and yet the Governor still dared accuse him of wanting to break the alliance! He proudly asserted that though the Company was rich and powerful, and Johor poor and weak, the Johorese were not lacking in courage. If the time should ever come when they would have to resist the Dutch, they would do it.¹⁰¹

In the relatively long history of Dutch-Johor relationships, rarely was such strong language used by the leaders of Johor. On the few occasions when it did occur, it was usually a result of some unin-

tentional affront committed by the Dutch to the dignity and respect of Johor as a sovereign nation. Whenever the Dutch or any other nation encroached on Johor's lands without express approval or neglected to accord proper respect to the ruler, Johor was prepared to take drastic steps to correct the situation. It mattered not that the Dutch were much more powerful than Johor since the very dignity and pride of the Johor Malays were being besmirched. No longer was the issue trade or ways of outwitting a business competitor, but of more serious import — that of Johor's sovereignty.

Although willing to resort to war if necessary, Johor was fully aware that it was to its best interests to cultivate the friendship of the Dutch. It recognized the importance which the Dutch attached to treaties and thus preferred to seek redress within the flexible bounds of the Dutch treaty system. It quickly responded to an appeal from Malacca to send a member of its Council to re-examine the treaty, but it requested that the negotiations take place in Riau.¹⁰² After pleading ignorance in treaty matters, as well as a lack of skilled personnel to negotiate treaties with the Dutch, it urged the Dutch to send some qualified individuals from the Council at Malacca to discuss the treaties in Riau.¹⁰³ It mattered little to the Dutch where the actual negotiations were held, but it was of some significance to Johor. Although the common man would not be exposed to the actual intricacies of the negotiations themselves, he would have considered it significant that the Dutch had come to Riau to ask for something from his leaders. As had been the case in the late seventeenth century when the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil demanded Jambi's presence in Johor as a condition for peace talks, the Raja Muda sought the psychological advantage and the prestige of having whatever negotiations occurring within Johor itself. The Dutch acceded to this request, and a mission was sent to Riau on 9 January 1713 to renegotiate the old 1689 treaty.

In the instructions to the envoys Jan Laspencier and Thimaneus Molinaeus dated 4 January 1713, the procedure for negotiating the various articles of the proposed treaty was set out: (my paraphrasing)

There should be no difficulties in articles one, five, six, and even three, although the sale of opium in Malacca would probably be requested by the Johorese but should be refused. Article three is the most important part of the treaty because it deals with free trade of the Company's and Malacca's inhabitants in the Siak and other rivers. It is imperative that the Johorese concede the free trade of Malacca's inhabitants up the Siak River

with no additional duties but the 40-50 to 100 rijksdaalders (in accordance with the size of the vessel) to be paid to the Johorese Syahbandar. If this should be refused and if Johor should persist in imposing a full toll and not allowing the vessels to unload their goods, then the negotiations should be broken off and the envoys should return to Malacca to await further orders from Batavia. Only after the treaty is signed are you to go to the Raja Muda to tell him that his goods sequestered at Negapatam would be returned.¹⁰⁴

With these instructions the envoys departed and reached the mouth of the Riau River on 11 January 1713. In order to avoid the treacherous reefs, unknown sand-bars, and the numerous little islands which are a hazard to shipping, the mission had to wait at the Straits of Singapore for a Johor fisherman to guide them to Riau. When they arrived in Riau, the sultan's secretary came on board and wrote down the purpose of the visit. He then informed the Dutch that the Sri Nara di Raja, the son of the Laksamana, was now exercising the function of his father who had died on 1 May 1712.¹⁰⁵

When the Malay version of the proposed treaty brought by the Dutch was read aloud by the sultan's secretary at the *balai*, there was visible agitation among the Orang Kaya and the chief ministers present. The Raja Muda arose and in an indignant tone addressed the envoys: (my paraphrasing)

The treaty of 1689 had been signed on the understanding that its validity would be upheld only until the young ruler [Sultan Mahmud Syah] reached his majority. In that treaty the Dutch East India Company was allowed to trade in the Siak River, and it was the Company's decision to abandon Siak. But since Johor is preventing the inhabitants of Malacca from trading there, the Company now wants another treaty. Although the Dutch want to make it possible for Malacca's inhabitants to trade in Siak toll-free, this will never be allowed. Patapahan and other Minangkabau areas in upriver Siak belong to Johor, and no Malacca inhabitants will be allowed to go upriver through Siak to Patapahan. If they want to go to Patapahan, they will have to find another route.¹⁰⁶

The Dutch were quick to point out that Patapahan and the surrounding areas had their own governments, and that Johor's authority extended only up to the area below Patapahan near the Tapong Kiri River. They added that every year these areas sent a small gift to the Minangkabau emperor who lived in the mountains of Sumatra. As further proof of their contention, the envoys cited an incident ten years before when some of the VOC's ships were sent to Patapahan to drive out the rebel Pahlawan from his fort on the

Tapong Kiri because he was hindering trade in the Siak River. That area, concluded the Dutch envoys, was clearly not under Johor's jurisdiction. Believing that they had concluded this matter to the satisfaction of both parties, the Dutch envoys broached a seemingly harmless question of an alternate route to Patapahan. Much to their surprise, the Raja Muda angrily reminded the Dutch that Patapahan *did* belong to Johor. If the Dutch wanted to know another route to Patapahan, they could go and look for one themselves. What right did the Company have to drive out the Nakhoda Pahlawan from his fort or, more recently, to impose tolls on the sultan's and his ships going to Malacca!

Hoping to divert the talks to less dangerous grounds, the Dutch envoys asked how much toll the Dutch would have to pay to go up the Siak River. At first the Raja Muda jokingly replied 1,000 rijksdaalders, but he later said that the Dutch ships would have to be visited and made to pay tolls on their goods, although he mentioned no specific amount. When the Raja Muda refused even to talk about article three dealing with the trade of Malacca's inhabitants up the Siak River, the Dutch realized that the negotiations would be fruitless.¹⁰⁷

The two Dutch envoys were merchants and had ample time to observe the state of Johor's trade during their mission. They were told by the Johorese that no French or Portuguese ships had come to Riau in five years, and that the last Danish ship had left Riau about three years ago. In a period of three years only three English ships and two to three English sloops had been to Riau to trade. There were five Chinese junks which had docked in Riau shortly before the envoys' arrival, and one or two more were expected. Trading ships from Siam, Cambodia, areas of the north, and Java's east coast, were numerous in Riau.

About 1,000 bahars of tin came from Kabon and Selangor, another 600 bahars from Siak (not counting those which came down through Kampar and Indragiri), and only very little from Perak and Kedah. Pepper was a monopoly of the Raja Muda and came principally from Terengganu and Muar. From south-west Celebes came the Macassarese and Buginese traders who sold spices in Riau for a price less than that given by the Company. Malacca's inhabitants had started trading in salt in the Kingdom of Johor about ten or twelve years previously and usually presented small gifts to the Johor officials. In the last two years the trade had increased con-

siderably and tolls of 150, 125, 110, 70, or 40 rijksdaalders were levied on all Malacca vessels intending to trade at Patapahan. All of this had now changed since the Raja Muda banned all of Malacca's inhabitants from Siak, thus depriving Malacca of one of its sources of livelihood.

The entire trading process rested in the hands of the Raja Muda, the sultan, and the Orang Kaya, but without the Raja Muda's permission nothing could be transacted. The Dutch grudgingly admitted that the Johorese Paduka Raja of the seventeenth century was no more cunning and intelligent than this Raja Muda. In the exercise of authority in the governing of the kingdom he was unchallenged.

While delivering the official letters during the treaty negotiations, the Dutch envoys had an opportunity to speak openly with the Orang Kaya in Riau. The latter regarded the Bendahara Tun Abdullah as a person of a good, generous, and frank nature whose authority as chief minister had been encroached upon and curtailed by the Raja Muda Tun Mahmud. When the envoys complained about the Raja Muda's actions in Siak and regretted the fact that personal differences should be responsible for damaging the relationship between two old allies, the Bendahara agreed with this sentiment. He then picked up the rather daring implication in that statement and replied that 'it is good to have those who know how to rectify the deeds of their masters'.¹⁰⁸

Within the Council of the Orang Kaya there was great curiosity about the war in Europe. The envoys talked about the war between Holland and its allies against Spain and France, and of the various Company wars. The Syahbandar remarked that he had served in the Java war under Speelman, and then recounted his less exciting role in the Johor government where 'he had as much to say as a block of wood: I must carry out the wishes and desires of the Raja Muda. I am his slave and an old man; what can I do?'¹⁰⁹

At a farewell dinner for the Dutch envoys the Raja Muda expressed great interest in the activities of the Dutch in Europe and Asia. Since he realized the great concern which the Dutch had in south-west Celebes, he discussed certain Macassarese events with them, and then unexpectedly began speaking in Macassarese. When the Dutch envoy Molinaeus expressed his inability to communicate in that language, the Raja Muda switched back to Malay and continued to question the envoys about the French, the situation of

the war in Europe, the few French ships in these waters, the Company's missions to India, and about the measures taken by the Dutch when they encountered a French ship.¹¹⁰

After his curiosity concerning these matters had been satisfied, he turned to the more immediate problems in the Dutch-Johor relationship. He asked the envoys why their letters had not mentioned their desire to discuss the situation in Siak. Taken aback by the Raja Muda's question, the envoys explained that in two separate conferences on 15 January the Raja Muda himself had agreed to a discussion of the problem of Siak. They argued that any misunderstanding between the Dutch and Johor could be resolved if a settlement of the Siak problem could be found to the satisfaction of both parties. The Raja Muda ended the entire discussion by stating that this matter could not be raised at that time. Dissatisfied with the entire tone of the talks and the unhappy turn of events in this final session with the Dutch envoys, the Raja Muda resorted to an oft-used Johorese convention of blaming the failure on *bahasa*. He claimed that the interpreter brought by the Dutch could not 'understand' the Raja Muda. If the envoys came again with another interpreter, discussions on Siak could then be resumed.¹¹¹

Perplexed by the Raja Muda's stand on Siak, the envoys kept repeating in disbelief: 'But you never complained before!' Unwilling to accept this decision as final, they pursued the question of Siak but received the same response. The Raja Muda persisted in his refusal and sent a letter to the Governor of Malacca informing him that no Malacca burger, Moor, non-Johor Malay, or any other nation would be allowed to trade in the Siak River since it belonged to the Sultan of Johor.¹¹²

The Dutch soon had yet another taste of the sensitive issue of Johor's sovereignty in the matter of the sequestered goods and sloop of the Dutch freeburger Pieter Domingo Janszoon. When the envoys asked the Raja Muda to release Janszoon's goods and ship, the Raja Muda explained why no action had been taken on a similar request made by Anthony Aldorp, the previous Dutch envoy to the court of Johor. Just before Aldorp's departure from Riau, he had sent the Malay scribe Encik Amar to seek the return of Janszoon's property. When the Raja Muda had learned that the request had been made on behalf of Aldorp, he had refused to even consider the case. The Raja Muda emphasized that if the request had come from the Governor of Malacca himself, it would have

been an entirely different matter.¹¹³ What mattered to the Johorese was the upholding of respect for the integrity of Johor as a sovereign kingdom where proper relations were maintained and where the inviolateness of its territories was acknowledged. A request from a high government official to the King of Johor for the restoration of the Dutch ship and goods would have been the minimal courtesy expected between two respectable nations. When the Raja Muda realized that the request was being made through a lower official, he refused even to discuss it. In the present mission the Dutch merchant-envoys again alienated the Raja Muda by disputing Johor's jurisdiction over certain areas of upriver Siak, thus challenging Johor's sovereign rights to these areas. Malacca's temporary imposition of tolls on ships coming to Malacca with passes from Sultan Abdul Jalil and the Raja Muda was another gesture which in the eyes of the Johorese was tantamount to non-recognition of the importance of the rulers of Johor. No power in the Malay world, nor elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago for that matter, would have been so gauche. It mattered greatly to the Johorese because these acts were damaging to their prestige in the Malay world. The Johorese realized that the written agreement was what mattered to the Dutch, and they themselves had benefited from these treaties. Trade concessions to the Dutch had never hindered the Johorese before, and they had no reason to believe that things would change with the signing of another treaty. The latest negotiations, however, were adumbrated by these Dutch 'indiscretions' which doomed the talks to failure.

The Raja Muda realized the displeasure which Johor would incur when the mission returned to Malacca; thus, in order to restore friendly relations with the Dutch, the Raja Muda decided to deal with the 'true leaders' of the Dutch in Batavia. Here one sovereign power could deal face to face with another sovereign power and not with an intermediary, as Malacca was considered to be by the Johorese. The Laksamana Sri Nara di Raja, who had been to Batavia two years before, was the head of the delegation from Johor whose mission was to iron out the difficulties between the two nations.¹¹⁴

On 26 April 1713 the Johorese delegation arrived in Batavia and delivered the letter from the Sultan Abdul Jalil to Governor-General Abraham van Riebeeck. The sultan explained that the Company (but not the Dutch burgers) had been given the privilege of trading

in Siak since the time of the Paduka Raja because the Dutch and the Johorese had always been good friends. He now hoped that such a friendship would continue and no differences would arise to destroy this alliance.¹¹⁵ When the Dutch inquired whether the members of the Johor mission had the proper credentials to sign a contract, they replied that it was not the custom of their country. Their ruler had given them instructions that they were to leave the contents of the treaty completely in the hands of the Dutch. They had but one request, that all traders be excluded from the Siak River and from Patapahan. If the Dutch insisted on this, however, they were willing to concede this point.¹¹⁶

The Johor envoys requested permission for Javanese ships to come to Johor with rice to alleviate the shortage on that island. But when the Dutch refused this request on grounds that there was great lack of rice everywhere, the envoys appeared satisfied. They did succeed, however, in obtaining a promise that the Dutch would restore the Raja Muda's ship and goods which had been confiscated on the Coromandel Coast. Batavia also granted their request for gunpowder and bullets 'to be used against the Siamese who were at war with their sultan, and to bridle the evil subjects of the sultan'.¹¹⁷

The eagerness of the Johor ruler to gain the favour of Batavia reflected the growing threat to his kingdom from both external and internal enemies. Although the Siamese threat had never fully materialized, there was still the fear that they would one day launch another expedition for a long overdue punishment of Johor. The Johorese themselves never seemed to have become totally reconciled to the authority of the new dynasty since its very turbulent inception in 1699. The rebellion among the Orang Laut, and revolts in the various dependencies — Selangor and Kelang in 1702, Minangkabaus in interior Siak in 1705, Rembau and Indragiri in 1706, Batu Bahara and Deli in 1707, plus renewed rebellions in these places and elsewhere — all contributed to a sense of instability and danger within the kingdom, despite the renewed trading vigour exhibited by the new dynasty in these areas. Even within the Johor capital city there was great dissension which had erupted into an open rebellion by two Orang Kaya and 400 other Johorese in 1709.

On 4 May 1714 the Raja Muda sent three grabs with the envoys Raja Indra Muda, Sri Pikrama Raja, and Sri Lela Raja to the ruler of Palembang to affirm the friendship between the two countries and to remove any difficulties which would endanger

their good relations. To make the negotiations somewhat more amicable from the outset, and as a gesture of appeasement, the envoys had brought along with them a large number of Palembangers who had been robbed by the Johorese.¹¹⁸ The Raja Muda understood how crucial it was to effect a marriage at this time when the ruler of Palembang had just recovered from an illness and was not expected to live long. A marriage alliance with Palembang would be an invaluable asset should the external and internal situation in the Kingdom of Johor become too unmanageable. Despite the elaborate and ambitious plans of the Raja Muda, the Palembangers rejected the marriage plans after the death of the old Sultan of Palembang. The Dutch observed, quite justifiably, that the Palembangers had acted out of fear of becoming too entangled in Johorese problems and too dominated by the Raja Muda.¹¹⁹

Having failed to effect an alliance with Palembang, the Raja Muda turned to the Dutch, but had little cause for rejoicing from this quarter. On 20 April 1714 he sent two envoys to Malacca to apologize for not coming earlier because of Johor's attempts to reinstall Sultan Ibrahim of Indragiri who had been deposed by his subjects.¹²⁰ He reported the return of the Johor embassy from Batavia and complained about the omission of his name from the treaty. Since he governed the Kingdom of Johor and its dependencies, he considered this oversight a slur on the good friendship which the Dutch professed toward Johor. He asked Malacca to write to Batavia to assure a rectification of this grave error.¹²¹ Malacca wrote to the Johorese on 30 April 1714 pressing for a speedy ratification of the treaty, but there was no response forthcoming because of the unintended slight done to the prestige of the Raja Muda.¹²² The Raja Muda continued to ignore Dutch pleas for a quick ratification of the 1713 treaty since Batavia continued to procrastinate in making the necessary corrections. It began to appear that all of Johor's special efforts in sending a delegation directly to Batavia to convince the Dutch leaders there of its true desire for friendship would come to nought because of this oversight. However, the deteriorating state of affairs and the threat of a Buginese rebellion in Johor's lands soon forced the Raja Muda to sign the treaty despite his strong objections.

Although the Buginese had been moving into the Johor kingdom in relatively large numbers toward the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, they had never before

constituted any threat to the Kingdom of Johor and had peacefully become a part of its system of administration. Buginese traders had taken service with the rulers and the Orang Kaya of Johor, and some had even served in responsible positions in the kingdom.¹²³ The large majority settled in Selangor until 1701 and later moved to Linggi, where they remained under their own leaders and only paid nominal allegiance to Johor. In the beginning of the eighteenth century they were finally granted permission by the ruler of Johor to settle in Selangor after a time of forced movement from Selangor to Linggi and then back again to Selangor.¹²⁴ The fortunes of the Buginese settlements in Selangor and Linggi soon changed with the confrontation of Johor and the two Buginese princes, Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok.

According to a report by Malays sent by Malacca to investigate these princes, Daeng Marewa's father was known as 'Upu'. The latter was a nephew or a cousin (*neef*) of the then ruler of Bone and had the states Pammana and Lamuru in south-west Celebes as his apanages. Twelve years before, he had gone to Keper¹²⁵ in east coast Java with 'Rumpone' Tondro,¹²⁶ plundered it, and returned with his booty to Bone. On his return, however, the entire booty was confiscated by the King of Bone. This arbitrary action so angered him that he left Bone on a konteng,¹²⁷ along with thirty people and went to Siantan in the Anambas Islands. Daeng Marewa was then sent by the ruler of Bone to persuade his father to return, but when his father refused, Daeng Marewa decided to remain with him in Siantan.

After some time had passed, Daeng Marewa asked and received permission from his father to go to Mocha, a port located on the Arabian Peninsula at the mouth of the Red Sea. Along the way he stopped at Selangor where he was asked by a prince of Kedah for military assistance in a war against his brother. Daeng Marewa consented and at the successful conclusion of the war was remunerated with twelve cannons by the ruler of Kedah. After this adventure, Daeng Marewa and his followers decided to settle in Linggi.¹²⁸ The Dutch contemporary records substantiate the account of the origins of Daeng Marewa in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, which was borrowed principally from the *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis*.¹²⁹

According to another investigative report on the Buginese leaders, the Dutch learned that the father of Daeng Manompok had exercised authority in Soppeng as a representative of the ruler, but because

of some damning remark or speech, he had both of his lips cut off. This had occurred about twenty years previously and was the reason that Daeng Manompok and his brother Daeng Matimo had left Celebes. They moved from east Java, to Bantam, to some other unnamed countries, to Selangor, and finally, about the year 1711, to Linggi.¹³⁰

The pass bearing the seal of Daeng Manompok provides a clue to his origins. On the seal were the words: 'Sultan Ibrahim Syah, descendant of the kings of Lampoko who believed in God'.¹³¹ Lampoko is a district within Soppeng which previously had its own rulers and later became a part of the Kingdom of Soppeng. In the beginning of the year 1690, Arung Palakka attacked Lampoko with the assistance of the rulers of Goa and Tallo in retaliation for an insult committed against his person by the regent.¹³² As a result of this serious incident, the ruler of Soppeng, ToEsang, fell out of favour with Arung Palakka.¹³³ It appears very likely that the event described to the Dutch in 1715 about Daeng Manompok's father's 'damning remark' may have been the 'insult' referred to here. Daeng Manompok's father would have been the regent of Lampoko in 1690 who was punished for the insult to Arung Palakka by having both of his lips cut off.

Daeng Manompok had his own following and was another locus of power in Linggi from that of Daeng Marewa. Some time between 1702 and 1715 Daeng Marewa managed to gain the leadership of the Buginese groups in the area. In terms of political organization as practiced in south-west Celebes, this meant that the other Buginese leaders maintained their following but recognized the superiority of Daeng Marewa. As their principal leader, he could persuade them to furnish him with manpower and a share of the booty, which were prerogatives attendant upon his position.¹³⁴

The Buginese leaders in Selangor and Linggi were content to remain on the periphery of the Malay kingdoms, for only then was it possible to continue their own political institutions and traditions which were the bases of their authority. Daeng Marewa understood this and was determined to continue exercising his authority in Selangor in the way he was accustomed. A confrontation between Daeng Marewa, Daeng Manompok and the Sultan of Johor arising out of the Kedah civil war in 1715 was the catalyst for a series of events which proved disastrous for the Kingdom of Johor and marked the beginning of a permanent Buginese political and social

role in the Malay and Minangkabau kingdoms on the Straits of Malacca and the south-west coast of Borneo.

The question of the division of spoils resulting from the participation of Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok and their respective following in the Kedah civil war in 1715 brought the Buginese into a major conflict for the first time with their overlords in Johor. The Buginese had agreed to assist the younger of two brothers contending for the throne of Kedah on the condition that, if he were the victor, he would compensate them with a certain quantity of tin.¹³⁵ When this younger brother failed to deliver the promised tin on his accession to the throne of Kedah, the Buginese avenged themselves on the people of Kedah and stripped the countryside of everything, including various types of guns, before returning to Selangor.¹³⁶

When the Raja Muda Tun Mahmud heard of the booty acquired by these Buginese subjects of Johor, he sent a messenger to demand half of the booty for Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor. In so far as the Raja Muda was concerned, this was not an unreasonable request 'because this part of all booty obtained by those living in his [the ruler's] land must be surrendered to him'.¹³⁷ The Buginese refused to give up half of their booty, saying that it had been taken as a guarantee until the ruler of Kedah fulfilled his promise to deliver to them a specified amount of tin. Fearing the worst for their refusal, the Buginese decided to build a fortress in Selangor for their own protection, even though this was going against the Sultan of Johor's express orders.¹³⁸

Angered by the impertinence of these Buginese subjects, the Raja Muda sent about fifteen ships on 4 February 1715 under the command of the Sri Bija Wangsa, the Orang Kaya Paduka Sri Dewa, and Encik Yusuf (a relative of the Raja Muda) to drive out these Buginese rebels who had meanwhile gone from Selangor to Linggi and settled in the area from the northern boundary of Malacca to the Penagie River.¹³⁹ Encik Yusuf informed the Dutch of their mission and said that the heads of these pirates in Linggi were the Buginese princes Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok, who had participated in the wars in Kedah on behalf of the young ruler.¹⁴⁰ On 18 March Daeng Marewa wrote to Malacca that the Johorese wanted to bring him to Johor, together with some cannons and an iron chain which had been given to him by the ruler of Kedah for safe-keeping. Although he had delivered two cannons and the chain to the Johorese force which arrived in Linggi, the latter refused to

accept them and instead demanded the surrender of all the cannon. If these were not given up, the Johorese threatened to expel the Buginese from Linggi.¹⁴¹

A misunderstanding resulting from a difference in political and cultural backgrounds had now developed into a major crisis. What was considered to be the prerogative of a Malay ruler to ask for an equal share of the booty of his subjects as an acknowledgement of his exalted position as their lord was interpreted by the Buginese as an arbitrary and excessive demand. The Raja Muda had asked the Buginese to send half of their booty to Johor as the ruler's rightful share, but the Buginese sent only 10 per cent. In south-west Celebes many of the petty kingdoms owed allegiance to a larger state within a confederation in which certain fixed modes of conduct were observed by all. One accepted practice was the acknowledgement of suzerainty by surrendering to the overlord one-tenth of all crops, goods, or booty. The Dutch understood this principle and requested only 10 per cent in taxes from those lands in south-west Celebes which had come under their supervision since 1669.¹⁴² When the Raja Muda requested a share of the booty on behalf of the Johor ruler, the Buginese obliged in the Buginese, not Malay, ratio. They were willing to recognize the overlordship of the ruler of Johor, but they would not submit to what they believed to be the same tyranny from which they had fled Celebes to avoid. When the Raja Muda sent troops, the Buginese had no other recourse but to defend their settlements and thus become embroiled in a protracted war which brought them to the forefront of political activity in the Malay world.

The Johorese, assisted by the Minangkabaus of Rembau and other neighbouring areas, prepared for battle with the Buginese in Linggi. Both sides began erecting fortresses opposite each other's position. One night the Buginese succeeded in overwhelming the Johorese and forcing the latter to take to their boats. All resistance from the Minangkabau subjects of Johor collapsed, and they too were quickly put to flight. Losses on all sides were light with the Buginese suffering two wounded by guns and ten by mantraps, the Minangkabaus one dead and one wounded, and the Johorese only one wounded. After this victory the Buginese put up palisades at the mouth of the river in order to prevent the Johor ships which had fled upriver from going out.¹⁴³ Six of the seven ships trapped in the river were finally captured and one burnt.¹⁴⁴

This was but the beginning of a war which sapped the strength of the Kingdom of Johor and made it a vulnerable victim of the Minangkabaus in 1718. It was ironic that the first military force sent by Johor carried orders to oust the Buginese from lands which the Dutch claimed to be under their jurisdiction, not Johor's. Daeng Marewa and his followers were settled on the southern side of the Penagie River, while Daeng Manompok and his Buginese occupied the northern bank of the same river, both of which were areas under VOC jurisdiction.¹⁴⁵ The situation between Johor and the Buginese became steadily worse, and in battles at Linggi, Sungai Ujong, and Rembau the Johorese were soundly thrashed by the Buginese.¹⁴⁶ Although the Dutch forbade any Buginese living in Dutch lands from participating in this war, many went to the assistance of their compatriots in Linggi and Selangor. The Buginese from Tangga Batu, territory nominally under the Company's jurisdiction, came to the assistance of the Buginese in Selangor and Linggi because their leader, Daeng Matimo, was a brother of Daeng Manompok.¹⁴⁷ These two brothers had fled together from south-west Celebes toward the end of the seventeenth century and now fought together against their Malay overlord in their adopted homeland.

In May 1715 the Temenggong Tun Abdul Jamal,¹⁴⁸ the youngest brother of the sultan and the Raja Muda, headed a fleet of about sixty warships in a campaign against the Buginese in Linggi. He brought the fleet to a place between the Penagie River and Cape Rachado¹⁴⁹ and then sent his relative, Encik Yusuf, to Muar to seek reinforcements. The latter unluckily ran into strong winds and was forced to beach at Tanah Merah in VOC territory. He and his crew were captured by the Buginese and then put to death at the orders of Daeng Marewa.¹⁵⁰

The growing strength of the Buginese and their successful defiance of Johor were a source of concern to the Johorese and the Dutch. In actual numbers and naval vessels the Buginese were vastly inferior to the Johorese, yet they were overwhelmingly successful in repulsing all manner of invasion from Johor. Since most of the battles occurred on land, Johor's naval superiority could not be brought to bear in the fighting. From previous Dutch reports on military activities of the Buginese, the chainmail-armour of the Buginese was considered to have given them a slight advantage in close fighting. This may have been an important factor in the Buginese-Johor wars in Linggi and Selangor. The unexpected victories of the Buginese over a

heretofore respected Malay power were a source of intense embarrassment and of great loss of prestige to Johor.

Buoyed by their successes against the Johorese, the Buginese forces now began confidently extending their activities into the Company's areas where there were large concentrations of their compatriots.¹⁵¹ It was quite obvious with whom the sympathies of the Buginese living in Dutch lands lay, and there were many cases in which they had openly sided with the Buginese from Selangor and Linggi. Exasperated and incensed by this further source of menace, Johor sent the Sri Bija Wangsa at the head of 600 to 700 Minangkabaus from Rembau to Ayer Hitam and Sungai Tuan, close to Sungai Baru in the Company's lands, to punish those assisting the Buginese in Linggi. While appealing for help to Daeng Marewa, one of the leaders of the Buginese in the VOC lands, Abdul Salam, also wrote to the Dutch requesting permission to assist Daeng Marewa with 300 to 400 men from Tanjung Kling and Tangga Batu (being mostly Buginese areas), to join those of Tanah Merah, Sungai Tuan, and Sungai Baru who were already with Daeng Marewa.¹⁵² The Dutch refused this request and held to a strict neutrality, but there was no effective way of preventing such assistance. The Dutch in Malacca would not have regretted seeing the disintegration of the Kingdom of Johor, their chief trading competitor in the Malay world; however, the experiences of the Dutch elsewhere with the renowned Buginese and Macassarese fighting forces made Malacca fear an even greater danger from a strong Buginese Kingdom established in the Straits of Malacca.

The Johorese forces under the Laksamana Sri Nara di Raja and the Sri Bija Wangsa entrenched themselves in their fortresses on one side of the Sungai Baru, while the Buginese under Daeng Marewa did the same on the other. The Dutch sent envoys to both the Johorese and the Buginese, demanding that they evacuate their territory. Daeng Marewa complied, but the Johorese insisted that they were occupying their own land. Soon thereafter they, too, abandoned the area for fear that the longer they remained the greater would be the possibility of their being attacked from the rear by Buginese reinforcements.¹⁵³

The conspicuous failure of the Johorese to dislodge the Buginese from Linggi elicited the Dutch comment that although the Johorese were superior in manpower to the Buginese they lacked courage to drive them out.¹⁵⁴ The Buginese were acknowledged to be good

fighters by both the Malays and the Dutch, but there was another more compelling reason which made them offer such determined resistance to the numerically superior Johorese forces. Many had left their homeland in south-west Celebes and had undergone difficult experiences in Java and Sumatra in their search for a new home. They had somehow managed to survive these hardships to settle in the relatively sparsely populated Malay Peninsula. In Selangor and Linggi they at last found conditions to their liking since these areas were located on the Straits of Malacca and were free from any strong direct Malay authority. Pockets of Buginese settlements sprang up under various leaders, but the growing dominance of Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok soon made the hope of a strong Buginese kingdom transplanted over a thousand miles away from their beloved homeland appear more attainable. They had fought with and against the Malays and had usually proven more skilful in combat, as a result of better organization and discipline, than their Malay allies or adversaries. While in the past the Buginese had fought on one or the other side, depending upon which ruler provided them with a better arrangement for a home and status within his kingdom, the Buginese-Johorese wars of 1715-1717 found an almost clear division of the forces between the Johorese and their Malay allies against the Buginese. The long duration of the struggle attests to the courage and the tenacity of the Buginese who were fighting under Buginese leaders to retain their adopted homelands in Selangor and Linggi.

Since the Johorese were making no progress whatsoever in the use of force, they decided to prevent the flow of goods to the Buginese. But this, too, failed.¹⁵⁵ The seriousness of the threat finally forced the Johorese to admit their failure and to seek Dutch military assistance. Under these circumstances the Johorese reluctantly abandoned their delaying tactics toward the signing of the 1713 treaty with the Dutch. Thus on 21 July 1715 both the Raja Muda Tun Mahmud and the Bendahara Tun Abdullah finally consented to affix their signatures to a treaty which had unforgivably omitted any mention of them. When the Dutch examined this treaty, however, they discovered that it had not been done in the way prescribed by Batavia. The envoys embarrassedly explained that they knew no other way to do it. As soon as they understood what was needed, they despatched someone to Riau to bring the proper papers. The signed document finally arrived in Malacca on 17

September 1715, more than two years after the first negotiations for the treaty had first begun (See Appendix D).¹⁵⁶

By finally ratifying the 1713 treaty with the Dutch, the Raja Muda hoped to demonstrate his good intentions toward them and thus assure their support in any showdown with the Buginese. The Raja Muda's position was boosted by an unexpected source of assistance in the form of the refugee princes from Palembang with their large armed following. After an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation with his uncle then ruling in Palembang, the Pangeran Dipati Anum had been forced to flee to Lingga with his two sons, a daughter, his brother Pangeran Lambu, and 400 armed men on fourteen ships. From Lingga the Pangeran Dipati Anum had sent a message to Riau asking to be brought under the protection of the Johorese. The Raja Muda sent two grabs to find out what the Pangeran's intentions were. When he was satisfied that the Pangeran truly desired to seek refuge in Johor, he extended to him an invitation to settle in Riau. Realizing the value of winning the support of the Pangeran in terms of manpower and of some future influence in the Kingdom of Palembang, the Raja Muda extended all courtesies to the refugee prince. He went to the mouth of the Riau River to greet Pangeran Dipati Anum and extend his welcome in person. The Raja Muda later bought a piece of land for 100 rijkdaalders where the Pangeran could build his house.¹⁵⁷ In that same month November it was rumoured that the Pangeran's brother and two sons were planning to marry daughters of the Raja Muda and Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor.¹⁵⁸ The Raja Muda could now safely count on the support of the Pangeran Dipati Anum's following of 400 armed men in any further battles with the Buginese. Far from being content with his successful diplomatic manoeuvres with the Dutch and the Pangeran Dipati Anum, he also sought to win the friendship of Indragiri and Jambi by sending missions to make alliances with these countries.¹⁵⁹ These were all a part of the larger web of alliances and counter-alliances which he considered necessary to protect Johor on every front in a final showdown with the Buginese.

Elsewhere, however, the picture looked bleak indeed. Leaders of Patapahan came to Riau to protest against the Raja Muda's levying a tribute of ten catties of gold on their independent state. The Raja Muda refused to let them leave until their differences were resolved for fear of difficulties at a time when Johor was at war with the Buginese.¹⁶⁰ In November a stream of envoys arrived in Riau with

complaints. Ambassadors from the ruler of Kedah demanded the return of the cannons which had been stolen by Daeng Merawa; envoys from Batu Bahara came asking for the restitution of their people who had been forcefully stolen by the Johorese from Bengkalis; and ambassadors from Pagar Ruyong arrived complaining about the fugitive Indragiri ruler who had taken refuge in Riau.¹⁶¹ All of these problems could erupt into another war which Johor could ill-afford at this time.

Another source of difficulty was Malacca. When Anthony Aldorp was in Riau as an envoy, he was confronted with a blunt accusation by the ruler's scribe, Dato Imam. The latter informed Aldorp that Encik Amar, the Malay writer employed by the Dutch at Malacca, had forwarded certain documents to Riau through Muar which revealed a conspiracy between the Dutch at Malacca and the Buginese. The Dato Imam then produced a letter supposedly sent by the Dutch to the head of Muar and read it aloud to Aldorp. According to the contents of this letter, Daeng Marewa had gone from Linggi to Batang Tiga with 300 men and had requested and received permission from the Dutch governor to come to Malacca. In the presence of the governor, Daeng Marewa had revealed his plans to attack Muar and had asked the governor's blessing in this enterprise. The governor not only agreed to this but even suggested that it would actually be more profitable to attack Johor because then all its territories would come under Daeng Marewa's sway.¹⁶² Aldorp refused to believe this story, and the Governor of Malacca, of course, strongly denied any knowledge of this letter to his superiors in Batavia.¹⁶³ Although the Dutch were as concerned as Johor with the Buginese threat in the area, Johor was convinced that the Dutch would willingly assist the Buginese in its destruction and thereby eliminate Malacca's chief commercial rival in the Straits. The spectre of a Buginese attack with the assistance of the Dutch was a nightmare which plagued the leaders of Johor.

The Raja Muda resumed the war against the Buginese in Linggi in January 1716, this time assisted by the Pangeran Dipati Anum of Palembang and his followers. He hoped in this campaign to end the Buginese threat either through force or through some mutually agreeable accommodation,¹⁶⁴ for the longer the conflict continued the more dangerous his own position at home became. He alone would be held accountable in the kingdom for these unsuccessful expeditions.

The desperate situation of the Buginese only became apparent to the Dutch when five representatives from Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok arrived in Malacca on 14 March 1716 requesting one of three alternatives from the Dutch: (1) Since it was the intention of the Johorese to come and war with the Buginese again, they wanted permission to settle in the Company's lands and receive the Company's protection so that they could peacefully earn their livelihood in agriculture and other occupations; (2) If this could not be granted, they wanted permission to continue living in Linggi; and (3) If this request were also to be refused, they wanted the Company's approval to move from Linggi elsewhere. The Dutch refused the first request, did not pass judgement on the second since Linggi belonged to Johor, and raised no objection to the third.¹⁶⁵

The Buginese under Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok were now desperately seeking to preserve their 'Little Celebes' from being completely overwhelmed by the Johorese. When they defied the Raja Muda in 1715 they did not realize how determined the Johorese would be in asserting their authority and wresting control of Linggi from the Buginese. The persistent attacks of the Johorese had been effectively repulsed, but the threats of more invasions and their new policy of blockading the Penagie River slowly sapped the Buginese strength. They realized that they were outnumbered and lacked supplies and that it would only be a matter of time before they would have to submit. Linggi and Selangor had been an ideal new home for the fugitive Buginese because there were few Malays and no direct Malay authority in the area. This ideal situation had now been shattered by an all too familiar Buginese nightmare which had been experienced so often already in the Indonesian world — a 'persecution' by the Malay ruler who had originally granted the Buginese a place to begin a new home. The Dutch seemed to be the only hope left for the Buginese, but the Dutch were loathe to become involved in any native war unless absolutely necessary. They were quite happy to see two menaces to Dutch trade too occupied in destroying each other to be able to harass the Dutch.

At the end of March 1716, Daeng Marewa himself came to Malacca urgently requesting an audience with the Governor. The Governor refused to see him for fear of antagonizing the Johorese but did assent to Daeng Marewa's request that fifty or sixty of his people who had gone to live in the Company's lands at Tangga

Batu, Tanjung Kling, etc., be returned to him.¹⁶⁶ Unsuccessful in obtaining Dutch intervention on their behalf, the Buginese, out of desperation, decided to go on the offensive. At the end of April 1716, Daeng Marewa led a Buginese force of eleven ships and 300 men which succeeded in defeating the Raja Muda and his Johorese-Minangkabau troops and in conquering Selangor. The Buginese losses were a mere three dead and a few wounded.¹⁶⁷ By this daring assault the Buginese gained a large amount of booty, restored their morale, and now controlled both Linggi and Selangor.

The conflict had now become a real economic threat to Johor because Selangor and Linggi, along with Siak, were the most important producers of tin for Johor. There was a strong possibility that, if the Buginese succeeded in holding onto these two areas, as well as Kelang, they would be joined by other Buginese and become even more deeply ensconced than before.¹⁶⁸ There were numerous pockets of Buginese living everywhere in the Malay world who would have been attracted by the possibility of establishing a Buginese kingdom under a Buginese prince. The promise of a friendly Buginese nation within a hostile Malay world would have been welcome to any wandering Buginese unsure of his position in a foreign land. The Buginese, now entrenched in Selangor, Linggi, and Kelang, were buoyed by the hope that their control of the tin areas would become an effective bargaining lever with both the Dutch and the Johorese. The control over the tin trade in Selangor and Linggi provided the Buginese with a commodity which they could easily trade for gunpowder and other war materials.¹⁶⁹

Johor began preparations for an all-out campaign to oust the Buginese from their lands.¹⁷⁰ Instead of waiting for Johor to launch yet another attack, the Buginese again went on the offensive. On 5 July 1716 Daeng Manompok went with twenty-five ships manned by 500 men from Linggi and attacked Johor's Minangkabau subjects at Bengkalis. The Buginese suffered a number of wounded, and the ship carrying Daeng Manompok was forced ashore. They succeeded, however, in capturing four or five small unmanned boats and winning over to their side forty to forty-five Buginese who were living in Bengkalis.¹⁷¹ With each new success the Buginese became more daring and maintained the offensive against a discouraged and disillusioned enemy. The Raja Muda began desperately grasping at straws. He seized upon a rumour of preparations of war in Aceh to inform the Dutch on 19 June 1716 that the Acehnese with 250 ships

were joining the French to attack Malacca and Johor.¹⁷² He eagerly offered to join the Dutch in repelling this attack. Later reports proved this rumour to be completely false,¹⁷³ thus dashing his hopes for a joint venture with the Dutch reminiscent of the glorious campaign of 1641. What he had envisaged was a Johorese-Dutch expedition which would deal a lethal blow to the aspirations of a nascent Buginese kingdom in Selangor-Linggi-Kelang.

But these were visions of a desperate man whose position at home was slowly being undermined as a result of the humiliating defeats of the Johorese by the smaller Buginese forces. The Raja Muda's personal enemies were emboldened by his misadventures, and they, in turn, were bolstered by the steadily increasing numbers of those disillusioned with the Raja Muda's management of the war and the kingdom. And thus the war went on, slowly eroding at home and abroad any confidence in Johor's ability to provide protection for safe trading. The Minangkabaus were no longer bringing their trade to Patapahan or down the Siak River because they were afraid of both the Johorese and the Buginese. Many of the traders left Patapahan to go elsewhere in order to wait and see what the outcome of the struggle between the Buginese and the Johorese would be.¹⁷⁴ The Malay world seemed to be watching and waiting, and it became increasingly apparent that Johor's military power had been bested by a numerically weaker foe with less armaments than the Johorese. With the prestige of their military force sullied by the campaigns against the Buginese, the Johorese were rightfully afraid of disastrous repercussions among the rebellious Johorese subjects in the outlying territories as well as from their neighbouring Malay kingdoms. Under these circumstances they turned once again to the Dutch and hoped to benefit from their relationship with them.

Since the Raja Muda was now desperately anxious to preserve the friendship of the Dutch, he was highly annoyed at the activities of the Buginese servants of the Pangeran Dipati Anum, who had stopped and molested a Chinese *nakhoda* from Malacca. The Dutch sent a protest to the Raja Muda, who then immediately organized an investigation to discover the guilty party. When the Raja Muda was informed that the Buginese were part of the Pangeran Dipati Anum's retinue, he wanted to send them directly to Malacca in order to avert an unnecessary crisis with the Dutch. The Pangeran Dipati Anum refused to allow this, thus causing a serious rift between the two leaders. The atmosphere in Riau became extremely tense with each

side keeping a close watch on each other's activities. A final sign of the irreparable harm done to the relationship was the quiet abandonment of plans for the marriage between the Pangeran and the daughter of the Raja Muda.¹⁷⁵ No longer welcome in Johor and fearing an attack by the Johorese, the Pangeran Dipati Anum decided to leave Riau with all of his followers and go to Siantan. According to a Malacca inhabitant returning from Riau, the Pangeran Dipati Anum let it be known that he was planning to build a strong base at Siantan from which place he would return and 'repay' Johor.¹⁷⁶

The Raja Muda's ill-advised treatment of the Pangeran Dipati Anum, the unsuccessful expeditions against the Buginese, and the dropping off of trade greatly strengthened those Orang Kaya who had opposed from the very beginning the Raja Muda's gross assumption of power. No longer content to remain on the island of Bentan under the tight control of the Raja Muda, these Orang Kaya advocated a return to the mainland and the establishment of the court once again in Johor. On 21 July 1716 the sultan moved back to the Johor mainland with the majority of the people and was followed a few days later by the Raja Muda, the Syahbandar Abdul Rahman, and the rest of the traders and inhabitants of Riau on eighty ships, including an English sloop, and a Moorish ship from Surat. All the houses, fortifications etc., were destroyed, and the guns transported on the English sloop and the Moorish ship.¹⁷⁷ On arrival in Johor the Raja Muda immediately organized the construction of fortifications on the Johor River to ward off possible attacks from various quarters.

The move back to the mainland of Johor reflected a cautious and less confident mood than that which had characterized the 1709 transfer of the capital to Riau. The leaders no longer believed that their forces were capable of taking the initiative and repulsing the enemy from their forward base at Riau. Instead, the mood was now of fear and despair and the faint hope that fortifications along the river would discourage invaders from going up to the new capital. In any case the new leaders were now comforted by the thought of the long river which afforded a fast and convenient avenue of escape from an invading force. The Pangeran Dipati Anum from his new base in Siantan would not forgive the insensitive treatment he had received at the hands of the Raja Muda and was eagerly seeking an opportunity to avenge this affront. Rumours of an attack from Aceh continued to be circulated and were not easily dismissed by the

Johorese whose relations with these northern neighbours in the past had been anything but cordial. Then there were the Buginese who no longer waited for an attack by the Johorese but launched their own military expeditions against Johor's many vulnerable positions.¹⁷⁸ The Johorese continued to send out their fleets against the Buginese from their new capital without making any progress whatsoever. The Johorese force finally abandoned Selangor in August 1717, thus ending the fruitless, costly campaigns in terms of manpower and prestige against the tenacious Buginese.

With their new position of strength and their control over a sizeable portion of the tin trade, the Buginese were able to deal directly with the Dutch in Malacca. In return for the Dutch promise to accept Daeng Marewa and his Buginese as Dutch subjects if they were to settle near the Company's lands, Daeng Marewa promised to prevent his people from attacking the Company's ships and to deliver all the tin of Selangor to the Dutch.¹⁷⁹ Surprisingly successful in their resistance to the Johorese, the Buginese consolidated their newly-won position on the Straits of Malacca while the Johorese became occupied with an even more serious Minangkabau threat from Bengkalis.

1. Kristof Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* (Copenhagen, 1958), pp. 14-15, 184.

2. Petrus Johannes Blok, *History of the People of The Netherlands*, vol. 5 (New York, 1900), p. 41.

3. Ibid. pp. 64-5.

4. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara, A History of Indonesia* (Brussels, 1961), p. 184.

5. Glamann, op. cit. p. 207.

6. KA 1530, OB 1701, Instructions from Gov. Govert van Hoorn of Malacca to His Successor Bernard Phoonsen, 23 Nov. 1700, fols. 12-15.

7. KA 1540, OB 1702, Missive from Gov. Phoonsen of Malacca to Batavia, 19 Jan. 1701, fol. 15.

8. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Phoonsen of Malacca to Batavia, 15 Aug. 1701, fol. 124.

9. Presumably the capital was still at Kota Tinggi. Although it was customary to move to a new capital whenever something inauspicious had occurred at the old site, the turmoil which followed the murder of Sultan Mahmud may have prevented the new ruler from making any such moves immediately. The safety of Kota Tinggi high up the Johor River away from the Orang Laut may have been another decisive factor in the decision to remain at the old capital.

10. KA 1555, OB 1703, Report of Willem van der Lely and Victor Victorisz on Their Mission to Johor, 11 Nov. 1701, fols. 186-95.

11. The Dutch reads: '...de sieckte van syn volck op Djohor'. It is uncertain whether he is speaking figuratively about the dissension within the kingdom or about an epidemic at Kota Tinggi. Both the Dutch and Malay records are silent on this point. *ibid.* fols. 196-7.
12. *Ibid.* fol. 198.
13. *Ibid.* fols. 198-203.
14. *Ibid.* fols. 203-4.
15. *Ibid.* fols. 204-5.
16. *Ibid.* Letter from Sultan Mahmud of Johor to Malacca, received 11 Nov. 1701, fol. 173.
17. *Ibid.* Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca received 11 Nov. 1701, fol. 178.
18. *Ibid.* Letter from the Syahbandar of Malacca, van der Lely, to the Bendahara of Johor, 28 Feb. 1702, fol. 180.
19. *Ibid.* Missive from Gov. Phoonsen of Malacca to Batavia, 8 Oct. 1702, fols. 388-9.
20. *Ibid.* Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to the Syahbandar of Malacca, received 6 Nov. 1702, fol. 406.
21. KA 1569, OB 1704, Missive from Gov. Phoonsen of Malacca to Batavia, 7 April 1703, fol. 192.
22. KA 1555, OB 1703, Report of Willem van der Lely and Victor Victorsz on Their Mission to Johor, 11 Nov. 1701, fol. 406.
23. KA 1668, OB 1710, Second Malacca Register, *Memorie van Overgave* of Gov. Pieter Rooselaer of Malacca to Gov. Willem Six, 26 Dec. 1709, fols. 34-5.
24. KA 1569, OB 1704, *Dagh-Register* of Malacca, under date 3 Oct. 1702, fol. 110.
25. KA 1583, OB 1705, *Journal of Dutch Cruisers*, under date 21 Jan. 1704, fols. 71-3.
26. *Ibid.* Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, received 30 Nov. 1703, fol. 126.
27. *Ibid.* Missive from Gov. Bolner of Malacca to Batavia, 2 Aug. 1704, fol. 171.
28. *Ibid.* fol. 173; KA 1603, OB 1706, Missive from Gov. Bolner of Malacca to Batavia, 25 Jan. 1706, fol. 60.
29. KA 1603, OB 1706, Report by Willem de Roo, appointed Special Commissioner of the Indies, concerning the Poor State of Malacca's Trade, 5 Dec. 1705, fols. 7-12.
30. *Ibid.* fols. 14-16.
31. *Ibid.* Missive from Gov. Bolner of Malacca to Batavia, 25 Jan. 1706, fol. 60; *ibid.* Report by Jan Pietersz. Theelen and Willem Decker on Their Mission to Johor, 25 Jan. 1706, fols. 68-9.
32. *Ibid.* Letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor to Malacca, received 25 Jan. 1706, fol. 74.
33. *Ibid.* Instructions to Theelen and Decker for Their Mission to Johor, 5 Nov. 1705, fols. 47-8.
34. *Ibid.* Letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor to Malacca, received 25 Jan. 1706, fols. 76-7.
35. *Ibid.* Letter from the Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, received 25 Jan. 1706, fol. 83.
36. KA 1621, OB 1707, Report of Arnout Cleur on His Mission to Johor, 18 Aug. 1706, fols. 180-4.
37. *Ibid.* fols. 184-5.

38. Ibid. fol. 189.
39. Ibid. fols. 193-215.
40. Ibid. Report of Ensign Jacob van Walcheren to Batavia on His Mission to Johor, dated 20 Sept. 1706, fol. 220.
41. Freeburgers were those who had served their time with the Dutch East India Company and had then established themselves in the area as free citizens.
42. KA 1621, OB 1707, Report of Assistant Johan de Wolff to Batavia on the Mission to Johor, dated 20 Sept. 1706, fols. 225-6.
43. Ibid. fol. 226.
44. Ibid. fols. 222-4, 227-8; *ibid.* Diary of Assistant Johan de Wolff (under date 25 July), 15 Sept. 1706, fols. 246-7.
45. Ibid. Report of de Wolff, 20 Sept. 1706, fol. 228.
46. Ibid. Report of Jacob van Walcheren on the Mission to Johor, 20 Sept. 1706, fols. 220-1.
47. Ibid. fol. 220.
48. Ibid. fols. 220-2. This was Tun Abdullah, who became Bendahara of Johor in 1708 and played a mysterious role in the conquest of Johor in 1718. Winstedt says that Tun Hussain was Bendahara between 1717 and 1718 (See R. O. Winstedt, 'The Bendaharas and Temenggongs', *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), p. 62), but the Dutch received no communication from Johor regarding a change of Bendahara at that time. Such communications were customary.
49. Ibid. Report of the Wolff on the Mission to Johor, 20 Sept. 1706, fol. 227.
50. KA 1636, OB 1708, Report of Johan de Wolff to Govs. Bolner and Rooselaer of Malacca, 28 Jan. 1707, fols. 23-4.
51. KA 1621, OB 1707, Report of Jacob van Walcheren on the Mission to Johor, 20 Sept. 1706, fol. 222.
52. A contemporary observer, Captain Alexander Hamilton, gave the following description of this ruler of Johor: '... he was beloved by all his Subjects, but being of a quiet Disposition, and a great Bigot to the Mahometan Religion, disposed himself to Prayer and hearing Sermons, and left the Management of his Government to a younger Brother, called Rajah Moudah' Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1727), p. 53.
53. KA 1636, OB 1708, Missive from Gov. Bolner of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1707, fol. 10.
54. Ibid. Report of Johan de Wolff on the Mission to Johor, 28 Jan. 1701, fols. 28-9, 31.
55. Ibid. Letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor to Gov.-Gen. Joan van Hoorn in Batavia, n.d., fol. 41.
56. Ibid. Extract from Dagh-Register of Malacca, under date 28 April 1707, fols. 243-5.
57. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1707, fol. 217.
58. Ibid. fol. 231.
59. KA 1652, OB 1709, Missive from Gov. Rooselaer to Batavia, 10 April 1708, fols. 173-4.
60. Ibid. Translation of a Letter from Nakhoda Hitam, under date 18 March 1708, fol. 339.
61. KA 1668, OB 1710, Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 21 June 1709, fols. 178-9.
62. Ibid. Letter from Gov. Rooselaer to King of Johor, dated 17 Aug. 1708, fol. 459.
63. KA 1652, OB 1709, Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 1 Oct. 1708, fol. 571. See p. 94 for a discussion on the importance of *bahasa*.

64. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 22 Jan. 1709, fol. 16-17.
65. A cargo boat of a heavy beamy type.
66. KA 1652, OB 1709, Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 22 Jan. 1709, fols. 18-19.
67. *Hikayat Negeri Johor, JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), p. 1, lines 23-5; Ernst Ulrich Kratz, *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* (Wiesbaden, 1973), pp. 44-5.
68. KA 1668, OB 1709, Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 16 April 1709, fols. 40-1.
69. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 21 June 1709, fols. 178-9.
70. Ibid. fols. 181-3.
71. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 22 July 1709, fol. 78.
72. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Rooselaer of Malacca to Batavia, 26 Dec. 1709, fols. 192-4.
73. Kratz, op. cit. p. 45.
74. Ibid. fol. 194.
75. KA 1687, OB 1711, Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 12 March 1710, fols. 46-8.
76. Ibid. fols. 100-2.
77. Ibid. Letter from Gov. Six of Malacca to the Raja Muda of Johor, 29 March 1710, fol. 210.
78. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 19 May 1710, fol. 261.
79. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 2 Oct. 1710, fol. 443.
80. Ibid. Report of Hercke Backer and Encik Aman on the Mission to Johor, 20 Oct. 1710, fols. 533-7.
81. Ibid. fols. 540-1.
82. Ibid. fols. 540-1.
83. Ibid. Verbal Report of Raja Lela Putra and Wan Abdul, Johor Envoys from the Raja Muda of Johor, 12 July 1710, fols. 552-4.
84. Ibid. fol. 554.
85. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 6 Sept. 1710, fols. 468-9.
86. Ibid. fols. 466-7.
87. Ibid. Report of the Interpreter Encik Aman on the Mission to Johor, 20 Oct. 1710, fol. 546; *ibid.* Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 6 Sept. 1710, fols. 568-9.
88. Ibid. Report of Backer and Aman on the Mission to Johor, 20 Oct. 1710, fol. 542.
89. Ibid. fol. 542.
90. Ibid. fols. 542-4.
91. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1710, fols. 530-1.
92. Ibid. fol. 531.
93. KA 1702, OB 1712, Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 17 March 1711, fol. 62.
94. KA 1687, OB 1711, Missive from Gov. Six of Malacca to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1710, fol. 61.
95. KA 1702, OB 1712, *Memorie van Overgave* of Gov. Willem Six of Malacca to Willem Moerman, 21 May 1711, fols. 159-160.
96. Ibid. fol. 160.

97. KA 1719, OB 1713, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Jan. 1712, fols. 8-10.

98. KA 1702, OB 1712, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1711, fol. 19.

99. Ibid. Letter from the Raja Muda of Johor to Malacca, under date 9 Nov. 1711, fols. 41-3.

100. KA 1719, OB 1713, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 4 July 1712, fols. 111-12.

101. Ibid. Report of Anthony van Aldorp on the Mission to Johor, 26 May 1712, fol. 146.

102. Ibid. Letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor to Malacca, received 18 July 1712, fols. 136-9.

103. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 30 July 1712, fols. 132-3.

104. Ibid. Instructions for Jan Lispensier and Thimanas Molinaus on the Mission to Johor, 4 Jan. 1713, fols. 29-32.

105. KA 1733, OB 1714, Report of Lispensier and Molinaus on the Mission to Johor, 13 Feb. 1713, fols. 86-7; Dagh-Register of Malacca, under date 13 May 1712, fol. 25. All the observations on the situation in Riau contained in this section are found in the report submitted by Lispensier and Molinaus, *ibid.* fols. 93-113.

106. Ibid. Report of Lispensier and Molinaus, 13 Feb. 1713, fols. 93-7.

107. Ibid. fols. 89-101.

108. Ibid. fol. 92: '... het is goed als men luyden heeft die haar meesters gedoente weeten te regtvaardigen en goed te maken'. The Bendahara Tun Abdullah waited five years before he was in a position to make this statement a reality. There are some intriguing coincidences which seem to indicate that perhaps the Dutch did encourage the Bendahara to pursue his ambitious designs in 1718. It is doubtful, however, that the Dutch gave anything more than oral encouragement to him because Malacca was forbidden by Batavia to become embroiled in native wars or to give any military aid to any native kingdom. The dissatisfaction of the Bendahara, nevertheless, may have been transformed into active plotting after the encouragement received in this meeting with the Dutch envoy in January, 1713.

109. Ibid. fol. 108.

110. Ibid. fol. 111.

111. Ibid. fol. 111.

112. Ibid. fol. 112.

113. Ibid. fol. 109.

114. Ibid. fol. 112-13.

115. Ibid. Letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor to Gov.-Gen. Abraham van Riebeeck in Batavia, received 26 April 1713, fol. 122.

116. Ibid. Report of a conference held in Batavia with Envoys from Johor, 9 June 1713, fols. 137-8.

117. Ibid. fols. 137-8.

118. KA 1746, OB 1715, Palembang Register, Report of Residents Abraham Patras and Isaac de la Fontaine of Palembang to Batavia, 4 May 1714, fols. 57-8.

119. KA 1760, OB 1716, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fol. 130.

120. KA 1746, OB 1715, Report of a Malacca Inhabitant Arriving in Malacca from Siam, 3 March 1714, fol. 22.

121. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1714, fols. 144-5.

122. Ibid. fol. 146.

123. KA 1733, OB 1714, Report of Two Ambonese from Riau, 22 Feb. 1713, fols. 120-1.

124. KA 1760, OB 1716, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fol. 141.

125. Keper in East Java was the site of the victory of the Dutch and the Buginese under Arung Palakka over the refugee Macassarese in 1679.

126. 'Rumpone Tondro', i.e. Arumpone to Unru'. 'Arumpone' simply means King of Bone, and 'toUnru' is one of the names by which Arung Palakka (d. 1696) was known in Macassar at this time.

127. A flat-bottomed Javanese fishing boat.

128. KA 1760, OB 1716, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fol. 140.

129. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Singapore, 1965), pp. 36-40.

130. KA 1760, OB 1716, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Aug. 1715, fol. 167.

131. KA 1922, OB 1726, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1725, fols. 25-6.

132. W. R. van Hoëvell (ed.), 'Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Celebes', *TNI*, jaargang II, XVI^{II} (1854), p. 218.

133. KA 1387, OB 1692, Macassar Register, Missive from Pres. Prins in Macassar to Batavia, 14 Nov. 1690, fols. 535^{r-v}.

134. The *Tuhfat* describes this process where Daeng Marewa (Kelana Jaya Putra) goes to Selangor and Langat to consult with the Buginese in order to obtain reinforcements for his campaign to assist Raja Sulaiman to regain the Johor throne from the Minangkabaus. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. pp. 53-4.

135. This compensation in tin is not as strange as it sounds. In the beginning of the fifteenth century one finds business being transacted in tin currency bars of fixed and certified weight. The rulers of Kedah struck coinage both in tin and silver in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Mohd. Kassim bin Haji Ali and William Shaw, 'The Coinage in Kedah', *Kedah dari Segi Sejarah*, IV, i (April 1970), pp. 31-2. See also Thomas Bowrey, *A Geographical Account of the Countries around the Bay of Bengal, 1669-1679* (London, 1903), p. 281.

136. KA 1760, OB 1716, Report by Syahbandar Cornelis Hasselaer of Malacca on His Interview with a Dutch Burger Frans Barbier on Events in Kedah, April 1715, fols. 117-18.

137. KA 1760, OB 1716, Report by Syahbandar Cornelis Hasselaer of Malacca on His Interview with a Dutch Burger Frans Barbier on Events in Kedah, April 1715, fols. 118-19.

138. Ibid. Report of a Chinese Trader in Kedah, 21 Jan. 1715, fols. 104-5.

139. Ibid. fols. 104-5; ibid. Report of a Chinese Trader in Kedah, fol. 99.

140. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 Jan. 1715, fols. 104-5.

141. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 Jan. 1715, fol. 106.

142. KA 1745, OB 1715, Macassar Register, Governor Sipman in Macassar to Batavia, 27 April 1714, fol. 48; KA Macassar to Batavia, *passim*.

143. Ibid. Interview with Barbier on Events in Kedah, April 1715, fols. 117-20.

144. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fol. 136.

145. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 Jan. 1715, fols. 111-12, according to the report by Gov. B. Bort of Malacca in 1678.

146. KA 1760, OB 1716, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fol. 136.
147. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fol. 138.
148. The *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* states that the Temenggong Tun Mutahir headed a Johor expedition against Linggi in 1129 A.H. (Dec. 1716-1717 A.D.). Kratz, op. cit. p. 45. Since there is no mention of the death of the Temenggong of Johor between 1715 and 1717, this Temenggong must have been the same individual who led another expedition to Linggi in 1715. The Dutch sources say that the Temenggong in 1715 was the youngest brother of Sultan Abdul Jalil (1699-1721). KA 1760, OB 1716, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fol. 137. For lack of an alternative suggestion, R. O. Winstedt accepts R. J. Wilkinson's reconstruction which makes Tun Mutahir a son of Sultan Abdul Jalil (1699-1721). This Tun Mutahir, however, is listed in Winstedt's genealogy as the Temenggong in 1734, and in both Winstedt and Wilkinson's reconstructions as the Bendahara of Pahang in 1756. Winstedt, op. cit. 'The Bendaharas...', pp. 59-61. The Dutch sources, unfortunately, only give the titles of the Bendaharas and Temenggongs, and no other Malay text mentions a Tun Mutahir as Temenggong at about 1715-1717. One can only accept the *Peringatan's* report as another possibility in the reconstruction of the early Temenggongs and Bendaharas of Johor. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the dates and the description of events in the *Peringatan* have been found to be remarkably accurate when checked against contemporary European sources. Until new material becomes available, the present author has decided to follow Winstedt in listing Tun Abdul Jamal as the Temenggong of Johor sometime before 1719. Ibid. p. 60.
149. Now called Tanjung Tuan, about ten miles south of Port Dickson.
150. KA 1760, OB 1716, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 21 July 1715, fols. 137-8.
151. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 17 Aug. 1715, fols. 163-4.
152. Ibid. fol. 164.
153. Ibid. fol. 166.
154. Ibid. fols. 166-7.
155. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 25 Sept. 1715, fol. 3.
156. Ibid. fol. 5.
157. Ibid. Second Jambi Register, Journal of Enche' Kamar of Jambi on His Trip to Riau, 2 Nov. 1715, fols. 14-15.
158. Ibid. Third Palembang Register, Missive from the Resident of Palembang to Batavia, 3 Dec. 1715, fol. 14.
159. Ibid. Report of Anthony van Aldorp on His Visit to Riau, 28 Dec. 1715, fol. 67.
160. Ibid. fols. 68-9.
161. Ibid. fols. 70-1.
162. Ibid. fols. 71-2.
163. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 20 Jan. 1716, fols. 40-1.
164. KA 1775, OB 1717, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 16 March 1716, fols. 3-4.
165. Ibid. fol. 5.
166. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia 20 April 1716, fols. 72-3.

167. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 12 June 1716, fols. 80-1.

168. Ibid. Letter from the Captain of the Chinese at Riau to the Captain of the Chinese in Malacca, received 19 June 1716, fols. 150-1.

169. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 12 June 1716, fols. 80-1.

170. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 20 April 1716, fols. 72-3.

171. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 5 Aug. 1716 fols. 100-1.

172. Ibid. Letter from the Johor Orang Kaya Tun Bija Wangsa, Orang Kaya Sri Palawan and the Syahbandar of Bengkalis, on behalf of the Raja Muda of Johor, to the Malay scribe of Malacca, Encik Aman, received 19 June 1716, fols. 149-50.

173. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 5 Aug. 1716, fol. 101.

174. Ibid. fol. 101.

175. Ibid. Letter from the Captain of the Chinese at Riau to the Captain of the Chinese in Malacca, received 29 July 1716, fol. 138.

176. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Report of Joan Rodrigo, a Malacca inhabitant, on his trip to Riau, 28 Oct. 1716, fol. 138. The Pangeran Dipati Anum of Palembang is mentioned in the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* as having arrived in Riau with two of his brothers/sisters (*tiga bersaudara*) in 1127 A.H. (1715 A.D.) and having remained a long while in Riau although not fully a year. Kratz, op. cit. p. 45.

177. Ibid. fols. 13-14.

178. Ibid. Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 29 Dec. 1716, fols. 10-11.

179. KA 1787, OB 1718, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca and Harmanus van Suchtelen to Batavia, 20 Aug. 1717, fol. 56.

IX

RAJA KECIL AND THE CONQUEST OF JOHOR

BENGKALIS and the Siak River were nominally under Johor until the later months of 1717. A Dutch ship arriving in Malacca from these areas reported the presence of large numbers of Minangkabaus in Bengkalis. What intrigued the Dutch was the rumour that their leader, Raja Kecil, claimed to be the son of Sultan Mahmud Syah of Johor who supposedly left no male heirs when he was assassinated by his Orang Kaya in 1699. In order to recover what he said was his lawful inheritance, Raja Kecil was planning to invade Johor.¹ On 4 December 1717 he sent a letter to the Governor of Malacca in which he requested Dutch assistance in regaining the throne of Johor. Since it was the accepted Dutch policy at that time to avoid being entangled in native struggles in the Malay states, the governor politely refused the request. The letter puzzled the governor because it claimed to have come from the raja of the Minangkabaus, and yet it was clearly contradictory to those letters he had received earlier from Pagar Ruyong in August and October of that same year.² In the letter from the 'King of Pagar Ruyong', which was received earlier in Malacca on 7 August 1717, was another request for Dutch assistance but to recover *for* the Sultan of Johor the goods and the people who had been carried off by the Buginese in Bengkalis. The 'King of Pagar Ruyong' swore that, if this were to be refused, he and the Sultan of Johor would declare war against the Dutch because the Buginese were, in effect, slaves of the Company.³ A second letter in a similar vein arrived in Malacca in October from Pagar Ruyong, this time from the Yang Dipertuan Baginda Putri Jamilan.

She asked that all effort be made to restore to the Sultan of Johor the goods stolen by the Buginese Daeng Manompok at Bengkalis because Johor and Pagar Ruyong were as one country. If the Dutch were to refuse this request, they would no longer be true friends.⁴

In both of these letters Pagar Ruyong had seemed ready to break off their friendship with the Dutch if no help were given to recover the stolen property of the Sultan of Johor. Such letters from the Pagar Ruyong court affirming the close ties between the two courts were not unusual. In 1138 A.H. (1725/1726 A.D.) a 'Raja Pagar Ruyong' entitled Sultan Khalifat Allah Muhammad Syah sent letters to Sultan Sulaiman (ruler of Johor), Sultan Alauddin (Daeng Marewa=Raja Muda of Johor), and Sultan Ibrahim (Daeng Manompok=Raja Tua of Johor) in which Pagar Ruyong, Johor, and 'Gunung Sailan' (judging from the text, a place in Sumatra) are referred to as 'three brilliant jewels'. The purpose of the letter was to ask for a renewal of an old oath between Johor and Pagar Ruyong which stated:

All Minangkabaus living on the seas and lands of Johor would acknowledge no other lord but the ruler of Johor. He is your lord, and if any Minangkabau in the *rantau* [*di laut*] should break this oath, he and his possessions would be consumed by the Besi Kawi and the curse of Allah.⁵

The letter from the Putri Jamilan is typical of the types of letters which were sent by the Pagar Ruyong court to the west and east coasts of Sumatra whenever some tragedy or disaster occurred. They all had a central theme calling for the re-establishment of safe and proper conditions so that trade could flourish without hindrance. The Putri Jamilan had also asked Dutch assistance in restoring the stolen goods of her children, the Minangkabaus, at Bengkalis. She saw the Kingdom of Johor as forming a single unity with Pagar Ruyong because it was a *rantau* area of the Minangkabaus and therefore under the spiritual and protective influence of Pagar Ruyong.

Although the letter of 4 December 1717 also claimed to be from the King of Pagar Ruyong, its contents were contrary to those contained in the previous letters from Pagar Ruyong. It informed the Governor and the Council of Malacca that he was sending his brother's son called 'Siry Sultan Sayet Mohalam Sa raja la lulla sulla allam' through Bengkalis to Johor 'in order to avenge the death of his son [Sultan Mahmud Syah] the righteous king'. If his brother's son should need guns, gunpowder, or lead, the Company should

grant these to him. It also asked the Dutch not to be offended that the letter had been sent without a *cap*, for his brother's son was sufficient *cap*.⁶ Instead of affirming the unity between Johor and Pagar Ruyong, or showing concern about the affairs of the Sultan of Johor, as the previous letters had done, this letter distinctly expressed the intention of seeking vengeance against Johor for the murder of Sultan Mahmud Syah. It was quite understandable, therefore, for the Governor and the Council of Malacca to suspect a forgery in the letter sent on 4 December 1717. The letter contained an intriguing statement that the representative sent from Pagar Ruyong (i.e., Raja Kecil) was all the necessary *cap* the letter needed. A clue to such a bold claim may perhaps be found in the Malay history entitled the *Siak Chronicles*. In a description of the coronation of Raja Kecil, the Yamtuan Sakti (Raja Alam or 'Emperor' of the Minangkabaus' at Pagar Ruyong) delivers a special prayer to the gods and ends with the words: '... nothing else is needed, for the Minangkabau heirloom Si-Buyong [Raja Kecil] is in himself sufficient'.⁸ By this coronation Raja Kecil becomes a messenger from Pagar Ruyong in whose person the authority and powers of that court reside.

The Johorese quickly learned of this new Minangkabau development in their territories. Defence works of earthen walls and forts were erected and other war preparations set in motion to meet this threat.⁹ Two ambassadors from Johor, the Raja Sri Dewa and the Syahbandar Abdul Rahman, were quickly despatched to Malacca in January 1718 bringing gifts and letters from the sultan, the Raja Muda, and the Bendahara of Johor. These letters professed a desire for a lasting friendship with the Company, and at the same time requested gunpowder, lead, and other war munitions. Although the ambassadors were given full power to negotiate a new treaty with the Dutch, they had brought no written provisions with them. They had been sent off in such great haste in order to obtain help in preventing an invasion of Johor and to recover Bengkalis from the Minangkabaus that they arrived with no written document as a basis for negotiations. In the interview the Johor ambassadors presented the following verbal requests:

1. Gunpowder, lead, and armed ships to recover Bengkalis;
2. Company's mediation in the quarrels and differences between the Johorese and the Buginese. They offered toward this end one of three places to Daeng Marewa where he could live and rule as he pleased: Linggi, Sungai Ujong, or Selangor. The only thing they asked of him was

that he deliver all the tin from his area to the Dutch and that he evacuate all Johorese areas which he had invaded;

3. Company's permission to transport tin from other areas on Johorese ships provided with Company passes without having to pay toll;

4. Immediate action to be taken on these points, *since at this time it would be disadvantageous and harmful to the interests of the King of Johor if they had to wait for the Company's answer*; (Italics mine.)

5. Forbidding any of the people of Bengkalis from giving any signs of obeisance to the pretender there¹⁰.

Meanwhile, the Dutch had already received word that the pretender at Bengkalis had sent about fifty ships of all sizes to Johor.¹¹ When the Dutch seemed unwilling to offer any assistance whatsoever to Johor, the ambassadors finally left. The Syahbandar Abdul Rahman sailed first to the Brouwer Straits and there met two ships manned by Minangkabaus who said that they were subjects of Raja Kecil and were now fighting the Temenggong of Johor. The Syahbandar then sailed to the mouth of the Johor River and was proceeding upriver when he heard cannon shots in the distance. He anchored his ship and soon saw a fleet coming down-river, obviously intending to attack him. Before he could do anything, the men on his ship had jumped overboard and started swimming toward the enemy. To his dismay he discovered that his guns and gunpowder had been filled with water by these men before they had jumped overboard. Seeing no other recourse open to him, he fled to the woods with three or four of his faithful followers.¹²

The betrayal of the Syahbandar's men was not an isolated case but seems to have been a consistent theme in the invasion of Johor. When Bendahara Tun Abdullah of Johor was in Bengkalis prior to the arrival of the Minangkabau forces there, he heard that the 'Emperor' of the Minangkabaus was sending to the coastal areas a certain Raja Kecil, who was reputed to be the son of the murdered Sultan Mahmud. He returned to Johor and reported this incident to the Raja Muda, who then sent Sri Setia to meet Raja Kecil and to discover what his intentions were. Raja Kecil told Sri Setia that he was the son of Sultan Mahmud and that he had a large number of ships and Minangkabaus ready to come to Johor in order to claim his rightful heritage. This reported conversation made the Raja Muda suspect that the Bendahara was an accomplice in this.¹³ In an oral report given by the Syahbandar Abdul Rahman to the

Dutch on 25 July 1718, the reason for Raja Muda's suspicions becomes clearer:

...after [escaping from Raja Kecil's fleet and] wandering seventeen days in the woods (where we were forced out of great hunger to eat the leaves of trees and other wild plants in order to survive), we arrived at a place near Johor called Ziddilly [Sedili] where we learned that the Raja Muda and the old Dato Bendahara were at odds with each other over some old quarrel between them. As a result the old King of Johor transferred the powers of the Raja Muda to the Dato Bendahara. The Raja Muda, however, could not accept this and beseeched the old King that he may retain his post (since it was due to him that this kingdom had to a great part declined, which also brought him to the first step toward his downfall) in order to arrest this decline and to restore the kingdom to its former lustre. However, the King would not heed his words and persisted in his original intention of granting his office to the Dato Bendahara. The Raja Muda was persuaded to surrender his administrative and governing powers to his Majesty and not to the Dato Bendahara. Perhaps out of anger, he began immediately making preparations to go down-river. He was prevented from doing so by the old King and the Dato Bendahara with the express advice that if he wanted to leave Johor and settle elsewhere he should go upriver but not downstream. In this way he would be unable to do any mischief. The Raja Muda, therefore, sailed upriver and settled somewhere with his people.¹⁴

Whether the actual transfer of power ever took place is doubtful. The Portuguese sea captain who was present in Johor from 12 October 1717 until after the invasion of Raja Kecil makes no mention of any such action. According to his account, the Raja Muda never relinquished his control of the government during the entire time that his ship remained in Johor.¹⁵ The power struggle, nevertheless, had intensified during this period of crisis. This may have caused the Raja Muda to suspect seriously that the Bendahara was somehow in collusion with the Minangkabaus.

When the Raja Muda Tun Mahmud heard that Raja Kecil's fleet had already entered the mouth of the Johor River, he quickly despatched the Johorese fleet down-river under the command of the Sri Bija Wangsa, the Temenggong, and the Paduka Raja to engage the Minangkabau fleet.¹⁶ Meanwhile the English and the Portuguese ships which were anchored off Pancor at this time were to be of assistance should the Minangkabau fleets come further upriver. Just when the attack on the Minangkabaus was about to begin, the Sri Bija Wangsa defected to the Minangkabaus. By this time some

of the crew members on Johor's ships had already leapt overboard to join the Minangkabaus, but not before mixing the ships' gunpowder with water. They were followed soon after by many others from all the ships in the Johorese fleet. Having been deserted by their men, the Temenggong and the Paduka Raja fled upstream to report the betrayal to the Raja Muda. Panic among the Johorese became widespread when news reached the capital city that the Johorese guns had not discharged at all.¹⁷

The Raja Muda realized now that there was no hope of defeating the powerful Minangkabau force since so many Johorese had betrayed him. He thus empowered the Bendahara to come to whatever agreement necessary in order to obtain the assistance of the English and Portuguese ships in preventing the Minangkabau fleet from going upriver to the city. The Johorese delivered nine pieces of artillery and eight small cannons to the English for this purpose, but they did not resist the Minangkabau fleet. When the Bendahara tried to approach the Minangkabaus to make peace, they fired at him and forced him to flee upriver to Johor Lama. News of the strange occurrences down-river had already reached the city, and thus the Raja Muda and a large number of his people had decided to escape further into the interior. Going ashore, the Bendahara met the Sultan Abdul Jalil wandering alone, abandoned by all of his Orang Kaya who had also gone over to the Minangkabaus. Seeing no other recourse open to them, they decided to flee inland where they remained for a period of five days until they were found by the Minangkabau Panglima Buyong. The latter said that he had been sent by Raja Kecil to inform the Sultan of Johor and the Bendahara that he, Raja Kecil, had come not to ruin Johor, but to bring it to full flower. The Sultan of Johor refused to believe him and instead was convinced that Panglima Buyong had been sent to murder him. Only when Panglima Buyong swore that his intentions were pure did the sultan and the Bendahara return with him to Johor.

Upon arrival in Johor Lama they heard that the (Laksamana) Sri Nara di Raja, the Temenggong, and the Raja Indra Muda had been put to death at the advice of the Sri Bija Wangsa and Encik Siam. Several other Orang Kaya who had joined the Minangkabaus had also agreed to murder the Bendahara Tun Abdullah and his small following, but they were frustrated in their intentions by the precautions taken by the Bendahara. Among these Johorese Orang

Kaya who had joined Raja Kecil were Sri Dewa, who was one of the two Johorese ambassadors who had been sent to Malacca on 13 January 1718 to seek Dutch assistance against the Minangkabaus.

At an opportune time the Bendahara took leave of his family, whom he entrusted to Sultan Abdul Jalil, and left Johor secretly with a small boat and two slaves to a place called Naga Manulun (?). On his journey down-river to the open sea, he came upon a large number of ships under the Raja Negara Selat.¹⁸ The latter asked the Bendahara what he was planning to do. When he learned that the Bendahara intended to sail to Malacca, he not only tried to discourage him from this plan, but also offered his assistance against the Minangkabaus if he would remain. The Bendahara politely refused and said that it was no longer possible to provide any assistance to the sultan since he had already lost his kingdom. The Bendahara then left the Orang Laut and arrived in Malacca on 26 May 1718 after a journey overland from Muar.¹⁹

The large-scale desertion of the Johorese to Raja Kecil is also reported by the Portuguese Captain Tavares whose ship was lying at anchor off Pancor during Raja Kecil's invasion.²⁰ His account is an interesting counterpoint to that of the Bendahara Tun Abdullah's because both were eye-witnesses to the events they described. An especially interesting contrast can be seen in the role which the Bendahara himself claimed he played and that which an outside observer understood him to have played in the invasion of Johor.

According to Captain Tavares, the Johorese had already despatched their ambassadors to Malacca when the Bendahara sent his Syahbandar²¹ to the Portuguese with an offer of thirty catties of gold if they would give battle to the Minangkabau fleet which had just entered the Johor River. The Portuguese refused to proceed down-river but informed the Syahbandar that they would remain anchored at Pancor and prevent any ship from going upriver. Since the Minangkabau fleet consisted of only some thirty poorly-armed galleys, which were inadequate for an invasion of Johor, Raja Kecil decided to remain in the Straits of Singapore and to seize any vessel he could. The Bendahara communicated secretly with Raja Kecil, asking him to continue upriver. He promised him all the help necessary since he had control over the maritime people who manned the fleets of Johor. Through 'the orders and assiduity of the Datu-bandar [Dato Bendahara]', the Orang Laut were prepared to assist Raja Kecil in his invasion of Johor.

Although the Raja Muda Tun Mahmud knew that the Orang Laut had joined Raja Kecil, he was unaware of yet other betrayals which were to be instigated by the Bendahara. The Raja Muda sent his third brother with a fleet of seventy vessels, of which three were royal grabs carrying the three chiefs, who were a brother, a brother-in-law, and a nephew of the Sultan of Johor.²² Seeing their overwhelming strength, the Johorese confidently began the attack. When the two fleets met, the crews of the Johorese ships all jumped overboard and deserted to Raja Kecil. The chiefs of the Johorese fleet tried to fire their cannons and mortars, but none would discharge. Realizing their hopeless position, they hastily retreated to the court of Johor and reported what had happened. The Raja Muda immediately suspected that the treasonous behaviour of the fleet was the work of the Bendahara. The Raja Muda was about to put him to death when the sultan intervened and advised him to stay his hand and merely to inform the Bendahara that he was relieved of his office.

The Bendahara, however, felt that he already had the upper hand in the Kingdom of Johor. He firmly believed that he could count on the larger part of the court and on the approval of the sultan, even though he had handed over his fleet to Raja Kecil.²³ He then went to see the Portuguese, ostensibly to ask their assistance (as was the intention of the Raja Muda in sending the Bendahara to them), but in reality to overthrow or weaken Raja Kecil so he would not be a hindrance to the Bendahara's assumption of power. The Raja Muda soon realized the futility of trying to save the beleaguered kingdom and fled on 4 March 1718 taking his gold with him. The quantity of gold was so great that it took thirty men to carry it onto two sloops. Later, however, the Raja Muda and his followers were forced to abandon their sloops and flee inland because of the approach of Raja Kecil.

The Bendahara established himself at a fortress which guarded the approach to the court of Johor. It was a sturdy fortress with cannons consisting of fourteen pieces of twelve, sixteen, and twenty-four pounders and was strategically situated at a point of the river which was so narrow that the ships had to pass in single file. On the other side of the fort were four well-armed sloops, in addition to twenty-four galleys, all well supplied with men and arms. The forces of the Bendahara were considerable, with the armed men from the court alone accounting for 4,000 men. Nevertheless, the Bendahara's

forces were outflanked and forced to abandon the fortress, and the Bendahara had to flee for his life. According to Captain Tavares, these particular tactics, which had been suggested to Raja Kecil by the newly-appointed Governor of Macao on board the ship, made it possible for Raja Kecil to take possession of the Kingdom of Johor.²⁴

The Minangkabau conquest of Johor remains fascinating because of the manner in which it was accomplished and because of the mystery surrounding the person of Raja Kecil. According to the *Siak Chronicles*, the father of Raja Kecil was Sultan Mahmud Syah, who came to the throne of Johor as a minor in 1685. On the evening before Sultan Mahmud was murdered in the year 1699, his fairy wife knew that something was amiss and quickly abandoned him. That night he called one of his concubines who was a daughter of the Laksamana called Encik Pong to massage his legs.²⁵ At dawn Sultan Mahmud fell into a fit of passion and spewed semen on a mat. He then turned to Encik Pong and told her to eat his semen so that she would have his child. He then commanded that she should bear the child secretly if she were to conceive since this child would be of the seed of King Iskandar Dzul-Karnain²⁶ and would continue the lineage. Encik Pong hurriedly swallowed the semen and, by the Grace of God, became pregnant.

That morning Sultan Mahmud was being brought to the mosque on the shoulders of a servant when he was struck on the head by Megat Sri Rama, an Orang Kaya whose pregnant wife had been cruelly murdered by Sultan Mahmud. Sultan Mahmud's blood flowed white as coconut milk (*keluar darah putih memancar seperti santan*), but he somehow managed to survive this blow and inflict a wound on Megat Sri Rama's foot. Grass grew in the foot wound, and for four years it did not heal. Sultan Mahmud managed to stagger back to the palace where he ordered the *imam* and the *khatib* to prepare a document telling of his death. This document was to be passed on to his descendants, if there were any, and was to be kept by the *imam*, but failing this, by Encik Pong. Having done this, he died.

Soon after, the Bendahara, who had been a part of the plot to assassinate Sultan Mahmud, entered the interior of the *istana* to examine all the court women and extract an oath that they were not with child by the murdered ruler. When he approached Encik Pong, she swore that if she were pregnant by the late ruler she would never

set eyes on her child. She was then taken by her father the Laksamana to seek refuge with her brother whom she had already informed of her problem.

When she gave birth she was told by the Laksamana that it was a handsome child. She refused to look at it and asked that it be taken away because she remembered the oath that she had sworn to the Bendahara. The Laksamana went later to the Singapore Straits to the Raja Negara Selat, head of the Orang Laut on Singapore, and told him the story of his daughter and grandchild. After hearing the story, the Raja Negara Selat stated unequivocally that even if this would mean their destruction, they would still be willing to receive the child since he was their true ruler.²⁷ The Raja Negara Selat then accompanied the Laksamana back to Johor where the former was entrusted with the child and with a letter for the Temenggong of Muar. With this precious cargo the Raja Negara Selat sailed to Muar and brought the child and the letter to the Temenggong. The latter cried when he read the contents of the Laksamana's letter and immediately took up the task of raising the child as his own.

After seven years had elapsed, the Temenggong of Muar returned to Johor with his charge, the young son of the late Sultan Mahmud by Encik Pong. During the entire time that the boy was in Johor he played at the grave of his father, and other boys would accompany him to the grave and follow his lead in eating the grass on the grave. Whenever they committed this sacrilege, they would all vomit blood, except the young son of Sultan Mahmud. News soon reached the Yamtuan (Raja) Muda of Johor that there was a child who bore a striking resemblance to the late Sultan Mahmud and who insisted on playing on the latter's grave. The Yamtuan Muda became suspicious and ordered that the boy be brought to him. The Laksamana heard of this and so conferred with the Temenggong of Muar and the Raja Negara Selat. Since it was generally known that the child had come with the Temenggong of Muar, it was considered wiser to have the child transported away from Johor by another person. When a Minangkabau trader called Nakhoda Malim suggested that he take the boy, the Laksamana readily accepted and explained to him the special circumstances surrounding the boy's birth and childhood. Nakhoda Malim gave the child the name Tuan Bujang, and they both sailed safely away to Jambi. From Jambi they went upriver till they reached the court of Pagar Ruyong where

they presented themselves before the Yamtuan Sakti, the 'Emperor' of the Minangkabaus. The Yamtuan Sakti was immediately struck by the beauty of the child and remarked on his royal bearing. After relating the story of this child to the Yamtuan Sakti, Nakhoda Malim suggested that the Yamtuan Sakti supervise the child's upbringing, since it was only proper in these circumstances.²⁸ The child was thus entrusted to Yamtuan Sakti's mother, the Putri Jamilan, who expressed great love for the fatherless boy and brought him up as her own child in the court of Pagar Ruyong.

At Pagar Ruyong one of the boy's favourite pastimes was to climb on top of the royal dais (*peterana*)²⁹ and play there. When he was reprimanded by the court maidens, they were in turn rebuked by the Putri Jamilan for attempting to prevent the boy from doing what was only natural to him. She explained to them that the boy was an heir to the throne of Johor and merely wanted to look at the crown.

He continued to play with the royal children until he reached the age of thirteen, and then he requested permission to go to the Batang Hari in order to seek knowledge (*hendak mencari 'ilmu*).³⁰ Putri Jamilan granted his request, and Tuan Bujang went with other Minangkabaus to Tambang, Limon, and then to the Batang Hari. As soon as he reached the Batang Hari, he decided to go further to Rawas and then down-river to Palembang. Upon arrival in Palembang, he paid his respects to Sultan Lumabang who took an instant liking to Tuan Bujang and made him the royal bearer of the *sirih* box.³¹ Soon thereafter, Sultan Lumabang fell ill and could not sit or walk properly. He then realized that he had only begun to suffer these ailments after he had made Tuan Bujang his *sirih* box bearer.

Tuan Bujang accompanied the Sultan Lumabang to Johor after the latter had been defeated in a civil war. In Johor Tuan Bujang attracted attention since he sat on the same level as the sultan. The Yamtuan Muda of Johor also noticed a striking resemblance between this royal bearer of the *sirih* box and the late Sultan Mahmud, and asked Sultan Lumabang who this boy was. Sultan Lumabang merely remarked that he was a Palembanger whom he had taken into his service.

When Sultan Lumabang failed to win one of the daughters of the Johor ruler as his bride, he left Johor and went to Siantan where Tuan Bujang was circumcised. The sultan and his retinue then sailed for Bangka to await an opportune time to effect a reconquest

of Palembang. While they were at Bangka they were visited by two Buginese chiefs, Daeng Parani and Daeng Cellak. The sultan at first enlisted their help but later rejected it because he was advised against having Buginese in his following who would destroy Palembang. Instead, Sultan Lumabang asked for assistance from the Dutch in Batavia and with their help succeeded in regaining his throne.

Tuan Bujang then took his leave of Sultan Lumabang and sailed upriver to Rawas, where he married the daughter of the Dipati³² of Batu Kucing. From this marriage came a child who was named Raja Alam. Tuan Bujang later went to Jambi where he took service with the Sultan Maharaja Dibatu and was wounded very badly in the thigh during a civil war then raging in Jambi. Tuan Bujang soon recovered and returned to Pagar Ruyong.³³

The story of Raja Kecil's adventures as a youth in Palembang and Jambi is not mentioned in the records of the Dutch comptoirs at Malacca, Palembang, Jambi, or West Coast Sumatra. There is, however, an interesting report which came from Palembang on 9 March 1720, that Raja Kecil had sent three Johor ships with three important ambassadors to Palembang on 5 March on an unknown mission. It was rumoured that when he was living in Palembang, he had had a daughter and had sent his ambassadors back to Palembang to fetch her.³⁴ Having lived in Palembang he could have been a part of those who followed the popular Pangeran Dipati Anum when he was forced to leave Palembang. It was said that, when Pangeran Dipati Anum had to flee to escape assassination in September 1714, he had the support of half of Palembang, plus all the mountain people and the pepper planters. With his children, two brothers, and a following of about 200 people, Pangeran Dipati Anum fled first to Bangka, then to another island called Kubuk,³⁵ before going to the Johor court at Riau. He was treated with great respect at Riau and became betrothed to the oldest daughter of the Raja Muda of Johor.³⁶ Differences between the Raja Muda and the Pangeran Dipati Anum over the activities of the latter's Buginese followers³⁷ soon soured their relationship and ended the engagement.³⁸ He then left with his entire following to Siantan and forcefully made himself master of the island.³⁹ On 8 November 1717 he was finally reconciled with the ruler of Palembang and made regent.⁴⁰ The peregrinations of the Pangeran Dipati Anum and his engagement to the daughter of the Raja Muda of Johor

bear a close resemblance to the account in the *Siak Chronicles* of the activities of the Sultan Lumabang of Palembang whom Raja Kecil served as royal bearer of the *sirih* box.

During the time that the Pangeran Dipati Anum was roaming the seas, Jambi was racked with an intermittent civil war between the kingdom upriver under Pangeran Pringabaya and the kingdom down-river under his brother Sultan Kiai Gedé. It would have been quite easy for Raja Kecil to have taken service with the Pangeran Dipati Anum until the latter's reconciliation and then participate in a civil war in Jambi. The activities described may have been the true experiences of Raja Kecil with the necessary embellishments to enhance the importance of his position and the kingly qualities which were present even from adolescence.

According to the *Siak Chronicles*, the sudden reappearance of Raja Kecil after his adventures in the *rantau* was a great delight and surprise to the Yamtuan Sakti. When asked why he had stayed so long overseas, Tuan Bujang (Raja Kecil) answered: 'I have been studying foreign customs (*Patek menengok cupak gantang orang*).'⁴¹ The Yamtuan Sakti smiled at his answer but revealed that he knew where Tuan Bujang's true desires lay. Even the Putri Jamilan suggested that it would be best if he were to go to Siak and seize Johor in revenge for the death of his father. To prepare him for his new mission, they installed Tuan Bujang with the beat of the royal drums (*nobat*). Putri Jamilan bore the regalia while the special drum of sovereignty made of the skins of lice⁴² was beaten. Tuan Bujang came and stood against a stake made of hardwood called *teras* with stinging nettle vines⁴³ wrapped around it and was crowned on that spot by the Yamtuan Sakti. Meanwhile the Yamtuan Sakti stood beside them and uttered special prayers to the gods, saying:

If you are the son of my brother in Johor, descended from Sultan Iskandar Dzul-Karnain, of the lineage of the Just Nurwan, sprung forth from the Prophet of Allah, Solomon (May God Bless Him and Save Him), nothing else is needed, for the Minangkabau heirloom Si-Buyong [Raja Kecil] is in himself sufficient.

The four chief ministers of Minangkabau came and paid homage to Tuan Bujang, wishing him an enduring rule as a great king in the lands of the Malays.⁴⁴ Tuan Bujang was then given the title of Yang Dipertuan Kecil and the personal name of Raja Beraleh.⁴⁵

Before Raja Kecil's departure the Yamtuan Sakti and the Putri Jamilan brought forth the sword called Sapurjaba, a Minangkabau

regalia which had been a gift from the Raja of Kuantan. The Putri Jamilan then presented Raja Kecil with a quid of betel, a strand of hair thirty feet in length, two *kupang* shells, and a *cap*. The *cap* explained that the bearer was Raja Kecil, a child of the rulers of Pagar Ruyong, who was going to the lands by the sea (*tanah laut*). It called on every Minangkabau in these areas to accompany him or else to provide him with twenty rials. If they refused to heed the *cap*, they would be punished by this oath and by the *bisa kawi*.⁴⁶ Raja Kecil was also presented with four hulubalangs: Dato' Lebinasi, Dato' Kerkaji, Raja Mandailing, and Sultan Pakadalian.

After embracing and kissing Putri Jamilan, Raja Kecil took his leave and went to Bukit Batu in Siak where he traded in *terubuk*⁴⁷ and *terubuk* roe. Raja Kecil also sailed and traded in Malacca on the boat owned by a Nakhoda Penangkok. While trading in the area, Raja Kecil observed that there were many wealthy Minangkabaus living in Bengkalis who owned large ships. When he finally decided that the time was right to launch an invasion of Johor, it was to Bengkalis that he went to recruit both men and supplies. He produced the *cap* from the ruler of Pagar Ruyong and quickly assembled whatever force he needed for this daring enterprise.⁴⁸ As soon as the word spread that he had been sent from Pagar Ruyong, he departed to Batu Bahara where there were also large numbers of Minangkabaus. Raja Kecil installed the four penghulus at Batu Bahara and augmented his forces with recruits from here and from Tanah Putih and Kubu. Having succeeded in gaining the support of these Minangkabaus, Raja Kecil returned once again to Bengkalis to plan the final assault on Johor.

During these preparations the Buginese chiefs Daeng Parani, Daeng Cellak, and the Buginese Raja Tua (Daeng Manompok) paid a visit to Raja Kecil. They had met once before at Bangka when Raja Kecil was bearer of the royal *sirih* box for Sultan Lumabang. They discussed the imminent invasion of Johor, and Daeng Parani extracted the promise that, should the Buginese join Raja Kecil in this enterprise, he would be rewarded with the title of Yang Dipertuan Muda (Raja Muda). This was agreed upon, and so the Buginese chiefs left for Langat to recruit an army from the Buginese communities settled there. They also concurred in a decision to send a letter to the Yang Dipertuan of Johor telling him that the son of Marhum Mangkat Dijulang (Sultan Mahmud Syah, 1685-1699), had come to avenge his father's death. Upon receipt of this letter,

the Yang Dipertuan of Johor called together his Orang Kaya and ordered defence preparations to be made.

Word soon quickly spread that the son of Sultan Mahmud Syah was coming to invade Johor. The Orang Laut under their lord the Raja Negara Selat deserted Johor and came to Bengkalis to give obeisance to their legitimate sovereign.⁴⁹ In Bengkalis itself the Minangkabaus became upset at the reports that he was a Johorese, and they insisted that he was their lord from Minangkabau. Fighting broke out, and Raja Kecil had to intervene to ask the two groups to set aside their quarrels and work together for the invasion of Johor. The ships were made ready, and the Minangkabau fleet set sail for Johor accompanied by the ships of the Orang Laut and all those who inhabited the sea coasts. When news arrived of the approaching armada, there was great consternation among the Johorese. It was said that the fleet was led by their legitimate ruler and that the Laksamana's *suku* (the Orang Laut) had already gone and paid homage to him. Since there were still many Johorese who doubted Raja Kecil's claim, they asked him to prove it by making brackish water fresh. Raja Kecil agreed to this and stuck a coil of rattan into brackish water and said: 'If I am truly descended of the kings of Johor, by the Grace of God, let this brackish water become fresh.'⁵⁰ And the water became fresh. By this miracle Raja Kecil convinced many Johorese to join him.

The Johor forts tried to fire their guns at Raja Kecil's fleet, but the guns spewed forth water instead.⁵¹ Thus Raja Kecil sailed up-river to the capital with complete impunity. With his sword the Sapurjaba in hand and his four *hulubalang* at his side, Raja Kecil clambered up a bridge and began the attack on the city. When the Yang Dipertuan heard that the Minangkabaus had penetrated into the city, he hurriedly abandoned his *istana* and retired to the *kampung*. Thus Raja Kecil met no opposition whatsoever in seizing the kingdom. The old Bendahara and the four *hulubalang* were at Raja Kecil's side on entering the city, but once in the *istana* Raja Kecil noticed that the Bendahara had disappeared. He was then told by the superintendent of the *istana* that the Bendahara had fled.⁵²

Soon the Yang Dipertuan (Sultan Abdul Jalil) returned and placed himself at the mercy of Raja Kecil because his heart was heavy with the burden of the murder of Sultan Mahmud Syah. He came and paid homage to Raja Kecil and was again made Bendahara.

As Bendahara he commanded that the Raja Muda be put to death for killing his wives and children. Thus Raja Kecil became master and ruler of the Kingdom of Johor.⁵³

The Malay histories originating from Johor generally accept the *Siak Chronicles*' story of Raja Kecil. They all relate that Raja Kecil was the son of the murdered Sultan Mahmud who had been raised in Pagar Ruyong and then sent back to reclaim the throne of Johor with the blessings of the rulers of Pagar Ruyong. The Malay writers were not averse to adopting the story that Raja Kecil may have been the son of Sultan Mahmud, and that he had been raised and blessed by the Pagar Ruyong rulers. It would have been humiliating to think that Johor had taken defensive measures against an ordinary foe, a pure Minangkabau adventurer. For many of the Orang Kaya of Johor, the appearance of Raja Kecil and his unverifiable pretensions provided the opportunity to manoeuvre the usurping Bendahara dynasty out of power and accept another Malay ruler, whether a scion of the murdered Sultan Mahmud or just an ordinary Minangkabau leader sanctioned by Pagar Ruyong.

There are, however, a few variations of the Raja Kecil saga in the Johor histories. In the *Sejarah Raja2 Riau*, another version of Raja Kecil's origin is given. After the murder of Sultan Mahmud, Encik Pong was taken by a Minangkabau called Panglima Bebas to Pagar Ruyong, where she gave birth to Raja Kecil. He was then raised by Panglima Bebas.⁵⁴ The *Tuhfat al-Nafis* adds further that, after Raja Kecil was born, he was presented to the ruler of Minangkabau by Encik Pong who explained the circumstances of his birth. Raja Kecil was then raised by the ruler until he was an adult.⁵⁵ According to a manuscript entitled the *Hikayat Johor serta Pahang*, the mother of Raja Kecil is called Ce Mi. She gives birth to Raja Kecil in Minangkabau, and when the latter is a young man she tells him that he is the son of Sultan Mahmud. He is thus encouraged to seek the assistance from the ruler of Minangkabau for an attack on Johor.⁵⁶

The *Tuhfat al-Nafis* presents the story of Raja Kecil 'according to the Siak history', except for the account of the attack on Johor in 1718. In the *Tuhfat's* version, immediately prior to the invasion, Raja Kecil sent someone who was skilled at spreading rumour and at deception to go among the Johorese. He was to tell them that Raja Kecil was the son of Sultan Mahmud Syah and was now planning to return to Johor to reclaim his rightful place on the throne of Johor. Whoever refused to join him would have himself and his

descendants punished by the supernatural powers of sovereignty (*kena daulat*⁵⁷) of the murdered Sultan Mahmud. Those who joined him would be rewarded with beautiful robes of honour for their loyalty. After hearing Raja Kecil's words, the Orang Laut expressed their willingness to support him in this venture. The Laksamana of Johor, the father of Encik Pong, then decided to betray Johor.

After having successfully spread these stories among the Johorese, Raja Kecil ordered his fleet to set sail. The Orang Laut did not warn Johor of the impending attack, and thus Johor was caught completely off-guard. When the Raja Muda of Johor was told that the enemy had come, he paid no attention but continued his game of chess. There was some fighting in the beginning, but then many of the Johorese joined the enemy because the Laksamana, their commander-in-chief, had already turned traitor. The Raja Muda ran amok, killing his wife to prevent her from falling into the hands of the Minangkabaus. He then turned and attacked the Minangkabaus until he was finally killed at Kayu Anak. Meanwhile, the Sultan of Johor had escaped to a *kampung* but was advised by his ministers to surrender. He humbled himself before Raja Kecil and asked to be installed as Bendahara. Raja Kecil thus made him his Bendahara.⁵⁸

These two versions can be combined to tell a fuller story since they complement one other. One striking contrast, however, is that the *Siak Chronicles* blames the Bendahara and the *Tuhfat* the Laksamana for the betrayal of Johor. The Dutch contemporary records verify the *Siak Chronicles*'s story, although one of the major fleet commanders, the Sri Bija Wangsa (but not the Laksamana), did betray Johor. In both of these accounts, the role of the Raja Muda is denigrated. The *Tuhfat* accuses the Raja Muda of irresponsibility since he refused to heed warnings of the approaching Minangkabau fleet. Perhaps as a descendant of the original immigrant Buginese princes of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the author of the *Tuhfat* was attempting to show that the principal ministers of the ruler were to blame for the downfall of Johor to the Minangkabaus. In demonstrating this point, he subtly accentuates the more vigilant and successful role played by his ancestors in support of the throne of Johor. The *Siak Chronicles* condones the killing of the Raja Muda because of his murder of his wife and children. It had little praiseworthy to say about the Raja Muda

because of his role as an enemy of Raja Kecil. In order to make the Minangkabau invasion of Johor justifiable, the principal antagonist had to be painted in the blackest of colours.

European contemporary reports indicate that the Raja Muda was a brave and intelligent leader whose downfall was caused by circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Bendahara dynasty on the throne of Johor in 1699. A Governor of Malacca described him as a person 'full of spirit and courage ... [willing] to undertake a great deal for the sake of his country'.⁵⁹ The Portuguese Captain Tavares, who was present during the Minangkabau invasion of Johor in 1718, said of Raja Muda that he was both clever and intelligent and 'possessed good sense and prudence'.⁶⁰ The only unfavourable contemporary report on the activities of the Raja Muda came from a country trader, the Scottish Captain Alexander Hamilton, who called the Raja Muda 'a covetous tyrannical Prince'.⁶¹ His views of the Raja Muda may have been coloured by their disastrous partnership in 1712, when their ship carrying a rich cargo of eighteen chests of opium, 1,535 lbs. of sandalwood, twenty-six lbs. of eaglewood, 176 lbs. of shellac, and 105 lbs. of *kesumba*⁶² was confiscated by the Dutch as contraband.⁶³ There is little in the contemporary records which indicates that he deserves the description given by Hamilton and later incorporated by both Netscher and Winstedt in their accounts of the Raja Muda. He undertook many policies similar to those pursued successfully by his predecessors, the Paduka Raja Tun Abdul Jamil and the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tun Habib Abdul Majid. The Kingdom of Johor which he governed, however, was unlike that administered by his predecessors; his family's rule was no longer based on the traditional pillars of strength which had previously supported the Malacca-Johor kingship. Only during the large-scale Johorese betrayals to a person claiming to be the son of Sultan Mahmud of the Malacca dynasty did he fully appreciate the deep wounds in the society which had divided the kingdom and had worked toward negating all of his and his family's efforts for Johor.

The court of Pagar Ruyong played a central role in the Raja Kecil saga. It was at Pagar Ruyong that Raja Kecil was brought up and adopted by Putri Jamilan. The latter was responsible for his education and even nurtured Raja Kecil's desire to reclaim his rightful throne of Johor. Before Raja Kecil's second and final departure from Pagar Ruyong, he was formally installed and given certain

objects to legitimize his mission, such as the sword (Sapurjaba) and a *cap*. Although both the Yamtuan Sakti and the Putri Jamilan gave their blessings to the enterprise, Putri Jamilan was the one who had encouraged this attitude since his childhood. With the full support of the Pagar Ruyong court, Raja Kecil was assured of some measure of success in the lands of the Minangkabau *rantau* areas of the Siak River and in the other states of east coast Sumatra.

Once again there is no reference in the Dutch records specifically linking Raja Kecil with the rulers of Pagar Ruyong; nevertheless, the prominent role which Putri Jamilan played in the Raja Kecil story may provide some clues as to the likelihood that the Raja Kecil saga could have been enacted as described in the *Siak Chronicles*. In the Minangkabau highlands a new method of succession had been established since 1683 whereby the Minangkabau position of Yamtuan Sakti, or the 'Emperor of the Minangkabau', alternated between the Pagar Ruyong and the Suruasso families. The name 'Putri Jamilan' was actually a hereditary title assumed by both the Queen Mothers of the rulers of Pagar Ruyong and Suruasso, and it was through the Putri Jamilan that the inheritance right to the thrones of Pagar Ruyong and Suruasso was legitimized. The eldest daughter of the Queen, through whom the succession descended, inherited the title Putri Jamilan at the death of her mother.⁶⁴ These Putri Jamilans exercised considerable moral and political influence in the Minangkabau world and had the prerogative of addressing letters to the outside world with the title translated into Dutch as 'Queen of the Minangkabaus' or just simply 'Emperor [*keizer*] of the Minangkabaus'.⁶⁵ Their position in the Minangkabau court in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has many similarities with the position of the Bundo Kanduang (Real Mother) in the Minangkabau work, the *Kaba Cindua Mata*.⁶⁶ Both the Putri Jamilans and the Bundo Kanduang are mothers of the rulers of Pagar Ruyong and occupy a somewhat more elevated status than their sons, thus reflecting the revered role of the woman in Minangkabau society. The Putri Jamilan was an active personage in the court at Pagar Ruyong and exerted her moral influence in both the west and east coasts of Sumatra. The Dutch records from the Jambi and Malacca comptoirs contain letters from the Putri Jamilan in the early eighteenth century urging restoration of the trade or of enslaved Minangkabau subjects, else face her wrath and retribution.⁶⁷ During the Minangkabau rebellion in the upriver Jambi kingdom in 1708,

the Putri Jamilan wrote a letter in support of the rebels and told Pringabaya, the ruler of the up-river kingdom, to uphold his contract made with the Yang Dipertuan (Yamtuan Sakti) of Pagar Ruyong.⁶⁸ Another letter from the Putri Jamilan arrived on 28 October 1709 addressed to the Kings of Jambi. In this missive delivered by her ambassadors Banyak Batua and Paduka Sri Nara, she reminded the Kings of Jambi that when their father Sultan Ingalaga had come to Pagar Ruyong, she had given him the *nagari* from Hujung Jubang upward. Now she asked that both brothers restore the coasts.⁶⁹ Sultan Kiai Gedé saw the rebellion as an opportunity to exploit the weakness of his brother and thus unite the divided Jambinese kingdom under his rule. He attempted to persuade Abraham Patras, the Company Resident at Jambi, to write a joint letter to Putri Jamilan seeking some mutually profitable arrangement, but Patras privately scoffed at the suggestion since he considered her a mere figurehead used by others for their own ends.⁷⁰ In March 1718 the Dutch in Malacca received a missive from the Putri Jamilan informing the Dutch that she had sent the son of the murdered Sultan of Johor to rule over Bengkalis. She had presented him with the ornaments and garments of the murdered ruler in order to prove the legitimacy of his claims to the throne of Johor.⁷¹

The comparatively large numbers of Minangkabaus who were settled on the main rivers and along the coasts of east coast Sumatra were a ready source of manpower to anyone who could somehow gain their allegiance. Armed with a *cap* and other objects from the Putri Jamilan and the Yamtuan Sakti, Raja Kecil was as successful as other previous Minangkabau leaders who had presented proof of having been sent from Pagar Ruyong. What made Raja Kecil succeed where the others had failed was perhaps the unique circumstances which preceded his arrival at Bengkalis. Johor had been rent with internal conflict and distrust because of the trauma which surrounded the accession of the Bendahara Sultan in 1699 and the strong personalities of the Bendahara Tun Abdullah and the Raja Muda Tun Mahmud. The divisions became even greater as the war with the Buginese which had begun in 1715 dragged on and any hopes for victory dwindled. In this tense atmosphere certain specific measures may have been directed against the Minangkabau settlers in Johor itself. On 12 November 1716 the Dutch Resident at Jambi reported the arrival from Johor of about 100 Minangkabau men, women, and children. They reported that the Sultan of Johor had

robbed them of everything, even though they had been granted the freedom to settle there. About 300 of them then left Johor on seven baloks,⁷² of which four went to Indragiri, one to Palembang, and two to Jambi.⁷³ Action taken against the Minangkabaus was not forgotten and may have contributed to the support which Raja Kecil so easily obtained. When Raja Kecil finally did conquer Johor, one of the reasons given for the conquest was to wreak vengeance on the Raja Muda, not only for his improper behaviour toward his own people and the Orang Kaya, but also for his unreasonable practices toward the Minangkabaus. According to Raja Kecil, the Raja Muda had used the Minangkabau women as his concubines and had even forced several of the women to be his slaves, a practice which would have been especially repugnant to the Minangkabau matrilineal society and especially to the Putri Jamilan. For this reason Raja Kecil had been given full authority to destroy the Raja Muda and put an end to his activities in Johor.⁷⁴

This explanation again may have been part of Raja Kecil's large arsenal of psychological weapons. He may have described some element of truth in more lurid detail in order to arouse the support of the Putri Jamilan and the numerous Minangkabaus in the *rantau* of east coast Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. He could then reason with the Minangkabaus that, by destroying the Raja Muda of Johor, he would be able to restore peace so that the Minangkabaus could carry on their trade and bring Johor to 'full flower'. Raja Kecil's appearance in Bengkalis in late 1717 provided all the different Minangkabau groups on the east coast of Sumatra with an opportunity for a concerted effort against Johor. With Johor weakened by its wars and its internal squabbles, and with a large number of Minangkabaus prepared to obey the summons of their spiritual overlords in Pagar Ruyong, it was an opportune time for someone such as Raja Kecil to come to the fore.

The surprisingly easy defeat of Johor must have been a stunning blow to the pride of the Johorese. Johor court historians only briefly mention, if at all, the conflict with the Buginese which sapped the strength of Johor and most probably contributed directly to the Minangkabau invasion. These histories, however, illuminate a deeper cause of the final collapse of the kingdom in 1718, which the Dutch contemporary observers sensed but never really comprehended: the malaise in the kingdom which haunted the Bendahara dynasty since the regicide in 1699. These accounts have also tended

to ignore some of the more serious and sensitive aspects of the betrayal. Whereas the betrayal of the Orang Laut is not omitted in any of the accounts, the role of the Johor Orang Kaya itself is usually soft-pedalled. In focusing the blame for the defeat of Johor on either the Bendahara⁷⁵ or the Laksamana,⁷⁶ these court accounts overlooked other key figures among the Orang Kaya who deserted to Raja Kecil. Since the treason (*derhaka*) of these Johor subjects was a radical departure from the Malay prescriptions of ideal behaviour between ruler and ruled, the Johor historians needed a way of explaining this phenomenon to future generations who would be drawing examples from these court records. The official version of Raja Kecil's life as recorded by the Siak court chronicler provided the later Johor court historians with a perfect solution. Since the new Bendahara dynasty had flouted the traditional beliefs of *daulat* by murdering Sultan Mahmud in 1699, what would be a more fitting retribution than to have the son of the murdered ruler as the instrument by which *derhaka* is punished? By subscribing to this story, the Malay chronicler could also explain satisfactorily the disloyal behaviour of certain key individuals in this ignominious period of Johor history. One is further inclined to make this suggestion since Raja Kecil himself, in his first formal letter to the Dutch on 22 January 1719, not only neglected to mention his earlier claims to being the son of Sultan Mahmud Syah, but also styled himself: 'Baginda Raja Kecil who rules over Pulau Gontong and acts as Syahbandar for Baginda Sri Sultan of Pagar Ruyong.'⁷⁷

The Johor and Siak histories provide a colourful account of Raja Kecil's birth, childhood, youth and manhood which may have been an elaboration and embellishment of the claims made by Raja Kecil himself when he first came to the notice of the Dutch in 1717. The most likely explanation, from the few clues available in the Dutch contemporary records (which include some translations of letters from Raja Kecil himself), is that he was an ingenious Minangkabau leader with genuine connexions with the Pagar Ruyong court. His sanction from the Pagar Ruyong rulers, especially the Putri Jamilan, contributed greatly to his large following and successes against Johor. Raja Kecil claimed to be the son of Sultan Mahmud Syah, the last male progeny of the Malacca dynasty, because he had accurately assessed the cause and the depths of dissension within the Kingdom of Johor over the regicide in 1699. This claim, which was originally used as a psychological weapon by Raja Kecil, was mani-

pulated into a state myth by a Siak chronicler by creating a life story which enhanced the glory of the founder of the new kingdom, while at the same time establishing the necessary prestigious links with the Malacca dynastic line. Interestingly enough, once the myth had been incorporated into the *Chronicles*, no attempt was made by later Siak rulers to claim direct descent from the Malaccan dynasty through Raja Kecil. Instead, they linked their prestige and their glorious heritage to the Minangkabau rulers in Pagar Ruyong. By this decision these later Siak rulers may have recognized the true origins of Raja Kecil in the highlands of Central Sumatra and not on the Malay Peninsula.

Raja Kecil's conquest of Johor marked the emergence of the Minangkabaus as an important political force in the politics of the Straits of Malacca. Prior to 1718 there were already many Minangkabau settlers both on the Malay Peninsula, in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, and in the east coast Sumatra states. Naning and Rembau had established very early on a Minangkabau *nagari* under different political rulers. Beyond that, the Minangkabaus were mainly on the periphery of the politically (but not always numerically) dominant Malay peoples. All of these *rantau* areas had their *adat* saying which linked them to their chieftain, their Malay ruler, and finally to their Pagar Ruyong overlord; nevertheless, they were separate, individual entities as in west coast Sumatra. They had linguistic and cultural bonds which were enforced by a common acknowledgement of the spiritual authority of the court at Pagar Ruyong, but this was the extent of their ties. When Raja Kecil united these groups on the east coast of Sumatra for the invasion of Johor, he created a loose political tie among these Minangkabaus which he maintained until his death in 1746. Both the Dutch and the Malays now respectfully referred to the Minangkabaus in the same way as they did the Buginese, and also with the same misconceptions. They now operated under the assumption that the Minangkabaus were a monolithic force in the Malay world awaiting the word from their leader to undertake more adventures at the expense of the Dutch or the Malays.

It was true that the Minangkabaus could no longer be ignored as a peripheral group in the political activities of the Malay world. The establishment of the Kingdom of Siak by Raja Kecil provided a power base from which the rulers of Siak could command some measure of loyalty from other Minangkabaus. The sons of Raja

Kecil — Raja Alam and Raja Muhammad — were able to raise sizeable forces from among the Minangkabaus on the east coast of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula and create havoc with Dutch and Malay trade. Raja Kecil's two sons, however, had an intense dislike for one another and provided two loci of Minangkabau power in the area. The Minangkabau states in west coast of the Malay Peninsula later obtained a separate overlord from Pagar Ruyong, thus weakening further any efforts to unify the Minangkabaus on the Straits under a single leader.

The Minangkabaus in the Malay world never succeeded in forging a solid union of all the Minangkabau states after Raja Kecil, but the fearful spectre of such a union made the Minangkabaus an important and respected potential political force in the Malay world for the greater part of the eighteenth century.

1. KA 1787, OB 1718, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1718, fol. 42.

2. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 20 Jan. 1718, fol. 43.

3. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 20 Aug. 1717, fols. 57-8.

4. Ibid. Letter from the Yang Dipertuan Putri Jamilan to Governor and Council in Malacca, 27 Oct. 1717, fols. 97-8.

5. Ernst Ulrich Kratz, *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* (Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 50.

6. Ibid. Missive from Gov. Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1717, fols. 55-6.

7. The Dutch reports often refer to the ruler of Pagar Ruyong, the Yamtuan Sakti, as 'keizer', i.e. 'emperor'.

8. The *Siak Chronicles*, Cod. Or. 7304, University of Leiden Library, p. 423, lines 10-11.

9. KA 1787, OB 1718, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1718, fols. 49-50.

10. Ibid. fol. 51.

11. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1718, fol. 53.

12. KA 1803, OB 1719, Report of the Refugee Syahbandar Abdul Rahman of Johor to Malacca, 25 July 1718, fols. 45-6.

13. Ibid. Report of the Refugee Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, 26 May 1718, fols. 27-8.

14. Ibid. Report of the Refugee Syahbandar Abdul Rahman of Johor to Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca, 25 July 1718, fols. 45-7.

15. T. D. Hughes, 'A Portuguese Account of Johore', *JMBRAS*, XIII, ii (Oct. 1935), pp. 117-56.

16. Although the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* accuses the Raja Muda of continuing to play chess despite warnings of the approach of the Minangkabau fleet, this is contradicted by other sources. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Singapore, 1965), p. 43.

17. The Johorese may have believed, through years of unquestioned acceptance of the efficacy of the supernatural force of the Pagar Ruyong rulers, that the guns had been unable to fire because Raja Kecil had inherited these very same powers from the rulers of the Minangkabaus in Pagar Ruyong. These special powers were the ability to blunt the blade of a knife, *remove the force of gunpowder*, hold the weather and wind in one's hands, and many other such powers mentioned in the titles. KA 1733, OB 1714, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Resident C. Hofman of Padang to Batavia, 22 March 1713, fol. 11; N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra inde 17^e eeuw', *JG*, II (1906), pp. 795-6. (Italics mine).

18. Head of the Orang Laut on Singapore.

19. The account of the attack is from an oral report from the Bendahara himself after he escaped from Johor. KA 1803, OB 1719, Report of the Refugee Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, 26 May 1718, fols. 25-32.

20. Hughes, op. cit. pp. 117-56.

21. Captain Tavares may have confused another person for the Syahbandar Abdul Rahman who was at that time on a mission to Malacca.

22. According to the Bendahara of Johor's report, these chiefs were the Sri Bija Wangsa, the Temenggong, and the Paduka Raja. Earlier Dutch missives and reports mention that the Temenggong was the younger brother of Sultan Abdul Jalil (1699-1719), and the Sri Bija Wangsa a brother-in-law of the Laksamana Sri Nara di Raja. However there is no mention of the Paduka Raja's family.

23. It must have been apparent even to the Portuguese that there was great disaffection within the kingdom among the Orang Kaya prior to Raja Kecil's invasion.

24. The Portuguese Governor on the ship was Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho, who had just been appointed to Macao. Dr. Russell Jones of the London School of Oriental and African Studies visited the Historical Archives of Goa on 2 September 1965 and found an interesting letter dated 6 May 1718 from the Viceroy of Goa, Conde Dom Luis de Menezes, to Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho, Captain-General of Macao. The letter contains a word of admonition to Coelho that he take care to forget the former discord and enmity which had led to his earlier expulsion from Macao. Dr. Jones believes that this would explain in part what might be regarded as an 'unduly extravagant nature of the praise of Coelho's acts in the account of the faithful Tavares'.

25. The word I translated as 'massage' is *memicit*: 'to massage by taking the flesh firmly in the hand and using the thumb (without ointment or lotion)... It represents massage by kneading and light pounding in contrast to massage by rubbing (*hurut*).' R. J. Wilkinson, *A Malay-English Dictionary*, vol. 2 (L-Z), pp. 900-1.

26. Alexander of the Two Horns, i.e. Alexander the Great. He was considered to be a great Muslim ruler and one of the illustrious ancestors of the prestigious Malay kingdoms which could trace their descent to the princes of Mt. Siguntang.

27. This statement from a Siak chronicler recreating Raja Kecil's past shows an awareness of the important role played by the Orang Laut. One can perhaps suggest that he was aware that the Orang Laut had 'received the child [Raja Kecil] since he was their true leader', and that this had meant their destruction. *Siak Chronicles*, p. 410, lines 4-5.

28. What the writer may have intended by the phrase is not known: 'Sa-patut-patutlah tuanku memelihara kan paduka adinda ['anakanda' in Cod. Or. 6342, p. 128, a typewritten Jawi copy made by Winstedt from another text.] ini'. p. 413. He may have meant that since the child was of royal birth, it would be only proper that he should be raised in a court. Another possibility is the allusion to the fact that the court at Pagar Ruyong was the home of persons 'whose abnormality in one respect or another made them feared and considered to be particularly richly endowed with mana'. P. E. De Josselin de Jong, *Minangkabau and Negeri Sembilan* (Leiden, 1951), p. 107.

29. *Peterana* is a dais, mat of honour; the dais for princes at a Malay court (the ruler's dais is *singgasana* or throne). On this dais is placed the *peterana*, or the royal sitting mat. Wilkinson, op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 897, 1111.

30. Going to the *rantau* was fulfilling one of the Nine Principal Laws, which was 'the subjection of self to the largeness of the world'. *ARB*, XXVII (1928), pp. 291ff.

31. The bearer of the royal *sirih*-box (*pembawa tepak*) was a position of honour.

32. A *dipati* was the head of a district (*marga*) in Palembang.

33. *Siak Chronicles*, op. cit. p. 408, line 4 to p. 422, line 10.

34. KA 1837, OB 1721, Palembang Register, Missive from Resident Pieter Kestelot of Palembang to Batavia, 9 March 1720, fols. 107-8.

35. KA 1746, OB 1715, Second Palembang Register, Report by Syahbandar Cornelis Hasselaer on the Flight of Pangeran Dipati Anum, 8 Dec. 1714, fols. 25-7.

36. KA 1774, OB 1716, Palembang Register, Missive from Resident Abraham Patras of Palembang to Batavia, 13 April 1715, fol. 34.

37. Among Pangeran Dipati Anum's Buginese followers were Daeng Parani and his people who were instrumental later in installing Pangeran Dipati Anum once again in the Kingdom of Palembang. KA 1803, OB 1719, Palembang Register, Missive from Resident van der Putte and Hendrik Verburg to Batavia, 30 Aug. 1718, fols. 98-9.

38. KA 1775, OB 1716, Malacca Register, Letter from the Captain of the Chinese at Riau to the Captain of the Chinese in Malacca, re the Attack of a Malaccan Chinese Ship near Riau by Nine Malays, 29 July 1716, fol. 138.

39. KA 1775, OB 1717, Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia, 29 Dec. 1716, fols. 11-12; and KA 1774, OB 1717, Third Palembang Register, Missive from Resident Panhuys of Palembang to Batavia, 6 Dec. 1716, fols. 4-5.

40. KA 1787, OB 1718, Palembang Register, Missive from Resident Panhuys of Palembang to Batavia, 8 Nov. 1717, fol. 40.

41. Professor Dr. P. E. De Josselin de Jong kindly translated this troublesome passage for me. *Cupak* is a standardized bamboo measure, and *gantang* is a cylindrical gallon measure. *Cupak nan duo* is a term applied to the traditional norms of life in Minangkabau. See Taufik Abdullah, 'Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau', *Indonesia*, II (Oct. 1966), p. 11.

42. The drum made of the skins of lice, *gendang kulit tuma*. See W. J. Leyds, 'Larassen in Minangkabau', *KS*, jaargang X, X² (1926), p. 401. Leyds suggests that what was intended was the skin of an animal umo, and not tuma(-a) as had been recorded by tradition. According to information he received, umo was an animal about as large as a cat which used to be found everywhere in the woods, but were by this time only found in Korinci. The animal had such a thin skin that by the slightest contact it would tear. He then identified the animal with the Sumatran hare (*Nesolagus Nescheri*).

43. During the swearing of an oath, present are all types of noxious plants and insects, such as *kacang miang* (a type of itch beans), *jelatan nyiru* (a type of thorn), a bunch of *anau* fruits whose skin is poisonous, *binkarung* (poisonous lizard) and snakes. Thus all those present were reminded that pain and suffering would befall any who swore a false oath. G. W. W. C. van Hoëvell, 'Over den eed der Maleiers ter Sumatra's Westkust', *TBG*, XXVI (1881), pp. 535-6.

44. These four ministers were called the Besar Empat Balai or Great Men of the Four Council Halls: The Bandaharo of Sungai Tarab or the Pamunchak (Apex) of the *suku* (clan) of Koto-Piliang; the Kali of Padang Ganting or the Suluh Bendang (Clear Torch) of the *suku* Koto-Piliang; the Makhudum of Sumanik or the Pati Bunian (Treasure Chest) of the *suku* Koto-Piliang. In the *Siak Chronicles* only three ministers are mentioned by name: the Bandaharo of Sungai Tarab, the Makhudum of Sumanik, and the Indomo of Suruasso. See *Siak Chronicles*, op. cit. p. 423.

45. *Beralah* means to veer, to change, to shift one's position. Wilkinson, op. cit. vol. I (A-K), p. 18. The symbolic meaning of his name seems clear here: he had now embarked upon a new phase of his life. There is a puzzling comment in a letter sent from a 'Raja Pagar Ruyong' quoted in the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* that he had sent Raja Beralah to Batu Bahara at the time when Raja Kecil attacked Riau. Kratz, op. cit. p. 50. It is difficult to know whether there is some confusion in the text itself or whether another Raja Beralah is meant here and not Raja Kecil himself.

46. The *bisa kawi* was a legendary power that punished people who altered the *adat*. According to tradition, the Minangkabau people bound themselves by an oath on the *bisa kawi* to treat the *adat* as immutable. Wilkinson, op. cit. vol. I (A-K), p. 519.

47. A type of fish. The Malays have two varieties: *terubuk padi* and *terubuk korin*.

48. The VOC records confirm the use of a *cap* by Raja Kecil which called on all Minangkabaus to offer their allegiance to the bearer. KA 1837, OB 1720, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 11 March 1720, fol. 174.

49. After Sultan Mahmud Syah was murdered in 1699, the Orang Laut refused to recognize the usurper and threatened to abandon Johor and place themselves under the Sultan of Palembang. KA 1515, OB 1700, Missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1699, fols. 12-13.

50. In the Abdullah and Shellabear recensions of the *Sejarah Melayu*, the story is told how Sang Sapurba made salt water fresh for his followers by putting a coil of rattan into the sea and then dipping his feet into the water within the rattan coil. Here again the powers of the ruler are shown, as in the case of the healing powers of water in which the feet of the ruler of Malacca were bathed. In the *Siak Chronicles* the rattan coil is mentioned, but the later chronicler seemed to have overlooked an important aspect of the story which concerned the immersion of the royal feet to bring about the miracle.

51. That the guns spewed forth water instead of fire was the chronicler's way of showing Raja Kecil's claims to special powers and accentuating his connexion with the Pagar Ruyong court. See footnote 17.

52. Apparently the Bendahara of Johor is meant. This would lend credence to some Malay histories' view that it was the Bendahara who betrayed Johor in 1718. This passage also helps to shed light on certain contradictory reports which are contained in the Dutch contemporary records concerning his role in the fall of Johor in 1718.

53. The above account is from the *Siak Chronicles*. It is mentioned by Raja Ali Haji in the *Tuhfat* as the history from Siak (*sejarah dan siarah Siak*). The account given is taken from p. 408, line 5 to p. 430, line. 5.

54. *Sedjarah Radja-Radja Riau II*, Von de Wall 62, VI, Perpustakaan Lembaga Kebudayaan, Jakarta, dated 1864. The *Tuhfat* gives the same story and says that this was from the history of Terengganu (*sejarah pihak Terengganu*). Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 13.

55. Raja Ali Haji op. cit. p. 35. Raja Ali Haji says this is from another history, but he does not say which.

56. *Hikayat Johor serta Pahang*, microfilm of a manuscript housed in the Johore State Archives, pp. 1,2,5; W. Linchan, 'A History of Pahang', *JMBRAS*, XIV, ii (May, 1936), p. 45.

57. *Daulat* is '... the divine element in kingship...[and] is identified in Malas with the old *andeka* or supernatural influence that protects kingship and punishes anyone who insults or injures the Lord's anointed'. Wilkinson, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 261.

58. KA 1803, OB 1719, Report of the Refugee Bendahara of Johor to Malacca, 26 May 1718, fols. 28-9.

59. KA 1668, OB 1710, *Memorie van Overgave of Pieter Rooselaer to his Successor Willem Six*, 26 Dec. 1709, fol. 27.

60. Hughes, op. cit. pp. 121, 126.

61. Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1727), p. 53.

62. An orange-red flower used as a dye for cotton and threads, as medicine, and as a saffron substitute to colour food.

63. KA 1719, OB 1713, *Missive from Gov. Moerman of Malacca to Batavia*, 27 Jan. 1712, fols. 8-10.

64. KA 1787, OB 1718, *West Coast Sumatra Register*, *Missive from Resident Abraham Schepmoes of Padang to Batavia*, 10 Nov. 1717, fols. 15-16.

65. *Ibid.* Malacca Register, 27 Oct. 1717, fols. 97-8: Letter from 'Jang dipertoevan baginda poetri djamilan die het hoogste en opperste gebied en koninklyke heerschappye voert...' (Yang Dipertuan Baginda [honorifics reserved only for rulers] Putri Jamilan, who wields the highest most supreme royal dominion and power...); KA 1733, OB 1714, *West Coast Sumatra Register*, 7 March 1713, fol. 75: Letter from the Putri Jamilan, 'radja parampouan van Minangkabau (Queen of Minangkabau)'.

66. J. L. van der Toorn, '*Tjindoer Mato*, Minangkabausch-Maleische legende', *VBG*, XVL, ii (1886), pp. 1-174.

67. KA 1787, OB 1718, *Malacca Register*, Letter from Putri Jamilan to Malacca, 7 Oct. 1717, fols. 97-8; KA 1651, OB 1710, *Second Jambi Register*, Letter from Zutri Jamilan to Kings of Jambi, 28 Oct. 1709, fols. 42-3.

68. KA 1651, OB 1710, *Second Jambi Register*, *Missive from Resident Abraham Patras of Jambi to Batavia*, 19 Nov. 1708, fols. 42-3.

69. KA 1686, OB 1711, *Jambi Register*, *Missive from Resident Patras of Jambi to Batavia*, 28 Oct. 1709, fols. 11-12. The rulers of Minangkabau often expressed their concern for the Minangkabau people in terms of 'restoring the strands' so trade would prosper.

70. KA 1651, OB 1710, *Second Jambi Register*, *Resident Patras of Jambi to Batavia*, 19 Nov. 1708, fols. 42-3.

71. KA 1803, OB 1719, *Malacca Register*, *Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia*, 17 March 1718, fols. 5-6.

72. A Malay cargo boat.

73. KA 1787, OB 1718, Jambi Register, Missive from Resident Carel van der Putte of Jambi to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1717, fol. 7. Apparently the Minangkabaus were not the only group to have borne the brunt of this discrimination. A number of inhabitants from Lingga also came to Jambi seeking service with the Sultan of Jambi in order to escape the depredations of the Johorese. This may account for the support which Raja Kecil received from the people of Lingga in his bid for the throne of Johor. KA 1803, OB 1719, Jambi Register, Missive from Resident van der Stoppel of Jambi to Batavia, 15 Nov. 1718, fol. 8.

74. KA 1803, OB 1719, Letter from Raja Kecil and Dato Makhudum to Malacca, 28 Sept. 1718, fols. 99-100.

75. The *Siak Chronicles* (Cod. Or. 7304 of the University of Leiden Library) the *Aturan Satiya Bugis dengan Melayu* (Cod. 1724 (2) in the same library); and others with such names as the *Hikayat Negri Riau*, *Sejarah Bugis*, *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, and *Silsilah Raja Bugis* have generally the same story as that found in the *Aturan Satiya Bugis dengan Melayu* which accuses the Bendahara of betraying Johor.

76. The *Tuhfat* states that it was the Laksamana who committed the act of treason. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 43.

77. KA 1803, OB 1719, Letter from the 'Baginda Radja Ketjil die het bestier heeft over poelo Gonton en de Sabandharye van baginda Siry Sulthan tot paggar oedjong', 22 Jan. 1719, fols. 33-4.

X

THE CREATION OF A NEW KINGDOM OF JOHOR

RAJA KECIL was prepared to be magnanimous after humbling the once powerful and prestigious Kingdom of Johor. He restored the old Sultan Abdul Jalil in his former post as Bendahara and offered the fugitive Syahbandar Abdul Rahman his old office along with a catty of gold as a sign of his favour. Within two months the relations between Raja Kecil and the 'restored' Bendahara (Sultan Abdul Jalil) had become quite amicable, and the former married the latter's daughter to cement the friendship. The Syahbandar, however, was too suspicious of Raja Kecil's motives to accept the offer.¹

While in exile in Pahang, the Syahbandar Abdul Rahman received news of the present state of affairs in Johor from his informants. From these reports he learned that Raja Kecil had approached Sultan Abdul Jalil to inform him of his intention to return to his residence in Siak for a month. During the preparation for the journey, wild speculations began circulating in the kingdom about the 'real' significance of this activity. While on the one hand it was rumoured that Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus were planning to massacre everyone, completely raze Riau to the ground, and return home to Siak with the booty; other rumours mentioned a plot by Sultan Abdul Jalil to kill Raja Kecil. Eager to suppress these dangerous speculations, Raja Kecil went to the residence of Sultan Abdul Jalil to seek an explanation for these rumours. Sultan Abdul Jalil, however, refused to name the rumour-mongers, and thus Raja Kecil returned home brooding.

That evening Raja Kecil's wife, the daughter of Sultan Abdul Jalil, fled from her husband's home back to her father. Unable to explain his wife's unexpected flight and fearing some evil design on the part of Sultan Abdul Jalil, Raja Kecil went with a large number of armed men to Sultan Abdul Jalil's compound. He demanded the return of his wife, but Sultan Abdul Jalil explained that she had come of her own volition. To calm the dangerously aroused Raja Kecil, he assured him that there was no evil plot afoot. He then invited Raja Kecil to come and fetch his daughter. However, when Sultan Abdul Jalil saw the large numbers of armed men with Raja Kecil, he became frightened and fled to Terengganu taking only his two sons and leaving the rest of his family and his treasures.²

The *Tuhfat al-Nafis* and the *Siak Chronicles* give a fuller description of the activities mentioned in this account by the Syahbandar Abdul Rahman. The *Tuhfat* and the *Siak Chronicles*, however, were written sometime after the events described and may contain embellishments to the bare facts which were still remembered. According to the *Siak Chronicles*, Raja Kecil was engaged to Tengku Tengah, the eldest daughter of Sultan Abdul Jalil, but broke off the engagement and married the younger, more attractive sister, Tengku Kamariah. Tengku Tengah never forgot this humiliation, and it was she who was responsible for abducting Tengku Kamariah from Raja Kecil's residence. When Raja Kecil was informed of this, he had the gong struck to call together his men to avenge this shame (*malu*) by attacking the Bendahara (Sultan Abdul Jalil's) compound. Tengku Kamariah was recovered, and the Bendahara was forced to flee to Pahang. When the Bendahara was killed in Pahang, the only two children who were captured were Tengku Tengah and Raja Sulaiman.³

The *Tuhfat* gives an even more extensive account of this event. It agrees with the *Siak Chronicles'* story of Tengku Tengah's rejection and her subsequent role in seizing her sister. Soon thereafter, Sultan Abdul Jalil established himself at a fortified position at Seluyut on the Johor River but was subsequently defeated by Raja Kecil and forced to seek safety in Terengganu. Half of the Johor royal family escaped to Malacca. After about three years in Terengganu, Sultan Abdul Jalil moved to Pahang where he was later joined by the Raja Indra Bongsu coming from Malacca with the other royal children.⁴

Since the *Siak Chronicles* is principally interested in the activities of Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus, it merely assumes that Sultan

Abdul Jalil fled to Pahang where he was killed by the Minangkabaus three years later. On the other hand, the *Tuhfat*, being a chronicle of the Malay-Buginese leaders of Johor, seems to have had access to much more detailed and accurate information about the activities and whereabouts of the Johor royal family after leaving Johor. Much of what is mentioned in the *Tuhfat* about these events can be corroborated in the Dutch contemporary records. Neither the *Tuhfat* nor the *Siak Chronicles* contradict the report of the Syahbandar Abdul Rahman; rather, they provide the motivations behind the acts which are described in brief by the Syahbandar of Johor.

Governor van Suchtelen of Malacca received news from Johor that Raja Kecil had put Sultan Abdul Jalil's residence to the torch and then collected a substantial amount of booty to carry away to Siak. When he tried to leave Johor, however, he was stopped by the Orang Laut who demanded that he leave all Johor's possessions behind as a condition for safe passage back to Siak.⁵ This action by the Orang Laut is unexplained in any of the sources. It may have been a result of some quarrel between the Raja Negara Selat and Raja Kecil, for not very long after the successful invasion of Johor, the Raja Negara Selat had offered the might of the Orang Laut to the Bendahara Tun Abdullah to reconquer Johor from the Minangkabaus. The Bendahara had declined this offer and had instead sought safety in Malacca.⁶ This event again emphasized the important role which the Orang Laut must have played in assisting Raja Kecil in the conquest of Johor. Acting as a single body, they were still powerful enough to force Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus to abandon their booty before leaving Johor.

The refugee Bendahara Tun Abdullah remained in Malacca for several months after the fall of Johor and then left on 11 July 1718 to go to Muar, Padang, and the surrounding areas, to assemble Johor's manpower.⁷ He was realistic enough to realize that any serious attempt to retake Johor would require much more strength than he could assemble on his own. Through careful solicitations and perhaps some unknown promised reward, he gained the valuable allegiance of the Buginese leader Daeng Marewa.⁸ Daeng Marewa was one of the two Buginese princes whose followers had proven to be more than a match for Johor's own military force. Strengthened by sixty Buginese ships the Bendahara passed by Malacca with his fleet and captured eight Minangkabau ships on the way to Johor.⁹ According to the Bendahara, he and Daeng Marewa had

received word before arriving in Johor that Raja Kecil had already returned to Siak. They thus changed course and headed instead toward Bengkalis. On arrival at Bengkalis Daeng Marewa sent two ambassadors to Raja Kecil, the 'King of the Minangkabaus', to convey the following message: If Raja Kecil wanted to demonstrate his friendship and desire to live as brothers with the Buginese, he should restore the Kingdom of Johor and make it again prosper. Furthermore, he should accept and support the former Bendahara Tun Abdullah and Sultan Abdul Jalil in their offices. If Raja Kecil did not accept these conditions, then he, Daeng Marewa, would have no other recourse but to consider him an usurper who rejected the favourable and useful contract which was being proposed.¹⁰

Raja Kecil's ambassadors returned the visit and conveyed his desire for a lasting friendship with the Buginese. As a sign of good faith he asked the Buginese to deliver up the Bendahara Tun Abdullah to the Minangkabaus. Daeng Marewa reiterated to the envoys his desire to live in peace with Raja Kecil but his disinclination to accede to Raja Kecil's request since the Bendahara was his father. Undeterred by Daeng Marewa's statement the Minangkabaus explained how they had driven out many of the Johorese from their country and wanted the Bendahara because he was a deadly enemy of theirs. If the Buginese delivered the Bendahara to them, they would combine with the Buginese and together with their greatly strengthened fleets go and conquer Malacca; the alternative was war. Daeng Marewa was visibly agitated by this report and called Raja Kecil no son of a king since he lacked all courtly manners and led a loose and profligate life. With this, the Minangkabau ambassadors departed.¹¹

That evening one of the Minangkabau ships going from Pulau Gontong to Bengkalis was attacked by the Buginese, and the fighting began in earnest. According to the refugee Bendahara Tun Abdullah's eye-witness report, the Minangkabaus under Raja Kecil and Panglima Buyong went to do battle with the Buginese about one in the afternoon and continued fighting till the evening. They then returned up the Siak River. The Buginese pursued them to the mouth of the Siak River before returning to their base at Alam Tua. During the night a severe *Sumatra*¹² ripped the Buginese ships from their moorings and drove them to Tanjung Balai. When the Minangkabaus realized what had happened, they attacked with greater determination the following morning. The Buginese put out to sea

where they were able to hold off the Minangkabaus with no clear results in the fighting. On the third day the Minangkabaus attacked again in the morning with thirty-three ships against the Buginese twenty-three. The fighting was especially heavy and continued until three o'clock in the afternoon when Panglima Buyong's ship caught fire from overheated guns. This so encouraged the Buginese that they pressed on with renewed vigour and chased the Minangkabaus on shore toward their cannon emplacements. Only nightfall prevented the Buginese from pushing their advantage against the Minangkabaus.

Somewhat cowed by the previous day's battle, Raja Kecil sent an ambassador to Daeng Marewa asking to be allowed to return to Lingga. Daeng Marewa was clearly overjoyed by this development and scornfully asked whether Raja Kecil had already been transformed from a man to a child. Turning to the ambassadors, he asked why Raja Kecil had made such a stupid request. Surely he must have known that a good part of the Buginese force had been killed in all the fighting and that he, Daeng Marewa, would not leave without taking a vengeful toll on the enemy for these losses. If Raja Kecil insisted on going, he would be allowed to on one condition, that he first release the wife and children of the ruler of Johor. If this were refused, he would continue fighting with a vengeance.

Two days later Daeng Marewa went to Pulau Gontong, which he took with very little difficulty, and recovered the wife and children of the Sultan of Johor and their entire retinue. The Bendahara promised Daeng Marewa that, after he accompanied the Johor royal family to Malacca, he would quickly return.¹³ When the Bendahara left, Daeng Marewa went to Raja Kecil and asked for an audience. The Dutch in Malacca soon received news of an agreement between the Buginese and Raja Kecil to restore the Sultan Abdul Jalil, now in Terengganu, to his former position as Sultan of Johor. The Buginese had then left to go to Johor for this purpose and had been followed shortly thereafter by Raja Kecil.¹⁴ Raja Kecil later reported this meeting in a letter to the Governor of Malacca, denying having succumbed to any Buginese suggestions for an alliance since what Daeng Marewa requested would have 'worked toward the detriment of our interests'.¹⁵

If any agreement had been made between the Buginese and the Minangkabaus, it was of short duration. In September 1718 the Malacca inhabitants complained about the increase in Minangkabau

piracy. Malacca believed that these piratical activities were being encouraged by Raja Kecil in retaliation for what he believed to be Dutch assistance in outfitting and supplying the Buginese in their campaigns against the Minangkabaus. What may have convinced Raja Kecil that the Buginese were operating with the blessings of the Dutch was the fact that tin was now entering Malacca from Buginese-controlled Selangor. Daeng Marewa was selling practically all the tin from Selangor to Malacca because he had no other outlet. For this much-desired tin he was able to buy gunpowder, lead, guns, etc., which were being used against the Minangkabaus.¹⁶

In September 1718 the Dutch envoy Aldorp was sent to Raja Kecil at his temporary residence on Pulau Gontong. Raja Kecil, who also entitled himself the Baginda Sultan Kecil, received the envoy on a grab. He apologized for not being able to respond to the Dutch letters in the proper fashion since he had no fixed residence. During the talks he expressed his regret that the Buginese had not kept the agreement with him to restore the destroyed Kingdom of Johor and reinstitute the old ruler to his former splendour on the throne of Johor. The Buginese had instead continued their murderous raids and burnt to the ground various important places around Bengkalis. Insofar as his relations with the Dutch were concerned, he promised to return all goods robbed from Malacca's ships and to make Pulau Gontong an attractive trading spot for the Dutch. Both of these acts would be done to demonstrate his desire for a lasting and sincere friendship with the Dutch.¹⁷ Throughout his conversations with Aldorp and in his letters to Malacca, Raja Kecil never once called himself the son of Sultan Mahmud Syah of Johor; on the contrary, he styled himself merely the 'Syahbandar' for the Yamtuan Sakti of Pagar Ruyong.¹⁸

Aldorp also visited the Buginese under Daeng Marewa on the island of Bulang near Riau. In his talks with the Buginese, Aldorp learned that Daeng Manompok had been extremely annoyed with the Bendahara of Johor for signing a separate treaty with Daeng Marewa without his knowledge and approval. In retaliation for this gross oversight, he led several attacks on Muar and the surrounding lands and plundered goods and people from these areas. The Bendahara was thus forced to appease Daeng Manompok by offering him 600 rijksdaalders. This peace offering, however, did not prevent further Buginese raiding on Johor's lands.¹⁹

From their bases at Bulang and at Selangor-Linggi, the Buginese began to make the waters in the area very unsafe for shipping.²⁰ With the fall of Johor in 1718, no Malay kingdom on the Straits of Malacca emerged to fill the role as guardian of the trading lanes. The Orang Laut had been a major component in patrolling these waters, but, with the weakening of their ties with the new ruling house of Johor, there was no longer any force within the kingdom with the ships, manpower, or knowledge of the seas to have adequately fulfilled the tasks formerly done by the Orang Laut. The Buginese flourished in this situation. When Malacca wrote to Sultan Abdul Jalil in Terengganu to restrain his Buginese, he could do no more than emphasize that the Buginese Prince Daeng Marewa and his people had previously given him much help and shown him great favour. He was sorry to hear that they were now committing such improper acts.²¹ Although Daeng Marewa had been of assistance to the Bendahara Tun Abdullah and therefore by extension to the ruler of Johor, he quickly saw the possibilities of much greater gains by taking advantage of the temporary helplessness of his Malay overlord.²²

The Kingdom of Johor was effectively partitioned in 1719 into three loci of power: Terengganu and Pahang under the Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor; Siak, Bengkalis, and Batu Bahara under Raja Kecil; and Selangor, Kelang, and Linggi under Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok. Johor and Riau had now been abandoned because without a *raja* these sites had no importance. It was not the land which was important, but the ruler, without whose presence there was no *negeri* and no purpose or focus within the *negeri*. After Sultan Abdul Jalil had fled to Terengganu and Raja Kecil had decided to abandon Johor and return to Siak, there was no reason for the people to remain in Johor. In the words of the refugee Syahbandar Abdul Rahman of Johor, 'the people were forced, with the departure of His Majesty [Sultan Abdul Jalil], to look elsewhere for a good lord'.²³ Other smaller areas such as Sungai Ujong appeared thoroughly frightened of the Buginese and of the uncertainty of the situation. They thus sought and received protection from the Dutch.²⁴

According to the *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, a Malay history whose facts have been found to be often very accurate when compared with contemporary Dutch sources, Sultan Abdul Jalil lost little time in re-establishing his new capital in Terengganu. He conferred titles on the various ministers, nobles, and warriors and ordered various

individuals from Kelantan to come and receive titles and serve him.²⁵ While organizing his government in Terengganu, he also sought ways of regaining his former status in the kingdom. When an English country-trader appeared in Terengganu in 1719, Sultan Abdul Jalil told him to convey his desire to the Governor in Bombay for protection under the English and for 150 men in order to 'bridle the Insolence of his own rebellious Subjects, and their Allies the Bougies too'.²⁶ A French trader who visited Terengganu in that same year was given a letter by Sultan Abdul Jalil for King Louis XV of France in which he offered all French subjects as much freedom as his own to trade, settle, and build fortifications in return for assistance.²⁷ These isolated overtures, however, led to nothing. The reorganization of the kingdom which had been instituted with such care in 1719 was weakened by dissension finally forcing Sultan Abdul Jalil to move his residence to the estuary of the Pahang River.²⁸ According to the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*, the move occurred on 17 Ramadan 1133 A.H. (11 July 1721).²⁹ The Bendahara, the Raja Indra Bongsu, and the royal family rescued from Raja Kecil, took this opportunity to leave Malacca in the beginning of August 1721 to join Sultan Abdul Jalil at his new capital at Kuala Pahang.³⁰

Raja Kecil was in a favourable position in Siak because of the Dutch demand for Minangkabau products from the interior. It was not long before he, too, came to realize the value of monopolizing the trade. The Dutch soon began complaining and accusing Raja Kecil of impeding the flow of trade to Patapahan.³¹ Although seemingly invincible in his position as 'King of the Minangkabaus', Raja Kecil was given an unexpected jolt and forced to flee sometime in the middle of 1719 by a certain 'Baginda Sultan Maharaja'. In a letter to the Dutch in Malacca soon after expelling Raja Kecil, the Baginda Sultan Maharaja began with a long introductory passage used by the rulers of Pagar Ruyong and then reported that he was the brother-in-law of the Sultan Gagar Alam (Raja Alam, Sultan Ahmad Syah, Emperor of the Minangkabaus). He said he was sent down by the Sultan Gagar Alam with the command to restore everything on land and sea. Toward this end he had sent his child Raja Kecil back to Pagar Ruyong and had now assumed the task of restoring the Kingdom of Johor.³²

These developments clearly puzzled the Dutch, but they decided to deliver the letters intended for Raja Kecil to this new 'Minang-

kabau messenger', Baginda Sultan Maharaja. But when the envoys arrived in Siak, they found Raja Kecil once again back in power. After being chased out by this 'usurper', Raja Kecil had gone to Riau where he was 'joyfully greeted' by the Orang Laut who offered their submission to him. Strengthened by their allegiance, Raja Kecil returned to Siak with a large number of Orang Laut and drove Baginda Sultan Maharaja and his Minangkabaus off Pulau Gontong.³³ In announcing his comeback to the Dutch on 8 October 1719, Raja Kecil said that his men were still pursuing the Baginda Sultan Maharaja and the four Orang Kaya who had fled to the woods. He also accused the Baginda Sultan Maharaja of having written to Daeng Marewa offering him Pulau Gontong.³⁴

Instead of remaining on Pulau Gontong where the danger of a counter-attack was not altogether improbable, Raja Kecil returned to Riau and summoned all the heads of the Johorese whom he had previously appointed to come and swear an oath of allegiance to him. It was further reported that he had sent a delegation to Terengganu to the former Sultan of Johor to ask that he return and become sultan once again, while he, Raja Kecil, assumed the position of Raja Muda.³⁵ Perhaps the fear of a Malay resurgence of power before he had the opportunity to consolidate his position within Johor convinced Raja Kecil of the need to reinstate Sultan Abdul Jalil and, for a time, be satisfied with being the chief minister. Unconvinced perhaps by the sincerity of Raja Kecil and also fearful of what awaited him in Riau, Sultan Abdul Jalil remained in Terengganu.

As with the former rulers in Riau, Raja Kecil recognized that trade was an important lifeline of the kingdom and the source of the power and prestige of its rulers. In December 1719 he wrote to Malacca asking the Dutch to allow the Chinese and Malabarese to trade in Riau.³⁶ Thus with the title of Sultan Abdul Jalil Rahmat Syah conferred on him by the ruler of Pagar Ruyong, Raja Kecil selected Riau as his place of residence and became its effective ruler. He transformed Riau into an island fortress which the Dutch considered so formidable that, 'unless the Orang Laut — several of whose important leaders had been killed at his orders — became antagonized by this and deserted him', they envisaged great difficulty in dislodging him.³⁷

The role of the Orang Laut was perhaps the single most important factor in Raja Kecil's success in the Malay world. After the assassination of Sultan Mahmud Syah in 1699, the Orang Laut rose up as a

group to condemn the killing of their lord. Instead of accepting the new dynasty, they threatened to punish those responsible for the regicide and offer their allegiance to the ruler of Palembang. Only after a year had gone by was there any signs of improvement in the internal affairs of the kingdom. But the sense of security was only an illusion, constantly being shattered by rebellions which continued throughout the first two decades of the life of the new dynasty. The Orang Laut groups seemed to have finally come to some *modus vivendi* with the leaders of Johor, but the shallowness of their allegiance only became apparent with the appearance of Raja Kecil in Bengkalis in late 1717. Both the Malay and the Dutch contemporary accounts report the joy with which the Orang Laut greeted the news that Raja Kecil was the son of their murdered lord of the legitimate Malacca dynastic line. Led by the Raja Negara Selat of Singapore, the Orang Laut offered their loyalty to Raja Kecil and were soon joined by other Orang Laut who deserted the Johor ships in the invasion in 1718.

The Orang Laut seemed to have accepted Raja Kecil's claims to being the son of Sultan Mahmud and appeared willing to serve him after the conquest of Johor. Yet when he decided to abandon Johor and return to Siak, the Orang Laut refused to follow him. This action may have been the result of some disagreement which seemed to have occurred between Raja Kecil and the Orang Laut after the successful conquest of Johor, as well as a reflection of something less apparent. Once before in 1688 the Orang Laut had expressed a reluctance to leave Riau to go to Pahang or Terengganu because they would not be able to gain a living there; whereas, Johor and Riau were both considered suitable locations for the Orang Laut to serve the ruler and pursue their livelihood. When Raja Kecil decided to abandon Riau for Siak, the Orang Laut raised objections. They hoped to make their new master change his mind and become their lord on Riau because they were most effective and felt most secure in the areas where they lived: the islands of the Riau-Lingga Archipelago and the mouth of the Johor River.

Raja Kecil could not be persuaded, but the loyalty of the Riau-Lingga Orang Laut toward him never waned. They remained in the safety of their familiar waters and awaited the calls of their lord in Siak — all in the style of the former rulers of Malacca and Johor. During the brief encounter with Baginda Sultan Maharaja, Raja Kecil returned to Riau and was warmly welcomed by the Orang Laut.

He quickly assembled a large Orang Laut fleet and launched a counter-attack on Pulau Gontong which effectively eliminated any further opposition from the Baginda Sultan Maharaja.

Uncertain of the ability of the Baginda to recruit more Minangkabaus for another attempt to force him to return to Pagar Ruyong, Raja Kecil decided to seek safety among his most trustworthy subjects, the Orang Laut. He strengthened Riau to prepare for any external threat, but he committed an inexplicable blunder by killing several of the most important Orang Laut chieftains for an unknown reason.³⁸ By this act he alienated a number of Orang Laut groups who now deserted his ranks and provided a welcome and valuable source of manpower to the enemies of Raja Kecil.

With the return of Raja Kecil to Riau, Daeng Marewa abandoned his now much too vulnerable base at Bulang and returned to Linggi. He began reaffirming his authority not only among the Buginese living in his area, but also among those living in Dutch territory. Some of the Buginese from Tanjung Kling in Dutch territory left there to take residence at Linggi but were again brought back to Tanjung Kling by Daeng Marewa. He dismissed these people from their offices, had the head of the Buginese there krissed, and laid down new laws for the inhabitants.³⁹ In a letter to Malacca, Daeng Marewa (now entitled Kelana Jaya Putra)⁴⁰ explained that most of the Buginese living in Tanjung Kling wanted to move under his jurisdiction in Sungai Baru. He had tried to prevent this by going to Tanjung Kling and trying to dissuade them from leaving their already planted fields and gardens.⁴¹

At Tanjung Kling Daeng Marewa had demanded that the head of the Buginese there explain his role in perpetrating rumours accusing Daeng Marewa of having murdered certain individuals. When confronted with this accusation, the head of the Buginese at Tanjung Kling ran amok. He was killed and replaced by one of Daeng Marewa's own choice.⁴² The reason given by Daeng Marewa for his actions in Tanjung Kling may have been merely a pretext in order to install a new Buginese head who would be more responsive to his wishes. In an attempt to bolster his position in the Malay world, it was of great importance to gain the full backing of the various Buginese communities settled on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Daeng Marewa wanted to be certain that these areas would remain faithful in any clash with the Minangkabaus, Johorese, the Dutch, or another Buginese leader. By March 1721 he con-

fidently announced that Buginese territory, which he presumably considered to be under his sway, stretched all the way from Malacca to Bernam.⁴³

So confident became the Buginese that they carried on their raids with impunity on land and on sea right to the walls of Malacca. Their principal threat, however, remained Raja Kecil. All the smaller states in the area could sense the impending clash between the Buginese and the Minangkabaus and thus appealed desperately to the Dutch for protection. The heads of Naning informed the Dutch in February 1721 that, while on the one hand the Buginese told them that they intended to march through their land to Rembau, Raja Kecil had warned them that if they allowed such a thing to happen they would be considered enemies.⁴⁴ The fishermen and the traders were so afraid of the Buginese that Malacca began to suffer a food shortage. Even some of the Dutch cruisers began to be targets of attack by the Buginese in these waters.

It was not long before the battle between the Minangkabaus and the Buginese was begun for supremacy in this area. Daeng Marewa was at Batang Tiga on 28 February 1721 buying some kerbaus for his son's circumcision feast when he was informed of the approach of a Minangkabau fleet which had already reached Batu Pahat. He hurriedly boarded a boat and headed back to Linggi.⁴⁵ On 14 March 1721 the Buginese in Linggi were attacked on land and by sea by a large expedition under Raja Kecil in an effort to wrest the tin areas away from the Buginese. The Buginese under Daeng Marewa again proved their mettle and handily defeated the Minangkabaus. They followed the retreating Minangkabau and Johor force as far as Malacca and then turned back to Linggi.⁴⁶

One of the major factors in the victory was the desertion in the midst of battle of several of the leaders in the Johor fleet. This forced the Laksamana of Johor to retire and call off a second attack. Another factor was the presence of eighty soldiers sent by the King of Bone to Daeng Marewa in return for gifts and booty which had been sent to him as a sign of homage.⁴⁷ In reporting this victory to the Dutch, Daeng Marewa emphasized that he had great trust in the Company and the ruler of Bone, toSappewali.⁴⁸ In September Daeng Marewa again called Dutch attention to a letter which he received from toSappewali expressing his faith in Daeng Marewa and his hope that the Buginese in Selangor and Linggi would continue to live there in peace.⁴⁹

The Dutch in Macassar believed that toSappewali would be receptive to the idea of summoning to Bone all of his refugee Buginese subjects, especially Daeng Marewa, from the various parts of the Malay-Indonesian world. Malacca had accused toSappewali of sending troops in 1721 to help Daeng Marewa, but the Dutch in Macassar discovered that this was being done by toSappewali's chief minister. The latter held great power within Bone, and no one could gain access to the ruler without his permission. His death on 3 February 1722 removed a major antagonist of the Dutch and very likely an important source of assistance for Daeng Marewa in Johor.⁵⁰ Daeng Marewa, however, continued to maintain ties with the court of Bone and sent to the new ruler of Bone, the Queen Batari Toja, fifty-two slaves as a gift or as tribute on 16 December 1721.⁵¹

Having failed to dislodge the Buginese from their strongholds in Linggi, Raja Kecil devoted his attention to another possible challenge to his authority in the Kingdom of Johor: the exiled Sultan Abdul Jalil in Terengganu. The move of Sultan Abdul Jalil from Terengganu to Pahang in 1721 and the departure of the Bendahara and Raja Indra Bongsu from Malacca to join him in his new capital were viewed with misgivings by Raja Kecil. According to the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, Raja Kecil sent the Laksamana Nakhoda Sekam to Pahang to persuade Sultan Abdul Jalil to return to Riau or face war. After some hesitation the sultan agreed to go. In the meantime another emissary from Raja Kecil, named Si Mas Raden, arrived with a note for the Laksamana commanding him not to bring the sultan back to Riau but to kill him. The Laksamana was highly upset at the breaking of his word to the sultan, but he commanded four of the war-chiefs, plus several other Minangkabau soldiers, to carry out Raja Kecil's orders. The sultan was finishing his morning prayers on the deck of the ship when he was attacked. He fought bravely but was eventually killed.⁵²

The *Siak Chronicles* says that Raja Kecil sent the Laksamana and the Sri Bija Wangsa to bring the Sultan Abdul Jalil back to Riau. In this account the sultan repented of having stolen his daughter from her husband Raja Kecil and was therefore ashamed to face Raja Kecil again. The Laksamana and the Sri Bija Wangsa both realized that his was the grave sin of *derhaka* (in the murder of Sultan Mahmud Syah in 1699), and thus the Sri Bija Wangsa intoned the sentence: '*Hutang nyawa, berbayar nyawa juga*' (A debt of life is re-

paid with life). It was decided to kill Sultan Abdul Jalil, which was accomplished only after a hard fight.⁵³

The Dutch records mention that in November 1721, on pretext of conducting Sultan Abdul Jalil in state back to Riau, Raja Kecil had him treacherously murdered.⁵⁴

Soon after having dealt with the possibility of any threat arising from the former Johor ruler in Pahang, Raja Kecil then sent another warfleet of about 100 ships under the command of the Laksamana to destroy the Buginese at Linggi. The fighting lasted three days, but the attackers finally had to abandon Linggi and scurry back to Riau. Unwilling to forego their momentary advantage, the Buginese under Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok with their fleet of about fifty ships pursued the retreating Minangkabau-Johorese force right to Riau itself.⁵⁵ At the island of Pengujan the Buginese fleet was attacked by the Minangkabaus, but the latter were forced to retreat upriver after a hard battle. The Buginese then established fortresses on Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Montoy and waited for the Minangkabaus to come down-river again.⁵⁶ For two days all was quiet, and then the Minangkabaus attacked the fortresses with great fury, putting all the Buginese to flight except for five ships under Daeng Marewa, to Talip, to Assa, and Haji Sore (and Daeng Manompok?). These five ships continued their unequal fight against the Minangkabaus when a storm arose with very strong winds, rain, thunder, and lightning.⁵⁷ The Minangkabaus could no longer manage their ships, and one of their leaders Panglima Putih was shot dead and his ship captured by the Buginese. Unable to manoeuvre in the storm, the Minangkabaus abandoned the fight.⁵⁸ The five Buginese ships sailed unopposed up the Riau River to the city followed by all the Buginese who had earlier been driven to flight by the Minangkabaus. Thus Riau fell to the Buginese. Raja Kecil remained in the stockade on the island of Bayan at the mouth of the Riau River for one day, and then fled to Lingga with the Laksamana whom he joined at Tanjung Ujong. Some of the Buginese were sent in pursuit and again worsted the Minangkabaus in battle. Those who escaped continued their flight to Lingga and were saved since 'none of them [the Buginese pursuers] knew the Lingga Straits'.⁵⁹

For five days the Buginese plundered Riau, robbing and killing all Minangkabaus. When they had completed their rampage, they installed with all the proper ceremonies Raja Sulaiman, son of the

murdered Sultan Abdul Jalil (Marhum Mangkat di Kuala Pahang), as ruler of Johor, and Tun Abbas as Bendahara.⁶⁰

Although both the Dutch contemporary reports and the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* accord in the general outline and in almost every detail in their descriptions of the Buginese conquest of Riau,⁶¹ they differ on one important point: how the Buginese became masters of Riau. According to the version of the *Tuhfat*, Raja Sulaiman was brought back from Pahang after the murder of his father Sultan Abdul Jalil. His hatred for Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus was so intense that he and the Bendahara decided to send a letter to the five Buginese brothers Daeng Parani, Daeng Menambon, Daeng Marewa, Daeng Cellak, and Daeng Kumasi, asking their help in the reconquest of Riau. The letter was entrusted to a faithful follower who delivered the message to the princes who were then at Matan on the south-western coast of Borneo. The princes were overjoyed at the contents of the letter, and Kelana Jaya Putra (Daeng Marewa) declared that, if he should take Riau and its dependencies, he would surrender them to Raja Sulaiman. They then swore the oath of allegiance to Raja Sulaiman, sailed away to Riau, and conquered it. After the victory, the princes sailed up the Riau River and met Raja Sulaiman and the Bendahara in the city.⁶²

In this version of the events, the Buginese were specifically invited to reconquer Johor by Raja Sulaiman and the Bendahara of Johor.⁶³ But according to Dutch contemporary records, the invasion of Riau was more the conclusion of a battle which had begun with the Minangkabau attack on Linggi in December 1721. After a series of hard fought battles which lasted several days, the Minangkabaus broke off all engagements and retreated to Riau. The Buginese thought this too fine an opportunity to miss and, hoping to destroy the Minangkabau force, or at least a substantial part of it, sent about fifty ships in pursuit. At Riau they repelled one attack by the Minangkabaus and were saved from another by a storm which gave the Buginese the supremacy on the water against the less skilful Minangkabau seamen. The storm proved the undoing of the Minangkabaus and made possible a total Buginese victory and the conquest of Riau. Only after five days of looting and killing did the Buginese finally install Raja Sulaiman as Sultan of Johor.

From these Dutch reports it appears that installing Raja Sulaiman as ruler of Johor and asking for the position of Raja Muda were not acts which had been carefully pre-arranged between the Raja Sulai-

man and the Buginese, but acts which had suggested themselves after the Buginese had quite suddenly become conquerors of Riau. With the convenient presence of Raja Sulaiman in Riau as a natural successor to his murdered father, the opportunity for strengthening the Buginese influence in the now moribund, ruler-less Kingdom of Johor was an opportunity which the ambitious Daeng Marewa would have been foolish to ignore. Although he dictated terms from his superior position, he was clearly aware of the power structure within the Kingdom of Johor and the important symbolic place of the ruler. He was also not unaware of the potential military power of some of the Orang Laut who had continued to serve the Bendahara dynasty in spite of everything. He understood that this power was the sultan's to wield whenever and for whatever purpose he desired. Although many of them had deserted the new dynasty and shifted their allegiance to Raja Kecil (whom they believed to be the true son of Sultan Mahmud and thus perpetuator of the Malacca dynastic line), there were others who had been alienated from Raja Kecil because of his murder of some of their leaders. The Orang Laut group was thus divided by the conflicting claims to the throne of Johor, as well as by the personal actions of Raja Kecil. Nevertheless, the ruler of Johor still commanded the allegiance of a part of the Orang Laut groups and, more importantly, his loyal Malay subjects to make him a figure of some influence in any reconstitution of the kingdom. This fact would not have easily escaped Daeng Marewa. He understood both this simple power relationship as well as the more symbolic relationship between the ruler and his Malay subjects.

The new ruler, too, was not unaware of the divisions among his faithful retainers, the Orang Laut; therefore, he carefully cultivated the friendship of the only other group within his kingdom capable of preserving his throne from the challenger from Siak: the Buginese. In addition to the Orang Laut groups on the Siak River (Sembulun, Gelam, Kelumang, Kopit, Semimbo, Seabui, Ladi, Tengajun and Perajun) and Bengkalis (Senggeran), there were some Orang Laut from two major groups who supported Raja Kecil and returned with him to Siak. These were from the Orang Suku Bentan and Bulang.⁶⁴ In the late nineteenth century descendants of these Orang Laut groups from Bentan and Bulang, displaced from their natural surroundings in the Riau Archipelago, were considered to be part of the court retainers (*hamba raja dalam*) in Siak whose duties were to man the private perahu of the sultan, maintain his guns, and serve in

wartime.⁶⁵ They may have subscribed to Raja Kecil's claims in the early eighteenth century of being the successor of Sultan Mahmud of the Malacca dynasty in Johor and may have continued to serve him and his descendants up until the late nineteenth century. The refusal of many of the Orang Laut to accept Sultan Sulaiman as their lord in the beginning of 1722 increased his dependence on the powerful Buginese forces in Riau.

In a ceremony described in the *Tuhfat*, Raja Sulaiman was installed in the manner of great kings before a gathering of Malays and Buginese. Daeng Marewa stood up, unsheathed his sword, and said: 'Let it be known to all Buginese and Malays that on this day Raja Sulaiman is entitled Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah and is the Yang Dipertuan Besar, ruler of Johor, Riau, Pahang, and all their dependencies.' The crowd answered with: 'May sovereignty increase sovereignty.' After this the heralds were sent out to bring the rajas and the Orang Kaya to pay their obeisance to the new ruler.

After the Buginese princes had completed their installation of Sultan Sulaiman, the latter met with Tun Abbas, who was now the Bendahara Sri Maharaja, and agreed to ask one of the five Buginese princes to become Yang Dipertuan Muda. When all of the five princes excused themselves for one reason or another, Daeng Manompok chided them in Buginese saying it was not proper to frustrate Sultan Sulaiman's intentions since it was they who had raised him to be ruler. It was finally decided that Daeng Marewa should become Yang Dipertuan Muda. He was thus installed in his office by Sultan Sulaiman according to *adat*. After being clothed in royal garments, Daeng Marewa performed the circumambulation ceremony and was then brought to the *balai*. The new Yang Dipertuan Muda (Raja Muda) then performed the *kanjar* and the *arok*,⁶⁶ saying:

Be assured, O Sultan Badrul Alam Syah, that I, the Yang Dipertuan Muda will govern your kingdom. Should you dislike something which is lengthwise before you, I would make it athwart; and that which you dislike athwart, I would make lengthwise. Should there be a thorny scrub before you, I would clear it away, etc.⁶⁷

The other Buginese followed suit and performed the same ceremony of allegiance before Sultan Sulaiman. Sometime later Daeng Manompok was installed by the Raja Muda and Sultan Sulaiman as Raja Tua. He was to be under the command of the Raja Muda. Although the Raja Muda received the title of Sultan Alauddin Riayat

Syah ibni Opu, the Raja Tua was not Sultan Tua or Yang Dipertuan Tua, but simply Raja Tua.⁶⁸

The *Tuhfat's* account of the installation when seen in conjunction with the VOC records dealing with the events and circumstances surrounding these ceremonies, reveals a somewhat biased viewpoint. It tended to cushion some sensitive issues in the early relationships between the Malays and the Buginese and between two different Buginese loci of power. According to the *Tuhfat*, the Buginese princes were ready to leave Riau but were persuaded to remain and accept the office of Yang Dipertuan Muda, a dignity which had been created especially for the Buginese. The Dutch records describe very plainly the total defeat of the Minangkabaus on Riau by the Buginese only a few days after having beaten off a Minangkabau invasion of Linggi. The Buginese campaign on Riau could not have been intended as anything but as an effort to destroy Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus. It was merely fortuitous that Raja Kecil was on Riau, and not in Siak or Linggi, and that Raja Sulaiman was a captive in the capital city. If the Buginese had come for the express purpose of rescuing Raja Sulaiman and installing him as their puppet lord, they would not have acted in the way they did. They behaved in every way the victorious conqueror—looting, burning, and killing for five whole days. Surely they would not have gone on a rampage against a country they intended to rule!

Both the Buginese leaders and Raja Sulaiman saw the mutual advantages in an alliance against Raja Kecil. Raja Sulaiman could become ruler of Johor, as the rightful successor to his murdered father Sultan Abdul Jalil (Mahrum Mangkat di Kuala Pahang), and feel safe from any future pretensions to the throne of Johor by Raja Kecil because of the presence of the Buginese on Riau. Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manampok, too, saw how they could bolster their position in the Malay world by being legitimized by one of the most prestigious Malay kingdoms in the area. From a position of power within Johor the Buginese could easily extend their commercial interests and perhaps in time become an important part of their new home. As soon as they had fled Celebes, they had been considered as 'adventurers' and 'pirates' by the Dutch and by many Malay-Indonesian kingdoms. The suspicion and fear with which they were regarded because of their large numbers and their reputation as fierce warriors undermined any previous Buginese and Maccas-sarese attempts at being absorbed within their newly-adopted homes.

The bright new prospects of being in a position of power in the Kingdom of Johor safeguarding the interests of their own people and thus perhaps easing their assimilation within the kingdom would not have been unwelcome prospects for these Buginese leaders. Their awareness of the importance of having a friendly haven for the refugees from south-west Celebes is apparent in one of the articles in the agreement between the Buginese and Malays: 'All Buginese, Macassarese, and inhabitants of Bima and Sumbawa will be delivered to the Buginese [on Riau] whenever they are captured by the Orang Laut (*menschen van de straat* (Singapore)); in all territories and ports of Johor, without exception, the Buginese shall have free entry; since we shall live as brothers, so shall the Buginese and their descendants be free for all time to leave the lands of Johor.'⁶⁹

There was, however, no unanimity among the Buginese. Daeng Manompok had always been a leader of equal status with Daeng Marewa with troops under his own command. He had been affronted by the tactlessness of the Bendahara of Johor in making an agreement with Daeng Marewa without his consent. To show his displeasure, he had raided Johor's lands. There is no attempt in the *Tuhfat* to disguise the rivalry between the two groups of Buginese. In contrast to the glowing accounts of the activities of the Raja Muda family in the Malay world, the *Tuhfat's* treatment of Daeng Manompok and the subsequent Raja Tuas in the eighteenth century is perfunctory and on occasions very critical. The harsh judgement of the Raja Tua family in the *Tuhfat*, which was written by or under the direction of the Raja Muda family, may have stemmed from an episode in the late eighteenth century. In 1767 the Buginese Raja Muda Daeng Kemboja heard a report of an impending invasion of Riau by Sultan Mansur Syah of Terengganu and Raja Ismail of Siak. Unsure of the loyalty of the Malay population on Riau, Daeng Kemboja had a very circumspect investigation conducted to determine which side the Malays on Riau would support if such an attack did occur. He learned the disturbing news that the Malays had been secretly communicating with Sultan Mansur and Raja Ismail, and that the Buginese Raja Tua was also planning to betray Daeng Kemboja by destroying the munitions shed. The ensuing confrontation between Daeng Kemboja and the Raja Tua is recorded in the *Tuhfat*:

'Now the Buginese have become Malays.⁷⁰ From this day forward I no longer have any hope or belief in you, nor will place any trust whatsoever

in you, Raja Tua.' The Raja Tua then retired, took his mother, wife and children and sailed to Palembang.⁷¹

The Raja Tua family is thus disgraced and banished, and their role in the establishing of Buginese power in the Malay world purposely dismissed or relegated to an insignificant, subordinate position in the Malay-Buginese *hikayat* written from the viewpoint of the Raja Muda family.

The *Tuhfat* attempts to downgrade the position of Daeng Manompok by mentioning that his installation ceremony came somewhat later than that of Sultan Sulaiman and Daeng Marewa, and that his title was simply 'Raja' Tua, and not 'Sultan' Tua or 'Yang Dipertuan' Tua.⁷² The VOC records, however, contain letters from Daeng Manompok in which he calls himself Sultan Ibrahim Syah, a title which he received when he was installed with Raja Sulaiman and Daeng Marewa. Among the Malay histories, only the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* mentions that Daeng Manompok was given the title of Sultan Ibrahim.⁷³ When a Raja Pagar Ruyong communicated with the Johor court sometime in 1138 A.H. (1725/1726 A.D.), he sent letters not only to Sultan Sulaiman and Sultan Alauddin (the Raja Muda), but also to Sultan Ibrahim (the Raja Tua).⁷⁴ The position of the Raja Tua was acknowledged by the neighbouring princes as one of the three most important offices in the Kingdom of Johor. In the early years when the Buginese position in the Johor Kingdom was still precarious, there would have been little doubt that Daeng Manompok was considered to be as influential a leader among the Buginese as was Daeng Marewa. Yet a Raja Tua accused of disloyalty to the cause of the Buginese in the late eighteenth century, plus a monopoly of historical writings in the hands of the Raja Muda family, combined to discredit the role of the Buginese Raja Tua family in the Malay world.⁷⁵

The Dutch in Malacca received a letter on 23 July 1722 from Daeng Marewa, or Paduka Sri Sultan Alauddin Syah, at Linggi. In this letter Daeng Marewa explained how after being attacked three times at Linggi by Raja Kecil they had pursued him to Riau and defeated him. The Buginese had then recovered Riau from the Minangkabaus and surrendered it to Raja Sulaiman before returning to Linggi. He affirmed his friendship with the Dutch and emphasized that he had informed them of all of these events in order that they would not give credence to false and evil rumours about him.⁷⁶ He neglected to mention, however, that he had left 500 Buginese on

Riau under his brother Daeng Parani.⁷⁷ A large Buginese force on Riau would have been beneficial to both the Johorese and the Buginese. The Johorese were so disorganized and emasculated by the civil wars and the foreign wars which had occurred on their lands that they were in no position to resist any determined counter-attack from Raja Kecil. The presence of the Buginese served as a deterrent against Raja Kecil, thus preserving both the new ruler on his throne as well as the new Buginese interests within the kingdom.

Daeng Marewa's return to Linggi seemed to have been occasioned by the dissension among the ranks of the Buginese leaders, especially between Daeng Marewa of Linggi and Riau on the one hand, and Daeng Manompok and the Syahbandar to Talip of Selangor on the other.⁷⁸ A slave, who escaped after two year's captivity among the Buginese on Linggi, reported a confrontation which occurred sometime in August 1722 between the Buginese leaders. In a public gathering Daeng Manompok proposed an attack on Malacca which was supported by most of the warchiefs present. Daeng Marewa and some of his followers, however, advised caution since their forces were small and proposed instead that an ambassador be sent to the Sultan of Aceh with a gift of fifteen slaves to ask his help in this undertaking.⁷⁹ In view of this development and the need to preserve a united front in their dealings with the Johorese and the Minangkabaus, Daeng Marewa felt obliged to return to Linggi and resolve any differences in their common struggle.

The Dutch were clearly upset and fearful of the new developments in Riau. They wrote a stinging reply to Daeng Marewa saying that they had already known for a long time about all of these events on Riau. They warned the Buginese to maintain the friendship with them by not interfering with Malacca's shipping.⁸⁰ On the other hand, the Dutch sympathized with Raja Kecil's disheartened letter of 18 June 1722 in which he recounted his woeful tale of defeat at Riau and requested Dutch protection of Siak, Bengkalis, and all Minangkabaus.⁸¹ The Governor of Malacca expressed his regret to Raja Kecil that the island of Riau had been conquered by the latter's enemies, and he hoped that 'His Majesty [Raja Kecil] would occupy and become master of the Kingdom of Johor in peace and quiet'.⁸²

Although the Dutch knew that Raja Kecil was an usurper, they preferred him on the throne of Johor because he would prove a

strong ruler and be able to keep the Buginese at bay.⁸³ Their fear and hatred of the Buginese so coloured their views of events in Riau that they could only envisage a totally impotent Sultan Sulaiman eagerly seeking to be freed from the Buginese at any cost. It was difficult for the Dutch to realize that perhaps Sultan Sulaiman himself preferred kingship highly circumscribed by his Buginese supporters to exile imposed by a usurping Minangkabau.

The growing threat of the Buginese was a source of constant worry to Malacca. A Chinese inhabitant of Malacca reported a Buginese plan to enter Malacca under the pretence of delivering tin, and then setting fire to and capturing the fortress.⁸⁴ Equally disturbing was a letter which arrived in Malacca on 20 January 1723 reporting that Daeng Marewa had written to the ruler of Bone and requested *another* 2,000 Buginese in order to destroy the Dutch in this area. According to this report, Daeng Marewa had explained to the ruler of Bone that this was an opportune time to destroy the 'Hollanders' since they were now occupied with difficulties in Java and in Palembang.⁸⁵

In order to prepare for any future war with the Buginese the Dutch made a study of their enemy's strength in the Straits of Malacca. According to Dutch intelligence, the Buginese population had grown to about 3,000 people and possessed more than 200 large and small ships equipped with cannons and guns. Many of these ships had been robbed and transformed into war vessels.⁸⁶ Of these 200 ships, 120 were large grabs with crews of twenty-four men. When one considers that the Dutch had estimated that there were less than fifty grabs at the disposal of the entire Kingdom of Johor in 1714, the Buginese fleet was impressive indeed. The estimation of 3,000 Buginese in the area was a number much greater than the modest calculation of men which the Buginese areas in the Kingdom of Johor could provide in 1714 (See Appendix F).

Many of the Buginese had flocked to areas on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula because of the attractiveness of these fairly successful settlements under Buginese leaders unmolested by neighbouring native rulers. With the profits from the tin sales in Malacca, Daeng Marewa could offer many of the Buginese both profit and adventure, two of the most enticing qualities to any young Buginese men.⁸⁷ Also among those who came to these shores from abroad were armed men sent from the court of Bone. The ruler of Bone still considered the Buginese outside Celebes to be his subjects and

continued to receive slaves from Daeng Marewa as a sign of homage.⁸⁸ In exchange for this sign of subservience and subjection, troops were sent from the court of Bone to aid in various successful military ventures which Marewa launched against the Minangkabaus. A specific example of military aid can be found in 1721 when the chief minister of Bone sent several boatloads of men to Pasir which later went on to the Malay areas.⁸⁹ In addition there were the ships and the manpower of Sultan Sulaiman which augmented the Buginese fighting forces. The Dutch were well aware that they would not be able to conquer Riau without substantial assistance, and even then it would be a costly undertaking because of Riau's heavy fortifications and well-placed guns.⁹⁰

Although the Dutch in Malacca were convinced that the Buginese were continually plotting their ruin, the Buginese themselves were preoccupied with other matters. According to the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, Daeng Parani returned to Selangor after the victory in Riau. While he was in Selangor, he received a letter from the elder brother of the King of Kedah asking Buginese assistance to regain the throne.⁹¹ Daeng Parani postponed giving a decision and sailed to Riau to consult with his brothers and with Sultan Sulaiman. It was agreed that they should help this Kedah prince, and thus the Buginese brothers sailed to Kedah where they arrived at a mutually profitable arrangement with the Kedah contender to the throne. The latter promised to reward the Buginese with fifteen bahars ringgit⁹² if they succeeded in placing him on the throne. After the successful campaigns, the Buginese were given three bahars ringgit and a promise of the full payment later. The Buginese then left Kedah and returned to Riau.⁹³

Despite the departure of the Buginese from Kedah, the war was far from conclusive. The unsuccessful Kedah prince now sought to enlist the support of Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus in order to continue the fight against his brother. Sometime in late November or early December 1722 Raja Kecil left Siak and went to Kedah with 110 ships in order to marry the daughter of a prince of Kedah and to seek assistance against the Buginese.⁹⁴ When the Buginese heard about this, they sent a fleet of fifty ships under Daeng Manompok to engage the Minangkabaus in Kedah. Meanwhile Daeng Marewa left Linggi with another sixty ships to go to Riau and join forces with his brother Daeng Parani. With their combined force

of 100 ships they intended to sail to Kedah to support Daeng Manompok's fleet which had now grown to about eighty ships.⁹⁵

Daeng Manompok's forces in Kedah were unable to win an outright victory and were inflicted with severe losses from the daily Minangkabau-Kedah attacks launched from the jungles. Because of the scarcity of gunpowder, the Buginese were forced to a defensive holding action until the arrival of reinforcements from Daeng Marewa and Daeng Parani in March 1723.⁹⁶ Sultan Sulaiman and the Bendahara Tun Abbas took this occasion to send a letter to Malacca which arrived on 17 March 1723. In the letter Sultan Sulaiman expressed his gratitude toward Kelana Jaya Putra (Daeng Marewa) and his brothers for the great service which they had rendered him. They had avenged the murder of his father and made him ruler of Johor by presenting him the kingdom, the people, the weapons, and everything appertaining to the ruling of the kingdom. He also notified Malacca that he had sent the Kelana Jaya Putra to cruise among the Orang Laut tribes to notify them that he was now in the service of the sultan.⁹⁷

The war in Kedah continued without any side being able to win any decisive victory over the other. In October 1723 Raja Kecil appealed to Malacca for assistance, and reported the futile daily exchange of gunfire without advances being made by either side.⁹⁸ In that same month a letter supposedly from the ruler of Pagar Ruyong arrived in Malacca with the request that the Dutch provide aid to 'his son' Raja Kecil and that they take him under their protection. The Dutch, however, affirmed their neutral stance in any native conflicts.⁹⁹ Then, quite unexpectedly, the inconclusive war in Kedah ended in January 1724. First to leave Kedah were the Buginese forces. The greater part of their fleet stopped first at Linggi and Selangor before returning to Riau. Raja Kecil remained a short time longer in Kedah and married Tunku Masuna, the niece of the ruler of Kedah. He later took advantage of the absence of the Buginese to return to Siak.¹⁰⁰

Quite unlike these brief matter-of-fact reports on the progress of the war in Kedah is the vivid and somewhat heroic account presented by the author of the *Siak Chronicles* on the same subject. According to the *Chronicles*, there was a succession dispute between two brothers in Kedah in which the Buginese allied themselves with the elder brother and Raja Kecil and the Minangkabaus with the younger. The war lasted two years without a break. One day Daeng

Parani scaled Raja Kecil's stockade and forced the latter and his *hulubalang* to jump into the river and swim to safety. They reached the opposite shore and scurried for cover within the tall grass which grew along the banks. Raja Kecil lay on top of the *hulubalang* to protect him against the bullets of the Buginese pursuers who were shooting towards the area where they thought the fleeing Minangkabaus had gone. One of the bullets hit Raja Kecil, but he ignored it. Another bullet struck the *hulubalang* on his leg, causing him to scream out in pain. Raja Kecil and his *hulubalang* were thus forced to abandon their hiding place and swim away again, this time with Raja Kecil carrying the wounded *hulubalang* on his back. Half-drowned, Raja Kecil managed to hang onto a branch and call for help. His men came running and brought them to safety within another stockade.

Raja Kecil summoned all his warriors and told them that he wanted to attack Daeng Parani that very evening because he was ashamed (*malu*) that he had left his handkerchief behind. He then promised to entitle (*jadikan besar*) anyone who succeeded in retrieving his handkerchief. An Encik Yahya¹⁰¹ volunteered to take on this precarious task and that night climbed into Daeng Parani's stockade and opened the doors for the Minangkabau troops. They conquered the stockade killing many Buginese, but Daeng Parani managed to escape. Encik Yahya then returned victorious to Raja Kecil and was rewarded with robes of honour.

The war dragged on for two years with no change whatsoever. Every day the war-drums sounded, and the Minangkabaus and the Buginese went forth to battle. The Minangkabaus and the Buginese soldiers became so disheartened that they agreed among themselves that, whenever their leaders told them to fight, they would fire their guns but not load them with bullets. Daeng Parani learned of this agreement and wrote to Raja Kecil concerning the state of mind of both armies. In order to determine the victor in this endless, hopeless war, Daeng Parani challenged Raja Kecil to a duel to determine the outcome of the war. Raja Kecil thought his chances dismal because of Daeng Parani's *baju rantai*; consequently, when Daeng Parani came aboard Raja Kecil's grab, Raja Kecil shot him through the chest from the poop of his ship.¹⁰² Thus Daeng Parani died, the younger brother gained the throne of Kedah, and the Minangkabaus returned to Siak.¹⁰³

The *Tuhfat al-Nafis* describes how the Buginese fought even more fiercely after the death of Daeng Parani and forced Raja Kecil to flee from Kedah. After this victory the Raja Tua (Daeng Manompok) buried Daeng Parani and then returned to Riau with the ruler of Kedah's permission.¹⁰⁴

In comparing the varying accounts of the final outcome of the war from the Malay and the Dutch records, one can suggest two major reasons for the Buginese withdrawal from Kedah. The first was their concern with the developments in Riau. Sultan Sulaiman had taken advantage of the absence of the greater part of the Buginese force to flee from Riau on a small boat to the island of Bulang with his wife and three or four of his trusted followers. He had decided to take this daring step with the assistance of the Orang Laut because he could no longer bear the affronts and brutalities he had to suffer under the Buginese remaining on Riau. At Bulang Sultan Sulaiman was able to recruit a large number of Orang Laut and return to Riau to try to rescue the rest of his family. They attacked the sixty-odd Buginese left on Riau and forced the latter to seek refuge within the main fortress where the royal family were being kept. When the Buginese threatened to ignite the gunpowder housed there and kill all the royal family if Sultan Sulaiman and his Orang Laut persisted in their attacks, the latter called off the fighting.¹⁰⁵ Sultan Sulaiman informed Malacca on 22 July 1723 of his differences with all the Buginese on Riau and asked to be rescued from his enemies.¹⁰⁶ Malacca could only plead its inability to extend aid to anyone, while wishing Sultan Sulaiman the greatest success against his Buginese enemies.¹⁰⁷

After having gained enough reinforcements and supplies from Linggi and Selangor, the Buginese forces headed toward Riau.¹⁰⁸ The Dutch received no intelligence whatsoever concerning the outcome of this mission, but in late August 1724 came a report that Sultan Sulaiman had once again 'embraced' the Buginese and come under their protection.¹⁰⁹ No mention is made in the Dutch records about Sultan Sulaiman's activities between the time that he tried unsuccessfully to rescue his family from the Buginese on Riau and when he once again 'embraced' the Buginese. The *Tuhfat* states, however, that after spending some time on the island of Bulang, Sultan Sulaiman had gone to Kampar, where he was later fetched and brought back to Riau by Daeng Marewa.¹¹⁰ Both the Dutch and the Malay records are silent on the particulars of this reconcilia-

tion. Although Sultan Sulaiman had been distressed at the troubles with the remaining Buginese on Riau, his quarrel may not have extended to Daeng Marewa and the leaders of the Buginese. The absence of any mention of a conflict between Sultan Sulaiman and the Buginese leaders in the Dutch records, at a time when the Dutch were so conscious of any sign of change in the political situation in the areas, seems to substantiate this belief.

A second reason which can be suggested for the Buginese abandonment of the war in Kedah was the growing discontent among Buginese ranks with the pace of the war and the death of Daeng Parani. There is no reason to believe that the Buginese were defeated in the field, for they continued to maintain their superiority in armaments and again threatened Raja Kecil in Siak in June 1724. The Buginese, accompanied by Sultan Sulaiman and to Passarai, an uncle of Queen Batari Toja of Bone, arrived in Siak from Riau with fifty ships and presented the following demands to Raja Kecil:

1. The return of all the Orang Laut who had sought protection under Raja Kecil;
2. The return of all the Malay subjects of the former ruler of Johor [Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah, 1699-1721] who were being held in Siak;
3. The return of the four heads of Siak;
4. The deliverance of all duties by traders who had gone up the Siak River.¹¹¹

If Raja Kecil refused to grant these demands, the Buginese threatened to begin the war again and this time pursue it to the very bitter end. Raja Kecil refused to agree to these demands, but he also realized that he could not withstand the Buginese force. That evening he and his entire fleet quietly slipped out of the Siak River and escaped to Lingga. From Lingga he went to Siantan where, it was rumoured, he planned to strengthen his force with Orang Laut and men from Palembang and Jambi. Having lost their game, the Buginese under Daeng Marewa escorted Sultan Sulaiman back to Riau and Daeng Manompok returned to Selangor.¹¹²

The demands made on Raja Kecil by the Buginese on behalf of Sultan Sulaiman reveal certain important changes which had occurred in the power structure of the Kingdom of Johor. Although there were still Orang Laut groups which had remained loyal to Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah and his successor, Sultan Sulaiman, some of the major groups, such as the Orang Suku Bentan, Orang Suku Bulang, and others from Lingga and Siantan, seemed to have accepted Raja

Kecil's claims to be the true successor to the Malacca-Johor throne and to have given him their loyalty. Since the more important of the Orang Laut groups had joined Raja Kecil, Sultan Sulaiman became more dependent upon the Buginese for protection against this formidable combination. With their new position of power within Johor and their navigating and trading skills, the Buginese quickly assumed the important roles once played by the Orang Laut. Raja Kecil thus rightly accused the Buginese of having 'totally ruined' the Orang Laut and of causing their flight to Siak. He claimed that the Buginese were attempting to destroy the Orang Laut by selling them into slavery or by killing them.¹¹³ One of the demands made on Raja Kecil betrayed a growing awareness among the Buginese that the large numbers of Orang Laut groups serving Raja Kecil could constitute a grave danger to their own position in Riau.

The presence in Siak of many Malay refugees from Johor who had supported Raja Kecil against the Bendahara dynasty was another source of worry to the Buginese. As long as these refugees remained in Siak, the chances of any reconciliation with Raja Kecil were minimized. They would never forget that an usurper was on the throne of the ancient kings of Palembang, Malacca, and Johor. It was thus of great importance that the Buginese remove this source of future trouble.

In addition to these two demands which concerned the security of Johor, the Buginese appended two others which were principally intended to affirm Johor's sovereign rights over Siak. The demand for the return of the four heads of Siak, who were Raja Kecil's chief ministers, was merely to accentuate the position of Sultan Sulaiman as overlord with the rights of disposal of any and all persons within his lands. Demanding the four heads of Siak was an oblique way of telling Raja Kecil that he, too, was but a subject of Sultan Sulaiman and thus could be held accountable to Sultan Sulaiman for his actions. Furthermore, as rightful ruler of Siak, Sultan Sulaiman demanded that all the duties collected on the Siak River be presented to him.

For Raja Kecil to have accepted these conditions would have been tantamount to his acknowledging the overlordship of Sultan Sulaiman. Rather than submit to these humiliating demands, Raja Kecil preferred to slip away quietly to Lingga and recruit his Orang Laut forces for a showdown at a more opportune time. Lingga was the area to which Raja Kecil first fled after being defeated at Riau by the

Buginese in December 1721. He now recruited ships and men from among the Orang Laut groups there in order to continue his war against the Buginese. Lingga thus became a place of refuge and a source of his naval strength. It came to serve the same function for him as did Bentan for the Johor ruling family.

From Lingga Raja Kecil went to Siantan where he succeeded in recruiting enough men and munitions to outfit sixty-five war vessels.¹¹⁴ He returned to Siak with this fleet and then went in search of the Buginese who were established on the island of Ungaran, which lies on the south-eastern side of the island of Sabong right before the mouth of the Kampar Straits. They had built a fortress on Ungaran from which place they could intercept all ships passing through the Kampar and Durian Straits.¹¹⁵ From this base Daeng Marewa provided passes to ships with his title 'Sultan Alauddin Syah of Ungaran'.¹¹⁶ In a battle with the larger Buginese fleet, the Minangkabaus were on the verge of gaining a great victory when one of the cannons on a Minangkabau ship exploded. This caused such consternation among the Minangkabaus that the Buginese were able to break out of the encirclement and escape. Nevertheless, Raja Kecil emerged a total victor losing only about twenty-five men, while the Buginese suffered a loss of about 100 dead and wounded.¹¹⁷

Having quickly recouped their losses, the Buginese returned to the offensive and arrived in Bengkalis on 16 September 1725 with forty large grabs. An unexpected strong wind storm prevented them from landing and forced them to leave the area.¹¹⁸ The Buginese appeared to be just strong enough to prevent the Minangkabaus from taking the heavily fortified Riau, but not strong enough to be in a position to eliminate the Minangkabau threat once and for all. The hope of active military assistance from the outside may have occasioned the letter sent by Daeng Marewa in 1725 to Daeng Matara, Captain of the Macassarese in Batavia.¹¹⁹ Unfortunately, neither the contents nor the result of this letter are reported in the VOC records. What was evident, however, was Daeng Marewa's ability to maintain links with the Buginese court at Bone and with other Buginese groups elsewhere in the island world in his struggle for supremacy in the Kingdom of Johor.

Raja Kecil found himself in a familiar Kingdom of Johor type scenario. The mainland of Siak could be considered as his official and 'traditional' place of residence which offered a vast interior as a place of refuge from any strong attacking force. Whenever he wanted

to take the offensive against the enemy, he went to Lingga and Siantan whence came the reinforcements of ships and manpower for his warfleets. He never considered Riau to be irretrievably lost to Sultan Sulaiman and the Buginese, and he continued to assault Riau and fend off counter-attacks during these years. Immediately after the Buginese fleet had been dispersed by strong winds off Siak in September 1725, Raja Kecil again left for Siantan. He recruited the necessary force to launch yet another invasion of Riau. Although his fleet besieged Riau for some time, it finally had to return empty-handed to Siak.¹²⁰ In the beginning of January 1727 both forces were again being equipped for yet another battle for control of the Kingdom of Johor.¹²¹

The Minangkabaus appeared to be in a much stronger and more independent position than the Buginese on Riau. So preoccupied had been the Buginese in maintaining Sultan Sulaiman on the throne of Johor and in preventing the Minangkabaus from conquering Riau, that such outlying areas as Muar and Padang on west coast Malay Peninsula were left to fall into Raja Kecil's hands.¹²² The repeated invasions of Riau also began to tell on the Buginese. A strongly-equipped fleet under Raja Kecil succeeded in destroying most of the Buginese warships in 1727 and forcing the Buginese to sue for peace. Raja Kecil only agreed to the peace on condition that the Buginese return his wife (Tengku Kamariah) and surrender the Johor royal family. Only after the Buginese agreed to these conditions did Raja Kecil return to Siak and allow Sultan Sulaiman and the Buginese to retain possession of Riau.¹²³

According to the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* Raja Kecil appeared in Riau in 1138 A.H. (1725/1726 A.D.) and requested that his wife be given back to him. The Raja Muda and the Raja Tua consented. In return Raja Kecil swore an oath in the mosque to deliver all the people and lands of Johor to Sultan Sulaiman and to cease fighting. Raja Kecil gave back the long kris, called the Bala Seribu, and was given his wife by the Raja Muda. Raja Kecil then returned to Siak.¹²⁴

The *Tuhfat* also gives the same date for Raja Kecil's visit but goes into greater detail with regard to the oath sworn by Raja Kecil in the mosque:

If he [Raja Kecil] should plan to do wrong again by carrying out hostilities against His Majesty Sultan Sulaiman and the Yang Dipertuan Muda, he would not have peace for the rest of his life, he would bring destruction upon

his descendants, he would lose the *daulat* of his kingdom like a stone split asunder, and he would be consumed by the Besi Kawi.¹²⁵

The elaborate oath and description of Raja Kecil's visit seemed to have made little difference in the war since both the *Tuhfat* and the *Peringatan* then go on to say that Raja Kecil resumed hostilities.

It is difficult to account for the discrepancy in dates between the Dutch contemporary accounts and the Malay histories. The Dutch in Malacca kept a very close watch on the activities of the Buginese and the Minangkabaus because of the threat they posed to the trade in the Straits of Malacca. In very clear terms the Dutch governor in Malacca reports that some time in 1727 Tengku Kamariah and the Johor royal family were finally surrendered to Raja Kecil as a condition for his return to Siak after defeating the Buginese forces on Riau. Both the *Tuhfat* and the *Peringatan's* report do not actually mention the date of the occurrence as they usually do in the other events. In these accounts a general date of 1138 A.H. (without the month or day) is given for an episode immediately preceding that of Raja Kecil's request for his wife. When the latter event is mentioned, the sources merely say, 'in that year' (*kepada hijrat itu*) such and such occurred, quite unlike many other episodes in both of these works which are dated fairly precisely. Whereas the authors of these two texts may have written their accounts based on a type of court diary, there may have only been a general notation that this Raja Kecil episode occurred sometime after another event which is given a specific date. The whole affair may very well have taken place as described, but in 1727, and not in 1725/1726, as mentioned in the Malay histories.

Raja Kecil was prevented from achieving a total victory on Riau in 1727 because of the presence of his wife among the enemy. Had he pressed his advantage and attempted to remove all Buginese influence from Riau, he would have endangered the life of Tengku Kamariah. His love for her is colourfully described in the *Siak Chronicles*, which employs all the known heroic conventions to eulogize the romantic attempt by Raja Kecil to rescue Tengku Kamariah from the Buginese. According to the *Chronicles*, Tengku Kamariah sent a letter to Raja Kecil telling him that if he wanted her he should get her by force. If he were not willing to do this, she would not go. When Raja Kecil received this letter, he decided to go to Riau with five war kakaps plus volunteers who were willing to sacrifice their lives with him. One hundred and fifty men who had

wives still on Riau were willing to accompany Raja Kecil on this dangerous mission. They sailed up the Riau River to the island of Bayan and then went ashore. A woman was sent ahead to inform Tengku Kamariah of their arrival and to tell her to come down to the boats. When the Buginese recognized the Minangkabaus, they began to panic and screamed that the enemy had come from Siak. Confident of victory Raja Kecil and his men attacked the fortress killing many of the Buginese defenders. Meanwhile, the woman messenger arrived at Tengku Kamariah's chambers and conveyed Raja Kecil's message. Hearing this news Tengku Kamariah quickly went down to the boats with her belongings and personal retainers on board.¹²⁶ So great was Raja Kecil's love for Tengku Kamariah that when she died he went every day to sleep at her graveside. According to the chronicler, he acted as if he were mad, neglecting the governing of the land.¹²⁷

Raja Kecil's great love for his wife may have been the principal reason for his readiness to abandon a splendid opportunity to regain Riau for the guarantee of safety for Tengku Kamariah and her family. It is difficult to offer a more satisfactory explanation for the events in Riau in 1727. If Raja Kecil had really won a decisive victory, as reported in the Dutch contemporary records, there must have been a compelling reason for his not occupying Riau. Another puzzling act was his demand that the Johor royal family be taken under his custody. These decisions by Raja Kecil become comprehensible only if the motivating factor was his love for his wife and his concern for the safety of his wife's relatives, i.e., the Johor royal family.

Having recovered his wife from the Buginese and having temporarily crippled the Buginese fleet in Riau, Raja Kecil confidently sent his ships out on the sea lanes to patrol the seas as if they were his own waters.irate letters from the Dutch accusing him of condoning and encouraging these piracies fell on deaf ears. He informed them that as long as the Buginese maintained their control of the Kingdom of Johor, he would not rest and would continue to 'scour the seas' until he had gained the throne and driven away the Buginese.¹²⁸

His supremacy on the sea was now unchallenged, but his attempts to consolidate his position in the Minangkabau areas of the Malay Peninsula formerly under the Kingdom of Johor met with some obstacles. Raja Kecil sent a certain Raja Khatib to take control of Rembau and to overthrow its head, Raja Malewa. After success-

fully completing this mission, Raja Khatib tried to extend his influence to the Dutch protectorate of Naning with the help of the Minangkabau areas of Sri Menanti, Johol, and Tampin. But before he could undertake this venture, he was forced to flee to Naning by a successful comeback by Raja Malewa of Rembau. The Dutch now seized Raja Khatib and sent him back to Siak on 15 February 1728.¹²⁹

Raja Kecil had still not returned from another attack on Riau when Raja Khatib was delivered to the Syahbandar of Siak. While in Siak the Dutch heard that the well-armed and well-prepared Buginese had won an overwhelming victory over the Minangkabaus in Riau and sent their ships fleeing for safety. Afraid of a Buginese counter-attack, Raja Kecil had brought his fleet to Pulau Gontong and began strengthening the fortifications and adding more guns to the fortress. A rumour also reached the Dutch that the fugitive Pangeran Dipati Anum of Palembang had participated in this attack on the side of Raja Kecil because they had agreed to assist one another in gaining the thrones of Palembang and Johor.¹³⁰ This rumour, however, later proved to be false. Although the Pangeran Dipati Anum had gone to Siak to seek some arrangement with Raja Kecil, they did not arrive at any agreement. The Pangeran Dipati Anum had thus angrily left Siak and had gone to Selangor and then to Linggi to seek to Passarai's help.¹³¹ In these circumstances the Buginese took the most logical step and entered into a defensive alliance with the King of Palembang to guard against their mutual enemies, Raja Kecil and the Pangeran Dipati Anum.¹³²

The Buginese victory over Raja Kecil in the beginning of 1728 seemed to have weakened his determination to wrest the Kingdom of Johor away from the Buginese. On the other hand, the Buginese on Riau recovered remarkably well after the humiliating defeat at the hands of Raja Kecil in 1727 and began re-arming and re-supplying their forces to an even greater extent than ever before. They delivered such a crushing defeat on Raja Kecil's next invasion in 1728 that the latter forswore all further plans for regaining Riau in the immediate future. Even when he managed to assemble a fleet to attack Riau in 1735,¹³³ he had no hope of succeeding against the now deeply-entrenched and strongly-equipped Buginese.

Having assured the security of Riau for Sultan Sulaiman and the Buginese, Daeng Marewa could now implement his goal of making the Buginese a vital part of the Kingdom of Johor. Linggi could

promise an empty land with freedom from domination by a Malay overlord, but the Kingdom of Johor offered them prestige, an honoured tradition of Malay sultans within a Malay world, as well as possibilities of wealth flowing from an international entrepot. Realizing that these advantages would remove much of the stigma which they possessed as pirates and mercenaries and would make possible an easier adaptation into a foreign community, Daeng Marewa decided to identify his and his followers' interest with the Kingdom of Johor. He left the other Buginese areas to toPassarai, who became leader of the Buginese in Linggi, and to Daeng Matekko, a prince from Wajo, who ruled in Selangor.¹³⁴ At the time of Daeng Marewa's death in the beginning of October 1728,¹³⁵ the Buginese were already assured of an important role in upholding Sultan Sulaiman's precarious but prestigious position as ruler of Johor.

The old Kingdom of Johor under its new ruling house, the Bendahara family, survived on the strength of the Buginese fighting men. The latter became an essential part of the power structure of Johor, but, like the Orang Laut, were never considered to be of the Malay community. The difference lay, however, in the greater aspirations and ambitions of the Buginese who were not content to occupy the periphery of a Malay kingdom whose rulers owed their position to them. The conflict of an outside group wanting to enter into the internal structure of a society and thereby encroaching on the privileges and positions of established members of that society is a theme in the history of Johor throughout the eighteenth century and only becomes modified when the offspring of intermarriages between Malays and Buginese becomes so much a part of that society that differences in outlooks between the two groups become muted.

A change had also occurred in the concept of the ruler because of the break with the old dynastic line and the introduction of a separate locus of loyalty in the person of the Buginese Raja Muda. The sacral character of kingship had been perpetuated in legends and stories which had identified the ruling sovereigns of the Kingdom of Malacca and Johor with their supernatural ancestors who had descended miraculously from Mount Siguntang somewhere in the interior of Palembang. Endowed with special qualities by the gods and by Allah, these rulers were believed to be responsible for the flourishing of the kingdom and the prosperity of the people. Through them the activities of the kingdom gained significance, for they were the *raison d'être* of the *negeri*. A lineage apart, they were the objects

of veneration and emulation by the people of the kingdom. In their sovereign lords, the people projected their desires and aspirations. They revelled in the glory and magnificence of their lords and suffered in their deprivations and disappointments. The acknowledgement of their position within Malay society at the very apex, perhaps in the same category as the gods, would have explained satisfactorily to the common Malay why one of his own fellows could expect to be struck with a dreadful retribution for such grave sins as touching the very food which reached the lips of their sovereign ruler.

How pained and humiliated would have been the Malays if they had known the manner in which their rulers were regarded by the Dutch! But the chief ministers served as the purifying filter which protected the sacred kingship from the vulgarities of mundane affairs of state and made possible the perpetuation of an important role of the sovereign lord as a symbol of the *negeri*. All of this is contained in the Malay word *daulat*, which is translated into English as 'sovereignty', but which encompasses the entire spectrum of beliefs in Malay society with regard to the sacred nature of the ruler and the special powers arising from this status. It was *daulat* which was brought over from Palembang and transmitted to the succeeding generations of rulers in Malacca and Johor; it was *daulat* which assured the preservation of the *negeri* throughout the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries when to all outward observers the Kingdom of Johor was but a shadowy apparition haunting the memory of a great past; and it was *daulat* which prevented the chief ministers of Johor bowing to Dutch pressure and which helped maintain an important sense of dignity and respect within the Kingdom of Johor.

With the brazen murder of Sultan Mahmud in 1699, the *daulat* of the Malacca dynasty was in effect rejected. The new Bendahara ruling family now had to prove its right to rule by creating a *daulat* which provided a rationale for its position in the kingdom, as well as a set of values to govern the relationships between itself and its subjects. During the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the Bendahara family assumed that the traditional power structure in Johor persisted. Only in the betrayals of many of the Orang Kaya and the Orang Laut in the Minangkabau invasion in 1718 did the new ruling house realize the changes which had occurred within the kingdom. When Raja Sulaiman of the Bendahara family once more occupied the throne of Johor in 1722 after a brief Minangkabau

interlude, he avoided the misconceptions of his father and uncles and relied upon sheer power to maintain his position. Bolstered by the arms of the Buginese, Sultan Sulaiman survived the challenges from Raja Kecil who posed a serious threat because of his strong Minangkabau following and his claims to being the son of the murdered Sultan Mahmud.

The efficacy of the *daulat* of the Bendahara family after 1722 was weakened by the introduction of a separate locus of loyalty in the Buginese innovation of an old title and dignity, the Yang Dipertuan Muda (or Yamtuan Muda or Raja Muda). The Buginese Yang Dipertuan Muda received the direct allegiance of all Buginese within the capital city, and to a great extent, in the outlying areas, and was thus in an enviable bargaining position with the Malay ruler. These Buginese were unwilling to become merely tools of Sultan Sulaiman but sought compensation in terms of security, acceptance, and prestige for themselves and their descendants within their adopted homeland. They assumed the important trading, patrolling, and military role in Johor once exercised by the Orang Laut, and they became essential to the ruler in maintaining his position from both internal and external enemies. Wedded to each other as a matter of preservation and as the best arrangement for the furtherance of their interests in 1722, the Bendahara dynasty and the Buginese survived almost a decade of war and rebellion and emerged by 1728 vindicated in their alliance.

1. KA 1803, OB 1719, Report of the Refugee Syahbandar Abdul Rahman of Johor, 25 July 1718, fols. 47-8.

2. Ibid. fols. 48-9.

3. *Siak Chronicles*, Cod. Or. 7304, University of Leiden Library, pp. 430-4.

4. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Singapore, 1965), p. 48.

5. KA 1803, OB 1719, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 4 July 1718, fol. 18.

6. Ibid. Extract from the Dagh-Register of Malacca, Report of the Refugee Bendahara of Johor, 26 May 1718, fol. 32.

7. Ibid. Report of the Refugee Bendahara of Johor After His Return from Bengkalis, 11 Aug. 1718, fols. 50-1.

8. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 4 July 1718, fol. 8.

9. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1718, fol. 41.

10. Ibid. Report of the Refugee Bendahara of Johor After His Return from Bengkalis, 11 Aug. 1718, fol. 51.

11. Ibid. fol. 52.

12. 'Frequent squalls ... these are often accompanied with Thunder and Lightning and continue very fierce for Half an Hour, more or less. Our English Sailors call them *Sumatras*, because they always meet them on the coasts of this Island.' Charles Lockyer, *An Account of the Trade in India* (London, 1711), p. 56.

13. KA 1803, OB 1719, Report of the Refugee Bendahara of Johor After His Return from Bengkalis, 11 Aug. 1718, fols. 53-4. By piecing together the various reports from the Dutch contemporary accounts, it appears that, after Sultan Abdul Jalil was forced to flee from Johor, he was accompanied by his two sons. The other members of the royal family were carried off to Siak where they remained until rescued by the Buginese under the orders of the refugee Bendahara Tun Abdullah and brought to Malacca in August 1718. The Johor royal family remained in Malacca until 1721, when they joined Sultan Abdul Jalil in Pahang. Although the *Tuhfat* records this information, it attributes these events to a later date when the Buginese were already in a position of power and influence in Riau. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 48.

14. KA 1803, OB 1719, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1718, fols. 42-3.

15. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Letter from Raja Kecil to Malacca received on 28 Sept. 1718, fol. 100.

16. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1718, fols. 7, 19.

17. Ibid. Report by Anthony van Aldorp on Mission to Pulau Gontong, 13 Sept. 1718, fols. 88-90.

18. Ibid. Letter from Raja Kecil to Malacca, received 22 Jan. 1719, fols. 33-4.

19. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1718, fol. 22.

20. Ibid. Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 22 Jan. 1719, fol. 14.

21. Ibid. Third Malacca Register, Letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor to Malacca, under date 22 Jan. 1719, fol. 30.

22. Hamilton reports that in 1719 two hundred Buginese perahus came to Terengganu to fetch Sultan Abdul Jalil, but he refused to go. In 1720 the Buginese again sent an embassy to him 'to see if he would allow them to enjoy the Continent and Islands beyond the Promontory of Romans [Tanjung Rumania], and they would leave him the quiet possession of the rest...' Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies* (Edinburgh, 1727), pp. 83-4.

23. KA 1803, OB 1719, Report of the Refugee Syahbandar Abdul Rahman of Johor, 25 July 1718, fol. 49.

24. KA 1837, OB 1720, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1719, fol. 13.

25. *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, JMBRAS, X, i (Jan. 1932), p. 2, lines 6-10.

26. Hamilton, op. cit. pp. 83-4.

27. A. Reid, 'The French in Sumatra and the Malay World, 1760-1890', *BKI CXXIX* (1973), p. 198, quoting from a letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah to Louis XV, n.d., Bibliothèque Nationale, manuscrits Malayo-Polynesiens, no. 223.

28. *Hikayat Negeri Johor*, op. cit. p. 2, lines 11-13.

29. Ernst Ulrich Kratz, *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor* (Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 46.

30. KA 1853, OB 1722, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1721, fol. 78; Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 48. The Raja Indra Bongsu did not remain in Kuala Pahang but went on to Terengganu where he remained. Kratz, op. cit. p. 46.

31. KA 1803, OB 1720, Letter from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Raja Kecil, 22 Jan. 1719, fol. 39.
32. KA 1837, OB 1729, Letter from Baginda Sultan Maharaja, under date 25 Oct. 1719, fols. 47-8.
33. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1719, fol. 14.
34. Ibid. Letter from Raja Kecil to Malacca, 8 Oct. 1719, fol. 52.
35. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1719, fol. 14.
36. Ibid. Letter from Raja Kecil to Malacca, under date 30 Dec. 1719, fols. 159-60.
37. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 23 Oct. 1720, fol. 5.
38. Ibid. fol. 5.
39. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Resolution of the Council in Malacca, 2 July 1720, fol. 33.
40. This is the first time that Daeng Marewa's new title, Kelana Jaya Putra, appears in Dutch records.
41. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 23 Oct. 1720, fol. 16.
42. Ibid. fol. 33.
43. KA 1853, OB 1722, Letter from Kelana Jaya Putra (Daeng Marewa) to Malacca, received 5 March 1721, fol. 69.
44. Ibid. Letter from the Penghulu Sri Raja Merah of Naning to Malacca, under date 24 Feb. 1721, fol. 40.
45. Ibid. Report of Two Malays Sent to Linggi by Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca, 2 March 1721, fol. 62.
46. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen to Batavia, 11 March 1721, fol. 62.
46. After Raja Kecil had made Riau his base, he had called back those Johor officials whom he had appointed previously. These and other Johorese who had betrayed Sultan Abdul Jalil in 1718 formed the Johorese support for Raja Kecil in these years.
47. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1721, fols. 79-80.
48. Ibid. Letter from Kalana Jaya Putra (Daeng Marewa) to Malacca, 15 April 1721, fols. 101-2.
49. KA 1872, OB 1723, Letter from Kelana Jaya Putra to Malacca, received 3 Sept. 1721, fol. 21.
50. KA 1871, OB 1723, Macassar Register, Gov. Sipman of Macassar to Batavia, 3 June 1722, fols. 12-14.
51. KA 1921, OB 1726, Macassar Register, List of Ships Arriving at Macassar, 16 Dec. 1724, fol. 53.
52. Raja Ali Haji, *op. cit.* pp. 49-50. A similar account is given in the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*. Kratz, *op. cit.* p. 46.
53. *Siak Chronicles* *op. cit.* p. 433, lines 13-15, and p. 434, lines 1-14.
54. KA 1853, OB 1722, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 29 Nov. 1721, fol. 184.
55. KA 1872, OB 1723, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 4 March 1722, fols. 70-1.
56. The *Tuhfat al-Nafis* says that, after the Minangkabaus were defeated at Penguljan, Raja Kecil fled to the island of Bayan at the mouth of the Riau River. The Buginese divided themselves into two groups with one going to Tanjung Pinang to build a fortress there and the other going to the head of the river. Raja Ali Haji, *op. cit.* p. 52.

57. The *Tuhfat* also records a very strong rain occurring during this battle: 'Maka hari pun hujan lebat sabur-menyaburlah'. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 53.
58. According to the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*, it was during the third day of fighting that the rains came down so heavily that the ships had to retreat causing the capture of half the Minangkabau fleet by the Buginese. Kratz, op. cit. p. 47.
59. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. pp. 53-5.
60. The account given of events during the Buginese conquest of Riau is from KA 1872, OB 1723, Report by Several Malays on Occurrences in Riau, 23 March 1722, fols. 73-6.
61. The *Siak Chronicles* merely states: 'After Raja Kecil had been on Riau for one year, Daeng Parani and Raja Sulaiman came and attacked Riau, and His Majesty [Raja Kecil] retreated to Lingga with one grab.' *Siak Chronicles*, op. cit. p. 435, lines 9-12.
62. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. pp. 50-3.
63. The *Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis, Hikayat Opu Daeng Menambon*, and the *Aturan Satiya Bugis dengan Melayu*, differ slightly in detail but give basically the same reason for Buginese intervention in Johor's affairs.
64. A. A. Hijmans van Anrooij, 'Nota omtrent het rijk van Siak', *TBG*, XXX (1885), pp. 330-1, 343.
65. Ibid. pp. 330, 334.
66. In the *kanjar* as described by Governor Ysaacq van Thiye of Macassar in 1695, the Buginese would unsheathe their swords, swear loyalty and allegiance with no fixed ceremonial words but with anything that came to mind, and then did a type of frenetic dance (*arok*) which concluded the ceremony. KA 1458, OB 1696, Macassar Register, Missive from Gov. Ysaacq van Thiye of Macassar to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1695, fols. 172-3.
67. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 62.
68. Ibid. pp. 60-3.
69. E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602 tot 1865* (Batavia, 1870), p. 60.
70. This was probably a remark intended to question the Raja Tua's loyalty. Daeng Manompok, the first Raja Tua, had married a Malay woman of royal blood. The author of the *Tuhfat* anticipates the event in 1767 by stating that it was difficult to know where the thoughts of their offspring were, with the Malays or with the Buginese. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. pp. 102-3.
71. Ibid. pp. 144-6.
72. Ibid. p. 63.
73. Kratz, op. cit. p. 47.
74. Ibid. p. 48.
75. It may be a worth-while project to try to trace the descendants of the Raja Tua family both in the Malay Peninsula and in Palembang to see whether they still possess written records or can still remember stories from the old days about the roles of their ancestors in the history of the Malay kingdoms.
76. KA 1872, OB 1723, Letter from Paduka Sri Sultan Alauddin Syah (Kelana Jaya Putra/Daeng Marewa) to Malacca, received 23 July 1722, fols. 113-14.
77. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Aug. 1722, fol. 84.
78. Ibid. fols. 84, 88.
79. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1722, fol. 140; *ibid.* Second Malacca Register, Report of a Slave of Lodewyk Joosten, 6 Oct. 1722, fols. 62-3.

80. Ibid. Letter from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Kelana Jaya Putra, 24 July 1722, fols. 114-15.

81. Ibid. Letter from Sultan Abdul Jalil Rahmat Syah (Raja Kecil) to Malacca, received 18 June 1722, fol. 122.

82. Ibid. Letter from Gov. van Suchtelen to Raja Kecil, 20 June 1722, fol. 123.

83. Ibid. Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Jan. 1723, fols. 12-13.

84. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Aug. 1722, fol. 85.

85. Ibid. Third Malacca Register, Report by Some Malacca Traders to Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca, 30 Dec. 1722, fols. 24-5. The 'difficulties' which Daeng Marewa is referring to in Java were the VOC troubles in Madura and Surabaya between 1718 and 1723. In Palembang the VOC had become involved in a civil war by aiding one of the contenders to the throne in 1722.

86. The practice of converting a vessel to a warship seemed to have been a common practice during the early years of Buginese presence in the Malay world. The process is described in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, where a vessel won at a cockfight by Daeng Rilakka and his sons is made into a warship. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 39.

87. In the Buginese lands the story of Sawerigading was recited to the young boys and men at the *baruga* (meeting hall), and thus the person of Sawerigading was upheld as the epitome of Buginese manhood. Sawerigading was a mythical figure in the Buginese epic poem *I La Galigo* who travelled extensively on the earth, in Heaven, and in the Underworld. His travels outside Celebes extended to Ternate, Bima, Majapahit and, popular tradition adds, even to the Coromandel Coast. In these lands he obtained power and authority through war and marriage. B. F. Matthes, 'Boegineesche-Makassaarsche Legendes', *BKI*, XXXIV, (1885), pp. 433-4; For the epic itself, see R. A. Kern, *I La Galigo* (Leiden, 1939).

88. KA 1921, OB 1726, Macassar Register, List of Ships Arriving in Macassar, 16 Dec. 1724, fol. 53.

89. KA 1871, OB 1723, Macassar Register, Gov. Sipman of Macassar to Batavia, 3 June 1722, fols. 12-14.

90. KA 1872, OB 1723, Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Jan. 1723, fols. 12-13.

91. The ruling King of Kedah was the very same prince who had acquired the support of the Buginese in 1715 with a promise of a specified remuneration. When he was placed on the throne, however, he refused to fulfil his part of the agreement and thus brought the Buginese wrath down on the Kedah people. See pp. 231-2. The name of this ruler was Sultan Ahmad Tajudin Halim Syah whose written orders to quash piracy bearing the date A.H. 1133 (A.D. 1720/1721) have been preserved as Raffles MS 77, Section III, in the Royal Asiatic Society. I am indebted to Barbara Watson Andaya for bringing this document to my attention.

The elder brother's name is not mentioned in either the Dutch or the Malay records. One may suggest that this elder brother became Sultan Mohamad Jiwa II, but there is too little known about the actual reign dates of this ruler to assume that he ascended the throne at this time.

92. 'Ringgit', meaning serrated or jagged, was the term used for the rial ringgit, or the milled dollar. The ringgit was given a value of five shillings by the English East India Company after 1618. D. K. Bassett, 'English Trade in Celebes, 1613-67', *JMBRAS*, XXXI, i (May 1958), p. 39.

93. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. pp. 64-5.

94. KA 1872, OB 1723, Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 27 Jan. 1723, fol. 7.
95. Ibid. fols. 7-8, 10. According to the *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*, the Buginese ships were sent to Kedah in 1136 A.H. (1723/1724 A.D.). Kratz, op. cit. p. 48. This expedition occurred most probably in early 1723.
96. KA 1872, OB 1723, Third Malacca Register, Report of Several Malacca Traders to Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca, 30 Dec. 1722, fol. 23.
97. KA 1888, OB 1724, Letter from the Bendahara Sri Maharaja of Johor to Malacca, received 17 March 1723, fols. 6-8.
98. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 11 Oct. 1723, fols. 22-3.
99. Ibid. Letter from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Sultan Sulaiman of Johor, no date, but shortly after 22 July 1723, fols. 45-6.
100. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1724, fol. 7. The Dutch records are very vague with regard to the person ruling in Kedah at the end of the hostilities. Because of the inconclusive nature of the fighting, one may suggest that there was a change in the power structure in Kedah. The fact that Raja Kecil married the niece, and not the daughter, of the ruler of Kedah may be interpreted as indicating that the elder brother supported by the Buginese was still ruling when the war ended in 1724.
101. In the *Tuhfat* he is called a Macassarese (*anak Makasar*). Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 67.
102. This somewhat 'unheroic' act by Raja Kecil is reminiscent of the killing of Hang Jebat by Hang Tuah in the *Hikayat Hang Tuah* (or of Hang Kasturi in the Raffles MS 18 recension of the *Sejarah Melayu*). By committing *derhaka* Hang Jebat (or Hang Kasturi) had performed the vilest of crimes which overshadowed any act of mercy which he may have shown to his friend Hang Tuah. Seen in this light, Hang Tuah's unquestioned killing of his friend was expected and upheld in the traditional Malay society. Were the Buginese considered so contemptible and outside the bounds of the traditional Malay society that Raja Kecil's act in this case could have been seen as a heroic act by the Siak chronicler?
103. *Siak Chronicles*, op. cit. p. 443, line 15 to p. 447, line 14.
104. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 68.
105. KA 1888, OB 1724, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 11 Oct. 1723, fol. 22.
106. Ibid. Letter from Sultan Sulaiman of Johor to Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca, received 22 July 1723, fols. 39-41.
107. Ibid. Letter from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Sultan Sulaiman of Johor, no date, but shortly after 22 July 1723, fol. 45.
108. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 24 Feb. 1724, fol. 75.
109. KA 1905, OB 1724, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 26 Aug. 1724, fol. 10.
110. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. pp. 67-8.
111. KA 1905, OB 1725, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 26 Aug. 1724, fols. 9-11.
112. Ibid. fols. 9-11.
113. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 26 Aug. 1724, fol. 13.
114. Ibid. Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1725, fol. 16.

115. KA 1922, OB 1726, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1725, fols. 10-11.
116. Ibid. fols. 26-7.
117. Ibid. fols. 11-13.
118. Ibid. fol. 13.
119. KA 1943, OB 1727, Third Malacca Register, Letter from Kelana Jaya Putra to Gov.-Gen. Matthaeus de Haan in Batavia, received 10 March 1727, fol. 70.
120. Ibid. Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen, 18 Oct. 1726, fol. 71.
121. Ibid. Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen of Malacca to Batavia, 31 Jan. 1727, fols. 8-9.
122. Ibid. Third Malacca Register, Letter from Panglima Besar, Raja Mas, in the service of Raja Kecil, to Malacca, received 30 Nov. 1726, fols. 18-19.
123. KA 1966, OB 1728, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. van Suchtelen and Pieter du Quesne to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1727, fols. 15-16.
124. Kratz, op. cit. p. 50.
125. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit. p. 70.
126. *Siak Chronicles*, op. cit. p. 440, line 8 to p. 442, line 3.
127. Ibid. p. 448, lines 1-5.
128. KA 1966, OB 1728, Third Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Pro Tempore Pieter du Quesne of Malacca to Batavia, 28 Jan. 1728, fols. 8-9.
129. Ibid. fol. 10; *ibid.* Third Malacca Register, Resolution of Council in Malacca, 9 Jan. 1728, fols. 20-1; and KA 1993, OB 1729, Missive from Gov. Pro Tempore du Quesne to Batavia, 29 March 1728, fol. 5.
130. KA 1993, OB 1729, Missive from Gov. Pro Tempore de Quesne of Malacca to Batavia, 29 March 1728, fols. 5-6.
131. KA 2026, OB 1720, Missive from Gov. Joan Fredrik Gobius of Malacca to Batavia, 13 Oct. 1729, fol. 20; E. Netscher overlooked this later Dutch report which contradicted an earlier rumour of Pangeran Dipati Anum's assisting Raja Kecil in an invasion of Riau. Netscher, op. cit. p. 64.
132. KA 1993, OB 1729, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Gobius of Malacca to Batavia, 11 Nov. 1728, fols. 34-6.
133. KA 2027, OB 1736, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. de Chavonnes of Malacca to Batavia, 20 Jan. 1735, fols. 50-1.
134. KA 2086, OB 1732, Missive from Gov. Pro Tempore du Quesne of Malacca to Batavia, 12 March 1731, fol. 2. According to a Wajo chronicle from the former Matthes Stichting in Macassar, Daeng Matekko was a younger brother of the famous Arung Sengkang of Wajo, La Maddu Kelleng. MS Mak 267, pp. 242ff. I am grateful to Dr. J. Noorduyn of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden for bringing this fact to my attention and for translating the relevant section.
135. KA 1993, OB 1729, Second Malacca Register, Missive from Gov. Gobius of Malacca to Batavia, fol. 36.

THE SEQUEL

THE Kingdom of Johor in the second decade of the eighteenth century saw but the beginning of a centrifugal tendency in the Malay world which continued throughout the eighteenth century and culminated in the permanent divisions wrought by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. The wars among the Malays, the Buginese, and the Minangkabaus for the right to rule the enfeebled Kingdom of Johor encouraged directed and undirected piracies which disrupted trade passing through the Straits of Malacca. No single Malay kingdom arose in these years to claim the mantle formerly assumed by Srivijaya, Malacca, Aceh, and Johor in preserving the peace in the Straits. The Malays were now but one of three major groups within the former Kingdom of Johor.

Daeng Marewa succeeded in becoming the champion of the Malay Kingdom of Johor and thereby gained for himself, his Buginese-Macassarese followers, and their descendants, a stake in this prestigious kingdom and a niche for themselves in the Malay world. Other Buginese leaders remained in the Linggi and Selangor areas and maintained loose links with the Riau-Johor Buginese. With the formal establishment of the Kingdom of Selangor in 1766 under Raja Lumu, another locus of Buginese loyalty appeared in the Straits of Malacca. Both centres, however, were closely linked through family relationships and often supported one another against a common enemy. Linggi was contested between toPassarai and Daeng Matekko for a brief period but later reverted once again to the family of the Buginese Raja Mudas of Johor.

The Minangkabaus, too, carved out their portion from the former extensive lands of the Kingdom of Johor. After being pushed out of

Riau in 1722, Raja Kecil and his sons established the Minangkabau dynasty in Siak and extended their hegemony over the areas up the east coast of Sumatra up to Deli. Raja Kecil, however, failed in his efforts to create a single Minangkabau state on both sides of the Straits of Malacca. The Minangkabaus on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula rejected his emissary sent to rule over them and subsequently obtained a ruler from their spiritual overlord in Pagar Ruyong.

The Malays at first remained loyal to the newly-crowned Sultan Sulaiman until it became apparent that he was becoming increasingly dependent upon the Buginese leaders in the kingdom. When the Buginese, who were the new champions of the Bendahara dynasty in Johor, began to accrue more and more benefits commensurate with their power and influence within the kingdom, the Malay Orang Kaya grew resentful and began abandoning the court and seeking refuge with other Malay leaders in Pahang and Terengganu. These two areas, especially the latter, became a major source of Malay opposition to the Buginese within the Kingdom of Riau-Johor throughout most of the eighteenth century.

By 1728 the traditional power structure of Johor had been transformed or was in the process of transformation. The ruler's position was propped up by the arms of the Buginese and was no longer the beneficiary of the *daulat* of the old and prestigious Malacca dynasty. In creating a new effective *daulat*, the ruler was placed in a dilemma in which the more he relied upon the Buginese to uphold the kingdom and his right to rule, the more he strengthened the position of the Buginese Raja Muda, which was a focus of a counter-*daulat* within the kingdom.

The Orang Kaya, who formed another pillar in the traditional power structure, were no longer in favour with the ruler because of their large-scale betrayal of the Bendahara dynasty in 1718 and their minor role in the recovery of the kingdom from the Minangkabaus. Their positions of honour and confidence within the court were now being usurped by Buginese princes and warleaders. The Buginese posts of Raja Muda and Raja Tua became of greater importance in the principal decision-making within the kingdom than the Malay chief ministers and the Council of the Orang Kaya.

But of the former sources of power within the Kingdom of Johor, the group which suffered most was the Orang Laut. The death of the last male line of the Malacca dynasty in 1699 had destroyed any

lasting ties which they had maintained with the Malacca dynasty. While they had been attracted to this dynasty because of the creation of a unique *daulat* in a distant past, the *daulat* in turn had acquired a certain cogency and credibility because of the power which the Orang Laut brought to the throne. The trauma of the regicide in 1699, which resulted in the confusion within the ranks of the Orang Laut and culminated in the betrayal of the new dynasty in 1717-1718 in favour of the supposed son of the last Malacca dynastic line, was a significant turning point in the history of the Orang Laut people within the Malay world. Refusing to offer their total devotion to a new ruling family, but also not willing to transfer their loyalty wholly to Raja Kecil in Siak, the Orang Laut vacillated between Riau-Johor and Siak, thereby weakening their impact in the affairs of these kingdoms. Those Orang Laut who remained in the service of the new Sultan Sulaiman were soon subject to demeaning behaviour by the sultan's new champions, the Buginese. Their principal task of serving as the ruler's navy and fighting men was now admirably fulfilled by the experienced seamen and warriors of south-west Celebes. The Orang Laut underwent such a significant metamorphosis in the eighteenth century that by the nineteenth century foreign observers were wont to characterize the Orang Laut groups they occasionally encountered as a shy, nomadic sea people of little consequence.

The new *daulat* of Johor's Bendahara dynasty was now based principally on the military, political, and economic skills of the Buginese. The latter had effectively replaced the traditional power structure within the Riau-Johor kingdom and had succeeded in legitimizing their position in the kingdom with the blessings of Sultan Sulaiman. With the Buginese firmly ensconced in Riau-Johor, Selangor, and Linggi, and with the Minangkabaus occupying an equally dominant position on the east coast of Sumatra and in areas of present-day Negri Sembilan, the affairs of the once proud and prestigious Malay Kingdom of Johor were now in the hands of non-Malays who continued to influence the course of events in the Malay world for the greater part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.



APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR AND THE VOC 6 APRIL 1685

Article 1.

Promise of continuing peace and friendship.

Article 2.

The VOC will have exclusive and toll-free trade in Indian cloth (*lijnwater*), species, tin, and gold on the Siak River. No house or lodge will be built there. The Paduka Raja may send a ship there annually with cloth. This article is valid only until the sultan reaches his majority.

Article 3.

The Johorese have freedom of trade up the Siak River in daily necessities and provisions, except salt. The Company has the right to visit their ships and to confiscate forbidden articles.

Article 4.

Trade in cloth will be permitted to no other European nation in the king's lands.

Article 5.

Mutual deliverance of deserters and runaway slaves.

Article 6.

The Company's cruisers will not harass Johorese ships on the Siak River or at Bengkalis.

Article 7.

The nobles will undertake to help settle the differences between Indragiri, Jambi and Palembang.

Article 8.

The Company's interests will be considered and this contract maintained.

(Translated from E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (Batavia, 1870), p. 36.)

APPENDIX B

MALAY VERSION OF TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR
AND THE VOC 6 APRIL 1685

In the year 1096, on the 28th day of the month Rabi'ul-akhir (according to us, April 3, 1685) being Wednesday, I, Paduka Raja who rules Johor and Pahang, have concluded this contract with Francois van der Beke, Syahbandar, and Lieutenant Jan Rosdom when they came as ambassadors to the *Yang Dipertuan* [the One who is Lord], asking to trade in cloth with the Minangkabaus up the Siak River.

I, Paduka Raja, gave answer that I had no power to permit such, since it is the preserve of the *Yang Dipertuan*, and he is at present very young. When he grows older, who knows, but he shall demand from me profit from his trade, and it shall be my fault [that he does not have it]. However, if de Heer Gouverneur [the Governor of Malacca, Cornelis van Qualbergen] insists on carrying on trade, he can do it, but no Dutch, black or white [i.e., Dutch freeburgers and native inhabitants of Malacca], must trade with my people in Siak; if they do this, they will be fined.

Also, no one may provide my people with money or cloth or they shall be punished by losing their investment [*verstreckte penningen*].

Except for the Company, no one can carry cloth upstream or pass the Syahbandar, nor bring any tin downstream; if the Syahbandar or Company's people witness this, they will confiscate the goods.

The Company and its people may only carry cloth upstream and bring down tin and goods, and [this applies to] me, Paduka Raja.

But the subjects of the Company and other freeburgers may buy no *pedro porco* there.

And none of the Dutch may build a stone lodge or an *atap* house in Siak, but must carry out trade by ship.

The Dutch must not anchor below Pasir Sala, but must anchor higher up, so that my people from Siak do not mingle with the Minangkabaus in order to prevent any differences from arising.

Also, the Dutch must not become involved in any disputes or differences with my people of Siak. Otherwise they will be severely punished, as will the people of Siak if they become involved in disputes with the Dutch. Further, the Company's people may not carry any salt upstream.

But if the people of Jambi and Palembang are at war, the Dutch will ask of the *Yang Dipertuan* that the Paduka Raja restore the friendship.

The sloops or panchallangs of the Company must stay no longer in the harbour of Bengkalis than [the time taken] to buy betel and areca, and then must leave again. Further, they must do no harm to the people of Bengkalis or the people sailing to and from there. Further, they cannot inspect any ship or take off the people from it, but they can do that in Rupert [an island to the north of Bengkalis] as the king consented to in the time of de Heer Jan Thyssen [Governor of Malacca, 1646-1662].

If the people of Johor steal any people of Malacca, they will be punished with death. This also applies to the people of Malacca.

If any Johorese slaves flee to Malacca, the owner shall pay twenty Johorese *mas* at twenty *dubbeltjes* each. This also applies to the people of Malacca if slaves flee to Johor.

If free people of Johor run away, the Governor of Malacca will restore them without payment, and similarly with the people of Malacca.

The first slave that runs away from Johor or Malacca shall be punished with death. The Company has also requested of the King and the Paduka Raja that they write a letter to Rembau, Tampin, Sungai Ujong, Kelang, and Selangor [directing them] to follow and maintain their old contract to the letter, and to do no harm to Malacca and commit no theft.

I, Paduka Raja and all the nobles [Orang Kaya] of Johor and Pahang have made this contract with the Dutch as well as the Company; this contract must last as long as the world, and it must always remain as I have written here.

(Notations made by the Dutch scribe)

At the top [of the page] in the principal position is the *cap* of the Dato Paduka Raja, son of the Dato Laksamana, and after that that of the Dato Bendahara Maharaja, son of Dato Sri Maharaja and that of the Orang Kaya Laksamana, son of the Paduka Raja. Following this is that of the Orang Kaya Temenggong Paduka Tuan, son of the Dato Paduka Raja. Following that is the seal of Syahbandar Francois van der Beke....)

(Translated from E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (Batavia, 1870), Appendices, vii-viii.)

APPENDIX C
TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR AND THE VOC
9 APRIL 1689

Article 1.

Renewal and maintaining of all earlier treaties.

Article 2.

Exclusive and toll-free trade for the Company in the king's lands.

Article 3.

No Moors or Hindus will be permitted to establish themselves in Johor's lands. If any come to trade, they will be severely fined.

Article 4.

Toll-free trade for Johor in Malacca.

Article 5.

Until the sultan reaches his majority, the Company is permitted toll-free trade only in Indian cloth [*linjwaten*], species, tin and gold on the Siak River, with liberty to build a wooden house there. The Bendahara is permitted to send a small ship there annually with Indian cloth.

Article 6.

The population along the Siak River and its tributaries has the right to sell wood to the Company.

The Johor Syahbandar of Sabouwer [on the Siak River] shall not oppose the Company's trade.

Article 7.

The subjects of Johor may trade in small goods and provisions in the Siak River. Their ships are subject to inspection by the Company's ships and to confiscation of forbidden goods.

Article 8.

Mutual deliverance of runaway slaves and deserters. Pirates will be punished with death. Also the first slave who runs away of his own free-will will be punished with death as a deterrent.

Article 9.

Subjects of Johor shall not be harassed by the Company's cruisers on the Siak River and at Bengkalis. Johorese instigating undesirable activities shall be punished.

Article 10.

As much as possible Johor shall take the Company's interest to heart and shall observe the Contract faithfully.

(Translated from E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (Batavia, 1870), pp. 38-9.)

APPENDIX D
TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN JOHOR AND THE VOC
19 AUGUST 1713

Article 1.

Strengthening of the old friendship and alliance between the VOC and Johor.

Article 2.

Free trade for the Company and its subjects in Johor's lands and for the subjects of Johor in the port of Malacca, while paying the usual tolls; trade in opium is forbidden for Johorese.

Article 3.

Free trade for inhabitants of Malacca with the Company's passes in the Siak River and its tributaries, without having to pay tolls if no goods are unloaded or brought on board. This holds true also for Johorese ships in Malacca, leaving within three days.

Article 4.

Malacca ships going to Patapahan will pay a fixed sum to the Johorese Syahbandar.

Article 5.

Free cutting and purchasing of wood in Siak for the Company and Malacca inhabitants.

Article 6.

Delivery of runaway slaves and debtors.

Article 7.

Mutual prevention of each other's subjects doing each other harm.

Article 8.

Johor shall not prevent the sale of tin at Malacca at thirty-six rijksdaalders a bahar of 375 pounds.

Article 9.

The King of Johor promises the return of a detained ship belonging to a freeburger of Malacca.

Article 10.

After the ratification of this contract the King of Johor will be paid the proceeds of one of the king's ships, which ran aground at Negapatam.

(Netscher adds that this contract was ratified for the Johor side by Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah and the reigning Duli Yang Dipertuan Muda 'who rules the lands of Johor and Pahang, and governs their dependencies and people'.)

(Translated from E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak* (Batavia, 1870), pp. 45-6.)

APPENDIX E

*A NEW SUCCESSION PRINCIPLE IN PAGAR RUYONG
IN THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY*

A succession dispute in 1674 in Pagar Ruyong resulted in the strengthening of the monarchy and an increased self-confidence which had important repercussions in the *rantau* areas, especially to the east. The traditional hereditary succession followed from father to son, if the son's mother was of the same family (*sabuah parui*) as the ruler. Otherwise, the succession went to the eldest son of the ruler's eldest sister.¹ In a case where a ruler was found unfit, a new one was selected by the nobles from among his sons. If there were no eligible sons, then the succession went to the sister's children.² The disputed succession was between the son of the late Sultan Ahmad, the Yamtuan Sakti of Pagar Ruyong, who was born of a royal mother but not of his father's family (*sabuah parui*), and the Sultan Ahmad's nephew, son of the ruler of Suruasso, who thus became legally entitled to the throne of Pagar Ruyong. The stalemate forced a temporary recognition of both claims in 1676, when the son was given the right to rule over the lands to the west from Pagar Ruyong to Padang,

and the nephew the lands to the east.³ This arrangement appeared to have been accepted, even if grudgingly, by all parties concerned because it remained in force until 1680.⁴ Then in February 1680 the late Sultan Ahmad Syah's nephew sent a delegation to the Dutch in Padang announcing somewhat prematurely his accession to the throne of Pagar Ruyong and his assumption of the title of Sultan Ahmad Syah.⁵

Hostilities, however, continued between the two factions until 1683, when the Laksamana from the Minangkabau court in the Padang Highlands arrived in Padang to announce the accession of Sultan Indrama [Indomo] Syah at Suruasso as Yamtuan Sakti.⁶ This accession ended all hostilities, and the two cousins at Pagar Ruyong and Suruasso ruled jointly as Yamtuan Sakti and continued to keep the succession within their two families through close marriage alliances.

One should perhaps view the new arrangements in Suruasso and Pagar Ruyong in 1683, therefore, as the beginning of a new succession principle for the Minangkabau monarchy. When P. J. Begbie wrote in the early part of the nineteenth century that '... in the royal family of Minangkabau, or, as it is sometimes denominated, Pagarooyoong: instead of the title descending, as it naturally should do, on the son of the deceased chieftain, it falls upon the son of his eldest sister',⁷ he was dismissed as having confused the common Minangkabau practice with that of the royal house.⁸ Most Minangkabau literature concerning the manner of succession makes a studied distinction between the matrilineal succession appertaining to the common people and the patrilineal succession operating in the Minangkabau royal house. An examination of Dutch contemporary reports of the period 1666-1718 reveals, however, that when the Ruler of Pagar Ruyong died in 1674 he was succeeded seven or eight years later by a nephew at Pagar Ruyong with the title associated with that house, Sultan Ahmad Syah;⁹ whereas, his son came to rule in Suruasso with the title Sultan Indrama Syah.¹⁰ When this Sultan Indrama Syah died in 1697, he was succeeded by his nephew, the son of Sultan Ahmad Syah, who then took the title of Sultan Indrama Syah. The latter wrote to the Dutch in Padang in 1702 in which he referred to '... my father Sultan Ahmad Syah, son of the Sultan Chalifatuaalla Indrama Syah'.¹¹

When the Dutch reported these accessions, they believed that the successions went normally from father to son, as was the case in their experience elsewhere. Consequently, they followed the succession from Pagar Ruyong (with the hereditary title Sultan Ahmad Syah) to Suruasso (with the hereditary title Sultan Indrama Syah) and then back again to Pagar Ruyong because this was the manner in which father to son succession occurred. The Dutch Resident at Padang, for example, attributed the Minangkabau war of 1713-1714 to the withholding of the yearly tribute to the court of Pagar Ruyong since the death of Sultan Indrama Syah in 1697. He went on to explain that the latter's successor, the presently ruling 'Raja Gagar Alam' [part of a title of Sultan Ahmad Syah, the Yamtuan Sakti of Pagar Ruyong]¹² thus attempted to enforce this tribute as a right acknowledged in the treaty signed by the old Yamtuan Sakti [Sultan Ahmad Syah in 1667] and in effect until the death of his

successor, the Sultan Indrama Syah in 1697.¹³ What was actually in effect was a matrilineal succession in which the eldest son of the eldest sister of the ruler succeeded to the office. The royal families at Pagar Ruyong and Suruasso appeared to have intermarried with each other, thus preserving the purity of the family while retaining control of the kingship.

There was a practice of the Sultan Ahmad Syah marrying the eldest sister of the Sultan Indrama Syah, and the Sultan Indrama Syah in turn marrying the eldest sister of the Sultan Ahmad Syah. These women obtained the title of Putri Jamilan and legitimized the successions to both thrones. By this method the son of Sultan Ahmad Syah of Pagar Ruyong would always succeed his uncle in Suruasso, while the son of Sultan Indrama Syah would likewise always succeed his uncle in Pagar Ruyong. The inheritance pattern thus was in accord with the matrilineal system practiced by the Minangkabaus. At least during this period the monarchy did not exist as an aberration in Minangkabau society with an inheritance pattern quite alien to the people they professed to rule; it was a part of the social fabric of Minangkabau society and played an important political and social role befitting its status.

As a result of the new succession arrangement between Pagar Ruyong and Suruasso, the three individuals who had the privilege and authority to use the title 'Emperor of Minangkabau' or 'Emperor of Pagar Ruyong' [as translated in Dutch] were the Raja Alam (King of the World with the regnal title of Sultan Ahmad Syah), Raja Suruasso (regnal title of Sultan Indrama [Indomo] Syah) and the Putri Jamilan (a title of honour given to the mothers of both the Raja Alam and the Raja Suruasso). By 1683 the Raja Suruasso seemed to have assumed the major role of the Raja Ibadat (King of Religion), while the Putri Jamilan replaced the Raja Adat (King of Adat) in the hierarchy of the Pagar Ruyong court. Many of the missives arriving in the various Dutch comptoirs in Jambi, Palembang, Padang, and Malacca during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries originated from this new triumvirate.

1. KA 1275, OB 1683, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Commissioner Joan van Leene of Padang to Batavia, 3 March 1683, fols. 1009^{r-v}.

2. H. van Bazel, 'Radicaale beschryving van Sumatra's Westcüst', report to the Gov.-Gen. in Batavia in 1761, manuscript in Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, Leiden, p. 96; N. Macleod, 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw', *IG*, I (1905), p. 127.

3. H. van Bazel, op. cit. p. 97; Macleod, op. cit. p. 133. The 'lands to the east' are not specified in any of the Dutch reports.

4. KA 1237, OB 1680, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Resident of Padang to Batavia, 3 June 1679, fols. 1006^v-1007^r.

5. KA 1248, OB 1681, West Coast Sumatra Register, Report of Melchoir Hurt of Padang to Batavia, 29 Feb. 1680, fols. 757^{r-v}.

6. KA 1746, OB 1715, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Resident Hofman of Padang to Batavia, 30 April 1714, fols. 118-20.

7. P. J. Begbie, *The Malayan Peninsula* (London, 1967), p. 134.
8. P. E. De Josselin de Jong, *Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan* (Leiden, 1951), p. 102.
9. KA 1248, OB 1681, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive Hurt of Padang to Batavia, 29 Feb. 1680, fols. 757^{r-v}.
10. KA 1746, OB 1715, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Resident Hofman of Padang to Batavia, 30 April 1714, fols. 118-20.
11. KA 1556, OB 1701, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Jordaen to Batavia, 22 July 1702, fols. 47-8.
12. KA 1773, OB 1714, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Hofman in Padang to Batavia, 22 March 1713, fol. 69.
13. KA 1746, OB 1715, West Coast Sumatra Register, Missive from Resident Hofman of Padang to Batavia, 30 April 1714, fol. 115.

APPENDIX F

MEN AND SHIPS IN THE KINGDOM OF JOHOR AND ITS DEPENDENCIES IN 1714

Terengganu:

500 soldiers in the service of the sultan. It has no fleets but only small perahus.¹

Pahang:

600 soldiers in the service of the sultan with only ten to twelve small perahus with a cannon in the front and three to four small cannons on each side.

Islands to the east of the Pahang coast:

700 soldiers in the service of the sultan with twelve to fourteen small perahus weaponed as those from Pahang.

Johor:

Being the old residence [and hence no longer populated] of the Sultan of Johor, can deliver neither men nor ships.

Riau:

Being the present residence of the sultan, together with the surrounding islands:

2000 soldiers in the service of the sultan. The sea force consists of

40 grabs² with two cannons fore and fifteen small cannons on each side

50 vessels with two cannons fore and ten small cannons on each side

100 perahus with a small cannon fore, and three smaller cannons on each side, as well as guns, assegais, swords, and krisses.

Lingga:

500 soldiers in the service of the sultan. The sea force consists of four to five grabs weaponed as those on Riau, and seven to eight other vessels weaponed as those on Riau.

Rio Formosa:

It cannot deliver any men or ships since it is a settlement of only ten to twelve houses.

Muar and upriver:

400 soldiers in the service of the sultan, but no sea force.

Rembau, the surrounding nagari, and the interior:

500 soldiers in the service of the sultan with no other weapons but assegais and krisses. These men must embark from Muar or the Linggi River.

Linggi and Sungai Ujong:

Inhabited mostly by Buginese and Minangkabaus. 200 soldiers in the service of the sultan, but no sea force.

Kelang:

Inhabited mainly by Minangkabaus.

300 soldiers in the service of the sultan, but no sea force.

Selangor:

Inhabited mainly by Buginese on the sea coasts and by Minangkabaus upriver.

300 soldiers in the service of the sultan, but no sea force.

Bengkalis and the nagari along the Siak River:

400 soldiers in the service of the sultan. The sea force consists of three to four penjajabs³ each with a small cannon fore, and three to four small cannons on each side.

Kampar:

100 soldiers in the service of the sultan, but no sea force.

Total of 6500 soldiers and more than 233 vessels of all types.

(Translated from a document in the Rijksarchief in The Hague, The Netherlands: KA 1746, OB 1715, Missive from Gov. Moerman to Batavia, 12 August 1714, fols. 146-149.)

1. An undecked native ship.
2. A sharp-bowed, light-draft coasting vessel with lateen sails and, usually, two masts.
3. A Buginese light warship with a mainmast and mizzen and small enough to be propelled by oars if necessary.

GLOSSARY

- adat*: Malay laws and customs.
- agar-agar*: Seaweed from which seaweed jelly is made.
- anreguru* or *anrongguru*: In the Kingdom of Goa in Macassar, the title *anrongguru lompona tumakajannang* was one of the major officials of the ruler, whose position in wartime was Commander-in-Chief. He was also head of the ruler's bodyguard and conveyor of the king's commands in peacetime. In Bone the *anreguru* was one of the heads of the ruler's fighting force, while in Luwu this title was given to lesser chiefs and leaders of troops in battle.
- arok*: Buginese war dance to indicate loyalty and willingness to follow a leader to war.
- Arumpon*: Ruler of Bone, a Buginese kingdom in south-west Celebes.
- atap*: Thatched-roofing usually made of nipah palm-leaves.
- baftas*: From Persian bâft (woven). Fine cotton cloth. The best came from Broach in Gujerat. It was usually black or white with an average length of fifteen cubits.
- bahar*: Measure of weight, during the seventeenth and eighteenth century about 375 pounds.
- bahasa*: Language, Malay etiquette.
- baju rantai*: Chain-mail armour (maliënkolder).
- balok*: Malay cargo boat of a heavy beamed type.
- banting*: Two-masted Acehnese sailing ship.
- Bendahara*: Traditionally the principal official of the Kingdom of Malacca and Johor.
- beraleh*: To veer, change, shift one's position.
- Besi Kawi*: See *Bisa Kawi*.
- Bisa Kawi*: In Minangkabau, a legendary power that punished people who altered the adat.
- cap*: A seal.

- catty*: Measure of weight about 1½ pounds.
- comptoir*: A Dutch post where a Resident or Governor was usually attached.
- daeng*: Title used in south-west Celebes for high or low nobility.
- darat*: Minangkabau heartland, consisting of the three *luhak* Agam, Tanah Datar and Lima Puluh Kota.
- daulat*: Strictly defined it means sovereignty, but it is used to refer to the symbolic power of a Malay ruler.
- derhaka*: Treason to a Malay ruler.
- dipati*: Head of a district.
- dividor*: A debt-bondsman.
- dubbeltje*: A Dutch coin which today is worth about three U.S. cents.
- freeburger*: One who had served his time with the VOC and could now establish himself in The Indies as a free citizen.
- gaukeng*: In south-west Celebes, these are religio-magical objects accorded particular veneration, often associated with the Heavenly Figures (toManurung).
- grab*: A sharp-bowed light-draught vessel with lateen sails and usually two masts.
- guiness*: Checkered cotton material imported for the purchase of slaves in Africa in the West India trade and the African trade.
- haj*: Pilgrimage to Mecca.
- Haji*: Title given to one who has made the pilgrimage
- hulubalang*: Warleader.
- imam*: Presiding Muslim elder of a congregation who leads the prayers at a Friday service.
- istana*: The residence of a Malay ruler.
- jihaad*: Holy War.
- kadi*: In seventeenth and eighteenth century Johor, the chief Muslim official.
- kakap*: A boat with a narrow beam and low free board.
- kafir*: Infidel
- kajang*: Palm frond which is woven into mats and used for boat-coverings, roofs, etc.
- kampung*: A cluster of buildings comprising a large homestead or a small hamlet.
- kanjar*: Part of Buginese ceremony of loyalty, where oath of allegiance is sworn with a *kanjar* (a straight-bladed, two-edged, sharp-pointed dagger).
- karaeng*: Macassarese title of nobility.
- kerbau*: Buffalo.
- khatib*: Lay preacher, reciter in mosque.
- kris*: Malay dagger.
- Laksamana*: Malay official title associated with one of the major Orang Kaya in Johor who was Chief of the Coast and leader of the fleet.

- lancar*: A type of fast-travelling boat.
luhak: Territorial unit in the Minangkabau heartland.
menagierse: Skilful handling of goods and the proper provisioning of ships.
aequipage: Originally a weight of gold dust, thus a gold coin weighing one mas. This was the coinage used by the Kingdom of Johor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
mas:
menteri: Malay official.
Memorie van: Final report written by an outgoing official in the VOC to his successor.
Overgave:
Moors: Term used by Dutch for Indian Muslims.
nafiri: Trumpet regarded as a special appurtenance of Malay royalty, part of royal band.
nagari: A Minangkabau settlement.
nakhoda: Shipmaster.
negeri: State or settlement.
nobat: Malay royal band, especially the drum.
orang kaya: Malay nobility
orang laut: Sea people, referring here specifically to the sea-going peoples who inhabited the islands and shores of the Kingdom of Johor.
panglima: Title of an officer of secondary rank.
pedro porco: Kidney stones found in porcupines, monkeys, goats, and used for curative purposes.
penghulu: Superintendent.
penjabab: A Buginese light warship with a mainmast, mizzen, and small enough to be propelled with oars if necessary.
perahu: Malay ship without deck.
pinang: Areca-nut which is prepared in various ways for chewing with betel-leaf.
Punggawa: Buginese title of a war commander, the precise function of which differs from kingdom to kingdom.
Putri Jamilan: Title of Queen Mother in Pagar Ruyong who legitimized the succession to the positions of ruler of Pagar Ruyong and Suruasso in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
rantau: Originally coastal areas of Padang on the west coast of Sumatra. Later it was extended to any area where there were large numbers of Minangkabaus outside the heartland.
rial: A Spanish silver coin imported into Asia which was worth about 2½ guilders or five shillings.
ringgit: Serrated or jagged. The milled dollar was referred to as 'rial ringgit'. Ringgit thus came to mean a dollar.
sangu: A seaweed of fine texture used for making seaweed jelly.

- sawah:* Wet-rice fields.
- Syahbandar:* Harbour-master.
- sirih:* Betel-leaf prepared for chewing with areca-nut, gambier and lime.
- spiauter:* Alloy or zinc obtained from China.
- suku:* In the Orang Laut context it means tribe. The Orang Laut are referred to by the name of the island where they are generally found. Hence Orang Suku Bentan refers to the Orang Laut from the tribe found generally on the island of Bentan. In the Minangkabau context, the word refers to the original quadripartite division into clans.
- sumatra:* A sudden small squall which occurs off the coast of Sumatra (hence its name) frequently in the evenings. It usually lasts for about a half hour.
- Surassen/*
Sarassa: A printed or woven patterned cloth which was much in demand in the Malay Archipelago and Japan. It was used as a waist cloth in the Malay Archipelago.
- terubuk:* A type of fish.
- to Manurung:* According to Buginese belief, this is a being who descended from Heaven bringing the *adat* and founding a royal lineage.
- tripang:* Bêche-de-mer (holothurian).
- VOC:* Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (The United Dutch East India Company).
- Yang* Literally, the One who is Lord. Used as title of Malay rulers.
- Dipertuan:*
- Yamtuan* Term of address for the Raja Alam of Pagar Ruyong.
- Sakti:*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. MANUSCRIPTS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES

A. ALGEMEEN RIJKSARCHIEF (GENERAL STATE ARCHIVES) IN THE HAGUE

Letters and appendices written to the Netherlands by Governor-General and Council (Overgekomen brieven uit Batavia) from the *comptoirs* Malacca, Palembang, Jambi, West Coast Sumatra, Macassar.

Letters from Governor General and Council to the various offices of the United Company in Asia (copies) (Inkomend briefboek Batavia).

Acquisitions concerning the Dutch settlements in Asia, preserved in the General State Archives.

Collectie Radermacher, No. 519, No. 526.

'Diverse aantekeningen ... in de jaaren 1705, 1706, 1707', *Van Hoorne-Riebeeck Collectie*, No. 44.

'Stukken betreffende Makassar, 1689-1777', *Verzameling Hope*, K.A. 8500.

B. KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT VOOR TAAL-, LAND-, EN VOLKENKUNDE IN LEIDEN

'Consideration over den tegenwoordigen toestand van Comps Saken op't Land van Macassar en de weder nieuw opgeboude jealousy en onlusten tusschen den Jongen Coninck van Bonee ende de Macassaren van Goa onder Radja Sandrabone.'
Opgesteld tot advis van den directeur generaal Joan van Hoorn

en overgegeven aan den Ho. Ed. Heer Gov.-Gen. Willem van Outhoorn and Raad van N-I. 24 Feb. 1708.

EERDMANS, A. J. A. F., *Algemeene geschiedenis van Celebes*. Eerste afd. I.

EERDMANS, A. J. A. F., *Geschiedenis van Bone* (met geslachtslijst Vorsten). Tweede afd. II.

EMANUEL, L. A., 'Landschap Bone'. Watampone, 8 November 1947. Residentie Zuid Celebes.

EMANUEL, L. A., 'Levensgeschiedenis van DaEng Pabarang'. Watampone, 28 November 1947.

EMANUEL, L. A., 'Memorie van Overgave van den aftredenden Assistent-Resident van Bone'. Periode 25 October 1945-20 April 1948.

GREVE, W. G. de, Memorie van Overgave door Assistent Resident van Bone, 'Over de Afdeeling Bone'. Macassar, 1908.

KUURMAN, J., 'Adatstaatsinstellingen van het Zelfbestuurend Landschap Soppeng'. Wattansoppeng. Residentie Zuid-Celebes, 11 Januari 1948.

PALM, W. A., 'Beschryving van't Groot Eyland Borneo', 1777.

SCHELLE, JAN DAVID VAN, 'Aantekeningen, getrokken uit de Memorien, Dagh-Registers, enz....' 2 delen. I. van 1669 tot 1800; II. van 1808 tot 1826.

SPEELMAN, CORN., 'Notitie dienende voor eenen corten tijt....' dd. Makassar 1669. 129 and 107 blzn. mach. Fol. 24.

SPYKER, J. T., 'Adatstaatsinstellingen van inlandsche rehtgemeenschappen in het Landschap Wadjo'. Sengkang Residentie Zuid-Celebes 27 Nov. 1747.

C. INDIA OFFICE

Mackenzie Collection 1822

a. 'Voyage Made to Borneo and Atcheen', No. 5, pp. 1-441.

b. 'Account of the Island of Sumatra', No. 17, pp. 1-162.

c. *Historical Retrospect of Bugis*, No. 67, pp. 111-75.

II. MALAY MANUSCRIPTS

(In Jawi Script unless indicated otherwise)

A. ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY IN LONDON

R.A.S. 119 *Sejarah Raja-Raja Riau*

Blagden 8 *Asal Raja-Raja Melayu*

B. LEIDEN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Klinkert 24 *Hikayat Riau*Klinkert 37 *Sadjarah Radja-Radja Riau*Cod. Or. 1754 *Hikayat Upu Daeng Menambon*Cod. Or. 1724 (2) *Aturan satiya Bugis dengan Melayu*Cod. Or. 3199 (2) *Silsilah turunan yang menurunkan kapada Sultan Sumeneb*Cod. Or. 3199 (3), No. 5 *Tjeritera asal katurunan radja-radja Malayu*

Cod. Or. 1741 (1)

Cod. Or. 1741 (2) *Hikayat Negeri Djohor*Cod. Or. 3322 *Hikayat Negeri Djohor*Cod. Or. 7304 (Sn. H. 78) *Sadjarah Radja-Radja Malajoe*

Cod. Or. 1999 'On Adat of Malay Rulers' (in Rumi)

Klinkert 153 *Sja'ir Perang Siak I*Klinkert 154 *Sja'ir Perang Siak II*

C. KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT VOOR TAAL-, LAND-, EN VOLKENKUNDE IN LEIDEN

Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw

D. PERPUSTAKAAN LEMBAGA KEBUDAYAAN INDONESIA IN JAKARTA

von de Wall Collection

62 I *Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw*62 V *Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw*62 VI *Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw*192 *Hikayat Negeri Djohor*193 *Hikayat Negeri Djohor*195 *Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw*197 *Sjadjarah Radja-Radja Riouw*273 *Sja'ir Radja Siak*274 *Sja'ir Soeltan Mahmoed di Lingga*

E. YAYASAN KEBUDAYAAN SULAWESI SELATAN DAN TENGGARA IN UJUNG PADANG (MAKASAR)

'Riwayat Ringkas dari Keradjaan Soppeng', (in Rumi), copied by the Datu of Soppeng, 7 Nov. 1963.

F. JOHORE STATE ARCHIVES IN JOHORE BAHRU

Hikayat Johor serta Pahang (in Rumi)

III. PUBLISHED SOURCES

- ABDUL, SAMAD BIN IDRIS, *et al.*, *Negeri Sembilan dan Sejarah-nya*, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.
- ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL KADIR, tr. by A. H. Hill, *The Hikayat Abdullah*, Kuala Lumpur, 1970.
- ABDULLAH, TAUFIK, 'Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau', *Indonesia*, II (Oct. 1966), pp. 1-24.
- *Minangkabau 1900-1927: Preliminary Studies in Social Development*, unpublished M. A. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1967.
- *Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1970.
- 'Some Notes on the Kaba Tjindua Mata: An Example of Minangkabau Traditional Literature', *Indonesia*, IX (April 1970), pp. 1-22.
- ABDURRAHIM, 'Kedatangan Orang Melaju di Makassar', in personal possession of author, Makassar, no date.
- and Wolhoff, G. J., *Sedjarah Goa*, Makassar, no date.
- ABDURRAZAK, DAENG PATUNRU, 'Sedjarah Keradjaan Tanete', *Bingkisan*, I, i (Aug. 1967) and I, iii (Sept. 1967).
- 'Sedjarah Ringkas dari Orang Melaju di Makassar (Sulawesi Selatan)', *Bingkisan*, I, viii (Dec. 1968).
- 'Sedjarah Ringkas Keradjaan Soppeng', *Bingkisan*, I, x (Jan. 1968).
- 'Sedjarah Ringkas Keradjaan Tallo', *Bingkisan*, I, xx (Jan. 1968).
- ABU HAMID, *Tindjaun struktural atas peranan-peranan dalam kehidupan masyarakat Bone*, unpublished skripsi, Fakultas Sastra, Universitas Hassanuddin, Makassar, 1965.
- ADRIANI, N., 'Mededeeling van Dr. Adriani over Vorstenbestuur (1917)', *ARB*, XVII, viii (1919), Serie P, Zuid-Celebes, 's-Gravenhage, pp. 130-1.
- AHMAD, KASSIM (ed.), *Hikayat Hang Tuah*, Kuala Lumpur, 1966.
- ALEXANDROWICZ, C. H., *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies*, Oxford, 1967.
- ALKEMADE, J. A. VAN RUN VAN, 'Beschrijving eener reis van Bengkalis langs de Rokan Rivier naar Rantau Binoewang', *BKI*, XXXII (1884), pp. 21-48.

- ANDERSON, B. R., 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture', in Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, 1972, pp. 1-69.
- ANDERSON, JOHN, *Acheen and the Ports on the North and East Coasts of Sumatra*, London, 1840.
- *English Intercourse with Siam in the Seventeenth Century*, London, 1890.
- *Mission to the East Coast of Sumatra in 1823*, London, 1826.
- van Anrooij, A. A. Hijmans, 'Nota omtrent het rijk van Siak', *TBG*, XXX (1885), pp. 259-390.
- ARASARATNAM, S., 'Some Notes on the Dutch in Malacca and the Indo-Malayan Trade, 1641-1670', *JSEAH*, X (Dec. 1969), pp. 480-90.
- BAKKERS, J. A., 'Het leenvorstendom Boni', *TBG*, XV (1886), pp. 1-209.
- BASSETT, D. K., 'The British Country Trader and Sea Captain in South East Asia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *Journal of the Historical Society*, University of Malaya, I, ii (1961), pp. 9-14.
- 'Changes in the Pattern of Malay Politics, 1629-c. 1655', *JSEAH*, X, iii (Dec. 1969), pp. 429-52.
- 'English Relations with Siam in the Seventeenth Century', *JMBRAS*, XXXIV, ii (1961), pp. 90-105.
- 'English Trade in Celebes, 1613-67', *JMBRAS*, XXXI, i (May 1958), pp. 1-39.
- *The Factory of the English East India Company at Bantam, 1602-1682*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, London, 1955.
- 'The Portuguese in Malaya', *Journal of the Historical Society*, University of Malaya, I, iii (1962/3), pp. 18-28.
- BASTIN, JOHN, AND ROOLVINK, R., (eds.) *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, Oxford, 1964.
- BATUAH, DATUK MARHUM AND TANEMEH, D. H. BAGINDO, *Hukum Adat dan Adat Minangkabau*, Jakarta, n.d.
- BATUAH, AHMAD DT. AND MADJOINDO, A. DT., *Tambo Minangkabau*, Jakarta, 1956.
- BAUMGARTEN, F. L., 'Sila-Sila Temenggong Muar' *JIA*, V (1851), pp. 66-8.
- BAZEL, H. VAN, 'Begin en voortgang van onzen handel en bezittingen op Sumatra's Westkust', *TNI*, IX (1847), pp. 1-97.

- 'Radicaale beschrijving van Sumatra's West Cust', Report made to the Gov.-Gen. in Batavia in 1761. Manuscript at the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, Leiden, 13 April 1761.
- BEECKMAN, DANIEL (Capt.), *A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo in the East Indies*, London, 1718.
- BEGBIE, P. J., *The Malayan Peninsula*, Kuala Lumpur, 1967 (Originally published by Vepery Mission Press, 1834).
- BERTLING, C. T., 'Een hypothese omtrent de sociale structuur van Zuid-Celebes in verband met de stichtingsmythe van Wadjo', *BKI*, XCVIII (1939), pp. 489-95.
- 'Bijdrage tot de kennis van den Maleischen zeeroover', *TNI*, jaargang 20 (1858), pp. 71-90.
- 'Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Celebes', *TNI*, II, jaargang 16 (1854), pp. 149-86.
- BLOK, ROELOF, 'Beknopte geschiedenis van het Makassaarsche Celebes en onderhoorigheden', *TNI*, I, jaargang 10 (1848), pp. 3-77.
- BLOK, PETRUS JOHANNES, *History of the People of The Netherlands*, tr. by Ruth Putnam, vols. 3-5, New York, London, 1900.
- BONNEY, R., 'A Short History of Kuala Lumpur', *Journal of the Historical Society*, University of Malaya, I, i (1960), pp. 67-76.
- *Kedah 1771-1821, The Search for Security and Independence*, Kuala Lumpur, 1971.
- BORAHIMA, RIDWAN, *Sedjarah Bone pada masa pemerintahan Aru Palaka*, unpublished skripsi, Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan Malang, (Dec. 1971), Malang, Indonesia.
- BORT, BALTHASAR, 'Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678', tr. by M. J. Bremner, introduction and notes by C. O. Blagden, *JMBRAS*, V, i (Aug. 1927), pp. 1-232.
- BOWREY, THOMAS, *Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 1669-1679*, Cambridge, 1903.
- BOXER, C. R., 'The Achinese Attack on Malacca in 1629, as described in Contemporary Portuguese Sources', in Bastin and Roolvink (eds.), *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, Oxford, 1964, pp. 109-21.
- *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800*, London, 1965.
- *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo: A Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South East Asia, 1624-1667*, 's-Gravenhage, 1967.

- 'A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Aceh, 1540-1600', *JSEAH*, III (Dec. 1969), pp. 415-28.
- 'Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry, 1641-1661', paper presented at a conference at the University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, sponsored by the Institute of Hispanic, Portuguese, and Ibero-American Studies (25 Feb. 1958).
- BRAAM, MORRIS D. F. VAN, 'Het landschap Loewoe', *TBG*, XXXII (1889), pp. 498-555.
- BRADDELL, T., 'Notes on Naning, with a Brief Notice of the Naning War', *JIA*, New Series, I, ii (1856), pp. 194-232.
- BROWN, C. C., 'Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXV, ii and iii (Oct. 1952).
- BROWN, DONALD, 'Social-Political History of Brunei, a Bornean Malay Sultanate', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1969.
- BRUCE, JOHN, *Annals of the Honourable East India Company, 1600-1707/8*, 3 vols., London, 1810.
- BRUIJN KOPS, G. F. DE, 'Sketch of the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago', *JIA*, VIII (1854), pp. 386-402; *JIA*, IX (1855), pp. 96-108.
- BRUNNELL, A. C. AND YULE, COLONEL HENRY, *Hobson-Jobson*, a glossary of colloquial Anglo-Indian words and phrases, and of kindred terms, etymological, historical, geographical and discursive, new edition. Ed. by William Crooke, India, 1968.
- CABATON, ANTOINE, *Catalogue sommaire des manuscrits indiens, indochinois et malayo-polynésiens*, Paris, 1912.
- CENSE, A. A. AND LE ROUX, C. C. F. M., 'Boegineesche zeekaarten van den Indischen Archipel', *Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap*, 2e serie LII (1935), pp. 687-714.
- 'Eeninge aantekeningen over Makassaars-Boeginese geschiedschrijving', *BKI*, CVII (1951), pp. 42-60.
- CHABOT, H. TH., *Verwantschap, Stand, en Sexe in Zuid-Celebes*, Groningen/Jakarta, 1950.
- CHUJS, J. A. VAN DER, *Geschiedenis der stichting van de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, Leyden, 1856.
- COMMELIN, ISAAK, *Begin ende voortgang van de Vereenigde Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1646.

- COOLHAAS, W. PH., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, 4 vols., 's-Gravenhage, 1964.
- 'Malacca under Jan van Riebeeck', *JMBRAS*, XXXVIII, ii (1965), pp. 173–82.
- CORDIER, HENRI, *Bibliotheca Indosinica*, vol. 2, Paris, 1912–1915.
- CORTESAO, ARMANDO (ed.), *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*, 2 vols., London, 1944.
- COUPERUS, C. TH., 'De instellingen der Maleijers in de Padangsche Bovenlanden', *TBG*, IV (1855), pp. 1–22.
- COWAN, C. D., 'Ideas of History in the *Journal of the Malayan (Straits) Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1878–1941', in D.G.E. Hall (ed.), *Historians of South East Asia*, London, 1961, pp. 279–85.
- CRAWFURD, JOHN, *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries*, London, 1856.
- *History of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. 2, Edinburgh, 1820.
- *Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia van't passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-Indië, 1624–1682*, Batavia, 1887, etc.
- DALTON, H. GORING, 'A Visit to Some Islands off the East Coast of Johore and Pahang', *JMBRAS*, VI, ii (Aug. 1928), pp. 78–96.
- DAM, PIETER VAN, *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie*, Book 2, vol. 1, 's-Gravenhage, 1931.
- DAMPIER, (Capt.) WILLIAM, *Dampier's Voyages*, 2 vols., New York, 1906.
- *A New Voyage Around the World*, 3 vols., London, 1699.
- DASGUPTA, ARUN KAMAR, 'Acheh in Indonesian Trade and Politics: 1600–1641', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1962.
- DAULAY, ZAHARA, 'Minangkabau, A Preliminary Study of the Culture and the People', unpublished M. A. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1960.
- DIBDEN, JACQUELINE, 'Aspects of Social and Political Change in the Malay Communities of Perak and Selangor in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of London, London, 1968.
- DIJK, LUDORICUS CAROLUS DESIDERIUS VAN, *Neêrland's vroegste betrekkingen met Borneo, den Solo-Archipel, Cambodja, Siam en Cochîn-China*, Amsterdam, 1862.

- DJAJADININGRAT, RADEN HOESEIN, 'Critisch overzicht van de in Maleische werken vervatte gegevens over de geschiedenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh', *BKI*, LXV (1911), pp. 135-215.
- DOUGLAS, F. W., *Notes on the Historical Geography of Malay and Sidelights on the Malay Annals*, Kelang, 1949.
- ECK, R. VAN, 'Mangkasaren en Boegineezen', *IG*, III, ii (1881), pp. 824-43; *IG*, IV (1881), pp. 1020-40; *IG*, I (1882), pp. 60-77.
- EDGEELL, T. C. P., 'English Trade and Policy in Borneo and the Adjacent Islands, 1667-1786', unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of London, London, 1935.
- EERDMANS, A. J. A. F., 'Het landschap Gowa', *VBG*, L (1897), pp. 1-77.
- ERKELENS, B., 'Geschiedenis van het Rijk Gowa', *VBG*, L (1897), pp. 81-121.
- ESSER, S. J., 'Korte Mededelingen', *BKI*, CXVII (1961), pp. 384-5.
- FAVRE, REV. P., 'A Journey in Johor', *JIA*, First Series, III (1849), pp. 50-64.
- FERRAND, G., 'Malaka, le Malayu et Malayur', *Journal Asiatique*, June, July-Aug. 1918.
- FORREST, THOMAS, *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago*, London, 1792.
- FOSTER, WILLIAM, *The English Factories in India*, vols., 1646-1650, 1661-1664, Oxford, 1914, 1923.
- FRANCIS, E., *Herinneringen uit den levensloop van een Indisch ambtenaar van 1815 tot 1851*, medegedeeld in brieven, 3 vols., Batavia, 1856, 1860.
- 'Korte beschrijving van het Nederlandsch grondgebied ter Westkust van Sumatra', *TNI*, II, i (1839), pp. 28-45, 90-111, 131-54, 203-20.
- 'De vestiging der Nederlanders ter Westkust van Sumatra', *TBG*, V (1856), pp. 8-121.
- FRIEDERICY, H. J., 'Aantekeningen over adatrecht bij de Bonesche prauvaarders', *KT* (1931), pp. 490-504.
- 'De standen bij de Boegineezen en Makassaren', *BKI*, XC (1933), pp. 447-602.
- FRIKIUS, HESSE EN SCHWEITZER, *D'aanmercklycke reysen van Elias Hessenac en in Oost-Indien, van't Jaar 1680 tot 1684*, Amsterdam, 1705.
- FRYER, JOHN, *A New Account of East India and Persia in Eight Letters*, London, 1698.

- FUNNELL, WILLIAM, 'The Voyage of William Funnell round the World as Mate to Capt. Wm. Dampier', in John Harris (ed.), *Complete Collection of Voyages and Travels*, vol. 1, London, 1744, pp. 131-50.
- GERVAISE, NICOLAS, *An Historical Description of the Kingdom of Macassar in the East-Indies*, London, 1701.
- GEYL, PIETER, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century*, Part One, 1609-1648, Second Edition, New York, 1961; Part Two, 1648-1715, New York, 1964.
- GHAZZALI, DATO MUHAMMAD, 'Court Language and Etiquette of the Malays', *JMBRAS*, IX, ii (1933), pp. 273-87.
- GIBSON-HILL, C. A., 'On the Alleged Death of Sultan Ala'u'd-din of Johore at Aceh, in 1613', *JMBRAS*, XXIX, i (1956), pp. 125-45.
- 'Johor Lama and Other Ancient Sites on the Johore River', *JMBRAS*, XXVIII, ii (1955), pp. 127-97.
- 'A Note on the Boats of the Rhio and Lingga Archipelagos', *JMBRAS*, XXIV, i (Feb. 1950), pp. 121-32.
- 'Notes on the History of the Old Straits, 1580-1850', *JMBRAS*, XXVII, i (May 1954), pp. 163-214.
- 'The Orang Laut of the Singapore River and the Sampan Panjang', *JMBRAS*, XXV, i (May 1952), pp. 161-74.
- GLAMANN, KRISTOF, *Dutch Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740*, Copenhagen, 1958.
- GODÉE, MOLSBERGEN E. C., *Jan van Riebeeck en Sy Tyd*, Pretoria, 1968.
- GOH YOON FONG, 'Trade and Politics in Banjarmasin, 1700-1747', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, London, 1969.
- GRAAF, H. J. DE, *Catalogus van de Westerse Handschriften van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 's-Gravenhage, 1963.
- *Geschiedenis van Indonesië*, 's-Gravenhage, 1949.
- *De Regering van Sunan Mangkurat I*, 's-Gravenhage, 1962.
- GRAHAM, W. A., *Kelantan: A State of the Malay Peninsula*, Glasgow, 1908.
- GRAMBERG, J.S.G., 'Reis naar Siak', *TBG*, XIII (1864), pp. 497-530.
- GULLICK, J. M., *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, 1956.
- 'Sungei Ujong', *JMBRAS*, XXII, ii (1949), pp. 1-69.

- HAAN, F. DE, 'Naar midden Sumatra in 1684', *TBG*, XXXIX (1897), pp. 327-66.
- HAKLUYT SOCIETY, *The Travels and Controversies of Frair Domingo Navarette, 1618-1686*, 2 vols., London.
- HALEWIJN, E. A., 'Geographische en Ethnographische gegevens betreffende het Rijk van Deli', *TBG*, XXIII (1876), pp. 147-58.
- HALL, D. G. E., *History of South-East Asia*, Third Edition, London, 1968.
- HAMILTON, CAPT. ALEXANDER, *A New Account of the East Indies*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1727.
- HAMERSTER, A. J., 'De Minangkabausche staten op het Maleische Schiereiland', *KT*, Derde jaargang, tweede half jaar (1914), pp. 1445-61, 1629-46.
- HAMERSTER, M., *Bijdrage tot de kennis van de afdeeling Asahan, Oostkust Sumatra Instituut*, Amsterdam, 1926.
- HARRIS, JOHN, 'The History of the Danish Commerce to the East Indies', in John Harris (ed.), *Complete Collection of Voyages and Travels*, vol. 1, London, 1744, pp. 976-80.
- HARRISON, BRIAN, 'Malacca in the Eighteenth Century, Two Dutch Governors' Reports', *JMBRAS*, XXVII, i (May 1954), pp. 24-34.
- HEERES, J. E., *Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders inden Maleischen Archipel*, vol. 3, 's-Gravenhage, 1895.
- *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, vol. 1 (1596-1650), 1907; vol. 2 (1650-1675), 1931; vol. 3 (1676-1691), 1934; vol. 4 (1691-1725), 1935; vol. 5 (1726-1752), 1938, 's-Gravenhage.
- Hikayat Negeri Johor* (in Jawi), *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932).
- HOËVELL, G. W. W. C. van, 'Over den eed der Maleiers ter Sumatra's Westkust', *TBG*, XXVI, (1881), pp. 529-37.
- HOFFMAN, J. E., 'Early Policies in the Malacca Jurisdiction of the United East India Company: The Malay Peninsula and Netherlands East Indies Attachment', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, III, i (March 1972), pp. 1-38.
- HOLLANDER, J. J. de, 'Geslachtregister der vorsten van Sambas', *BKI*, XVIII (1871), pp. 185-203.
- HOOYKASS, CHRISTIAAN, *Over Maleische Literatuur*, Second Edition, Leiden, 1947.
- 'Laks (a)mana at Malay Courts', Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, *Oriental Institute Journal*, VI (1957), pp. 1-2.
- HORSFIELD, THOMAS, 'Report on the Island of Bangka', *JIA*, II, vi,

- (June 1848), pp. 299-336.
- HUGHES, T. D., 'A Portuguese Account of Johor', from the 'Jornada de Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho', *JMBRAS*, XIII, ii (1935), pp. 111-56.
- HULLU, J. DE, 'Over den Chinaschen handel der Oost-Indische Compagnie in de eerste dertig jaar van de 18^e eeuw', *BKI*, LXXIII (1917), pp. 32-154.
- HUSSEIN, ISMAIL, 'Hikayat Negri Johor, Satu Penyelenggaraan Teks', unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1962.
- 'The Study of Traditional Malay Literature', *JMBRAS*, XXXIX, ii (1966), pp. 1-22.
- HUTCHINSON, E. W., *Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century*, London, 1940.
- (ed.), *1688 Revolution in Siam, The Memoirs of Father de Bèze*, Hong Kong, 1968.
- IJZERMAN, J. W., *Dwars door Sumatra*, tocht van Padang naar Siak, Batavia, 1895.
- 'Mededeelingen betreffende de Kwantan-Districten', *BKI*, zevende volgrees, IX, (1910), pp. 123-37.
- ILETO, REYNALDO, 'Magindanao, 1860-1888: The Career of Dato Utu of Buayan', unpublished M. A. Thesis, Cornell University Ithaca, 1970.
- IONGH, D. DE, *Het krijgswezen onder de Oostindische Compagnie*, 's-Gravenhage, 1950.
- IRWIN, GRAHAM W., 'The Dutch and the Tin Trade of Malaya in the Seventeenth Century', in Jerome Ch'en and Nicholas Tarling (eds.), *Studies in the Social History of China and South-East Asia*, Essays in Memory of Victor Purcell, Cambridge, 1970.
- JOHNS, A., 'Aspects of Sufi Thought in India and Indonesia in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century', *JMBRAS*, XXVIII, i (1955), pp. 70-7.
- *Rantjak Dilabueh: A Minangkabau Kaba*, Data Paper No. 32, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1958.
- JONGE, J. K. J. DE, *Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië*, verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het Oud-Koloniaal Archief, vols. 5-6, 's-Gravenhage and Amsterdam, 1870, 1872.
- JONG, P. E. DE JOSSELIN, 'Malayan and Sumatran Place Names in Classical Malay Literature', *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geog-*

- raphy, IX (1950), pp. 61-70.
- *Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan*, Leiden, 1951.
- 'The Rise and Decline of a National Hero', *JMBRAS*, XXXVIII, ii (July 1965), pp. 140-55.
- 'The Malacca Sultanate (An Account from a Hitherto Untranslated Portuguese Source)', *JSEAH*, I, ii (1960), pp. 20-9.
- 'Who's Who in the Malay Annals', *JMBRAS*, XXXIV, ii (1961), pp. 1-89.
- JOUSTRA, M., *Minangkabau*, Overzicht van land, geschiedenis en volk, Leiden, 1920.
- JUNUS, MAHMUD, *Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta, 1960.
- JUYNBOLL, H. H., *Catalogus van de Maleische en Sundaneesche handschriften der Leidsche Universiteits Bibliotheek*, Leiden, 1899.
- KÄHLER, HANS, *Ethnographische und linguistische Studien über die Orang Laut und Orang Utan im Riau-Archipel und auf den Inseln an der Ostküste von Sumatra*, Berlin, 1960.
- KATHIRITHAMBY, JEYAMALAR, 'British West Sumatra during the Residency Period, 1760-1785', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis University of London, London, 1965.
- KATHIRITHAMBY-WELLS, JEYAMALAR, 'Ahmad Shah ibn Iskandar and the Late 17th Century' "Holy War" in Indonesia', *JMBRAS*, XLIII, i (July 1970), pp. 48-63.
- KEMP, JEREMY, *Aspects of Siamese Kingship in the Seventeenth Century*, Bangkok, 1969.
- KEMPE, JOHN E. and WINSTEDT, R. O., 'A Malay Legal Digest', Compiled for 'Abd al-Ghafur Mahaiyu'd-din Shah, Sultan of Pahang, 1592-1614 A.D., with undated additions, *JMBRAS*, XXI, i (April 1948), pp. 1-67.
- KENNEDY, J., *A History of Malaya*, London, 1962.
- KERN, R. A., 'Boegineesche scheppingsverhalen', *Feetsbundel*, Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunst en Wetenschappen, vol. 1, Weltevreden, 1929, pp. 297-312.
- 'Een episode iut La Galigo Epos', *BKI*, CXVII (1961), pp. 363-83.
- *I La Galigo*, Leiden, 1939.
- 'Proeve van Boegineesche geschiedschrijving', *BKI*, CIV (1948), pp. 1-31.
- KHOO KAY KIM, 'Genealogy of the Temenggong of Muar', *Peninjau*

- Sejarah*, University of Malaya, III (1968), pp. 60-2.
- KIELSTRA, E. B., 'Onze Kennis van Sumatra's Westcüst omstreeks de helft der achttiende eeuw', *BKI*, IV (1887), pp. 499-599.
- KLERCKS, E. A., 'Geographisch en ethnographisch opstel over de landschappen Korintji, Serampas en Soengai Tenang', *TBG*, XXXIX (1897), Batavia, pp. 1-114.
- KLOSS, C. BODEN, 'Visits to Batam Island', *JMBRAS*, L (Sept. 1908), pp. 61-71.
- KOOREMAN, P. J., 'De feitelijke toestand in het gouvernements gebied van Celebes en onderhoorigheden', *IG*, V, i (1883), pp. 171-204, 358-84, 482-98, 637-55; *IG*, V, ii (1883), pp. 135-69, 346-58.
- KORN, V. E., 'Oosterse visie op Westers bewind', *BKI*, CXIII (1957), pp. 16-31.
- KRATZ, ERNST ULRICH, *Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*, Eine malaiische Quelle zur Geshichte Johors im 18. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden, 1973.
- KROESEN, R. C., 'Aanteekeningen over de Anambas-, Natoena-, en Tambelan-eilanden', *TBG*, XXI (1875), pp. 235-47.
- KROESKAMP, H., *De Westkust en Minangkabau (1665-1668)*, Utrecht, 1931.
- LA SIDE, 'Bagaimanakah watak Sultan Hasunuddin', *Bingkisan*, II, i (Sept. 1968).
- LE ROUX, C. C. F. M., See Cense, A.A. 'Legende van de afkomst der Sumatranen en van hunne instellingen', *TNI*, jaargang I, XXI, i (1859), pp. 19-389.
- LEUPE, R. P. (ed.), 'Rapport van [Ryckloff Volkertsz.] van Goens', *BKI*, IV (1856), pp. 141-80.
- LEUPE, P. A., 'Wetboek voor zeevarenden van het Koninkrijk Makassar en Boegies', *TNI*, II, i (1849), pp. 305-17.
- LEUR, J. C. VAN, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, The Hague/Bandung, 1955.
- LEWIS, DIANNE, 'The Dutch East India Company and the Straits of Malacca, 1700-1784; Trade and Politics in the Eighteenth Century', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970.
- 'The Tin Trade in the Malay Peninsula during the Eighteenth Century', *New Zealand Journal of History*, III, i (April 1969), pp. 52-69.
- LEYDS, W. J., 'Larassen in Minangkabau', *KS*, X jaargang, X, i

- (1926), pp. 387-416.
- LEYDEN, JOHN, *Malay Annals*, London, 1821.
- LIGTVOET, A., 'Transcriptie van het Dagboek der vorsten van Gowa en Tello', *BKI*, XXVIII, iv (1880), pp. 1-259.
- 'Geschiedenis van de afdeeling Tallo', *TBG*, XVIII (1872), pp. 43-66.
- LIJF, J. M. VAN, 'Het graf van de Luwu'se Vorst Matinroë ri Malangke', *BKI*, CIX, (1953), pp. 379-80.
- LINEHAN, W., 'A History of Pahang', *JMBRAS*, XIV, ii (1936), pp. 1-257.
- LITH, P. A. VAN DER, *Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 's-Gravenhage/Leiden, 1895-1905.
- LOCKYER, CHARLES, *An Account of the Trade in India*, etc., London, 1711.
- LOGAN, J. R., 'The Ethnology of the Johore Archipelago', *JIA*, I (1847), pp. 336-40.
- LOMBARD, DENYS, *Le Sultanat d'Atjeh au temps d'Iskandar Muda, 1607-1636*, Paris, 1967.
- MACGREGOR, I. A., 'Notes on the Portuguese in Malaya', *JMBRAS*, XXVIII, ii (May 1955), pp. 5-47.
- 'Johore Lama in the Sixteenth Century', *JMBRAS*, XXVIII, ii (May 1955), pp. 48-125.
- MACHRAY, W. H. AND PAVR, C. W. C., 'History of Rembau', *JSBRAS*, LVI (1910), pp. 1-157.
- McKILLOP, R. L., 'Malay Society in the *Sejarah Melayu*', unpublished B.A. Honours Thesis in Anthropology, Sydney University, Sydney, 1962.
- MACLEOD, N., 'De onderwerping van Makassar door Speelman, 1666-1669', *IG*, II (1900), p. 1269.
- 'De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17^e eeuw', *IG*, vols. 1904, ii, to 1907, i.
- *De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azië*, vol. 2 (1632 to 1650), Rijswijk, 1927.
- McQUOID, J., 'Notes on Dutch History in the Archipelago', Extracted from the records at Batavia under the Administration of Sir Stamford Raffles, *JIA*, New Series, I, ii (1856), pp. 141-93.
- MADJOINDO, A. DT., See Batuah, Ahmad Dt.
- MAJUL, CESAR ADIB, 'Political and Historical Notes on the Old Sulu Sultanate', *JMBRAS*, XXXVIII, i (1965), pp. 23-42.

- MARRISON, G. E., 'Persian Influence in Malay Life (1280-1650)', *JMBRAS*, XXVIII, i (1955), pp. 52-69.
- MARSDEN, WILLIAM, *History of Sumatra*, Second Edition, London, 1784.
- MATHESON, VIRGINIA, 'The Tuhfat al-Nafis: Structure and Sources', *BKI*, CXXVII, (1971), pp. 375-92.
- MATTHES, B. F., *Bijdragen tot de ethnologie van Zuid-Celebes*, The Hague, 1875.
- 'Boegineesche en Makassaarsche Legendes', *BKI*, XXXIV (1885), pp. 431-94.
- *Over de Wadjoreezen met hun handels en scheepswetboek*, Makassar, 1869.
- MAXWELL, WILLIAM EDWARD, 'Aryan Mythology in Malay Traditions', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, XIII (1881), pp. 399-409.
- (ed.), 'Barreto de Resende's Account of Malacca', *JSBRAS*, LX (Dec. 1911), pp. 1-24.
- 'Folklore of the Malays', *JSBRAS*, VII (1881), pp. 11-29.
- 'The Ruling Family of Selangor', *JSBRAS*, XXII (1890), pp. 321-4.
- 'Raja Haji — Attack on Malacca by Rhio Malays', *JSBRAS*, XXII (Dec. 1890), pp. 173-224.
- 'History of Perak from Native Sources', *JSBRAS*, IX (1882), pp. 85-108.
- MEILINK-ROELOFSZ., M. A. P., *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*, The Hague, 1962.
- 'Memperkenalkan beberapa pahlawan Sulawesi Selatan diperantau (istimewa La Maddu Kelleng Sultan Pasir)', *Bingkisan*, I, vi (Nov. 1967); and I, vii (15 Nov. 1967).
- MEREWETHER, E. M., 'Outline History of the Dindings from the 17th Century', *JSBRAS*, XXIII (June 1891), pp. 35-47.
- MJER, P., 'Punten en artikelen, in vorm van Generale Instructie', dated 26 April 1650, from Heeren XVII to Gov.-Gen. and Council in Batavia. Found in the *Verzameling van instructiën, ordonnanciën en reglementen voor de Regering van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Batavia, 1848.
- MILBURN, WILLIAM, *Oriental Commerce, etc.*, vol. 1, London, 1813.
- MILLS, LENNOX A., 'British Malaya, 1824-1867', *JMBRAS*, III, ii

- (Nov. 1925). (Reprinted, Kuala Lumpur, 1966).
- MILO, T. H., *De invloed van de zeemacht op de geschiedenis der Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, vol. I, The Hague, 1946.
- MOHAMMAD BIN ANAS, 'Geographical Notes to the Tuhfat al-Nafis', unpublished B.A. Honours Thesis, University of Malaya, Singapore, 1958.
- MOHAMMAD AMIN BIN HASSAN, 'Perang Klang: A Study of Traditional Malay Politics in Selangor, 1875-1900', unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1970.
- MOHD. KASSIM BIN HAJI ALI, AND SHAW, WILLIAM, 'The Coinage in Kedah', *Kedah dari Segi Sejarah*, IV, i (April 1970), pp. 31-4.
- MOHD. KHALID SAIDIN, 'Naskhah2 lama mengenai sejarah negeri Johor', *Dewan Bahasa*, XV, viii (Aug. 1971), pp. 351-9; *Dewan Bahasa*, XV, ix (Sept. 1971), pp. 387-401.
- MOHAMAD TAIB OSMAN, 'Hikayat Seri Kelantan', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1961.
- 'Mythic Elements in Malay Historiography', *Tenggara*, II, ii (Oct. 1968), pp. 80-9.
- MOKHZANI BIN ABDUL RAHIM, 'Minangkabau Writer's View of Their Society', unpublished B.A. Honours Academic Exercise, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1960.
- MÜLLER, E., 'Proeve eener geschiedenis van een gedeelte der West-Kust van het eiland Borneo', *De Indische Bij*, Leyden, 1843.
- MUNDY, RODNEY (Capt. R. N.), *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes*, down to the Occupation of Labuan, From the Journals of James Brooke, Esq., vol. 1, London, 1848.
- NASRUN, M., *Dasar Falsafah Adat Minangkabau*, Pasaman/Jakarta, 1957.
- NETSCHER, E., 'Beschrijving van een gedeelte der residentie Riouw', *TBG*, II, (1854), pp. 108-270.
- *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, Batavia, 1870.
- 'Aanteekeningen omtrent Midden-Sumatra', aan officiële bescheiden ontleend, in 1877 door den toenmaligen Gouverneur van Sumatra's Westkust, E. Netscher, aan de Regering ingediend rapport ..., *VBG*, XXXIX (1800), pp. 1-84.
- 'Kronijk van Sambas en van Soekadana in het oorspronkelijk Maleisch, voorzien van de vertaling en aanteekening', *TNI*, jaargang I, I (1852), pp. 1-41.
- 'Verzameling van overlevering van het rijk van Minangkabau

- uit het oorspronkelijk Maleisch vertaald', *Indisch Archief*, jaargang II, III (1850), pp. 33-68.
- 'Togtjes in het gebied van Riouw en onderhoorigheden', *TBG*, XII (1862), pp. 233-54; *TBG*, XIV (1864), pp. 1-23, 340-51.
- NEWBOLD, T. J., *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, 2 vols., London, 1839.
- NIEMANN, G. K., 'De Latowa', *BKI*, XXXII (1884), pp. 198-228.
- 'De Boegineezen en Makassaren, Linguistische en Ethnologische Studiën', *BKI*, XXXVIII (1889), pp. 74-88, 266-86.
- 'De Maleische handschriften in het Britsche Museum', *BKI*, Third Series, VI (1871), pp. 96-101.
- NIEHOFF, JOHN, *Voyages and Travels into Brasil and the East-Indies*, vol. 2, London, 1703.
- NOORDUYN, JACOBUS, *Een achttiende-eeuwse kroniek van Wadjo*, 's-Gravenhage, 1955.
- 'Een Boeginees geschriftje over Arung Singkang', *BKI*, CIX (1953), pp. 144-52.
- 'Origins of South Celebes Historical Writing', in Soedjatmoko (ed.), *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, Ithaca, 1965, pp. 137-55.
- OVERBECK, HANS, 'Malay Customs and Beliefs as recorded in Malay Literature and Folklore', *JMBRAS*, II, iii (1924), pp. 280-9; *JMBRAS*, III, i (April 1925), pp. 53-7; *JMBRAS*, III, iii (Dec. 1925), pp. 22-31.
- (ed.), 'Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis dan Sakalian Raja-raja-nya', An English Summary, *JMBRAS*, IV, iii (Dec. 1926), pp. 339-81.
- 'Overzicht der betrekkingen van de Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Compagnie met Siam', *TBG*, XIII (1864), pp. 410-56.
- PARKINSON, C. NORTHCOTE, *Trade in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1813*, Cambridge, 1937.
- PAUW, J., 'Het Minangkabausche gebied', Serie H, No. 72, 'De Hoofden in de Kwantan (1918)', uit een nota van den controlleur J. Pauw, *ARB*, XXVII (1928), pp. 391-402.
- PAVR, C. W. C., See Machray, W. H.
- PELRAS, CHRISTIAN, 'Notes sur quelques populations aquatiques de l'Archipel nusantarien', *Archipel* III (1972), pp. 133-68.
- RADERMACHER, J. C. M., 'Korte beschrijving van het eiland Celebes en de eilanden Floris, Sumbauwa, Lombok, en Baly', *VBG*, IV (1786), pp. 143-96.

- RAEF, J. A. M. Cots, Baron de, 'Vergelyking van den vroegeren toestand van Deli, Serdang, en Langkat met den tegenwoordigen', *TBG*, XXIII (1876), pp. 20-39.
- RAFFLES, LADY SOPHIA, *Memoir of the Life and Public Services with Some of the Correspondence of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles*, London, 1830.
- RAJA ALI AL-HAJI RIAU, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, Singapore, 1965.
- RAS, J. J., *Hikayat Bandjar*, 's-Gravenhage, 1968.
- RAYCHAUDHURI, T., *Jan Compagnie in Coromandel, 1605-1690*, A Study in the Inter-relations of European Commerce and Traditional Economies, 's-Gravenhage, 1962.
- REBER, ANNE LINDSAY, 'The Sulu World in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, A Historical Problem in British Writings on Malay Piracy', unpublished M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1966.
- REID, ANTHONY, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969.
- 'The French in Sumatra and the Malay World, 1760-1890', *BKI*, CXXIX (1973), pp. 195-238.
- 'Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia', *JSEAH*, X, iii (Dec. 1969), pp. 395-414.
- RENIER, G. J., *The Dutch Nation, An Historical Study*, The Netherlands, 1944.
- RENTSE, ANKER, 'History of Kelantan', *JMBRAS*, XII, ii (1934) pp. 44-62.
- 'A Historical Note on the Northeastern Malay States', *JMBRAS*, XX, i (1947), pp. 23-40.
- RESENDE, CAPT. PEDRO BARRETTO DE, See Maxwell, William Edward.
- RESINK, G. J., 'Centuries of International Law in Indonesia', *Indonesia's History Between the Myths*, The Hague, 1968, pp. 191-223.
- RIDLEY, H. N. AND SKEAT, W. W., 'The Orang Laut of Singapore', *JSBRAS*, XXXIII (Jan. 1900), pp. 247-50.
- RINKES, DOUWE ADOLF, *Abdoerraoef van Singkel*, Heerenveen, 1909.
- ROGGEWEIN, COMMODORE, 'An Account of Commodore Roggewein's Expedition', in John Harris (ed.), *Complete Collection of Voyages and Travels*, vol. 1, London, 1744, pp. 256-320.
- RONKEL, Ph S. VAN, 'Catalogus der Maleische handschriften van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië', *BKI*, LX (1908).
- 'Het Heiligdom te Oelakan', *TBG*, LVI (1914), pp. 281-316.

- *Rapport betreffende de godsdienstige verschijnselen ter Sumatra's Westkust*, Batavia, 1916.
- *Supplement Catalogus der Maleische en Minangkabausche handschriften in de Leidsche Universiteits Bibliotheek*, Leiden, 1921.
- ROO DE LA FAILLE, P. DE, *Het Sumatra's Westkust Rapport en de Adat*, 's-Gravenhage, 1928.
- ROOU, J. F. A. DE, 'De positie der volkshoofden in een gedeelte der Padangsche Bovenlanden', *IG*, XII, i (1890) pp. 634–81.
- ROOKMAAKER, H. R., 'Oude en nieuwe toestanden in het voormalige vorstendom Bone', *IG*, XLVI, i (1924), pp. 397–417, 508–27.
- ROOLVINK, R., See Bastin, J.
- 'The Variant Versions of the Malay Annals', *BKI*, CXXIII (1967), pp. 310–24.
- RUTTER, OWEN, *The Pirate Wind, Tales of the Sea Robbers of Malaya*, London, 1930.
- ST. JOHN, HORACE, *The Indian Archipelago: Its History and Present State*, 2 vols., London, 1853.
- SALAHUDDIN, 'Pembangun Pemerintahan di Wadjo, suatu critical study', unpublished skripsi at the Institute of Sociology and Political Science at Hasanuddin University, Ujung Pandang (Makassar), 1965.
- SAMSON, A. L., 'Het Minangkabausche Gebied', Serie H, No. 71, 'Adatstaatsrecht van Indragiri (1924)', *ARB*, XXVII (1928), pp. 328–90.
- SANGO, DATOEK BATOEAH AND TOEAH, DATOEK H., *Tambo Alam Minangkabau*, Payakumbuh, 1955.
- SCHADEE, W. H. M., *Geschiedenis van Sumatra's Oostkust*, 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1918.
- SCHEEMAKER, L. DE, 'Nota betreffende Batoe-barah', *TBG*, XVII (1869), pp. 461–79.
- SCHNITGER, F. M., *Forgotten Kingdoms in Sumatra*, reprint in Leiden, 1964.
- SCHOT, J. G., 'De Battam Archipel', *IG*, IV, ii (1882), pp. 25–54, 161–88, 470–79, 617–25; *IG*, V, i (1883), pp. 205–11, 463–84.
- 'Het stroomgebied der Kateman, bijdrage tot de kennis van Oost-Sumatra', *TBG*, XXIX (1884), pp. 555–81.
- 'Bijdrage tot de kennis van Oud Bintan', *TBG*, XXXII (1889), pp. 602–19.
- SCHRIEKE, BERTRAM JOHANNES OTTO, 'Bijdrage tot de bibliografie van

- de huidige godsdienstige beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust', *TBG*, LIX (1912-1921), pp. 249-325.
- *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, vol. 1, The Hague/Bandung, 1955.
- SCHWARTZ, H. J. E. F., 'Nota over den politieken en economischen toestand van het landschap Kwantan', *TBG*, XXXVI (1893), pp. 325-42.
- SEN, S. R., 'The Role of Indian Textiles in Southeast Asian Trade in the Seventeenth Century', *JSEAH*, II, ii (Sept. 1962), pp. 92-110.
- SERJEANT, R. B., *The Saiyids of Hadramawt*, Inaugural Lecture delivered at the London School of Oriental and African Studies on 5 June 1956.
- SHAW, WILLIAM, See Mohd. Kassim bin Haji Ali.
- SHEEHAN, J. J., 'Seventeenth Century Visitors to the Malay Peninsula', *JMBRAS*, XII, ii (1934), pp. 71-107.
- SHEPPARD, M. C., 'The Nobat', *Malaya in History*, IV (1958), pp. 22-3.
- 'A Short History of Trengganu', *JMBRAS*, XXII, iii (June 1949), pp. 1-74.
- *A Short History of Negri Sembilan*, Singapore, 1965.
- Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis* (in Jawi), Johore Bahru, 1956.
- SIMKIN, C. G. F., *The Traditional Trade of Asia*, London, 1968.
- SITUMORANG, T. D. AND TEEUW, A., *Sedjarah Melayu*, Jakarta/Amsterdam, 1952.
- SKEAT, W. W., *Malay Magic*, London, 1965 (first published in 1900).
- See Ridley, H. N.
- SKINNER, C. (ed. and tr.), *Sja'ir Perang Mengkasar* (The Rhymed Chronicle of the Macassar War) of Encik Amin, 's-Gravenhage, 1963.
- SNOUCK HURGRONJE, C., tr. by A. W. S. O'Sullivan, *The Achehnese* 2 vols., London, 1906.
- SOETAN, DATOEK MAHARADJA, 'Het Minangkabausche Gebied', Serie H, No. 66, 'Artikelen van Datoek Soetan Maharadja in de Oetoesan Melajoe (1911-1913)', *ARB*, pp. 287-313.
- SOLHEIM II, WILHELM G., 'Johore Lama, Twice Destroyed Malay Fortress', *Malaysia in History*, VI, i (July 1960), pp. 17-23.
- SONNERAT, PIERRE, *Voyages aux Indes Orientales et a la Chine*, 3 vols., Calcutta, 1788.
- SOPHER, DAVID E., *The Sea Nomads, A Study Based on the Literature of the Maritime Boat People of Southeast Asia*, Singapore, 1965.


- SPAT, C., 'De Rijkssieraden van Loewoe', *Nederlandsch-Indië Oud en Nieuw*, III, (1918-1919), pp. 64-72.
- STADEN TEN BRINK, P. B. van, *Zuid-Celebes*, Bijdragen tot de krijgsgeschiedenis en militaire geographie van de zuidelijke landtong van het eiland Celebes, Utrecht, 1884.
- STAPEL, F. W., *De Archipel en het Maleische Schiereiland in 1684*, 's-Gravenhage, 1931.
- *Het Bongaais Verdrag*, Groningen/The Hague, 1922.
- 'Een verhandeling over het ontstaan van het Minangkabausche rijk en zyn adat', *BKI*, XCII (1935), pp. 459-70.
- STAVORINUS, JOHAN SPLINTER, *Account of Celebes, Amboyna, etc.*, in John Pinkerton (ed.), *Voyages and Travels*, vol. 3, London, 1809, pp. 216-87.
- STRUYS, J. J., *The Voyages and Travels of John Struys ... and Asia*, tr. by J. Morrison, London, 1684.
- STUERS, H. J. J. L. RIDDER DE, *De vestiging en uitbreiding der Nederlanders*, 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1849.
- SULTAN KASIM, 'Latar belakang perdjandjian persahabatan antara Aru Palakka dan Kompeni Belanda/VOC pada tahun 1665', unpublished skripsi, Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan, Makassar, Dec. 1970.
- SULTAN SULAIMAN, 'Royal Recollections', An Extract from a Talk by H. R. H. Sultan Sulaiman of Selangor to the Rotary Club of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1936, *Malaysia in History*, XII, i (Oct. 1968), pp. 17-20.
- SUNTHARALINGAM, R., 'The Establishment of British Power in West Sumatra, 1685-1716', unpublished Ph D. Thesis, University of Malaya, Singapore, 1961.
- SWEENEY, P. L. AMIN, 'The Connection between the Hikayat Raja2 Pasai and the Sejarah Melayu', *JMBRAS*, XL, ii (1967), pp. 94-105.
- TACHARD, FATHER GUY AND BROEKHUIZEN, G. V., *Reis na Siam, gedaan door den Ridden de Chaumont*, Amsterdam, 1687.
- TANEMAH, D. H. BAGINDO, See Batuah.
- TEEUW, A., 'Hang Tuah en Hang Djebat — Nationalisme, Ideologie en Literatuur beschouwing', *Forum der Letteren* (Feb. 1961), pp. 37-48.
- and Wyatt, D. K., *Hikayat Patani*, The Story of Patani, 2 vols., The Hague, 1970.
- See Situmorang, T.D.

- TEMMINCK, 'The Geographical Group of Celebes', tr. from Temminck's *Coup d'Oeil general sur les possessions Neerlandaises dans l'Inde Archipelagique*, vol. 3, *JIA*, IV (1850), pp. 664-86, 761-5.
- TENAS, EFFENDY, *Sja'ir Perang Siak*, disusun kembali oleh Tenas Effendy, Badan Pembina Kesenian Daerah Propinsi Riau, Pekanbaru, 1969.
- TEUKU ISKANDAR, 'Raja Ali Haji, Tokoh dari Pusat Kebudayaan Johor-Riau', *Dewan Bahasa*, VII (1964), no. 12.
- THOMSON, J. T., 'Description of the Eastern Coast of Johore and Pahang, and Adjacent Islands', *JIA*, V (1851), pp. 85-92, 135-54.
- 'A Glance at Rhio', *JIA*, I (1847), pp. 68-74.
- TIDEMAN, J., 'Land en volk van Bengkalis', *Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap*, 2nd Series, LII (Nov. 1935), pp. 788-816.
- TIELE, P. A., *Bouwstoffen van de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel*, 2 vols., 's-Gravenhage, 1886, 1890.
- 'De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel', *BKI*, XXV (1877), pp. 321-420; *BKI*, XXVII (1879), pp. 1-69; *BKI*, XXVIII (1880), pp. 261-338; *BKI*, XXVIII (1880), pp. 395-482; *BKI*, XXIX (1881), pp. 153-215; *BKI*, XXX (1882), pp. 141-242; *BKI*, XXXII (1884), pp. 49-118; *BKI*, XXXV (1886), pp. 257-355.
- TOBIAS, J. H., 'Borneo', *De Nederlandsche Hermes*, Tydschrift voor Koophandel, Zeevaart en Nijverheid, Derde jaargang (1828), No. 12, pp. 1-89; No. 13, pp. 3-38.
- 'Macassar', *De Nederlandsche Hermes*, No. 7 (1828), pp. 3-67.
- TOBING, PH. O. L., *Hukum pelajaran dan perdagangan Amanna Gappa*, Ujung Pandang (Makassar), 1961.
- TOEAH, DATOEK H., See Sango, Datoek Batoeah.
- TOORN, J. L. VAN DER, 'Tjindoer Mato, Minangkabausche-Maleische legende', *VGB*, XLV, ii (1886) pp. 1-174.
- 'Translation of the Malayan Laws of the Principality of Johor', *JIA* (1855), pp. 71-95.
- 'Trengganu Royal Pedigree', *Malaysia in History*, XII, i (Oct. 1968), p. 15.
- TROMP, S. W., 'Eenige mededeelingen omtrent de Boegineezen van koetei', *BKI*, XXXVI (1887), pp. 167-98.
- VALENTYN, F., *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, vols. 3 and 5, Dordrecht/Amsterdam, 1724.

- VETH, P. J., *Borneo's Wester-afdeeling*, geographisch, statistisch, historisch, voorafgegaan door eene algemeene schets des ganschen eilands, 2 vols., Zaltbommel, 1854.
- *Java*, geographisch, ethnologisch, historisch, vols. 1-2, Haarlem, 1912.
- *Midden-Sumatra, 1877-1879*, vol. 1, Leiden, 1881.
- VLEKKE, BERNARD H. M., *Nusantara, A History of Indonesia*, Brussels, 1961.
- VOORHOEVE, P., 'List of Malay Manuscripts in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society', *JMBRAS*, XXXV, i and ii (April 1963).
- VOSMAER, J. N., 'Korte beschrijving van het Zuid-Oostelijk Schiereiland van Celebes', *VBG*, XVII (1839), pp. 63-184.
- WALL, A. F. VON DE, 'Beknopte geschiedenis van het vorstenhuis en de rijksinstellingen van Lingga en Riau', *TBB*, VI (1892), pp. 298-324.
- WALLACE, ALFRED RUSSELL, *The Malay Archipelago: The Land of the Orang-Utan and the Bird of Paradise*, New York, 1869.
- WIJNAENDTS VAN RESENDT, W., *De gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op hare buiten-comptoiren in Azië*, Amsterdam, 1944.
- WESTENENK, L. C., *De Minang Kabausche Nagari*, Padang, 1913.
- 'Opstellen over Minangkabau I', *TBG*, LV (1913), pp. 234-51.
- 'Opstellen over Minangkabau II', *TBG*, LVII (1916), pp. 241-62.
- WILKES, CHARLES, 'Excerpt from His Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition, 1844', in E. H. Blair and J. A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, vol. 43, Cleveland, 1906, pp. 128-93.
- WILKINSON, R. J., 'The Early Sultans of Pahang', *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932).
- *A History of the Peninsular Malays*, Singapore, 1923.
- and R. O. Winstedt, 'A History of Perak', *JMBRAS*, XII, i (June 1934), pp. 1-180.
- *Life and Customs*, Kuala Lumpur, 1908.
- 'Mahmud II and Abdul Jalil III, 1685-1720 A.D.', *JMBRAS*, IX, i (1931), pp. 28-34.
- 'The Malacca Sultanate', *JMBRAS*, XIII, ii (Oct. 1935), pp. 22-67.
- *Malay Beliefs*, London, 1906.

- *A Malay-English Dictionary* (Romanized), 2 vols., London, 1959.
- 'Notes on Negri Sembilan', in *Papers on Malay Subjects*, No. 5, Kuala Lumpur, 1911.
- 'Old Singapore', *JMBRAS*, XIII, ii (Oct. 1935), pp. 17-21.
- 'Some Malay Studies', *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), pp. 67-137.
- 'Sungai Ujong', *JSBRAS*, LXXXIII (April 1921), pp. 123-41.
- WILSON, CHARLES, *Profit and Power*, London, 1957.
- WINSTEDT, R. O., 'Abdu'l-Jalil, Sultan of Johore (1699-1719), 'Abdu'l-Jamal, Temenggong (ca. 1750) and Raffles' Founding of Singapore', *JMBRAS*, XI, ii (Dec. 1933), pp. 161-5.
- 'The Bendaharas and Temenggongs', *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), pp. 55-66.
- 'The Date, Authorship, Contents and Some New Mss. of the Malay Romance of Alexander the Great', *JMBRAS*, XVI, ii (Dec. 1938), pp. 1-23.
- 'The Early Rulers of Perak, Pahang, and Aceh', *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), pp. 32-43.
- 'Hikayat Hang Tuah', *JSBRAS*, LXXXIII (April 1921), pp. 110-22.
- *A History of Classical Malay Literature*, Singapore, 1961.
- 'A History of Johore (1365-1895 A.D.)', *JMBRAS*, X, iii (Dec. 1932), pp. 1-159.
- *A History of Malaya*, Singapore, 1935.
- 'A History of Negri Sembilan', *JMBRAS*, XII, iii (Oct. 1934), pp. 40-111.
- 'A History of Selangor', *JMBRAS*, XII, iii (Oct. 1934), pp. 1-35.
- 'Keramat: Sacred Places and Persons in Malaya', *JMBRAS*, II, i (June 1924), pp. 264-79.
- 'Kingship and Enthronement in Malaya', *JMBRAS*, XXII, i (June 1947), pp. 129-39.
- 'Malay Chronicles from Sumatra and Malaya', in D. G. E. Hall (ed.), *Historians of South-east Asia*, London, 1961, pp. 24-8.
- See Kempe, John E.
- 'Malay Titles', *JMBRAS*, XVIII, ii (Aug. 1940), pp. 146-8.
- 'Notes on the History of Kedah', *JMBRAS*, XIV, iii (Dec. 1936), pp. 155-89.
- 'The Temenggongs of Muar', *JMBRAS*, X, i (Jan. 1932), pp. 30-1.

- WOLHOFF, G. J., see Abdurrahim.
- WOLTERS, O. W., *Early Indonesian Commerce*, Ithaca, 1967.
- *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History*, Ithaca, 1970.
- WOOD, W. A. R., *A History of Siam*, Bangkok, 1924.
- WYATT, DAVID K., 'Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand', *JSEAH*, IX, ii (Sept. 1968), pp. 208-28.
- See Teeuw, A.
- 'A Thai Version of Newbold's "Hikayat Patani"', *JMBRAS*, XL, ii (Dec. 1967), pp. 16-37.
- YULE, COL. HENRY, See Brunnell, A. C.
- ZAINAL-'ABIDIN BIN AHMAD, 'Some Malay Legendary Tales', *JMBRAS*, XXIV, i (Feb. 1951), pp. 77-89.
- ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN FARID AND ANDI ALLAM, 'La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan jang tak kenal menjerah', *Bingkisan*, I, ix (Dec. 1967); I, x (June 1968); I, xv (March 1968); K, xvi (April 1968); K, xxii (Aug. 1968).



Index

ABAS, TUN, Bendahara of Johor, 293, 295, 302.

Abdul, Wan, 216

Abdul Jalil, Tun, Bendahara of Johor, later Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah, Sultan of Johor (1699-1719), 7, 182-3, 185, 198, 199-200, 201-2, 205-8, 210, 213-14, 216, 217, 219, 226-7, 231, 241, 257, 264, 265, 266, 279-80, 282, 283, 286, 287, 293, 294, 296, 315; becomes Sultan, 3, 12, 186, 189; his part in murder of Sultan Mahmud, 4, 186, 187-8, 258-9; character of, 185, 199, 200-1, 208-9, 244; demoted to Bendahara, 264, 265, 266, 279-80, 291; flees to Terengganu, 280, 283, 285-6, 287, 291, 315; moves to Pahang, 280-1, 286, 291, 315; murdered, 280-1, 291-2, 293, 294, 296.

Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah, Sultan of Johor (1623-77), 61, 62, 63, 64, 66-7, 74-5, 85-6, 92-3, 96, 97, 99, 100, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 113-14, 129, 159; relations with Patani, 68, 192; and trade, 70-3, 76, 95; and Jambi, 86-7, 89; a fugitive in Pahang, 99, 159; death of, 114, 127.

Abdul Jamal, Tun, Temenggong of Johor, 233.

Abdul Jamil, Tun, Laksamana and later Paduka Raja of Johor, 14, 48, 87, 95, 98, 99-100, 104-5, 109, 114, 133, 162, 192, 221; his struggle with Abdul Majid, 10, 153, 193; and trade, 39, 73, 104, 108, 115, 123, 136, 141, 146-7, 149-50, 203, 227; becomes Laksamana, 63, 159; and Raja Muda's marriage, 89-90; appointed by Sultan to restore Johor's fortunes, 100, 104-5, 107, 159; establishes a base on Riau, 104, 159, 214; and Jambi, 105, 112, 115, 121, 122, 127, 129-30, 132-3, 134-5, 136, 140-1, 147-8, 149, 154-5, 158, 159-62, 166, 180, 184-5; and friction with Dutch, 105, 107-8, 146, 148, 150-1; and Sultan Ibrahim, 127, 130-1, 133, 135, 136, 138-9, 141-2, 160; made Paduka Raja, 131, 162; and Raja Hitam, 131-2, 132-3, 160, 166; and trade, 136, 138-9, 140-1, 150, 153; and Dutch, 141, 142-5, 169; and Siam, 146; and east Sumatra, 146-7, 150-2; overthrow of, 152-6, 166, 181; his death,

- 156-7, 167; death of his sons and daughter, 156, 167; threat from his surviving sons, 167, 170, 181; compared with Abdul Majid, 168, 173, 180, 181; protects minor Ruler's privileges, 171, 176.
- Abdullah, Sultan of Kampar, 21, 23.
- Abdullah, Raja (Raja Seberang: Sultan Hammat Syah), 24, 34-5.
- Abdullah, Tun, Temenggong and later Bendahara of Johor: reports Kecil's invasion to Dutch, 14, 153-4, 209, 213, 215, 256, 274, 282, 283, 315; his character, 209, 224, 269; criticizes Tun Mahmud, 224, 246; signs treaty (1715), 235; becomes Bendahara (1708), 244; and Raja Kecil, 253, 255-6, 257-8, 264, 276, 281-2; suspected of treachery, 253, 256-7, 266, 271, 276, 278; hopes to gain power for himself, 257; his rivalry with Tun Mahmud, 269; refuses offer of Orang Laut's help, 281; flees to Malacca, 281; and Buginese, 282, 283, 285, 293; rescues royal family, 283, 315; offends Manompok, 284, 297; leaves Malacca for Pahang, 286, 291.
- Abdul Majid, Sri Maharaja Tun Habib, Bendahara of Johor: his struggle with Abdul Jamil, 10, 135; denied traditional authority, 134, 140-1, 149, 157-8, 160, 162; signs treaty (1685), 142; leads overthrow of Abdul Jamil, 149, 153-6, 180; Abdul Jamil plans to send him away from Riau, 152-3, 158; restores constitutional government, 166, 173, 176, 181; guards against possible rising, 167, 170, 180; and 1689 treaty, 169-72, 173, 180, 206; and trade, 172-3, 174, 178, 181, 203, 204, 267; protects minor Ruler's privileges, 169-70, 171, 175-6, 180; plays Batavia off against Malacca, 174-9, 181; his death, 180, 182, 184; his achievements, 180-1, 184-5; compared with Abdul Jamil, 181, 267.
- Abdul Rahman, Syahbandar of Johor: reports Kecil's invasion to Dutch, 14, 253-4, 280-1, 285; has no authority, 224; returns with Sultan Ibrahim to Johor from Riau, 241; in embassy to ask for Dutch help against Kecil, 252-3, 274; betrayed by his men, 253; rejects Kecil's offer of his old post, 279.
- Abhiṣeka Ceremony, 45, 48-9.
- Abu Syahid, Sultan, 18.
- Aceh kingdom, Sumatra, 59, 220, 239, 241-2, 299, 321; at war with Johor, 3, 15, 22-5, 26, 34-5, 40, 48, 53, 56, 110, 144; a trade centre, 22, 69; defeated by Portuguese, 25; English factory in, 35; Johor freed from threat of, 37, 56-7; Johor's trade with, 39-40, 76, 115, 128, 144, 147, 148, 168, 171, 179; makes peace with Johor, 60-1, 79, 82; loses Pahang to Johor, 61, 63, 64; conquers Deli, 65; foreign traders and, 73, 174, 177; controls much of coastal Sumatra, 110; conquered by Dutch, 111, 115; slave-trade in, 150, 299.
- Adat (custom), 7-8, 61, 117, 118, 176, 194-5, 272, 276, 295.
- Adipati Anum, of Jambi, 88, 90, 98, 120-2.
- Ahmad, Sultan of Malacca, 20-1, 33.

- Ahmad Syah (Raja Alam: Sultan Gagar Alam) 'Emperor of the Minangkabaus', 286; hereditary title in Pagar Ruyong, 328-30.
- Ahmad Tajuddin Hakim Syah, Sultan of Kedah (1803-43), 229, 301, 318.
- Alam, Raja, son of Kecil, 261, 273.
- Alauddin Riayat Syah, Sultan of Aceh (1596-1604), 65.
- Alauddin Riayat Syah, Sultan of Johor (1529-64), 24, 33, 40, 53, 64.
- Alauddin Riayat Syah, Sultan of Siak, 35.
- Alauddin Riayat Syah II, Sultan of Johor (1597-1613), 24, 25, 26, 34, 40, 53, 143.
- Alauddin Riayat Syah al-Kahar, Sultan of Aceh (1537-71), 22, 24.
- Alauddin Riayat Syah ibni Opu (Daeng Marewa), 251, 295-6, 298, 307.
- Albuquerque, Alfonso d', 20.
- Albuquerque Coelho, Antonio de, 274.
- Aldorp, Anthony, 225, 237, 284.
- Ali Haji, Raja, 5-8, 19; (cited), 6, 7, 18, 100, 180, 182, 194, 229, 230, 247, 254, 266, 274, 277, 278, 280, 291, 292, 293, 296, 301, 304, 305, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319.
- Amar, Encik, 225, 237.
- Ambon Island, 72.
- Anambas Islands, 229.
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824), 94, 321.
- Anglo-Dutch Wars: First (1652-4), 31; Third (1672-4), 97, 102.
- Aria, Pangeran, of Palembang, 130, 142.
- Armenian traders, 69, 204.
- Aru (Deli) kingdom, Sumatra, 21, 24, 64-5, 80.
- Arumpone to Unru ('Rumpone Tondro'), title of Arung Palakka, 229, 247.
- Arung Palakka, Sultan of Bone (1672-96), 117-20, 230, 247.
- Ayuthia, Siam, 101, 213.
- BAGINDA SULTAN MAHARAJA, 286-7, 288-9.
- Bahasa*, 94-5, 99, 102, 190, 212, 225, 244, 249.
- Banda Islands, Moluccas, 30, 72.
- Bangery, 106.
- Bangka Island, 260-1, 263.
- Banjarmasin kingdom, Borneo, 104.
- Bantam, Kingdom of, Java, 33, traders from, 62; Locke visits, 102; Jambi appeals in vain to, 115; Macassarese-Buginese refugees in, 116, 120-1, 122, 130; conquered by Dutch, 136, 139, 145, 155; Dutch trade in, 143, 145.
- Bantang Island, Riau-Lingga, 215.
- Barbukit, Hook of, 51, 71, 216.
- Barus, west Sumatra, 22.
- Batak lands, Sumatra, 22; Batak people, 147.
- Batam archipelago, Riau-Lingga, 44.
- Batari Toja, Queen of Bone, 291, 305.
- Batavia, Java: Dutch colonial government in, 38, 152; entrepot, 32, 139; historical sources provided by reports sent to, 13-15; Macassarese in, 307; powers of, 29-30; often independent of Netherlands, 30-2, 197; protects its spice monopoly, 30, 72; seizes Portuguese and Spanish possessions, 30-1, 77; and English, 31; and Johor, 32-3, 40, 51-2, 58, 59, 61-4, 67, 69, 70, 71, 75, 78, 90, 137, 139, 145, 146, 160, 174-5,

- 178-9, 181, 197, 205, 209, 226-7; and Malacca's quarrel with west Minangkabau settlements, 68; and Jambi, 84, 88, 90, 140-5, 146, 181, 197, 227, 228; sends mission to Riau, 114; wants Macassarese refugees to return to Celebes, 122; turns to cash crops, 197; helps in restoration of Sultan Lumbang, 261.
- Batu Bahara, Sumatra, 43, 147, 180, 210, 216-17, 218, 227, 237, 263, 285.
- Batu Pahat, Johor, 87, 290.
- Batu Pahat River (Rio Formosa), 37.
- Batu Sawar (Makam Tauhid), Johor's capital, 24, 26, 67, 80.
- Bayan Island, Riau-Lingga, 153, 215, 292, 310, 316 (*see also* Pulau Bayan).
- Bebas, Panglima, 265.
- Bekaka, Orang Laut of, 44, 47.
- Bendahara dynasty, beginning of, 3, 12, 190-1, 198, 267, 288, 313; defended in *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, 7-8; *Peringatan* and, 10; upheld by Buginese, 17, 312, 314, 322; Orang Kaya and, 198, 265, 271, 313, 322; and Orang Laut, 202-3, 210, 227, 271, 285, 288, 294, 304, 306, 313, 323; opposition to, 210, 216-17, 227, 269, 270-1.
- Bendahara of Bentan, 46.
- Bendaharas of Johor: (1641-2), 60, 63; (1671), 93; (1673), 98-9 (*see also* Abdullah: Abdul Majid: Mas Anum).
- Bengal, 31, 70, 108.
- Bengkalis, Sumatra, 147; part of Johor kingdom, 37, 136, 143, 145; Tun Mahmud's designs in, 43, 212, 216, 217, 218; soldiers from, 50, 68, 332; pedro de porco found in, 52, 178; and Dutch 60, 75, 97, 115, 137-8, 146; English refused a trade lodge in, 73; Aceh's trade in, 70; Jambi attacks ships near, 92, 96, 97; Johor's trade with, 95, 108-9, 129, 136, 143, 145, 183, 200, 219; tin trade in, 105-6, 108; Abdul Jamil visits, 132; traders in Johor from, 149; foreign traders in, 174; Tun Mahmud's monopoly in, 178; shocked by murder of Sultan Mahmud, 189; Kedah and, 237; Buginese attacks on, 239, 250, 284, 307; and Raja Kecil, 242, 250, 252, 253, 263, 264, 269, 270, 282, 288; Abdullah and Buginese send embassy to Kecil in, 285, Orang Laut of, 294.
- Bentan Island, 59, 96, 107, 201, 215, 241; Malacca Sultans retire to, 21, 191; taken by Portuguese, 22, 51; Hammat Syah retreats before Acehnese to, 24; a part of Johor kingdom, 37; Sultan of Malacca flees from, 40, 45; Orang Laut of, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 294, 304; Parameswara and, 45-6, 47, 48; tin sent from west Malay Peninsula to, 74; new Johor capital in, 104; Johorese officials take refuge in, 112.
- Beraleh, Raja, 262, 276 (*see also* Kecil, Raja).
- Bernam, Perak, 37.
- Bertam, Malacca, 46.
- Bima Island, Lesser Sundas, 297, 318.
- Birdsnest, trade in, 38.
- Bogaert, Andries, 89.
- Bombay, India, 286.
- Bone, Kingdom of, Celebes: with Dutch help conquers Goa, 117-19; refugees in Malay Peninsula and Siantan from, 202, 229; sends help to Buginese in Malay Peninsula, 290-1,

- 300-1, 305, 307.
 Bongsu, Nakhoda, 129.
 Bonket, Joannes, 169, 175.
 Bontuala, Bone, 119.
 Borenken, Bruyn, 39, 53, 208.
 Borneo, 131, 172, 231, 293.
 Bort, Balthasar, Governor of Malacca (1666-78), 77, 95, 99, 104, 107, 108, 123, 138.
 Brouwer Straits, 50, 253.
 Bruas, Perak, 37.
 Buginese: 17, 56, 129-30, 201, 202, 230, 233, 234, 298, 300, 305; regarded by Dutch as pirates, 2, 296; absorbed into Johor, 3, 7, 312; pro-Buginese Malay histories, 4, 5-9, 10-11, 12, 19, 94, 266, 318; at war with Minangkabaus (1723-5), 5, 7, 247, 281, 282-4, 290-3, 296, 298, 301-3, 307-11, 321; Sulaiman and, 8, 9, 10, 293, 295, 300, 306; replace traditional groups in Johor, 12, 15, 17, 306, 314, 321-3; uphold Bendahara dynasty, 17, 312, 314, 322; Ibrahim said to have been murdered by a Buginese in Rembau, 114; and Dutch wars in Celebes, 116, 117, 118, 129, 201, 235, 247; as refugees in S.E. Asia, 116, 119-20, 121, 122, 130, 235, 238; their form of overlordship, 117-18, 202, 230, 289-90; Arung Palakka and, 119, 129-30, 201, 233, 234, 300; as traders, 179, 202, 223, 229; Johor uncertain whether to accept them as settlers, 200-1; settle in west Malay Peninsula, 202, 228-9, 230, 321; Tun Mahmud looks for reinforcements among, 217, 218; confront Johor, 229, 230-2; Dutch investigate past of leaders of, 229-30; and Kedah civil war, 230-1, 237, 301-5; become a permanent part of Malay world and Borneo, 230-1; at war with Johor (1715-17), 232-5, 236, 237-8, 239, 240-1, 242, 269, 270; want to form a kingdom, 235, 238, 239, 240; want to settle in Dutch possessions, 238-9, 242; with Palembang refugee, 240, 261; their leaders meet Kecil, 263, 282; respected by Dutch and Malays, 272; agree to rescue Johor from Minangkabaus, 281; want to restore Abdul Jalil as Sultan, 283; piracy by, 285, 290; Abdul Jalil asks English to help him against, 286; feared by small states, 290; receive help from Bone, 290-1, 300-1, 305, 307; capture Riau, 292-4, 296, 298-9, 306-7; their seamanship, 293, 306; install Sulaiman as sultan and their own leaders as ministers, 293, 295-6; covet the prestige of Johor, 296-7, 312, 314, 321; dissension among, 297, 298, 299, 300; population of, 300, 305; allied with Palembang, 311.
 Bujang, Tuan, 259, 260-1, 262 (*see also* Kecil, Raja).
 Bukit Siguntang, 5 (*see also* Siguntang, Mount).
 Bulang Island, Riau-Lingga, 37, 284-5, 289, 304; Orang Laut of, 44, 68, 294, 304.
 Bulo, Orang Laut of, 44, 47.
 Bundo Kanduang, title, 268.
 Bunga emas (tribute), 134.
 Buton Island, 148.
 Buyong, Panglima, 282-3.
 CAMBODIA, 62, 223.
 Camphor, trade in, 38.
 Camphuys, Joannes, Governor-General (1684-91), 139-40, 146, 174-5.

- Cape Rachado (Tanjung Tuan), Selangor, 233, 248.
- Carrying trade, Dutch lose monopoly in, 197.
- Cash crops, Dutch and, 196, 197.
- Celebes, south-west: home of Buginese, 12; treaty-making in, 56; Dutch wars in, 78, 115, 116-17, 119, 201; refugees from, 116, 119-20, 122, 202, 233, 296-7, 300, 323; Arung Palakka in, 117, 118; overlordship in, 117-18, 230; traders from, 223; Buginese leaders' early days in, 229-30.
- Cellak, Daeng, 5, 261, 263, 293.
- Cenrana, Bone, 119.
- Ceribon, Java, 139, 197.
- Chainmail, worn by Buginese, 233.
- China, 184, 203; things required for trade with, 44, 189; her old trade policy in Straits of Malacca, 51-2, 177; Coxinga driven from, 75; Johor's trade re-established (1641) with, 110; Johor sends tin to, 179.
- Chinese traders, 90, 153; and Aceh, 22, 76; goods brought to Riau by, 38; living in Malacca, 39, 150, 208, 240, 300; trade with Johor, 39, 71-2, 75-6, 148-9, 176, 177, 179, 180, 184, 198, 204, 214, 223; friction between Dutch and Johor over, 74, 95, 128, 169; trade with English, 182, 199, 203; Kecil asks Dutch to allow them to trade in Riau, 287.
- Cili, Encik, 59.
- Cinnamon, 30, 77.
- Cleur, Arnout, 206-8.
- Cloth, 70-1, 78, 81, 106, 128, 140, 168, 174, 177, 199; exchanged for tin, 38, 108, 177, 179; valuable for barter, 69, 76, 128, 143, 174; Johor's trade in Sumatra, 76, 115, 146-7, 174, 177; Dutch restricted on Siak River in trade in, 143, 145-6, 169, 220; Riau a centre for, 147-8, 149; Dutch restrict east Javanese trade in, 172.
- Cochin, India, 78.
- Cochin-China, 62.
- Cockfighting, 209, 318.
- Coen, Jan Pietersz., Governor-General (1618-23, 1627-9), 30-1, 77, 139.
- Coffee, 196, 197.
- Colombo, Ceylon, 77.
- Comans, Dirk, Governor of Malacca (1686-92), 176-7.
- Concordia*, S.S., 98.
- Copper, trade in, 38, 76, 128; trade in copper utensils, 214.
- Coromandel coast, India, 69, 70-1, 76-7, 106, 179, 204, 227, 318.
- Cotton, trade in, 220.
- Council of the Indies, 13, 30, 32, 140.
- Coxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung), 71, 74-5.
- DANISH EAST INDIA COMPANY, 180, 194.
- Danish traders: Dutch want monopoly against, 140, 141, 143, 169, 172, 173, 175, 176, 180; trade at Johor, 149, 173, 177, 179, 204; at Malacca, 168, 198; in Riau, 214, 223.
- Daulat* (sovereignty): Malay's attitude to, 11, 16, 49, 189, 271, 322, 323; *timpa daulat*, 191; defined, 277, 313; of Kecil, 309; of Bendahara dynasty, 313-14, 322-3; Buginese, 322.
- Deli (Aru) state, Sumatra, 64-5, 77, 147, 198, 210, 227, 322.
- Denmark, 173, 194; increases her trade in Europe, 197.

Derhaka (treason), Malays' attitude to, 4, 8, 11, 49, 186-8, 271, 291.

Dias, Manuel, 96.

Dias, Tomas, 111, 136.

Dipa Negara, Pangeran, 122.

Dungun, Terengganu, 149.

Durian Islands, 215.

Durian Straits, 185, 307.

Dutch: 17, 24-5, 37, 38-9, 86, 104-5, 129, 133, 267, 285, 290; their attitude to Johor and Siak, 1; regard Buginese as pirates, 2, 296; in Malay histories, 9; and east Sumatra, 12, 111; their aims in trade, 14; friendly with Johor, 26-7, 52, 86, 128, 159; take Malacca (1641), 26-7, 30, 59, 65, 66, 110, 115; want monopolies against European traders, 29, 55, 56, 58, 140; their system of tolls and passes, 40, 55-6; grant Johor trade privileges, 56, 65; conquer Aceh, 56, 111, 115; mediate between Aceh and Johor, 60-1, 82; mediate between Johor and Jambi, 78, 85-6, 87-90, 91-2, 95-6, 105, 114; their military strength 86, 115; at war with English, 96; and west Sumatra, 111-12; and trade in tin, 114; maintain neutrality, 115, 159, 197, 234, 246, 250; defeat Goa, 115, 116, 119-20; allied with Buginese in Celebes, 116-18, 247; and Macassarese refugees, 122; mediate between Johor and Palembang, 132-3; claim Palembang as a possession 135; Jambi a protectorate of, 151; and rights of suzerainty, 232; asked for help by Johor against Buginese, 235, 240; their attitude to Malay Rulers, 313; and Pagar Ruyong, 329; see

also *Batavia*: *Malacca*: *Treaty system*.

Dutch historical records for Johor, 63, 64, 162, 193, 215, 248, 261, 274, 298; histories, 1-2, 12; often corroborate Malay histories, 11, 285; contemporary reports, 13-15, 43; value of, 14; on chief ministers, 42; on Orang Laut's loyalty to sultan, 48, 288; on sack of Johor Lama, 50; on Johor's recovery (1673), 103; on fall of Abdul Jamil, 165; on character of Sultan Mahmud, 182, 186; on origins of Marewa, 229; on Kecil's invasion of Johor, 266; and Kecil's origins, 268, 271; on Abdullah's part in fall of Johor, 276; on exile of Johor's royal family, 281, 315; on murder of Sultan Abdul Jalil, 292; on Minangkabau-Buginese war, 293, 309, 310; on installation of Sulaiman, 296; on Kedah war, 304.

Duties on trade: in Johor, 172; waived in Malacca for ships under Johor's patronage, 177; waived in Johor for Danish ships paying bribes, 180; in Siak, 206, 221-2, 305-6.

Duyong, Pahang, 217.

EAGLEWOOD, trade in, 38, 52, 267. Eighty Years' War (1581-1659), 28.

England, 31, 77-8, 97, 102, 197.

English: refuse to help Jambi, 115; Abdul Jalil asks for protection of, 286.

English East India Company, 35.

English traders, 148, 286; rivals of Dutch, 29-30, 128; refused permission to build lodges in Johor, 39, 69-70, 73; Dutch want monopoly against, 55,

- 140, 141, 143, 169, 175, 176; Maetsuycker tries to avoid difficulties with, 77; Johor's trade with, 98, 102, 177, 179, 204, 208, 223, 241, 254-5.
- Europe: war in, 29, 139, 181, 216, 219, 224-5, 240; demand for tin in, 106; Dutch trade in, 197.
- Europeans: Portuguese dominant among early, 55; as traders with Johor, 72-3, 169; Dutch want to exclude, 176; decline in numbers in Johor, 184, 198; their contemporary reports about Tun Mahmud, 267.
- FACTORIES, DUTCH: in Pancor, 39, 208; in Jambi, 96.
- Foreign traders in Johor and Sumatra, 38, 69, 98, 100, 146, 174, 175, 181, 184, 219.
- Forts, fortresses and fortifications: 34, 286; Dutch have right to build under treaty, 29, 31; Dutch power maintained by, 31; Johor's against Minangkabaus in Kelang and Pahang, 67; in Riau, 149; razed in Riau (1688), 166; on Bayan and Bentan, 215; Buginese in Selangor, 231, 232, 234; Johorese in Selangor, 232, 234; Tun Mahmud fortifies Johor River, 241; Johor's against Kecil, 252, 257-8, 264; Buginese near Riau River, 292, 316; Buginese on Ungaran, 307.
- France: traders from, 143, 173, 175, 176, 223, 286; at war with Netherlands, 124-5, 181, 216, 219, 224-5, 240; Dutch trade with, 197; commercial importance of, 197; Johor hints at alliance with, 219.
- Freeburgers in Malacca, 39, 143, 145, 169, 208, 215, 219, 225, 226; defined, 244.
- Freitas, Seraphim de, 55.
- GAGAR ALAM (Raja Alam: Sultan Ahmad Syah), hereditary title in Pagar Ruyong, 286, 329.
- Galang Islands, Riau-Lingga, 44, 47.
- Gale, Ceylon, 30.
- Gambala, Raja, 211.
- Gaukeng*, and only, 117.
- Geese, Captain Joan der (Juan de Jesus), 72, 74.
- Gelam, 47, 294.
- Genealogies, 2, 6, 100.
- Giti, Siak, 107, 114.
- Goa, India, 31, 274.
- Goa kingdom, Celebes: van Diemen fails to conquer, 31; treaties popular in, 56; Johor and, 63; Malacca refugees in, 72, 82; conquered by Dutch, 78, 115, 116; Arung Palakka and, 118-20; refugees in Jambi from, 120; refugees in Johor from, 202; helps Arung Palakka against Lampoko, 230.
- Gold: acquired by Malacca kingdom, 20; Aceh seeks, 22; Johor's trade in, 38, 128, 146, 174, 177; bought by Moorish traders from Minangkabau, 76; captured by Jambi in Johor, 98-9, 102; Johor-Dutch rivalry for, 111, 122; in Indragiri, 128, 174; Dutch trade in, 143; in Siak, 143, 146, 168, 177.
- Good Hope*, S.S., 102.
- Governor-General of the Indies, 13, 30-2.
- Guinees (cloth), trade in, 38, 52, 192.
- Gujarat, India, 192; Gujeratis, 70.
- Gunpowder: 58, 97, 148, 239, 284, 251-2; mixed with water

- in Kecil's invasion of Johor, 253, 255, 257; supernatural powers over, 274.
- HAMILTON, CAPTAIN ALEXANDER (cited), 181, 182, 209, 219, 244, 267, 277, 315.
- Hammat Syah (Raja Seberang: Raja Abdullah), Sultan of Johor (1613-23), 24-5, 34-5, 84-5.
- Hassan, Tun, Bendahara of Johor, 9-10.
- Heemskerck, Admiral Jacob, 26.
- Hikayat Hang Tuah*, 37.
- Hikayat Johor serta Pahang*, 265.
- Hikayat Negeri Johor*, 3, 6, 8-9, 18-19, 157, 278, 285.
- Hikayat Negeri Riau*, 278.
- Hikayat Opu Daeng Menambon*, 8, 19, 317.
- Hitam, Raja, 131-2, 133.
- Hussain, Tun, Bendahara of Johor, 244.
- IBRAHIM, RAJA, Raja Muda of Johor: marries Jambi princess, 84-5, 86-9, 159; has no influence in Johor, 97; escapes from Jambi's attack on Johor Lama, 98; Dutch hear a rumour that Sultan has abdicated in favour of, 99, 104; death (1675) of, 100, 105.
- Ibrahim, Raja, of Indragiri, 211, 212, 228.
- Ibrahim, Raja, of Rembau and Naning (1677-8), 109-10, 112-14, 122, 124.
- Ibrahim Syah, Sultan of Johor (1677-85): becomes Sultan, 100; and Dutch, 114, 129; and trade, 114-15; and Abdul Jamil, 123, 127, 130-1, 133, 135-6, 138, 141-2, 160; returns to Riau, 127; and Kedah, 128, 129; and Siam, 131; returns to Johor, 135, 138; death of, 138-9, 140, 160, 163, 166.
- Ibrahim Syah, Sultan (Daeng Manompok), 230, 251, 298.
- I Mappaosong Karaeng Bisei, Sultan of Goa (1674-7), 120.
- India: Portuguese in, 20; English trade with, 35; traders from, 69-70, 75, 108, 115, 225; Johor's trade with, 70-1, 72, 77, 110; Portugal loses possessions in, 77-8; cloth from, 78, 106, 128, 192, 199; Dutch and, 139, 225 (see also Moorish traders: Moors).
- Indragiri River, 150, 200, 212.
- Indragiri, Sumatra, 84, 108; allied with Johor against Aceh, 25; Malacca kingdom gets tin from, 37; Palembang plans to annex, 62; Dutch refuse to let Moors trade in, 76; attacked by Jambi, 90; allied with Johor against Jambi, 91, 95, 101, 109; attacked by Kuantan, 110, 113; Buginese and, 122; gold and pepper in, 128; Johor-Dutch rivalry in, 138; Johor regains trade with, 147; Malacca's trade with, 168; Johor's trade with, 174; rebels against Johor, 207, 210, 227; dispute over succession in, 211-12, 228, 237; Minangkabau refugees in, 270.
- Indrama (Indomo), hereditary title in Suruasso, 329-30.
- Indra Segara, Tun, 64.
- Ingalaga, Sultan of Jambi, 151, 152, 269.
- Interpreters, 93-4, 142, 225.
- Iskandar Dzul-Karnain (Alexander the Great), 258, 262, 274.
- Iskandar Muda, Sultan of Aceh (1607-36), 22, 24, 25, 64.

Iskandar Thani, Sultan of Aceh (1637-41), 26, 60-1.

Islam, basis of Muslim's appeal against Dutch, 113, 164.

Ismail, Raja, of Siak, 297.

Ivory, trade in, 38.

JACATRA, JAVA, 197.

Jafna, Ceylon, 77.

Jamal, Panglima, 203.

Jambi, Kingdom of, Sumatra: and Johor, 3, 9, 19, 50, 53, 57, 78, 85-7, 90-2, 96, 97-100, 103-4, 108, 109, 114, 115, 120-3, 127-8, 129-30, 131, 134; 135, 137, 148, 149-51, 159, 172, 236; allied with Johor against Aceh, 25; receives Johor's embassy about return of Tungkal and refugees, 25, 84; Hammat Syah's widow returns to, 35; English factory in, 35; trade of, 62, 77; invites Macassarese to settle, 120-2; pepper in, 128; attacked by Palembang, 129; Palembang defeated by Johor and, 130; pays tribute to Siam, 134; threatens Palembang, 135; Dutch trade with, 143, 145; Dutch help a new ruler to the throne, 150, 152; Dutch protectorate, 151; Siam wants to trade with, 163-4; disturbed by Buginese, 152, 201; Kecil in, 259, 261; civil war in, 261, 262, 269; Minangkabau rebellion (1708) in, 268-9; Minangkabau refugees in, 270; refugees from Lingga in, 278.

Jambi River, 89-90, 115, 121, 129, 151.

Janggut, Dato, 202.

Janszoon Pieter Domingo, 225.

Japara, Java, 35.

Java: traders from, 25, 76, 92, 97, 148, 179, 198, 227; defeats Parameswara, 45; *kasekten* in, 49; Johor's trade with, 62, 148, 175; Minangkabaus in, 112-13; Macassarese and Buginese refugees in, 115, 129, 235; civil war in, 139; Dutch involved in, 139, 300, 318; Dutch commercial interests in, 197; Dutch wars with Buginese in, 201.

Java, east: Locke in, 102; Macassarese and Buginese refugees in, 120, 121, 229, 230, 247; Johor's trade with, 139, 171, 172; traders from, 223.

Johol, Negri Sembilan, 311.

Johor, Kingdom of: historical sources for, 1-19; Dutch claims in east Sumatra based on treaties with, 1; Dutch attitude to, 1-2; Bendahara dynasty in, 3, 17, 312; invaded and conquered by Kecil, 3, 4, 5, 8, 16, 188, 233, 247, 264, 279, 288; at war with Jambi (1673), 3, 9, 19, 50, 53, 57, 78, 85-7, 90-2, 96, 100, 103-4, 109, 114, 115, 120-3, 127-8, 131, 134, 137, 159; heir to Kingdom of Malacca, 12, 15-16, 24, 37, 94, 189, 306; and Buginese, 16, 230-42, 269, 270, 290, 306; Portuguese and, 21, 22-4, 25-6, 40, 56, 59, 110; Aceh and, 22-5, 26, 34-5, 40, 56, 60-1, 63, 64-5, 79, 82, 110, 144; hegemony of, 22-3, 25, 27; resilient, 23, 48, 50, 99-100, 103-4, 198; values Dutch friendship, 26, 35, 52, 59, 62-3, 66-7, 69, 78, 86, 113-15, 128, 145, 151, 159, 169, 175, 179, 197, 208, 209-10, 220, 221, 227, 228; helps Dutch to take Malacca, 26-7, 110, 115; takes advantage of circumstances of Dutch, 32-3,

- 52, 58, 128, 137, 159, 173, 174-5, 177, 179, 203, 205-8, 215, 219, 226-7; its possessions and dependencies, 37, 179, 189, 191, 200, 220, 222-3, 225, 226; protects its traders, 43, 50; uses intimidation against trade rivals, 50-1, 177, 185, 203, 219; trade rivalry with Dutch, 51, 65, 71-2, 79, 106-7, 108, 128, 137, 142, 146, 168, 174; rules governing its relationship with Dutch, 55-63, 65-7, 69-71, 74-8, 219; friction with Dutch, 65, 75, 105, 108, 136-8, 140-6, 148, 174, 178, 220-1; guarantees foreign traders' safety 73, 92, 96-7, 240; prosperous, 76, 99, 110, 176, 180, 181; helps Jambi against Palembang, 129-30, 131, 134, 135; Siam and, 131, 146, 159, 166, 227; friction with Jambi, 149-52; friendly with Pagar Ruyong, 159; prestige and power of, 161, 181; abandoned (1709), 203, 214; government returns (1716) to, 241; and Buginese, 282, 284, 286, 294, 311-12; raided by Manompok, 284, 297; abandoned (1719), 285; its empire partitioned, 285; piracy increased by fall of, 285, 321; naval strength of, 300; struggle for supremacy in, 307-8; transformed in second half of 18th century, 321-3; soldiers recruited in, 331.
- Johor Lama, 255; burnt by Jambi, 3, 50, 97-100, 103-4, 108, 115, 121-2, 128, 130-1, 135, 137, 159; an international entrepot, 38, 58, 69, 73, 104, 108, 131, 159, 184, 185, 205, 312; foreign traders in, 69, 174; Chinese traders in, 71-2; superseded by Riau, 108.
- Johor River, 96, 280; Johor's court settles on, 3, 35, 42; Portuguese raid up, 23; Aceh's raid on, 24; crowded with traders, 33; Jambi raid up, 97; new settlement (1688) on, 166; trade on, 214; fortified, 241; Kecil's invasion up, 253, 254; Orang Laut centred on, 288.
- Junk Ceylon Island (Ujong Salang: Phuket), 106.
- KAARTEKOE, WILLEM, 59.
- Kaba Cindua Mata*, 268.
- Kabon, Siak, 106-7, 114, 173-4, 177, 178, 199, 204, 223.
- Kadi of Johor, 39, 208, 209, 216, 217.
- Kajang* (palm-fronds), 44, 53.
- Kamariah, Tengku, 280, 308-10.
- Kampar River, 37, 174.
- Kampar, Siak, 152; allied with Portuguese, 21, 23; allied with Johor against Aceh, 25; forty ministers deal with affairs of, 33; in Malacca Empire, 37; Johor's trading centre for Minangkabau, 147, 174; Riau's trade in tin with, 223; Sultan Sulaiman in, 304; soldiers from, 332.
- Kampar Straits, 179, 307.
- Karangan Engku Busu*, 6, 8.
- Karimun Islands, 25, 37.
- Kasang, Malacca, 70.
- Kasu (Selat), Orang Laut of, 47.
- Kecil, Raja (Tuan Bujang: Raja Beraleh: Yang Dipertuan Kecil: Baginda Sultan Kecil: Sultan Abdul Jalil Rahmat Syah): found Siak dynasty, 4, 272, 322; put forward as posthumous son of Sultan Mahmud, 4-5, 250, 253, 258-9, 265, 267, 271, 288, 294, 295, 304-5, 314, 323; invades and conquers Johor, 4-5, 8, 14, 16, 188, 253-8, 264, 266, 270-1, 274;

- supported by rulers of Pagar Ruyong, 5, 250-2, 262-3, 267-9, 270, 287, 302; probable origins of, 5, 271-2; his sons, 5, 272-3; in *Tuhfat*, 7; at war with Buginese, 8, 19, 281-3, 290-1, 292, 296, 306-7, 308; in *Peringatan*, 9; loses Riau, 19, 296, 298, 317, 322; asks Dutch for help, 250, 299, 302; coronation of, 252, 262, 267-8; birth of, 259, 265, 271; early life of, 259-63, 265, 271; discusses with Buginese the invasion of Johor, 263; uses psychological weapons, 265-6, 270-1; seeks vengeance on Tun Mahmud, 270; death (1746) of, 272; and Orang Laut, 274, 281, 287-9, 294-5, 304-5, 323; supernatural powers of, 274, 276; supported by Lingga, 278; his wives, 279-80, 302-3, 308-10; 'King of the Minangkabaus', 282, 286; receives ultimatums from Buginese (1718, 1724), 282, 305; Johor's royal family rescued from, 283, 286; agrees that Abdul Jalil be restored as Sultan, 283, 287; his communications with Dutch, 283, 284, 287, 299; commits piracy, 283-4, 310; does not call himself Sultan Mahmud's son, 284; his share of Johor Empire, 285; and trade monopoly, 286; temporarily driven out by Baginda Sultan Maharaja, 286-7, 288; kills some Orang Laut leaders, 287, 289, 294; rules in Riau, 287, 289; has Abdul Jalil murdered, 291-2; flees to Lingga, 292, 317; hated by Sulaiman, 293; Sulaiman allied with Buginese against, 296; intervenes in Kedah civil war, 301-3, 319; kills Parani, 303, 319; flees from Kedah, 304; remains a threat to Johor, 306, 314; does not follow up his victory at Riau, 308-10; tries to consolidate his power in west Malay Peninsula, 310-11.
- Kedah 40; Buginese intervene in civil war in, 19, 229, 230-1, 301-3, 318; and tin, 37, 106, 223, 247; trade with Johor, 147, 179-80, 199; demands back the cannons given to Buginese, 237; Kecil enters civil war in, 301-3; aftermath of civil war in, 318, 319.
- Kelana Jaya Putra, 289, 293, 302, 316 (*see also* Marewa, Daeng).
- Kelang, Selangor, 114; and tin, 37, 69, 73, 204, 239; Johorese fortifications at, 67; and Dutch trade, 140, 171; excluded from 1685 treaty, 142; Johor's trade with, 180; rebels against Johor, 202, 210, 227; Buginese in, 239-40, 285; soldiers from, 332.
- Kelang River, 37.
- Kelantan 37, 286.
- Kelembak (eaglewood), trade in, 38, 52.
- Kelumang, Siak, 294.
- Kemboja, Daeng, Raja Muda of Johor, 297.
- Keper, east Java, 229, 244.
- Kerkaji, Dato', 263.
- Khalifat Allah Muhammad Syah, Sultan of Pagar Ruyong, 251.
- Khatib, Encik, 155.
- Khatib, Raja, 310-11.
- Kiai Demang Kecil, 134.
- Kiai Demang Suranegara, 90.
- Kiai Gedé, Sultan of Jambi, 262, 269.
- Kilang, Orang Laut of, 44, 47.
- Klong, Orang Laut of, 47.
- Koa, Siak, 147.
- Kopet, Orang Laut of, 47, 294.

- Kota Baru, Siak, 174.
 Kota Rena, Siak, 106-7, 114.
 Kota Tinggi, capital of Johor, 184, 242, 243.
 Kratz, Ernst Ulrich (cited), 9, 19, 26, 154, 156, 165, 213, 214, 245, 248, 249, 251, 273, 276, 291, 292, 298, 316, 317, 319.
 Kuala Kampar, Sumatra, 203.
 Kuala Lambur, Jambi, 150.
 Kuala Pahang, Pahang, 286, 315.
 Kuantan, Sumatra, 110, 113, 141-2, 204, 263.
 Kubu, Sumatra, 263.
 Kubuk Island, 261.
 Kudang, Panglima, 150.
 Kumasi, Daeng, 293.
 Kunta, Siak, 106.
- LADI, SIAM, 47, 294.
 Laksamanas of Johor: (1641-2), 59-60, 61, 63, 64; (1662-4), 74, 76-7; (1623), 85; (1671), 93; son of Abdul Jamil, 141, 142, 154, 155, 162, 167, 170; (1688-93), formerly Sri Pikrama Raja, 154, 169, 178, 193; (1706-12), 207, 208-9, 216, 217, 222; (1713-15), also Sri Nara di Raja, 222, 226, 234; (1699), father of Encik Pong, 258, 259; (1717), 264; (1718), 266, 271, 278; (1721), Nakhoda Sekam, 290, 291, 292 (*see also* Abdul Jamil).
 Laksamanas, of Malacca kingdom, 21; of Minangkabau, 329.
 La Kwa, 39, 208.
 Lambu, Pangeran, of Palembang, 236.
 Lampoko district, Soppeng, 230.
 Lamuru, Celebes, 229.
 Langat, Selangor, 247, 263.
 Langit, Panglima, 150.
 Lantar, Siak, 106.
 Lebinasi, Dato', 263.
 Levant, the, Dutch trade with, 197.
 Ligor, Siam, 62.
 Lima Kaum, Sumatra, 111.
 Lingga Island, 154; Hammat Syah's base on, 25, 35; trade in, 25; part of Johor kingdom (1641), 37; Orang Laut in, 47, 50, 304; Johor collects ships there for attack on Jambi and Palembang, 87-8; Raja Muda waits for his bride at, 89; dockyard in, 148, 215; traders from, 149; part of Johor's fleet goes there for action against Siam, 216, 218; reinforcements summoned from, 217; Palembang refugees in, 236; some of its inhabitants enter Jambi's service, 278; Kecil's base in, 283, 292, 304, 306, 307, 317; soldiers from, 331.
 Lingga Straits, 292.
 Linggi, Selangor, 194, 248, 302; Tun Mahmud visits, 43, 218; soldiers from, 50, 332; Buginese settle in, 200-1, 202, 217, 229-32, 234, 235, 237-8, 239-40, 285, 290, 304; battles (1715) at, 232-3; tin in, 239; offered to Buginese by Johor, 252; acquired by Buginese, 285, 312, 321; headquarters of Marewa, 289, 290, 291, 298, 301; battle (1721) at, 292, 293, 296, 298; Marewa prefers Johor to, 311-12; Palembang refugees in, 311.
 Lispensier, Jan, 221-5.
 Locke, Captain Edward, 98, 102, 143.
 Lodge: for trade, 39, 70, 73, 143, 145, 175, 178, 214; as armoury, 96.
 Lopes de Sequiera, Diego, 46.
 Lucasz, Philips, 26.

Lumabang, Sultan of Palembang, 260-1, 262, 263.

Lumu, Raja, of Selangor, 321.

Luwu, Celebes, 119.

MACAO, 274; Governor of, 258.

Macassar, Celebes, 63, 116, 120, 136, 202; traders from, 25, 39, 73, 223; refugees from Malacca in, 72; Dutch wars (1667, 1669) in, 78, 116, 129, 155, 234; Dutch in, 118; help from Marewa from, 291.

Macassarese: Malacca refugees protected from, 72; in Kelang, 113; refugees in Java, 115, 120, 121; refugees in Bantam, 115-16, 120-1; as soldiers, 116, 129, 234; refugees in S.E. Asia, 116, 119-20; system of overlordship and alliances among, 117-18; Arung Palakka and, 118, 119-20; refugees in Jambi, 120-2, 128; threaten Indragiri, 129; attack Jambi, 129; as mercenaries of Palembang, 129-30, 135; feared by Dutch, 129-30, 234; defeated by Johor and Jambi, 130; Johor gives trade passes for Malacca to, 179; look on Johor as a haven, 202, 297; regarded with suspicion by Malays, 296; Buginese ask help from Macassarese in Batavia, 307.

Maetsuycker, Joan, Governor-General (1653-78), 77, 78, 139.

Mahmud, Tun, Raja Indra Bong-su, later Syahbandar (1707) and Raja Muda (1708) of Johor: leading minister in Johor (1708-18), 201, 244; and trade negotiations with Dutch, 207-8, 219-25, 228, 235-6; his power, 207, 208, 209, 210-11, 218-19, 224; becomes Raja

Muda, 210-11; becomes Syahbandar, 211; and trade, 211-12, 214-15, 219, 224, 225; his foreign policy, 212, 227-8, 236-7; and threat from Siam, 213, 214, 215-16, 217, 218; wants capital moved to Riau, 213-14; and rebellions, 216-17; opposition to, 218, 269; compared with Abdul Jamil, 224; plays Batavia off against Malacca, 226-7; and Buginese, 228, 231-3, 236, 238-40; and Palembang refugees, 236, 237, 240-1, 261; wants Dutch friendship, 240; growing unpopularity of, 240-1; and Kecil's invasion, 253, 254-5, 257, 263-4, 266-7, 274; suspects Abdullah of treachery, 253-4, 257; dismissed, 254; flees, 257; and the youthful Kecil, 259, 260; condemned to death, 265; death of, 266; character of, 267; Kecil executes vengeance on, 270.

Mahmud Syah, Sultan of Malacca and Johor (1511-29), 20-1, 23, 33, 40, 41, 103, 191.

Mahmud Syah, Sultan of Johor (1685-99): murder of, 3, 4, 7-8, 12, 186, 194, 198, 199, 202, 242, 252, 258, 263, 264, 265, 269, 271, 276, 287-8, 291, 313, 322-3; rumoured to be Kecil's father, 4-5, 7, 258-9, 263, 265, 268, 269, 271, 288, 294, 295, 305, 314, 323; wickedness of, 7, 181-2, 184-5, 186, 194, 199, 201, 258; and Abdul Jalil, 139, 152-3, 154-5, 156, 157, 167; minority of, 139, 140; Dutch postpone new treaty till his majority, 145, 152-3, 157, 167; Abdul Majid takes him from Riau, 6, 154-5, 167; visited by Siamese embassy, 166;

- and treaty with Dutch, 168-9, 171, 175, 205, 222; sends embassy to Patani, 170; reaches majority, 181, 183; punishes pirates, 182, 185; favours Syahbandar, 184; trade declines under, 184, 199; plot to avenge, 189-90.
- Majapahit kingdom, Java, 49, 318.
- Makam Tauhid (Batu Sawar), capital of Johor, 60, 61, 80.
- Makhdum, Nakhoda, 150-1, 152.
- Malabar, India, traders from, 287.
- Malacca: captured (1511) by Portuguese, 3, 15, 20-1, 23, 26, 72, 110; captured (1641) by Dutch, 3, 30, 56, 110; an international entrepot, 20, 22, 26, 38, 159, 205; Portuguese rule in, 20-2, 23, 25, 35, 66; Johor's trade with, 25; Dutch grateful to Johor for help in capture of, 26-7, 59, 63, 64, 66, 67, 115; not to be a major entrepot under Dutch, 32-3; Dutch and Johor share power in, 37; Orang Laut of, 48-50; foundation of, 49; system of tolls and passes in, 56, 61-2, 69, 70, 204; Chinese trade with, 71-2; decline of, 139; Johorese patrols near, 150; Rembau's slave-raids on, 168; kidnappings by Johorese in, 177; Macassarese in, 202; new trading rules for, 211-12; Kecil visits, 263; Johor's royal family flees to, 280, 283, 315; Abdullah a fugitive in, 281; Kecil proposes attack with Buginese on, 282; Johor's royal family and officials leave, 286; shortage of food in, 290; Manompok wants to attack, 299.
- Malacca, Dutch in: friendly with Johor, 3, 66, 75, 113-14, 148, 151, 169, 186; sacrificed to Johor by colonial government, 32-3, 40, 51-2, 58, 62, 75, 78, 137, 139, 160, 174-5, 178-9, 181, 197, 205, 209; and Johor trade, 51, 65, 69, 70-1, 73-4, 75, 79, 105-7, 108, 128, 137, 142, 147-8, 168; their system of tolls and passes, 56, 69, 95, 128, 137; Johorese friction with, 59, 74-5, 95, 97, 105, 107-8, 136-7, 148, 150-1, 177-8, 203, 220-1; send trade missions to Johor (1642, 1687, 1689, 1705, 1707), 61-2, 148-50, 167-72, 205-6, 209-10; and Minangkabau unrest, 66-8, 113-14; their prices not competitive, 76, 128, 137, 199, 203, 223; act as mediators in Johor-Jambi dispute, 87, 89, 91-2, 95, 96; protect Johor's territories, 99, 108-9, 129; remain neutral, 95, 99, 105, 137, 181, 238, 302, 304; and English threat, 138; and Buginese, 238-9, 242, 252, 289, 290, 298, 299-300, 304; offered help by Johor against Aceh, 239-40; and Raja Kecil, 252-3, 256, 284, 287, 299, 302; suffer from piracy, 283-4, 285, 290, 310; get tin from Selangor, 284, 300; and Bone, 291; (*see also* Dutch).
- Malacca, Kingdom of: defeated by Portuguese, 3; Johor heir to, 12, 15-16, 24, 37, 94, 189; its dynasty founded by Parameswara, 45-7; Bentan and, 45-6, 47; Aru and, 64; its power based on trade, 91; kept the peace in Straits of Malacca, 321.
- Malacca, Straits of, 54, 76, 136; Aceh's depredations in, 3; Johor the principal Malay

- power in, 13, 15, 84; Dutch want peaceful trade in, 14-15, 52; Johor welcomes Dutch friendship in, 26, 27, 56, 115; patrolled by Orang Laut, 50; Orang Laut used against Dutch in, 51, 185-6; piracy in 18th century in, 79; Johor respects Dutch power in, 115, 181; piracy in, 185-6, 285; Dutch recognize Johor's strategic position in, 197; Buginese strength in, 230-1, 234-5, 242, 300, 321;
- Malacca-Johor dynasty: Kecil claims to be connected with, 4, 271-2, 294-5; Buginese change traditional groups in, 12, 17, 322; Portuguese trade rivalry with, 21-2; Orang Laut and, 45, 46-9, 189, 288, 294-5, 322; and Orang Laut of Lingga, 47; *daulat* of, 49, 313, 322; its seat transferred to Johor, 103-4; end of, 189, 322-3; sacred character of, 312.
- Malay histories and records, 43, 63, 162, 193, 215; description of, 1-12, 15; pro-Minangkabau, 4-5, 10-11, 12, 17, 267, 281; pro-Buginese, 4, 5-8, 10-11, 12, 94-5, 281, 298; Orang Laut in, 48; account of Abdul Jamil's fall in, 156-7; Sultan Mahmud's character in, 182; his death in, 186-7; on Kecil, 262-7, 272, 276; on reasons for Johor's collapse 270-1, 276; on Orang Laut and Kecil's victory, 274, 288; on Abdul Jalil in Terengganu, 285; their treatment of Manompok, 298; on Kedah civil war, 304; on Minangkabau-Buginese war, 309.
- Malays in Johor: histories written about, 4, 9-10, 11; traditional views of, 8, 11-12; as soldiers, 50; respect Minangkabaus, 272; Kecil fears resurgence of power among, 287; and Sulaiman's installation, 295; their early relationship with Buginese, 296-7; lose loyalty for Sulaiman, 322; their struggle for Johor, 323.
- Malay traditional practice: taken from Malacca court, 15; Ruler regarded as divine man in, 16, 190, 271, 277; code of conduct between kingdoms in, 85; studied insults in, 89; letter, not bearer, represents the sender, 92, 101; *bahasa*, 94-5, 99, 102, 190, 212, 225, 249; Ruler's rights during minority, 171, 175-6, 181 (see also *Daulat*: Ruler of Johor).
- Malewa, Raja, 310-11.
- Malim, Nakhoda, 259-60.
- Mampawah, west Borneo, 19.
- Mandailing, Raja, 263.
- Mandar, Celebes, 119.
- Mandau River, north Sumatra, 145, 168.
- Mangika, Daeng, 115-16, 119-22, 128, 129-30.
- Mangong, Perak, 37.
- Manila, Philippines, 63, 71, 72, 148.
- Manompok, Daeng (Sultan Ibrahim Syah: Raja Tua of Johor), 251; early history of, 229-31; a threat to Johor, 229, 230-1; a rival of Marewa, 230, 284, 297, 298, 299; takes part in Kedah civil war, 230-1, 301-2, 304; in war against Johor, 233, 238-9, 251; helps to build Buginese kingdom, 235; in embassy to Kecil, 263; quarrels with Abdullah, 284, 297; helps to rule part of Johor Empire, 285; in war against Minangkabaus, 292; becomes Raja Tua of Johor, 295-6, 298; wants

- Buginese to be a vital part of Johor, 296-7; becomes Sultan Ibrahim Syah, 298; hands back Kecil's wife, 308; marriage of, 317.
- Mansur, Sultan of Aceh, 65.
- Mansur Syah, Sultan of Terengganu, 297.
- Mantang, Orang Laut of, 47.
- Marewa, Daeng (Kelana Jaya Putra: Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah: Raja Muda of Johor), 251, 263, 287, 318; early life of, 229; Manompok's rivalry with, 230, 284, 297, 298, 299; becomes overlord of Buginese in west Malay Peninsula, 230, 234-5, 247, 289; leader in Selangor, 230; in war against Johor, 233, 238-9; in war against Minangkabaus, 282-3, 290, 292, 307; rescues Johor's royal family, 283; sells tin to Dutch, 284, 300; helps to rule part of Johor Empire, 285, 321; captures Riau, 292; wants Buginese to be vital part of Johor, 294, 296-7, 311-12, 321; installs Sulaiman as Sultan and himself becomes Raja Muda, 295-6, 298; death of, 312.
- Mas Anum, Tun, Bendahara of Johor, 199-201, 203, 205, 207, 209, 210-11, 217.
- Mas Kulup, Raden, 122.
- Masuna, Tunku, 302.
- Matan, Borneo, 293.
- Matara, Daeng, 307.
- Mataram, Kingdom of, Java: has aggressive alliance with Palembang, 62-3, 68; Jambi a vassal of, 84, 115; Sultan Abdul Jalil fears attack from, 86; Dutch trade in, 143, 145; signs away Java to the Dutch, 197.
- Matekko, Daeng, 312, 320, 321.
- Matelief de Jong, Admiral Cornelis, 34, 140, 143.
- Matimo, Daeng, 230, 233.
- Maurits, Prince, of Holland, 26.
- Megat Mansur, 35.
- Megat Sri Rama, 8, 49, 186-8, 194, 258.
- Menambon, Opu Daeng, 19, 293.
- Menie, Jan Jansz., 62, 66-7, 68.
- Mepar, Lingga Island, 44, 47.
- Mi, Ce, mother of Kecil, 265.
- Minangkabau heartlands, 5, 124; Aceh and, 22, 110; tin and gold in, 76, 111; Dutch want to trade with settlements in, 106, 108, 136, 141; population of, 111; Dutch-Johorese trade rivalry in, 111, 136, 146-7, 173-4, 204.
- Minangkabaus in Sumatra, 15, 149, 289; invade and conquer Johor (1718), 3, 5, 12, 16, 188, 233, 250-8, 264, 270, 313; histories written from viewpoint of, 4-5, 10-11, 12, 17, 267, 281; at war with Buginese, 5, 7, 247, 281, 282-4, 290-3, 296, 298, 301-3, 307-11, 321; under Johor, 110; trade of, 112, 132, 168; respect Pagar Ruyong's royal family, 112; Johor takes measures against Minangkabau settlers, 269-70, 278; Kecil makes a loose unity from, 272; empire of, 285; and Baginda Sultan Maharaja, 287, 289, 301-2; Johor survives threat from, 314; their share of Johor Empire, 321-2, 323; succession among, 329.
- Minangkabaus in west Malay Peninsula: obtain a ruler from Pagar Ruyong, 109-10; under Johor, 110; many settlers before 1718, 272;
- Mnau, Orang Laut of, 44.
- Moerman, Willem, Governor of Malacca (1711-12), 219-20.

- Mohamad Jiwa II, Sultan of Kedah (1723-78), 318.
- Molinaeus, Thimanus, 221-5.
- Monopoly: Portuguese, 20, 55; Dutch spice monopoly, 30, 72, 78; Dutch waver between free trade and, 32, 137; VOC policy, 55, 59, 78; in trade with Johor Dutch try to get, 58, 140, 141, 143, 168-70, 172-3, 175, 176; Dutch sign monopoly treaties for tin, 106; Abdul Jamil enforces monopoly with Minangkabaus, 136; Abdul Majid and, 178; in carrying trade, 197; of Tun Mahmud, 223; Kecil and, 286; Monsoon, 90; trade dependent on, 38, 53; Orang Laut and, 44.
- Moorish traders: in Malacca, 39; frequent Johor, 75-6, 169, 177, 204, 208; supply cloth, 76, 128, 169, 177; visit Bengkalis for tin, 108; on Danish ships, 147-8, 172; excluded from trade on Siak River, 225.
- Moors (Indian Muslims), 98, 186; live in Johor, 149, 208, 214; live in Riau, 150.
- Moro, Orang Laut of, 47.
- Motta, Manuel de, 87.
- Muar, Johor, 114, 156, 210, 256; Portuguese attack on, 21; a possession of Johor, 37, 63, 76, 99, 149; operations against Rembau from, 67-8; blockaded by Jambi, 92; Sultan Abdul Jalil asks Dutch to take temporary charge of, 99, 108, 129; traders from, 149; tin sent to Malacca from, 198; pepper grown in, 223; Kecil in, 259; raided by Manompok, 284; captured by Kecil, 308; soldiers from, 332.
- Muar River, 23.
- Mudeliar, Raja, 71.
- Muhammad, Raja, son of Kecil, 273.
- Muslim traders, 22, 208 (*see also* Moorish traders).
- Mutahir, Tun, Temenggong of Johor, 248.
- Muzaffar, Raja, Sultan of Johor (1564-80), 53.
- NAM, ORANG LAUT OF, 47.
- Naning, Negri Sembilan, 61, 63, 68, 69, 109, 113, 272, 290.
- Narai, King of Siam (acceded 1657), 121, 161, 166, 167.
- Negapatam, India, 77, 194, 220, 22.
- Negri Sembilan, 323.
- Netherlands, The: advantageously placed for trade, 27; and Indonesia, 29-32; makes peace (1661) with Portugal, 78; at war with England, 96-7; retrenchment in, 139; at war in Europe, 181, 216, 219, 224; no longer an important European power, 196.
- OPIUM, TRADE IN, 38, 172, 178, 179, 211, 221, 267.
- Orang Kaya: of Malacca kingdom, 15; of Pahang, 25, 144; of Aceh, 37, 60; of Bentan, 51; of Jambi, 88, 98; of Indragiri, 109, 168; of Siak, 287, 304.
- Orang Kaya of Johor, 59, 74, 97, 144, 145; and murder of Sultan Mahmud, 4, 186, 187-9, 190, 250; Dutch report problems of, 13; lose position to Buginese, 17, 322; and trade, 39-40, 56, 58, 75, 76, 140, 168, 172, 173, 174, 177, 202, 204, 211, 224; hold fiefs, 42, 109, 183-4; power of chief members of, 43-4; Council of, 43, 158, 166, 208, 211, 216, 217, 218,

- 220, 224, 322; complain of Dutch disrespect, 62, 105; captured by Jambi, 98-9; Abdul Jamil and, 123, 127, 130, 132, 134-5, 140-1, 158-9, 160, 166; Abdul Majid has no influence with, 149; overthrow Abdul Jamil, 152-6, 158, 180; their power restored, 158; consulted by Abdul Majid, 158, 166-7, 181; and 1689 treaty, 169, 173; help to meet threat from Patani, 170; take bribes from traders, 172, 180; discontented at loss of trade under Sultan Mahmud, 184; their traditional attitude to Ruler, 190; and deposition of Ruler, 194-5; and Bendahara dynasty, 198, 227, 265, 274, 288, 322; Buginese in service of, 202, 229; order of precedence among, 208-9; Tun Mahmud and, 208; and Mas Anum, 210; appoint Tun Mahmud Chief Minister, 211; oppose move to Riau, 214, 215, 217, 227; and threat from Siam, 216, 218; hostile to Tun Mahmud, 224, 241, 270; desert to Kecil, 255-6, 271, 313; ordered to oppose Minangkabaus, 264; at Sulaiman's installations, 295.
- Orang Laut: of Singapore, 44, 256, 274, 288; of Malacca kingdom, 46-8; of Bengkalis (Senggeran), 68, 294; of Ungaran, 68; of Jambi, 85, 92-3, 105, 150.
- Orang Laut, by *suku*, 85; Bentan, 44, 46, 47, 294, 305; Mepar, 44, 47; Bulang, 44, 68, 294, 395; Galang, 44, 47; Pesukuan (Bulo, Bekaka, Kilang, Timiang, Mnau, Pulau Boya), 44; Bulo, 44, 47; Singgera, 47; Kopet, 47, 294; Gelam, 47, 294; Sekanna, 47; Sugi, 47; Ladi, 47, 294; Klong, 47; Trong, 47; Moro, 47; Tambus, 47; Mantang, 47; Kasu (Selat), 47; Nam, 47; Sembulun, 47; Kelumang, 294; Semimbo, 294; Seabui, 294; Tengajun, 294; Perajun, 294; Lingga, 305; Siantan, 305.
- Orang Laut of Johor, 15, 67, 96, 297; superseded by Buginese, 17, 306, 314, 322-3; loyal to Ruler, 24-5, 44, 45, 46-50, 104, 157-8, 160, 167, 259, 274, 288, 322-3; defined, 44; commit piracy, 44, 150-2, 177, 185-6, 198, 202, 212, 218; duties of, 44, 47, 50-1, 294-5; their skill, 44-5; becomes a shy people, 47, 323; help in state's recovery, 50-1, 100, 104; Dutch and, 51-2, 60, 177, 185-6, 198; Rulers exact vengeance through, 73; attack Jambi's shipping in wartime, 85, 92; absent during destruction of Johor Lama, 99; live on Riau, 150; remain with Abdul Jamil on Riau, 152; help to overthrow Abdul Jamil, 155, 160; do not want to leave Riau, 157, 288; provide most of Johor's seamen, 188; and murder of Sultan Mahmud, 189, 198, 202, 276, 287-8, 323; believe that Palembang's ruling house is successor of Malacca-Johor dynasty, 189, 195; Mas Anum's treachery towards, 202-3; desert to Kecil, 206, 256-7, 264, 271, 281, 288-9, 294, 313; oppose Bendahara dynasty, 210, 227, 242, 276, 295, 322; and Siamese threat, 213; stop Kecil from leaving Johor, 281; their services offered to Abdullah, 281; out of touch with dynasty, 285; no longer police Straits

- of Malacca, 285; welcome Kecil in Riau, 287; some of their leaders killed by Kecil, 287, 289, 294; source of Kecil's power, 287-8, 294, 306-7; Buginese realize their value, 294; dissension among, 294; informed by Sulaiman that Marewa is in his service, 302; help Sulaiman to flee from Riau, 304; Buginese want Kecil to hand over, 305; not part of Malay community, 312; some retire to Siak, 323.
- PADANG, MALAY PENINSULA**, 217, 281, 308.
- Padang, Sumatra**, 22, 111, 328-9; Padang Highlands, 75, 110-11, 329.
- Padang Tarab (Sungai Tarab)**, Sumatra, 111.
- Paduka Raja**, 43, 254-5, 274 (*see also* Abdul Jamil).
- Paduka Sri Dewa**, 231.
- Paduka Sri Maharaja**, 43.
- Pagar Ruyong kingdom, Sumatra**, 238, 286, 298; supports Kecil, 5, 109, 250-2, 253, 259-60, 261, 265, 267-8, 269, 271, 275, 287; belief in supernatural powers of rulers of, 109, 274, 276; has great influence over Minangkabaus, 111-12, 133, 270, 272; population of, 111; Hitam and, 131; and Jambi-Palembang dispute, 134; complains of Johor's pressure on Minangkabaus, 136; Dutch want friendship with, 141; dynastic dispute in, 149; friendly with Johor, 159; royal succession in, 268, 328-30; sends a ruler to west Malay Peninsula, 273, 322; Baginda Sultan Maharaja and, 289; asks Dutch to help Kecil, 302; matrilineal, 329-30.
- Pagar Ruyong, Yamtuan Sakti** of, 110, 131, 136, 260, 268-9, 284, 328-9 (*see also* Raja Alam).
- Pagoh, Johor**, 23.
- Pahang**, 47, 217; Aceh suzerain of, 22; Johor sends a ruler to, 25; Johor asks Dutch not to interfere in, 26; a part of the Malacca kingdom, 37; Johor recruits soldiers from islands near, 50; taken by Johor from Aceh, 60-1, 63, 64, 65, 149, 295; Johor's trade with, 62; Johor builds fortifications in, 67; Sultan Abdul Jalil a refugee in, 99, 107, 159; foreign ships forced by Johor to call at, 108; Sultan Abdul Jalil, dies in, 114; Ibrahim dies in, 138; Abdul Jamil and his family flee to, 155-6, 157; Dutch want to trade with, 172; given by Sultan Mahmud to his mother, 184; Tun Mahmud claims to rule, 211; Abdul Rahman a fugitive in, 279; Sultan Abdul Jalil flees to, 280, 285, 291, 292, 315; Sulaiman brought from, 293; Johor's royal family in, 315; Orang Kaya of Johor retires to, 322; soldiers from, 331.
- Pakadalian, Sultan**, 263.
- Palembang kingdom, Sumatra**, 120; and Johor, 25, 62-3, 87-8, 129-30, 132, 134, 227-8, 236, 237, 261; Parameswara in, 45-6; heir of Srivijaya kingdom and predecessor of Malacca, 45-6, 91, 94, 189, 195, 306, 312; pepper grown in, 132, 134, 143, 203, 261; Jambi likely to invade, 134-5; a threat to Riau, 135; Dutch trade in, 143, 145; after Sultan Mahmud's murder Orang Laut

- discuss settling in, 189, 276, 288; Sultan Mahmud's murder disturbs Sultan of, 190; Buginese in, 201; Kecil in, 260-1; princes reconciled with, 261, 275; Johor's treatment of Minangkabaus from, 270; Raja Tua of Johor retires to, 298; Dutch involved in the civil war in, 300, 318, allied with Buginese, 311.
- Palembang kingdom, Pangeran Dipati Anum of, 236, 240-1, 242, 249, 261-2, 275, 311.
- Pammana, Celebes, 229.
- Panai, Sumatra, 147, 180, 200.
- Panai River, 22, 24.
- Pancor, capital of Johor, 39, 199, 205, 206, 208, 212-13, 214, 254, 256.
- Pangeran Ratu, of Jambi, 84, 87-8, 89, 92, 96, 98, 99, 120-1.
- Panglima Buyong of Minangkabau, 255.
- Parameswara, 45-7, 49, 195.
- Parani, Daeng: visits Sultan Lumabang, 261; visits Kecil, 263; in service of Palembang prince, 275; Sulaiman asks help from, 293; commands Buginese garrison on Riau, 299; and Kedah, 301-3; death of, 303-4, 305, 309; attacks Riau, 317.
- Pariaman, west Sumatra, 136.
- Pasai, north Sumatra, 21, 22, 23.
- Pasir Sala, Siak, 143, 145, 325.
- Passes, for trade: Dutch, 40, 51, 55-6, 178; Portuguese, 55-6; Dutch insist on them for Johorese sailing north of Malacca, 61-2, 65; free passes to Coromandel, 70, 77; free passes for Johor's trade with China, 71; Johor refuses passes to Macassarese for Aceh, 73; Johor gets passes from Malacca to trade in distant areas, 76-7; Johor gives passes for Aceh, 115, 177; Johor passes for Sumatran trade, 129; Johor gets Dutch passes for east Java, 148, 171-2, 175; Dutch give Johor passes for Siak, 177; Buginese, 230, 307.
- Patani, 26, 60; traders from, 25, 62, 128; allied with Johor, 25; at war with Johor, 26; united with Johor by marriage, 35, 67-8; helps Portugal against Aceh, 35; opposed to Siam, 35; members of Johor's royal family murdered in, 68; refugees in Macassar from, 72; Johor's trade with, 76; Johor threatened by, 167, 170, 173, 180-1, 192; allied with Johor against Siam, 212.
- Patapahan, Sumatra: refuses to trade with Johor, 133, 178; acknowledges Johor as overlord, 146, 223; agrees to trade with Johor, 146; Dutch-Johorese trade rivalry over, 173-4, 177; at war with Kabon, 174, 177, 204; trades in tin with Dutch, 198; Johor bans Dutch trade with, 219, 220, 222-3, 224, 227; protests to Johor about tribute, 236; its trade hampered by Johor-Buginese war, 240; Dutch complain against Kecil over, 286.
- Patras, Abraham, 269.
- Patronage in trade, 38-40, 77.
- Pedir, north Sumatra, 22.
- Pedra Branko, Johor, 71.
- Pedro porco, trade in, 38, 52, 178.
- Penagie (Lower Linggi) River, 37, 61, 62, 150, 231, 233, 238.
- Penangkok, Nakhoda, 263.
- Pengujan Island, 292, 316.
- Penuba, Lingga Island, 25.
- Pepper: Malacca's trade in, 20; Aceh seizes centres of, 22;

- Johor's trade in, 38, 104, 128;
Dutch trade in, 96, 132, 150-1;
grown in Jambi, 96, 128, 150-1;
grown in Banjarmasin, 104;
Dutch-Johorese rivalry for, 111,
148; grown in Palembang, 132,
134, 148, 203, 261; Dutch
want monopoly for trade to
Aceh and China in, 168-9;
Chinese trade in, 177; gives
place to textiles in importance
with Dutch, 196; Tun Mah-
mud's monopoly in, 223.
- Perajun, Siak, 294.
- Perak, 60, 101; conquered by
Selangor, 19; Aceh overlord
of, 22, 64, 73; Malacca has
tin treaty with, 37; Johor's
trade with, 40, 76, 148, 179,
223; and Sultan Mahmud's
murder, 190; traders from, 199;
pirates in, 200.
- Perepat Seratus, Sumatra, 178,
179.
- Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor*,
3, 9-11, 17, 104, 156-7, 214,
286, 298, 308-9.
- Perpatch Berjajar, Tun, Benda-
hara of Bentan, 46.
- Phaulkon, Constant, 131, 161,
163.
- Phoosen, Bernard, Governor
of Malacca, 199, 203.
- Phra Khlang, official title in
Siam, 131, 161, 163-4.
- Phuket Island ('Junk Ceylon'),
106.
- Pikrama, Tun, of Muar, 154.
- Piracy: Johor gains wealth
through, 41; Orang Laut com-
mit, 44, 150-2, 177, 185-6,
198, 202, 212, 218; committed
by Aru, 64; in Straits of
Malacca after fall of Johor,
79, 321; Jambi's in wartime,
92, 93; distinction between
types of, 101; Jambi's (1687)
against Johor, 149; Dutch
think Laksamana of Johor
guilty of, 178; Sultan Mahmud
punishes, 182-3; Abdul Majid
promises to suppress, 200;
Siam plans to punish, 212,
216; committed by Kecil, 284,
310; committed by Buginese,
285, 290, 296, 312; Kedah
plans to suppress, 318.
- Pisang Island, 92.
- Pitt, Jacob Jorisz., Governor
of Malacca, 87, 89, 113, 115, 138.
- Pong, Encik, 258-9, 265.
- Porcelain, trade in, 38, 214.
- Portuguese, 35; capture Malacca
(1511), 3, 15, 20, 23, 26, 110;
lose Malacca to Dutch (1641),
3, 59, 66, 110, 115; attack
Johor (1535), 4; their ambi-
tions mostly for trade, 21-2,
23; at war with Johor, 22-4,
25, 26, 40, 48, 56, 86, 110;
sign treaty with Johor, 24;
their trade at Malacca, 25;
defeat Aceh, 25, 35; Dutch and
Johorese allied against, 26,
56, 59, 110, 115; their posses-
sions captured by Dutch, 30,
77-8; conquer Bantam, 48,
51; issue trade passes, 55, 56;
introduce treaties, 56; as
traders, 96, 108, 141, 148, 204,
222, 254-5, 256; asked by
Abdullah for help, 257, 274.
- Pott, Gerritt, 98.
- Preanger, the, Java, 197.
- Pringabaya, Pangeran, of Jambi,
262, 269.
- Pulau Bayan, Riau-Lingga, 155,
217 (see also Bayan Island).
- Pulau Buya, Orang Laut of, 44,
47.
- Pulau Gontong, Sumatra, 271,
282, 283, 284, 287, 289.
- Pulau Lada, Sumatra, 198.
- Pulau Langkawi, Kedah, 198.
- Pulau Laut, Borneo, 149.

- Pulau Tujuh, Orang Laut of, 44, 53
- Putih, Panglima, 292.
- Putri Jamilan, Baginda, Yang Dipertuan of Pagar Ruyong, 5, 250-1, 260, 262-3, 267-9, 270, 271; an hereditary title, 268, 331.
- RAFFLES, SIR STAMFORD, 111.
- Raja Alam, hereditary title in Pagar Ruyong, 252, 253, 262, 286, 330.
- Raja Indra Bongsu: as patron of trade, 39; in order of precedence, 208; with Johor royal family, 280, 286, 291, 315 (see also Mahmud, Tun).
- Raja Indra Muda, 43, 216, 227, 255.
- Raja Lela Putra, 216.
- Raja Muda, Buginese (Yang Dipertuan Muda), 6, 11, 293, 295, 312, 314, 322; Raja Muda family, 6, 10, 297-8, 321 (see also Ibrahim, Raja: Mahmud, Tun).
- Raja Negara Selat (title of Orang Laut leader), 256, 259, 264, 281, 288.
- Raja Sri Dewa, 252, 256.
- Raja Tua, Buginese, 11, 295-6, 297-8, 322; Raja Tua family, 10, 297-8, 317.
- Rakit Island, 155.
- Rantau areas, 110-11, 112, 124, 251, 262, 268, 272, 275, 328.
- Rattans, trade in, 38.
- Regicide, Malays' attitude to, 4, 8, 13, 15, 189-90, 270, 271, 288, 323 (see also *Derhaka*).
- Rekan, Raja, 18.
- Rembau, Negri Sembilan: Dutch try to prevent rivals' trade with, 61; a Johor possession, 63, 76, 109; punishment for murder of Dutchmen in, 66-7; Dutch friction with Minangkabaus in, 68-9, 96, 113; tin in, 68, 109, 198; no Dutch tolls on Johor's trade with, 76; Malacca's trade with, 109; slave-raids from, 168; rebellion (1706) against Johor in, 207, 210, 227; Buginese opposed by Minangkabaus in, 232, 233, 234; Minangkabau kingdom in, 272; Buginese and, 290; Kecil and, 310-11; soldiers from, 332.
- Riau, Bentan Island, 129, 138; and *adat* about deposition of Sultan, 7; conquered by Buginese, 19, 292-4, 298-9, 317, 322; an international entrepot, 38, 141, 147-9, 159; becomes Johor's capital, 38, 51, 104; military population of, 50, 331; trade built up at, 108, 151, 214; Dutch mission at, 114; Malacca's trade rivalry with, 128, 146-8, 184; Sultan Ibrahim leaves, 135, 138; and Sumatran trade, 146-7; Abdul Jamil driven from, 152-6; abandoned (1688), 166, 167; tolls at, 169; Tun Mahmud recommends that it again be the capital, 213-14, 241; Orang Kaya oppose move to, 213, 215-16, 217-18; Siamese threat to, 217-18; Dutch trade negotiations in, 221-5; decline in trade of, 223, 241; Palembang refugees invited to settle in, 236, 249, 261; Palembang refugees leave, 241; Sultan leaves (1716), 241; abandoned (1719), 285; trade important for, 287; Kecil rules in, 287-9; Kecil wants Abdul Jalil in, 287, 291-2; first battle (1721) of, 292, 296, 298, 301, 306-7, 317; threatened by Terengganu and Siak, 297; Dutch consider

- possibility of taking, 301; Sulaiman flees from, 304; Kecil's attacks on, 308; Kecil's victory in second battle (1727) at, 308-10, 311; Buginese win third and fourth (1728) and fifth (1735) battles at, 311.
- Riau histories in Johor, 6, 9-10, 11.
- Riau-Lingga archipelago, 25, 37, 44, 47, 53, 213, 272, 288.
- Riau River, 148, 222, 236, 292, 293, 306, 310.
- Rice: trade in, 25, 38, 108, 138, 147, 198; Dutch protect Johor's 'rice-bowls', 129; Johor's ban on export of, 217.
- Rilakka, Daeng, 318.
- Rio Formosa (Batu Pahat River), 37, 108, 129, 153, 217, 331.
- Rokan River, 82.
- Rokan, Sumatra, 37, 59, 106, 109, 200, 203.
- Rooselaer, Pieter, Governor of Malacca (1707-10), 211.
- Rosdom, Lieutenant Jan, 140, 143.
- Rulers of Johor: wanderings of, 3, 23, 40; kingdom's safety depends on presence of, 12, 40-1, 99, 104, 285, 312; Orang Laut loyal to, 24-5, 44, 45, 46-50, 104, 157-8, 160, 167, 259, 274, 288, 322-3; not concerned with details of government, 41-3; subjects' ideal attitude to, 41, 271, 294; trade privileges of 56, 58, 70-1, 73, 204; drum and pipes mark presence of, 92, 153, 158; Chief Ministers and, 158, 166, 181, 313; ministers cannot harm minor's privileges, 169, 171, 175-6, 205; deposition of, 187, 194; divine right of, 189-90; deterioration in position of, 190-1, 294, 312-13; Buginese and, 229.
- SALT, TRADE IN, 38, 138, 140, 147, 148, 178, 223.
- Sandalwood, trade in, 267.
- Sapurjaba, minangkabau sword, 262-3, 264, 268.
- Sawerigading, Buginese mythical hero, 318.
- Schagen, Governor of Malacca (1685-6), 145.
- Sea-slugs, trade in, 44.
- Sea-weed (*agar-agar*: *sangu*), trade in, 44, 47.
- Sebabui, Siak, 294.
- Seberang, Raja (Raja Abdullah: Sultan Hammat Syah), 24, 34-5, 53, 140.
- Sedebebe, 39, 199, 200, 208.
- Sedili, Johor, 149, 254.
- Sejarah Bugis*, 8, 19, 278.
- Sejarah Melayu*, 4, 11, 15, 17-18, 41, 42, 45, 48, 49, 103, 188, 190, 195; another name for *Siak Chronicles*, 49, 54, 194.
- Sejarah Raja2 Riau*, 265.
- Sekam, Orang Laut leader, 93, 105.
- Sekanna, Orang Laut of, 47.
- Selangor, 302; conquers Perak, 19; and tin, 37, 69, 114, 198, 204, 223, 239, 242, 284; visited by Tun Mahmud, 43, 216-17, 218; Dutch are refused free trade in, 140, 142, 171; Johor's monopoly in, 180; piracy to be suppressed in, 183, 200; Buginese in, 200-1, 202, 218, 229, 230-1, 238, 247, 285, 290, 299, 301, 304, 312, 321, 323; rebels (1702) against Johor, 202, 210, 227; conquered by Buginese, 239-40, 242; Johor offer to let Buginese keep, 252; Palembang prince visits, 311; soldiers from, 332.
- Seluyut, Johor, 280.
- Semarang, Java, 197.
- Sembulun, Siak, 294.

- Semibo, Siak, 294.
 Sempurna, Raja, 141.
 Senggeran (Bengkalis), 294.
 Serlang River, 91.
Siak Chronicles, 1, 4-5, 6, 7-9, 10-11, 17, 49, 186, 258, 262, 265, 266, 268, 272, 278, 280-1, 291, 302-3, 309-10; another name for *Sejarah Melayu*, 49, 54, 194.
 Siak kingdom, Sumatra, 132, 152, 154, 178, 296; Dutch attitude to, 1; Kecil founds a dynasty in, 4, 272; Minangkabaus in, 17, 131; belongs to Aceh, 22; allied with Johor against Aceh, 25; a part of Malacca kingdom, 37; Johor's trade with, 39, 176; a possession of Johor, 69, 136, 143, 145, 225, 306; tin in, 104, 105-6, 204, 223, 239; Dutch-Johorese trade rivalry in, 106, 137, 145-6, 168, 173-4, 177; Dutch trade in, 143, 145; Johor restricts Dutch trade in, 143, 145-6, 214-15, 221-4, 225, 226-7; Dutch trade lodge abandoned in, 204, 214; rebels (1705) against Johor, 227; Kecil's early days in, 262, 263; Kecil's base in, 279, 281-2, 285, 288, 301, 302, 305, 307, 323; Buginese send embassy to, 282; some Orang Laut migrate to, 294, 306, 323; threatens Riau, 297; Kecil asks Dutch to defend, 299; battle in, 307-8; Palembang prince visits, 311; Johor's royal family taken as prisoners to, 315.
 Siak River, 73, 113, 268, 305, 332; a part of Johor kingdom, 37, 250; soldiers from, 50; restored to Johor by Aceh, 82; tin trade on, 105, 108; Johor's conditions for Dutch trade on, 114, 115, 143, 145, 219, 220, 221-3, 225, 227; rebellion (1682) on, 131; Johor uses intimidation against traders on, 136, 219; Dutch do not enforce treaty rights on, 177; Laksamana of Johor visits, 178; battle on, 282; Orang Laut of, 294; Sulaiman demands trade duties on, 306.
 Siam, 133; traders from, 25, 128, 149, 223; Johor's trade with, 62, 163; overlord of Patani, 67; Orang Laut take revenge for ill-treatment by, 73; foreign traders and, 108, 130, 207; offers help to rebuild Johor, 130, 166; Jambi subordinate to, 134, 164; warns Dutch not to harass Johor, 146; friendly with Johor, 148, 164; supports Johor against Jambi, 159; Dutch treaty with, 163; threatens Johor, 212-14, 215-16, 227; and Terengganu, 215, 216-18.
 Siantan, Anambas Islands, 149, 229, 241, 260, 261, 304, 308.
 Siguntang, Mount, Palembang, 274, 312 (*see also* Bukit Siguntang).
 Silk, trade in, 38, 168, 177, 220.
Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis, 8, 18, 19, 229, 317.
Silsilah Raja Bugis, 278.
 Singapore, Straits of, 37, 51, 154, 217, 222, 256, 259.
 Singapore Island, 37, 44, 46, 50, 99, 138, 153, 259, 288.
 Singgara, Orang Laut of, 47.
Sirih (betel-nut), 59, 92, 143, 206; described, 79, 163.
 Six, Willem, Governor of Malacca (1710-11), 219.
 Slaves, 98; African, 52; return of runaway, 62, 140, 142, 144, 168-9, 182-3, 185, 205-6; return of stolen, 68; slave-raids, 92, 168; Aceh's trade in, 128,

- 150; freeing of, 268; Tun Mahmud uses Minangkabau women as, 270; sent by Buginese as tribute to Bone, 291, 301; sent by Buginese as gift to Aceh, 299.
- Slicher, Thomas, Governor of Malacca (1687-91), 38, 150-1, 167; (cited), 147-8.
- Soppeng kingdom, Celebes, 117, 118-19, 229-30.
- Sore, Haji, 292.
- Sovereignty: 'where there is sovereignty, there is gold', 41; Johor sensitive about, 62, 74-5, 221, 225; Johor disregards Jambi's, 85; only Ruler can dispose of, 171, 176; dependent on trade, 184; supernatural powers of, 266; 'may sovereignty increase sovereignty', 295; defined, 313 (*see also* *Daulat*).
- Spain: Netherlands' trade with, 27-8, 197; Dutch drive Spaniards from north Taiwan, 30; Dutch undertake to protect Johor from, 63; traders from, 72, 74; at war with Netherlands, 181, 216, 224.
- Spanish America, Dutch trade with, 197.
- Spanish rials, 48, 61, 74, 104, 155, 177, 212.
- Spanish Succession, War of the (1700-13), 196.
- Specie, 152; payment in, 38; trade in, 106, 140, 143, 168.
- Speelman, Cornelis, Governor-General (1681-4), 139, 224.
- Spiauter, trade in, 38, 52, 169, 177.
- Spices: Portuguese want monopoly in, 20, 55; Dutch want monopoly in, 29, 30, 72, 78; Anglo-Dutch rivalry over, 35; Dutch trade with Europe in, 106; Buginese-Macassarese trade at Riau in, 223.
- Sri Amar di Raja of Johor, a son of Abdul Jamil as, 141, 155.
- Sri Amar Wangsa of Johor, 154, 155.
- Sri Bija di Raja of Johor: (1710), 43, 216; (1673), 99; a son of Abdul Jamil as, 141, 147, 154, 155-7; (1669), 187.
- Sri Bija Wangsa of Johor: (1699), 4, 187-91; one of the important Orang Kaya, 43; (1691), 174; (1718), 188, 254, 255, 256, 266, 274; (1707), 210; (1710), 216; (1715), 231, 234; (1721), 291.
- Sri Dewa of Johor, 256; Sri Dewa Muda, 174.
- Sri Lela Raja of Johor, 227.
- Sri Mahawangsa of Johor, one of the important Orang Kaya, 43.
- Sri Menanti, Negri Sembilan, 311.
- Sri Nara di Raja of Johor: one of the important Orang Kaya, 43; a son of Abdul Jamil as, 141, 155; the Laksamana's son as (1706-15), 207, 216, 222, 226, 234, 253, 274.
- Sri Nara Mentri of Johor: one of the important Orang Kaya, 43.
- Sri Perdana Mentri of Johor: a son of Abdul Jamil as, 141, 147, 154-5; (1689), 169.
- Sri Pikrama Raja of Johor: one of the important Orang Kaya, 43; (1693), 178, 193; (1714), 227.
- Sri Setia of Johor: one of the important Orang Kaya, 43; (1718), 253.
- Srivijaya kingdom, 48; Orang Laut of, 45-6, 51; Malacca heir to, 49, 94; trade important to, 57, 91; formerly kept the peace in Straits of Malacca, 321.

- Steen, Abraham, 73.
- Sukadana, south Sumatra, 122.
- Sulaiman, Raja, later Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah, Sultan of Johor (1722-60), 251; *Peringatan* and, 9-10; helped by Buginese in struggle to regain Johor, 247; captured by Kecil, 280; becomes Sultan, 292-4, 295, 296, 298; hates Kecil, 293; appeals to Buginese, 293; used by Buginese, 294, 296, 323; not accepted by many Orang Laut, 295, 323; has to rely on Buginese, 295, 296, 300, 306, 312, 323; installs Marewa and Manompok in office, 295-6, 298; helps Buginese forces, 301; thanks Buginese leaders, 302; flees from Riau, 304-5; goes to Kecil with Buginese, 305; as overlord of Siak, 306; retains Riau, 308, 311; present at attack on Riau, 317; loses Malays' loyalty, 322.
- Sumatra, east coast of: Dutch on, 1, 12; Pagar Ruyong's influence on, 5, 111, 112, 268; Johor's raids on, 10, 96; Minangkabaus on, 16, 112, 269, 272, 322, 323; Buginese on, 16; Orang Laut on, 44; piracy on, 92; Johor's possessions on, 103, 110; overlordship of Dutch or Malay states on, 110; Aceh's control over, 110; Johor restricts Dutch trade on, 142, 204, 219; Johor's trade with, 146-7, 174, 178; Kecil and, 268, 270.
- Sumatra, west coast: Aceh's power on, 22, 110; under Dutch control, 76; Dutch victory over Aceh increases Minangkabaus' opportunities on, 111-12; Kecil and, 261; Putri Jamilan's influence over, 268; separate Minangkabau groups in, 272.
- Sumatra storm-wind, 282, 315.
- Sumbawa Island, 120, 297.
- Sungai Ujong, Negri Sembilan: Johor controls tin of, 69; accepts Raja Ibrahim as ruler, 109-10; Dutch want trade monopoly in, 140; Johor refuses Dutch free trade in, 142, 171; Bendahara's passes allow ships to trade toll-free with, 180; battle in, 233; offered to Buginese, 252; frightened of Buginese, 285; soldiers from, 332.
- Sunting, Panglima, 150.
- Surabaya, Java, 318.
- Suruasso, Sumatra, 111, 268, 276, 328-30.
- Suzerainty, rights of, 232.
- Syahbandars: Dutch, in Malacca, 13, 14, 66, 73, 91, 175, 199, 201; Johorese, in Siak, 82, 108, 168, 206, 222, 311; Johorese, in Bengkalis, 109, 112, 114, 132, 137-8, 146, 154, 222; of Kelang, 113; of Indragiri, 167.
- Syahbandars of Johor: (1718), 14; (1662), 74; (1699), 183-4, 194; (1706), 207; (1710), 216; (1713), 224, 279-80 (*see also* Abdul Rahman).
- TAHIL, ENCIK, son of Abdul Jamil, 156, 157.
- Talele, Daeng, 119.
- Tallo, kingdom, Celebes, 230.
- Tambelan Island, Borneo, 25, 35, 149.
- Tambus, Orang Laut of, 47.
- Tampin, Negri Sembilan, 66-7, 311.
- Tanjung Jati, Sumatra, 154, 178, 179.
- Tapong Kiri River, 222-3.
- Tavares, Captain, 254, 256, 258, 267, 274.
- Tea, 196.

- Temasek (Singapore), 46.
 Temenggongs of Johor: (1687), 43; (1671), 93; murdered by Abdul Jamil (1683), 133, 141, 162; a son of Abdul Jamil, 141, 142, 155, 170; (1699), 187; (1718), 253, 254-5, 274.
 Temmer, Captain Hendrick, 132, 134.
 Tengah, Tengku, 280.
 Tengajun, Siak, 294.
 Terengganu state, 47, 149, 152; a part of Malacca kingdom, 37; a possession of Johor, 148, 215; traders from, 148; Abdul Jamil killed in, 155, 157; Abdul Majid intends to meet Patanese threat in, 170; Siam and, 215-18; Abdul Jalil a fugitive in, 280, 283, 285-6, 315; Kecil sends embassy to, 287; Orang Laut do not want to go to, 288; Abdul Jalil leaves, 291; threatens Riau, 297; Johor Orang Kaya retire to, 322; soldiers from, 331.
 Ternate Island, Moluccas, 318.
The Supply, S.S., 69.
 Thyssen, Jan, Governor of Malacca (1647-62), 71, 73, 75.
 Tikos, west Sumatra, 136.
 Tima, Tun, 165.
 Timiang, Orang Laut of, 44, 47.
 Tin: for Malacca kingdom, 20, 37; payment made in, 38; Johor's control of, 69, 76; in Siak, 69, 143, 146-7, 169, 177, 178, 204, 239; in Selangor, 69, 204, 239, 284; in Kelang, 69, 73-4, 114, 204; in Sungai Ujong, 69, 73-4; world demand for, 73; in Rembau, 73-4, 204; in Perak, 76; Dutch-Johorese rivalry over, 104, 105-7, 108, 111, 114, 144-5, 179, 203, 204; European demand for, 106; Dutch want monopoly in, 106, 168-9; use-ful as a commodity for trade, 108, 239; Malacca's trade in, 144, 179, 198, 204, 284; Riau's trade in, 147, 148; Johor's dispute with Buginese over, 231; used as currency, 231, 247; Buginese control supply of, 239; Buginese sell to Dutch, 242, 300.
 to Assa, 292.
 to Campo, 201-2.
 to Esang, Ruler of Soppeng, 230.
 Tolls: at Malacca, 61-2, 69, 95, 105, 128, 137, 204, 226; Dutch often grant Johor exemption from, 62, 65, 70, 71, 75, 76, 140, 179, 180, 219; Johorese in Siak, 146, 219, 222, 223-4; at Riau, 169; Danish and Chinese traders by bribing Johorese officials avoid paying, 180; Johor's special plea for exemption from Dutch, 253.
 to Manurung, 117.
 to Mingo, Punggawa, 201-2.
 to Passarai, 305, 311, 312, 321.
 Toraja, Celebes, 119.
 to Sappewali, Sultan of Bone, 290-1.
 to Talip, 292, 299.
 Trade: Malacca's importance for, 20; international, 20, 22, 26, 38, 40, 42, 45, 51, 58, 69, 73, 85, 92, 104, 108, 131, 159, 173, 184, 185, 205, 312; Portuguese, 20-2, 23, 25, 59; free, 32, 56, 57, 142, 221; English, 35, 69-70; Chinese, 42, 51, 71-2, 74, 110; at Palembang, 45; in Straits of Malacca, 51, 287; with West Indies, 52; with Africa, 52; free, 57, 137; Indian, 69-71, 72, 110; world trade, 73; between India and China, 75; power and prestige based on, 91, 97, 287; attacks on, 91, 92-3, 96; Minangkabau's, 111-12, 270; Acehnese,

- 128; Siamese, 131, 163; in Siak, 177; Kecil and, 286, 287; Buginese, 309; disrupted by piracy, 321 (*see also* Cloth: Monopoly: Passes: Tin).
- Trade, Dutch: Dutch-Johorese rivalry, 13-14, 33, 39, 52, 65, 75, 105-7, 108, 111, 133, 139, 160, 168, 173-4, 176-7, 179-81, 185, 198, 203-5, 234, 237; essential for Netherlands, 27-8, 31; Dutch East India Co.'s policy on, 29-30, 32, 52, 55, 58; Dutch vacillate between free trade and monopoly, 32; Malacca important for, 32; decreases at Malacca, 33, 75; Johor delays decision on, 60; Maetsuycker and, 78; war a threat to, 87, 91, 92; with India, 106; restricted by Johor in Siak, 114-15, 136, 140, 145-6, 221-4, 225, 226-7; spoilt by high Dutch tolls, 128, 137, 204; in west Malay Peninsula, 171; in Pahang, 172; fall in importance of, 196-7; Kecil promises to promote, 284.
- Trade, Johorese: Dutch competition with, 13-14, 33, 39, 52, 65, 75, 105-7, 108, 111, 133, 139, 160, 168, 173-4, 176-7, 178-9, 185, 198, 203-5, 234, 237; the lifeblood of the state, 27; international, 38, 58, 67, 69, 73, 104, 108, 131, 159, 173, 184, 185, 205, 312; prospers, 38-40, 69-73, 75, 110, 136, 176, 181, 227; patronage and, 38-40, 76; with Aceh, 39-40, 76, 115, 128, 144, 147, 148, 168; with China, 39, 71-2, 75-6, 110, 148-9, 176, 177, 180, 184, 204, 214; brings wealth and prestige, 40-1, 42, 43, 52; protected, 43, 50; helped by harassment of rivals, 50-1, 203, 219; benefits from Dutch 'pass' system, 56, 58, 65, 76-7, 115; survives against Portuguese and Aceh, 56; benefits from favourable rules, 57; banned with Portuguese Malacca, 59; under agreement (1642) with Dutch, 61-2; with Java, 62, 148, 171, 172, 175; basis of Abdul Jamil's power, 144; declines and recovers, 198-9; Tun Mahmud and, 219.
- Tranquebare, India, 149, 194, 198.
- Treaties: Dutch East India Co. can make, 29; Malacca kingdom gains tin through, 37; introduced into Malayo-Indonesian archipelago by Portuguese, 56; discrepancies in copies of, 65-6, 80, 142, 163; Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824), 94, 321.
- Treaties between Dutch and Johor, 94; about east coast of Sumatra, 1; Johor refuses to sign (1688), 12; (1639-42), 56, 61-2, 65-6, 75, 95, 97, 102, 136; (1685), 77, 140, 141-5, 151, 167-9, 324-6; (1689), 77, 80, 167-70, 171, 180, 205, 214-15, 220, 221, 326-7; (1713), 77, 228, 235-6, 327-8; (1606), 140, 143.
- Treaty system, Dutch: Dutch attitude to, 1, 13, 170, 221, 226; Johor's attitude to, 52, 55-8, 65-6, 69, 75, 76, 78, 137, 170, 173; Palembang treaty, 63; treaties (1676) with Siak states, 107, 174; treaty (1689) with Siam, 163; treaty (1705) with Mataram, 197.
- Trong, Orang Laut of, 47.
- Trunajaya, Java, 115.
- Tuan Pikrama of Johor, one of the important Orang Kaya, 43.
- Tuhfat al-Nafis*, 1, 5-9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 100, 126, 254, 265, 266, 280-1, 291, 293, 295-6, 297-8, 301, 304, 308-9, 316.

- Tunang, Encik, 152-3.
 Tungkal, Sumatra, 25, 84, 90.
 Tun Lela Putra of Johor, one of the important Orang Kaya, 43.
 Tun Pikrama of Muar, 153, 154.
 Tun Talanai, a title in Bentan, 45.
 Turtle-shell, trade in, 44.
- UJONG SALANG ISLAND ('Junk Ceylon': Phuket), 147.
 Ungaran Island, 37, 68, 307.
 United Dutch East India Co. (VOC), 62; records of, 1, 12, 14-15, 26; formed (1602), 29; policies of, 29-32, 52, 55, 77, 128, 139-40; its trade in the Straits of Malacca, 58; and friendship with Johor, 78-9, 148; agrees to arbitrate between Johor and Jambi, 90; and tin, 106; Abdul Jamil hostile to trade of, 133; and trade in Palembang, 134; and trade on Siak River, 145, 169, 214-15, 220, 226-7; makes treaty (1689) with Siam, 163; and monopoly trade, 172; forbids attacks on Johorese ships, 179; changes to cash crops, 196-7; and Johor-Buginese war, 233-4 (*see also* Batavia, Dutch Colonial government in).
 Ussi, Panglima, 203.
- VALENTYN, WILLEM, 148-50.
 van de Beke, Francois, 140, 143, 168-9, 175.
 van der Lely, Willem, 199-200.
 van de Lijn, Cornelis, Governor-General (1645-50), 69.
 van der Toorn, J. L. (cited), 268, 277.
 van Diemen, Antonio, Governor-General (1636-45), 27, 30-1, 62, 64, 65, 66, 77, 79, 139; (cited), 26, 35, 36.
 van Gent, Hendrik, 62.
 van Gistelen, Valerius, 68.
 van Goens, Rykloff, Governor-General (1678-81), 114, 139.
 van Hoorn, Govert, Governor of Malacca, 184, 185, 197, 199.
 van Qualbergen, E. Cornelis, Governor of Malacca (1681-5), 184.
 van Riebeeck, Abraham, Governor-General, 226.
 van Suchtelen, Harmanus, Governor of Malacca (1717-27), 281, 283, 299, 309.
 van Thiye, Ysaacq, Governor of Macassar, 317.
 van Twist, Governor of Malacca, 61.
 van Vliet, Jeremias, Governor of Malacca, 63, 66, 68.
Vautoir, French ship, 130.
 Venetian traders, 20.
 Verhoeven, Admiral, 34.
 Victorszoon, Ensign Victor, 199-200.
 Vlaming van Oudthoorn, Arnold de, 68.
 Vosburgh, Gelmer, Governor of Malacca, 176, 179.
 Vries, Captain de, 66-7, 68.
- WAJO, CELEBES, 119, 312, 320.
 Weylant, Adrian, 92-3, 95-7.
 Wilkinson, R. J. (cited), 49, 195, 248, 274, 275, 276, 277.
 Winstedt, Sir Richard (cited), 2-3, 17, 18, 24, 34, 35, 53, 70, 81, 162, 244, 248, 267.
 Wylde, Philip, 69-70.
- YAHYA, ENCIK, 303.
 Yang Dipertuan Muda (Raja Muda), Buginese take over post of, 295-6, 314.
 Yusuf, Encik, 231, 233.
 Yusuf, Sheikh, 120.
- ZEELAND, HOLLAND, 29.